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This thesis presents the development and application of methods to assess 
cognitive markers of emotion and psychological wellbeing in a species of non-
human primate, the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta). In humans, vulnerability 
to emotional disorders such as anxiety and depression is characterized by 
particular cognitive profiles, known as cognitive biases. For example, anxious 
people automatically attend to threat-relevant information, interpret ambiguous 
information negatively, and have negative expectations of future events. In this 
thesis, I first describe two treatments that were used prior to cognitive testing to 
induce positive and negative shifts in inferred affective state in the monkeys 
(enrichment and a health-check, respectively) and discuss the impact of these 
treatments on the monkeys’ behaviour and physiology (Chapters 2 and 3). In the 
first cognitive study (Chapter 4), I present a method that uses eye-gaze to assess 
the extent to which threatening (versus non-threatening) stimuli capture visual 
spatial attention when two stimuli are presented at different locations. In the 
second study (Chapter 5), I present a simple operant touch-screen task to assess 
the extent to which a threatening distractor stimulus captures attention and impairs 
performance on an ongoing task when presented at the same location as the task-
relevant stimulus. In the third study (Chapter 6), I present a Go/NoGo touch-
screen task to assess judgements about the reward value of ambiguous stimuli. In 
all of these studies, the two treatments led to different cognitive profiles in the 
monkeys. Monkeys showed a) automatic capture of attention by threatening 
stimuli, which was followed by avoidance following the health-check, but not 
Post-enrichment; b) impaired task performance when a threatening distractor 
stimulus was presented Post-health-check, and improved performance on these 
 iii
trials Post-enrichment; and c) a more negative judgement about the reward value 
of ambiguous stimuli Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment. I discuss these 
cognitive biases in light of available data from humans, and recent work with non-
human animals. These data indicate that furthering our understanding of primate 
and other animal psychological wellbeing, may be achieved through the 
development of measures of cognitive bias, such as those presented here. 
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Accurate assessment of emotion states and psychological wellbeing is a central 
goal of animal welfare research (Dawkins, 1990; Mendl & Paul, 2004). Emotions 
are widely accepted as componential phenomena which evolved due to their 
survival function (LeDoux, 1996; Damasio, 2000; Rolls, 2000). They comprise, 
broadly, physical (behavioural, physiological) and psychological (cognitive and 
subjective) components. For humans, methods exist to measure each of these 
components, and it is the study of the cognitive and subjective components that is 
considered central to understanding and improving human psychological 
wellbeing (Gray, 1971; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002).  
 
In non-human animals (from herein animals), welfare has been assessed using 
behavioural and physiological measures, i.e. the ‘non-psychological’ components 
of emotion. The subjective component of animal emotions is not accessible, 
however the cognitive component is. Developing cognitive measures of emotion 
in animals, it has been argued, will increase the accuracy of our assessment of 
animal emotions and provide critical measures of animal psychological wellbeing 
(Harding et al., 2004; Paul et al., 2005). 
 
In humans, emotional disorders such as anxiety and depression are characterized 
by specific cognitive profiles (Eysenck et al., 2006); these profiles are known as 
cognitive biases. Cognitive tests have revealed emotion-congruent cognitive 
biases in the way people attend to, interpret and recall information about the world 
(Eysenck, 1992; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). For example, anxiety is characterized by 
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preferential attention to threat-relevant information, negative interpretation of 
ambiguous information and negative expectations of future events (Mathews et 
al., 1989b; Richards et al., 2002; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Depression is 
characterized by the preferential recall of negative events from the past and 
expectation of a greater number of negative, and fewer positive, events in the 
future (Haas & Canli, 2008; Strunk & Adler, 2009). Optimistic individuals, by 
contrast, show a bias to expect a greater number of positive future events 
(Schweizer & Schneider, 1997; Cummins & Nistico, 2002). Many of the methods 
used to examine cognitive biases in humans are suitable for modification for use 
with animals due to their independence from assumptions of awareness (cognitive 
biases have been demonstrated for subliminally-presented stimuli: Öhman et al., 
2000) and non-reliance on verbal report (many methods use button-press 
responses: Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
 
In the first study of its kind, Harding et al. (2004) adapted methods used to 
measure cognitive bias in humans for use with rats. These authors trained rats on 
an operant Go-NoGo lever-press task using two auditory tones, one high-pitched 
(4kHz) and one low pitched (2kHz). One tone signaled reward, and required a 
lever press (‘Go’ response) to gain that reward. The other tone signaled 
punishment, and required not pressing the lever (‘NoGo’ response) to avoid the 
punishment (a burst of white noise). Half of the rats were then housed in 
unpredictable housing, and half in normal housing; these housing conditions were 
assumed to induce higher and lower levels of stress in the rats, respectively. Rats 
were then presented with experimental trials in which presentations of the two 
training tones were randomly interspersed with presentations of three ambiguous 
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tones intermediate in frequency to the two training tones (2.5, 3 and 3.5 kHz). 
Proportion and latency of lever presses were recorded. Rats in unpredictable 
housing were slower to press the lever following ambiguous tones than were rats 
in predictable housing, suggesting that when under environmental stress rats 
judged the ambiguous tones more negatively than did their ‘non-stressed’ 
counterparts. These results are comparable to the negative expectations of 
outcomes, and judgements about ambiguous information, that anxious people 
make compared with non-anxious individuals (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Richards 
et al., 2002). 
 
Since Harding et al. (2004), further research has adapted the original method and 
demonstrated cognitive bias in starlings (Bateson & Matheson, 2007) and dogs 
(Casey et al., 2008). These studies suggest that cognitive methods may be 
developed to assess psychological wellbeing in a range of taxonomic groups. In 
this thesis I review these recently developed cognitive methods for use with an, as 
yet, limited range of animals, and discuss their implications in light of more 
established methods for studying psychological wellbeing in humans. This sets 
the context for the studies presented in this thesis, the primary aims of which are 
a) to present the first development of methods to study the cognitive component 
of emotion in a species of non-human primate (from herein primate), based on the 
original work of Harding et al. (2004); and b) to extend this research by 
developing novel paradigms for investigating other aspects of the cognitive 
component of emotion in primates. In the rest of this Introduction chapter I 
present the arguments for the development of such methods. 
 
 5 
1.1 Accurate assessment of emotions is a central goal of animal 
welfare research 
The assumption that animals experience emotions, and may therefore suffer 
distress, lies at the core of animal welfare research (Dawkins, 1990 and 2006b; 
Mendl, 2001; Harding et al., 2004). The study of animal emotions has, however, 
been hampered by argument over the validity of emotions as subjects for scientific 
research. This is due in large part to the consideration of emotions as 
unobservable subjective states not suited to scientific study (Fraser, 2009). 
Increasing public concern for animal welfare has resulted in government-funded 
research directives to address this issue. For example, the UK government-
commissioned Brambell report in 1965 led to the establishment of the ‘five 
freedoms’ of animal welfare: 1) freedom from thirst and hunger; 2) freedom from 
discomfort; 3) freedom from pain, injury and disease; 4) freedom to express 
normal behaviour; and 5) freedom from fear and distress (FAWC, 2009). These 
freedoms have been adopted globally as welfare markers for captive farm, 
laboratory and zoo animals (Veissier et al., 2008). One category of captive 
animals which are found widely in laboratory and zoo settings and for which 
particular welfare concerns have been voiced are the non-human primates (Rennie 
& Buchanan-Smith, 2006; NC3Rs, 2009). 
 
Dedicated committees for improving the welfare of primates in captivity are found 
in a number of scientific societies (including the American Society of 
Primatologists, Animals Procedures Committee, Animal Welfare Institute, 
Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour, Association of Primate 
Veterinarians, The Boyd Group, European Federation for Primatology, European 
Marmoset Research Group, International Primatological Society, Laboratory 
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Animals Ltd, National Centre for the Replacement, Refinement and Reduction of 
Animals in Research, and the Primate Society of Great Britain). The National 
Centre for the Replacement, Refinement and Reduction of Animals in Research 
(NC3Rs) states that the use of primates in research is ‘of particular 
concern…since, in the case of these animals, the potential for suffering is 
compounded because of their highly developed cognitive abilities and the inherent 
difficulties in meeting their complex social, behavioural and psychological needs 
in a laboratory environment’ (NC3Rs, 2009). The recognition that the welfare of 
primates requires dedicated attention, and that all animals should be allowed the 
fifth freedom - freedom from fear and distress - provides a strong case for the 
study of primate psychological wellbeing. To enable this requires development of 
methods allowing accurate assessment of the psychological (cognitive) component 
of emotions in these animals. 
 
Work in animal welfare has relied on a range of measures to assess wellbeing. 
Behavioural indicators of emotion typically focus on species-typical ‘positive’ 
behaviours and stereotypical or abnormal ‘negative’ behaviours (Novak, 2003; 
Clubb & Mason, 2004; Dawkins, 2004; Balcombe, 2009). Physiological measures 
such as changes in circulating corticosteroid hormones have been widely used as 
indicators of stress and anxiety in animals (Sapolsky et al., 2000; Shutt et al., 
2007), but are typically limited in explanatory power since they reflect emotional 
arousal and do not provide information about valence (Dawkins, 2006b).  
 
One problem with the use of behavioural and physiological measures is that 
behavioural indicators of emotion may become dissociated from physiological 
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indicators of emotion (Higham et al., In Press). For example, four personality 
dimensions have been identified in rhesus macaques on the basis of behaviour: 
sociability, confidence, equability and excitability (Capitanio, 1999). Monkeys 
who engage in high levels of behaviours associated with excitability and high 
confidence demonstrate specific cortisol profiles. However, monkeys who engage 
in high levels of behaviours associated with sociability and equability have 
cortisol profiles indistinguishable from those of monkeys who have low scores for 
these traits (Capitanio et al., 2004).  
 
Ruys et al. (2004) measured the blood plasma cortisol levels of rhesus macaques 
undergoing chair restraint training on each of six consecutive days. Monkeys 
showed a decline in both behavioural agitation and circulating cortisol levels over 
the course of the six days of restraint. These responses may be interpreted as both 
psychological and physiological habituation to chair restraint. However, a follow-
up session conducted six months post-training revealed that while monkeys 
continued to show no behavioural agitation to chair restraint, the cortisol response 
had returned to initial levels. The authors interpreted these results as evidence that 
behaviour may be an unreliable indicator of underlying physiological (and 
psychological) processes. The reduced cortisol response to chair restraint over the 
six successive training sessions reflected physiological adaptation to sustained 
high levels of circulating cortisol during training (Ruys et al., 2004). The negative 
feedback loop created by sustained high levels of cortisol is the mechanism by 
which chronic exposure to stress may lead to abnormal hormonal profiles, such as 
the low cortisol levels seen in hypocortisolism in both humans and animals (Fries 
et al., 2005). 
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In addition to traditional behavioural and physiological measures, some 
researchers have used experimental approaches, such as choice tests, to address 
issues of captive animal welfare. Experimental paradigms that test motivation to 
perform behaviours or access resources under different conditions (e.g. Mason et 
al., 2001), provide means of determining what animals ‘want’, which is, according 
to Dawkins (2004), a key concern in animal welfare. Motivation to perform a 
behaviour may be an indicator of the rewarding value access to a particular 
resource confers (Dawkins, 1990; Mason et al., 2001). Whether choice tests 
provide a measure of true reward value or simply reflect a contrast effect is 
unclear. Hence behavioural indicators of motivation and emotion in the laboratory 
must be interpreted in light of ethological data (Dawkins, 2004). In addition, 
species differences in the nature of the stress response, makes generalizing results 
between species difficult (Mason & Mendl, 1997; Clubb & Mason, 2004). 
Nevertheless, choice tests and other paradigms that allow consideration of the 
economics of behavioural decisions, provide a valuable means of assessing 
changes in specific behaviours in response to particular experimental 
manipulations. 
 
Some animal welfare researchers argue for an a priori assumption that animals are 
sentient beings with awareness of their own emotional states, and therefore have 
the capacity to suffer (Wemelsfelder, 1993 and 1997; Goodall, 1997; Gallup, 
1998). Others argue against this position (e.g. Heyes, 1998; Wynne, 2004). Most 
researchers accept that while empirical evidence for subjective states in animals is 
lacking, the possibility that animals may experience subjective emotions provides 
a serious concern for welfare research (Dawkins, 1990; Harding et al., 2004; 
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Kendrick, 2006). Although the precise subjective nature of animals’ experience 
cannot be known, the likelihood of its existence provides a strong argument for 
the scientific study of animal emotions so that we may better understand their 
welfare implications (Dawkins, 1990 and 2006a). 
 
1.2 Emotions are componential and functional 
The variation in methods used to measure emotions reflects the fact that they are 
componential phenomena, comprising behavioural, physiological, cognitive and 
subjective components (Paul et al., 2005; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Combining 
methods that address these different components will provide the most 
comprehensive data on animal emotions. There are well established methods for 
measuring the behavioural and physiological components of emotion in humans 
and other animals. These are covered in more detail in Chapter 3. The cognitive 
and subjective components of emotion have almost exclusively been studied in 
humans, and are the focus of research into human psychological wellbeing. While 
cognitive components of emotion in humans may be assessed using objective 
methods, subjective states are only inferred, indirectly, from verbal report. It is the 
measurement of the cognitive component of emotion in animals, specifically 
rhesus macaques, and the validation of this approach using behavioural and 
physiological data, that is the aim of this thesis. 
 
There is strong evidence that emotions are survival mechanisms which have 
played a key role in the survival and evolution of many taxonomic groups of 
animals (Darwin, 1965; LeDoux, 1995). Neuroscientific data show that many of 
the neural mechanisms involved in emotional processing (for example the 
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thalamo-amygdala pathway) involve brain structures that are shared across 
taxonomic groups (LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Bradley & Lang, 2000; 
Damasio, 2000; Rolls, 2000). This suggests a significant function of emotions 
throughout the evolution of a wide range of taxonomic groups. There is general 
agreement that emotions allow behavioural flexibility, enabling organisms to 
avoid danger and seek rewards within dynamic environments (Scherer & 
Wallbott, 1994; Panksepp, 1998; Aureli & Whiten, 2003). The consideration of 
flexibility in the interplay between internal states and ecological factors has also 
been introduced to modeling approaches of life-history theory (McNamara & 
Houston, 2008). Including differential states provides models with added power to 
consider how the internal state of an individual may mediate life-history trade-offs 
under variable environmental conditions, and the implications of such trade-offs 
for behaviour.  
 
The definition of emotion used here, and widely accepted by many animal 
emotion researchers, is that emotions are short-lived responses to rewarding or 
punishing stimuli (LeDoux, 1996; Rolls, 2000; Paul et al., 2005). Emotions 
involve different components, which may vary in the extent to which they are 
expressed between species (Clubb & Mason, 2004; Belzung & Philippot, 2007), 
or between individuals of the same species (e.g. cultural differences in humans: 
Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). Emotions, according to this definition, do not require 
consciousness, that is, subjective awareness of underlying emotions. Conscious 
awareness of one’s own emotions results in feeling states, but these are not a pre-
requisite for emotional processes to occur (LeDoux, 1995; Damasio, 2000; 
Öhman et al., 2000). In the human brain, emotional stimuli (such as a threatening 
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face) may be processed subconsciously, so that stimuli presented without a 
participant’s knowledge may affect subsequent behaviour, as is also seen in 
patients with blindsight (de Gelder et al., 1999; Heywood & Kentridge, 2000; de 
Gelder et al., 2005). Following other authors in the field of cognition-emotion 
interaction in animals, in this thesis the term emotion is used interchangeably with 
the term ‘affect’. Affect is a broad term which encompasses both short-lived 
emotional states, which are stimulus-bound, and longer-lasting phenomena such 
as mood and trait temperament (e.g. Paul et al., 2005). Cognition is defined in its 
broadest sense as information processing (Shettleworth, 2001). Cognition includes 
processes such as sensory inputs, appraisal, storage and retrieval of information 
and associated outputs.  
 
The componential nature of emotions means we need methods that measure most, 
if not all, of the components to develop a full understanding of emotions and their 
implications for psychological wellbeing in animals. The definition of emotions as 
functional responses to rewards and punishers that may occur outside of 
awareness, together with evidence that emotional responses involve brain 
structures that are shared across animal taxa, means we can study emotions in 
animals without inferring human-like subjective feeling states. The question of 
whether animals do, in fact, have subjective feeling states is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
 
1.3 Cognitive bias and psychological wellbeing in humans 
The cognitive component of emotion is considered central to human 
psychological wellbeing (MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews, 1990; Mogg & 
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Bradley, 1998). People process information about the world differently according 
to their emotional state, mood, or longer-lasting personality traits (Richards et al., 
2002). This is known as cognitive bias. As briefly described earlier, studies of 
cognitive bias in humans have shown that affective disorders such as anxiety, 
depression and phobia are related to changes in cognitive processes including 
attention, appraisal, memory, expectation and learning (Mathews et al., 1989a; 
Eysenck, 1992; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  
 
The most important use of cognitive bias measures in human psychological 
welfare research is in the identification of individuals who have cognitive profiles 
which leave them vulnerable to the onset of affective disorders associated with 
poor psychological wellbeing (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). Emotion-congruent 
changes in information processing generate subsequent emotional states which, in 
the case of negative biases and emotional states, may ultimately lead to the onset 
and exacerbation of affective disorders such as anxiety or depression (Haas & 
Canli, 2008). Therefore, not only do changes in affective state influence 
cognition, but changes in cognition feed into affect. Possibly one of the greatest 
values of cognitive bias measures is that an existing cognitive bias is a strong 
predictor of vulnerability to the onset of future affective disorders (Williams et al., 
1996), and provides a reliable predictor of (self-reported) experienced distress 
(Pury, 2002). Understanding the bidirectional emotion-cognition interaction has 
proven critical to research into human psychological wellbeing. 
 
There are many types of cognitive bias and many types of affective system that 
interact with these biases. Compared with normal controls, people high in anxiety 
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demonstrate a bias to attend to threatening information (attentional bias: e.g. Bar-
Haim et al., 2007), interpret ambiguous stimuli more negatively (interpretive bias: 
e.g. Mathews et al., 1989b) and expect more negative events to occur in the future 
(expectancy bias: e.g. MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Eysenck et al., 2006). Depressed 
individuals typically demonstrate a bias to recall more negative past events 
(memory bias: e.g. Bradley & Lang, 2000; Eysenck et al., 2006). Phobics show 
similar biases for phobia-related information (e.g. Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Therapeutic approaches indicate 
cognitive biases are not fixed phenomena, but rely on the interplay between 
cognitive and affective processes. For example, following training-induced 
positive interpretive bias for ambiguous information, previously anxious people 
report reduced levels of state anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). Therefore the 
link between cognition and emotion has been well established in humans. 
 
Cognitive biases may be induced in humans using mood manipulation (e.g. 
presentation of a small gift: Nygren et al., 1996; mock filming procedure: 
Richards et al., 2002). Cognitive biases may also be compared between groups of 
people according to clinical diagnosis (MacLeod et al., 1986) or between groups 
identified according to scores on state and trait questionnaires for anxiety and 
depression (Richards et al., 2002; Holmes et al., 2009). Therefore cognitive biases 
may be revealed in both state and trait affect. 
 
The implication of cognitive bias research for understanding psychological 
wellbeing in humans means similar methods may provide important information 
on the cognitive component of emotion in animals, and therefore animal 
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psychological wellbeing (Harding et al., 2004; Mendl et al., 2009). The 
application of induced processing biases in the treatment of human anxiety 
disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) suggests a potential future application of 
such approaches in the treatment of psychological disorders in animals. In this 
thesis I address three of the core cognitive components of emotion. For clarity, 
each component is discussed at the start of each of the three main experimental 
chapters: Chapter 4 (attentional bias, specifically spatial orienting of attention 
towards threatening stimuli); Chapter 5 (attentional bias, specifically the 
emotional evaluation of stimuli); and Chapter 6 (judgement bias, subsuming 
expectancy and, to a lesser degree, interpretive biases).  
 
1.4 Cognitive bias and psychological wellbeing in animals 
The method developed by Harding et al. (2004; see also Harding, 2002) provides 
a means of studying the cognitive component of emotion in animals and, 
consequently, provides a novel measure of animal psychological wellbeing. It 
combines the cognitive theory and methods applied to humans, with animal 
operant conditioning approaches. The method developed by Harding et al. (2004) 
measures ‘judgement bias’. Judgement bias is a general term which reflects the 
fact that several different cognitive processes (e.g. attention, stimulus appraisal, 
expectation and recall) may feed into the differential patterns of responding seen 
in stressed versus non-stressed (and in some cases enriched) animals.  
 
Judgement bias is the only form of cognitive bias that has begun to be studied 
systematically in animals (Mendl et al., 2009). No one has systematically 
investigated the underlying biases that may feed into judgement bias in animals. 
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The Go-NoGo task developed by Harding et al. (2004) required an initial training 
phase which was found to be time-consuming (Mendl et al., 2009). Therefore, for 
the current research I undertook a series of studies which involved experimental 
procedures of increasing complexity to investigate firstly attentional bias, then 
bias in the appraisal of emotional information and, finally, judgement bias. The 
studies are presented in the order they were conducted. 
 
1.5 Overview of the thesis 
The main body of this thesis is composed of five Chapters which detail the 
development (Chapters 2 and 3) and application (Chapters 4-6) of methods to 
measure cognitive biases in rhesus macaques (Figure 1.1). In Chapter 2, I describe 
the equipment and operant procedures that were developed for measuring 
cognitive processes in rhesus macaques. The equipment for this research was 
purchased and constructed specifically for the purposes of the studies presented in 
this thesis. The monkeys who took part in the studies were naïve to working in a 
laboratory setting and so were trained prior to the start of the experiments. This 
initial pilot work formed the basis for the further development of the methods 
presented in Chapters 4-6.  
 
In Chapter 3, I review traditional behavioural and physiological methods used to 
assess welfare in non-human primates and describe their application with the 
rhesus macaques who took part in the studies presented in Chapters 4-6. In 
particular, the behavioural and physiological measures were included to provide 
comparability with existing studies and provide additional data on the influence of 
two treatment conditions (a week of enrichment and restraint for injection and a  
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Figure 1.1 Overview of the experimental chapters presented in the thesis 
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health-check) used in the studies on other factors that may feed into affect, such as 
arousal. In each cognitive study, monkeys were tested following the two 
treatments: both following a week of environmental enrichment, and following a 
three-monthly health-check. The data presented in Chapter 3 are discussed in 
terms of the impact of these two treatments on the behaviour and physiology of 
the monkeys who took part in the cognitive studies. 
 
Chapters 4-6 comprise the main experimental chapters. In Chapter 4, I review 
cognitive theories of the role of affect in mediating (spatial) attentional biases to 
emotional stimuli in humans. I then present the method developed to measure 
emotionally-mediated attentional biases for different facial expressions in rhesus 
macaques. In this chapter, I test specific hypotheses about early spatial orienting 
biases for threatening versus non-threatening faces, and the influence of affective 
state on these biases. This study was developed following evidence that anxious 
people are faster to detect threatening information than are non-anxious people. 
However, there are conflicting theories about the timing and the direction of 
attentional biases in humans. Some authors propose vigilance for threatening 
information (Seligman, 1971), with faster orienting of attention towards 
threatening versus neutral information by anxious versus non-anxious people 
(Eysenck, 1992). Other authors propose avoidance of threatening information in 
anxiety, with faster orienting away from threatening versus non-threatening 
information by socially phobic versus non-phobic people (Chen et al., 2002). Yet 
others propose a vigilant-avoidant strategy in anxiety whereby initial vigilance is 
followed by subsequent avoidance of threatening versus non-threatening 
information in anxiety (Garner et al., 2006b). The method presented in Chapter 4 
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was designed to test the competing hypotheses about the spatial orienting of 
attention towards or away from threatening information by monkeys when 
stressed versus when the same monkeys are not stressed. I then present the first 
data on attentional bias in rhesus macaques and discuss these in light of data from 
humans.  
 
In Chapter 5, I review theories of emotion evaluation and response slowing in 
humans, and describe the development of a method to study these processes in 
rhesus macaques. This Chapter explores the effects of emotion on controlled 
aspects of attentional processing, and coexisting mechanisms such as behavioural 
approach-avoidance and freezing responses (Gray, 1971). This study was 
developed following evidence that anxious people demonstrate a more negative 
appraisal of threatening information than do non-anxious people, and also 
demonstrate an arousal-related slowing of responses to highly salient (arousing) 
stimuli versus non-arousing stimuli (Mogg et al., 2008). Response-slowing to 
threatening information has only recently been addressed in studies with humans, 
yet is important for an understanding of how arousal and emotion interact to 
influence latencies to respond to negative versus neutral or positive stimuli (Mogg 
et al., 2008). Further, the study is particularly important because of the 
implications of response-slowing for interpretation of studies where single stimuli 
that vary in valence are presented on each trial (for example, during emotional 
Stroop tasks: Mogg et al., 2008). In this chapter I present the first data on 
emotion-evaluation and response-slowing in rhesus macaques and discuss this in 
light of possible underlying mechanisms. 
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In Chapter 6 I review human and animal literature on judgement biases, and 
describe the development of the method to study judgement bias in rhesus 
macaques. This chapter builds on recent work conducted with animals which 
demonstrates that affect-mediated judgement biases may be measured in animals 
other than humans. I identify the various cognitive and affective processes that 
may feed into judgement bias, present the first data on affect-mediated judgement 
bias in rhesus macaques and discuss these data in the context of findings from 
both humans and animals. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I summarise the findings of the thesis, and discuss these in 
terms of how the three aspects of cognition-emotion interaction (attentional bias, 
emotion evaluation and judgement bias) may relate to one another, and to the 
behavioural and physiological data presented in Chapter 3. I then consider the 
implications of the methods developed for the measurement of psychological 
wellbeing in animals. To conclude, I review how the existing methods may be 
improved, and the ways in which they may be developed for future application to 







2 Developing methods to study cognitive processes in 
primates 
 
In this chapter, I describe the development of a method to study cognitive 
processes in adult male rhesus macaques. In Part A, I describe the equipment and 
operant procedures I developed for this purpose. In Part B, I describe the 
refinement of the operant procedures including the selection of appropriate stimuli 
for testing hypotheses about the effect of emotion-cognition interactions on the 
processing of social and non-social information. The main research for this thesis 
was conducted at the Sabana Seca Field Station of the Caribbean Primate 
Research Centre (CPRC), Puerto Rico. The procedures I present here were 
informed in large part by an initial period of training at the Psychology 
Department, Oxford University, in the laboratory of Dr Matthew Rushworth, and 
in the Department of Veterinary Sciences, Oxford University, with Dr Paul 
Honess. During this time, I learnt effective procedures for training monkeys to 
work in a cognitive laboratory, including how to train monkeys to enter a cage for 
transportation to a laboratory and how to train monkeys to touch stimuli presented 
on a touch-sensitive monitor in order to gain food rewards. All studies presented 
in this thesis adhered to the ethical guidelines of, and were approved by, 
Roehampton University ethics board and CPRC Institutional Animal Care and 





The monkeys at the CPRC were naïve to any form of training or cognitive testing 
prior to the start of the study, and no cognitive laboratory of this kind had been 
established at the CPRC previously. The aims of the present chapter, therefore, 
are to describe the stages involved in establishing a laboratory for assessing 
primate cognition. These stages were broadly, i) habituating naïve monkeys to my 
presence (habituation phase), ii) training monkeys to enter a cage to be 
transported to the laboratory (cage-training phase) and, iii) training monkeys to 
respond to stimuli presented on a touch-sensitive monitor (laboratory-based 
operant training phase).  
 
To begin, I present the rationale and training protocols I applied to establish a 
working laboratory with rhesus macaques and discuss the importance of 
habituation and positive reinforcement practices for effective and ethical training 
procedures. I then list the specific training aims. The subsequent sections detail 
the methods and training protocols employed, and present data on training 
success. At the end of each of these sections I summarise training success for the 
group and show the number of monkeys who reached the criterion to move onto 
the next stage of training. Individual training outcomes are also presented. 
Particular attention is paid to the effects of age, temperament, duration of single 
housing and task complexity on training success. Finally, I discuss the 
implications of the training procedures used, and the success rates obtained, for 
the establishment of a primate laboratory that would ultimately allow me to assess 




Part A: Establishing the laboratory and basic operant procedures 
2.1 Introduction 
Training monkeys to work effectively and reliably in a laboratory setting involves 
several stages of animal learning and requires a species-specific protocol (Prescott 
et al., 2005). Initially, animals must habituate to the trainer’s presence, and 
familiarise with daily working patterns (habituation and associative learning: 
Leussis & Bolivar, 2006). Secondly, animals must be given the opportunity to 
learn about the rewards (or punishers) that arise from given behaviours in 
response to specific stimuli (associative and operant learning: Prescott & 
Buchanan-Smith, 2003). Thirdly, animals must learn to perform particular 
experimental tasks according to the experimental paradigm being used (Prescott et 
al., 2005). With repeated experience under controlled conditions animals will 
learn to combine series of behaviours and perform even very complex tasks (such 
as visual discrimination and reversal learning tasks: Rudebeck et al., 2006). 
Finally, performance must be maintained so that animals work consistently at any 
given task, or series of tasks, under experimental conditions. Successful training 
and good working practices are contingent on the development of positive 
associations of the trainer and training procedures with reinforcers (resources that 
animals will work to secure, such as food). These can be used to train animals to 
engage voluntarily and reliably in a range of experimental procedures of 




A preliminary goal of researchers studying animal behaviour is to habituate study 
subjects to human presence, so that researchers have a minimal impact on 
naturally occurring behaviours (Waitt et al., 2002). For example, free-ranging 
chimpanzees visually monitor human observers, often interrupting other tasks to 
do so, and regulate distance from the observer accordingly (Bethell, 1998). 
Therefore, the presence of a human observer may influence an animal’s 
behaviour, and cause the animal unnecessary stress (Prescott et al., 2005). This, in 
turn, may impair cognitive processes such as learning and memory that may affect 
experimental outcomes (Nishimura et al., 1999; Burman & Mendl, 2000; Belanoff 
et al., 2001)  
 
Habituation, or ‘desensitisation’, is considered to have occurred when an animal 
ceases, or reduces, responses to an initially novel eliciting stimulus over repeated 
exposures (Leussis & Bolivar, 2006). Habituation is a process of learning that a 
stimulus (e.g. a human) is not associated with aversive outcomes. It occurs first 
and foremost at the neural level and may be expressed overtly at the behavioural 
level (Leussis & Bolivar, 2006). At the neural level it is a prerequisite for 
selective attention, whereby stimuli that are irrelevant to ongoing behaviour 
should be ignored, so that a greater majority of neural resources are available to 
attend to stimuli more relevant to an individual’s goals. Evidence that threatening 
stimuli capture attention selectively and automatically (e.g. Macleod, 1991; 
Holmes et al., 2006) highlights the need for habituation to particularly salient 
stimuli, such as humans, by study animals (Rennie & Buchanan-Smith, 2006a). In 
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the case of cognitive studies where animals are required to attend to experimental 
stimuli, this is particularly important.  
 
I habituated the participant monkeys for two purposes: to minimise my impact on 
their baseline behavioural and (possibly) neurophysiological arousal, and to 
develop a cooperative relationship, thereby maximising opportunity for learning 
during operant training. The point at which responses to a stimulus are judged to 
have changed sufficiently such that habituation can be said to have occurred is 
dependent on the methods and aims of the study (Prescott & Buchanan-Smith, 
2003). Humans represent a highly salient environmental stimulus for captive 
animals, associated with the most positive and negative aspects of daily husbandry 
routines (Waitt et al., 2002). It is therefore important to maximise the 
predictability of human-related events (such as husbandry procedures and training 
protocols), both in terms of their occurrence and outcomes (Rennie & Buchanan-
Smith, 2006b).  
 
One measure of habituation is a change in overt behavioural responses towards a 
human. Because behaviour may be observed easily, it provides a convenient 
measure of habituation, specifically behavioural habituation. Behavioural 
measures do not allow us to distinguish whether animals habituate at a 
physiological or neural level (Ruys et al., 2004). Therefore, the term ‘habituation’ 
is used here to refer to behavioural habituation specifically. Whether animals 
habituated at a neural or physiological level is not known. In the present study, 
degree of behavioural habituation was used to assess whether changes in 
behaviour towards a human influenced other training outcomes. Habituation data 
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were not used to determine which animals were suitable for further training. 
Therefore data on behavioural habituation are descriptive and had no influence on 
inclusion in further aspects of training. 
 
2.1.2 Animal learning, positive reinforcement and operant training 
Predictability of events and outcomes provides the information animals need to 
learn set environmental contingencies. An environment that is predictable both in 
terms of physical (Bassett & Buchanan-Smith, 2007) and social (Olsson & 
Westlund, 2007) parameters is less stressful than an uncertain environment (see 
also Harding, 2002). One essential environmental factor for animals to learn in the 
context of training is the association of a trainer with the delivery of positive 
reinforcers. 
 
Positive reinforcement training (PRT) is a form of training which encourages 
animals to work to gain rewards (Prescott & Buchanan-Smith, 2003). Associating 
a trainer and training procedures (conditioned stimuli: CS) with positive 
reinforcers (unconditioned stimuli: UCS) reduces fear responses and increases 
opportunity for learning to occur (Reinhardt, 1997; Waitt et al., 2002). Stressful 
husbandry procedures have been demonstrated to impair cognitive processes such 
as learning and memory (Mendl, 1999; Burman & Mendl, 2000). Classical 
conditioning (learning that a CS is associated with an UCS: Pavlov, 1927), when 
used with positive reinforcers, is likely to increase speed of learning since the 
trainer and training procedures become associated with positive outcomes. 
Consequently, attentional resources are less likely to be ‘hijacked’ by a fear 
response to the trainer. The impact of threatening distracting stimuli on ongoing 
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task performance is covered in detail in Chapter 5. In brief, work with humans has 
shown that highly stress-responsive individuals have a pronounced preconscious 
selective attention for threatening social information compared with less stress-
responsive individuals, and this automatic capture of attention impairs 
performance on an ongoing task: there is a temporary freezing of ongoing 
processes (Roelofs et al., 2007). The interruption to ongoing cognitive processes 
by threatening stimuli (freezing) in humans may be comparable to the freezing 
responses seen in other animals, including rhesus macaques, when faced with 
threatening stimuli (Kalin et al., 1998). Unhabituated rhesus macaques who freeze 
in the presence of a human will very probably therefore be impaired in learning 
and performance of tasks in a laboratory environment. 
 
Operant conditioning requires an animal to learn that performing certain 
behaviours leads to particular consequences (Reinhardt, 1997; Schapiro et al., 
2003). Behaviours that result in positive outcomes (i.e. the delivery of a positive 
reinforcer) will, over time, come to be performed preferentially over behaviours 
that do not result in positive outcomes (Skinner, 1947). Behaviours that result in 
negative outcomes should come to be avoided. For the present research, Positive 
Reinforcement Training (PRT), in which animals work to gain a positive 
reinforcer, was chosen as the more scientifically and ethically sound means of 
training in the first instance. PRT provides animals with the option to work or not 
work during a given task. PRT therefore enables animals to learn at their own 
pace, without additional stress, and may also provide a form of enrichment in 
itself (Prescott & Buchanan-Smith, 2003; Manteuffel et al., 2009). This will 
improve the training conditions of animals (Schapiro et al., 2003), increase 
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cooperation with laboratory procedures (McKinley et al., 2003) and may produce 
a more conducive state for learning to occur (Scott et al., 2003). The most 
commonly used positive reinforcer is food (e.g. Vertein & Reinhardt, 1989), but 
other positive reinforcers such as access to social information may also be used 
(Deaner et al., 2005).  
 
An alternative to PRT is Negative Reinforcement Training (NRT), in which 
animals work to avoid a negative reinforcer or punisher (Laule et al., 2003). NRT 
leaves the animal with little option but to work to avoid an otherwise inevitable 
negative event, and therefore may be a stressor in itself. During the present 
research NRT was only employed during the cage-training phase when PRT 
options had been exhausted. In such cases NRT was used to encourage the 
monkey to enter the testing cage where he could then be rewarded for doing so. 
The rationale was that, once a monkey was in the testing cage he would have the 
opportunity to learn that being in the testing cage was associated with receiving 
food. This would subsequently encourage a motivation to enter the testing cage on 
future occasions, when PRT alone could be reinstated. 
 
The operant training protocol used in this study is detailed in Table 2-1. The 
protocol was adapted from Prescott et al. (2005) and Laule et al. (2003). These 
authors identify robust learning of the association between performing a 
behaviour and delivery of primary and secondary reinforcers to be a key factor for 
successful training. Primary reinforcers are usually small food items. Secondary 
reinforcers are always an otherwise neutral stimulus (such as a sound) which, over  
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Table 2-1 The series of stages for habituating and training naïve monkeys to enter a testing cage for transportation to a laboratory  
Training Stage Rational, aims and general procedures Outcomes and Adapted Procedures used in this study 
Identify goals 
 
Identify sequential training stages required to encourage 
monkeys to cooperate in a laboratory setting. 
 
A training protocol was developed to train singly-housed adult male M. mulatta in 
successive stages to enter a testing cage for transportation to a laboratory where they 




effective ‘bridge’  
 
Identify preferred foods for each monkey for primary 
reinforcement. Calculate calorie content and offset against 
daily food ration. A ‘bridge’ is a secondary reinforcing 
tone which sounds when an animal performs a desired 
behaviour. This helps animals learn which behaviour is 
being rewarded. 
 
Preferred foods were identified for each monkey (there were persistent individual 
preferences and dislikes for apple, pear, kiwi, plum and fig). Reward rations were 
scaled to each monkey’s weight . A vocal click was identified as an effective bridge. 
Habituate  Habituate monkeys to an unfamiliar human. Introduce 
basic reward contingencies. Short sessions repeated daily. 
 
Monkeys learned to take food from my hand calmly, associate such cooperative 




Train monkeys to associate vocal clicks with food.  Monkeys learned to sit calmly for longer periods of time between bridge and delivery 





Habituate monkeys to the sight, sound, smell and 
movement of the transport cage. 
The transport cage was placed in front of each monkey’s cage and daily food ration 
placed inside or on top. Monkeys were left to enter, explore and feed in the transport 
cage with the door open. 
 
Train to fully 
enter cage 
 
Habituate monkeys to being inside the transport cage and 
the door closing. One short session conducted daily. 
Monkeys entered and fed on the daily food ration inside the transport cage. Short 
sessions enhanced positive associations and avoided build up of stress or boredom.  
 
Increase time in 
cage 
 
Increase the duration for which the monkey is in the cage 
before being fed over successive days. 
I left each monkey in the transport cage until he had eaten his daily food ration. Over 
successive days I reduced the size of the food reward until monkeys entered the cage 
for a small reward only.  
 
Transport  in the 
cage 
Familiarise monkey with being transported in the cage and 
receiving a reward following transport to the laboratory. 
On each day I moved the cage increased distances towards the laboratory before 
delivering the daily food ration, until monkeys were fed in the cage in the laboratory. 
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repeated pairings with the delivery of the primary reinforcer, comes to be 
associated with reward. Secondary reinforcers can be used to ‘bridge’ the gap 
between the moment an animal performs a desired behaviour and the delivery of 
the primary reinforcer, enabling the animal to identify more easily which 
behaviour is being reinforced. ‘Shaping’ is the process by which individual 
behaviours may be combined incrementally to result in animals learning complex 
behavioural sequences prior to being rewarded (Laule et al., 2003). Once 
reinforcement contingencies have been learnt, the general rule (behaviour leads to 
secondary reinforcer, which leads to primary reinforcer) may be applied to any 
number of behaviours and operant procedures (Prescott & Buchanan-Smith, 
2007).  
 
To date, PRT has been applied to a range of animal groups for husbandry and 
research procedures, such as presenting a limb for venipuncture (rhesus macaques: 
Reinhardt, 1997; tortoises: Weiss & Wilson, 2003), collection of urine samples 
(marmosets: McKinley et al., 2003), movement of animals between enclosures 
(rhesus macaques: Reinhardt, 1992), in-home-cage weighing (McKinley et al., 
2003), as a behavioural management tool to increase affiliative behaviours 
(female rhesus macaques: Schapiro et al., 2001), and for research-related operant 
training (goats: Langbein et al., 2007; rhesus macaques: Rumbaugh et al., 1989). 
In each of the aforementioned studies, animal training proceeded through a series 
of reinforcement stages. Initially, small behaviours (such as approach towards a 
target) were rewarded. Once an animal reliably performed this initial behaviour, it 
was shaped so that, for instance, rewards were then only given when the animal 
both approached and touched the target. Such behaviour was further shaped by 
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rewarding the animal for additional behaviours such as staying for longer periods 
of time touching the target, or for touching another target simultaneously. Stages 
of training can be built up until an animal performs the final desired behavioural 
repertoire on cue.  
 
2.1.3 Additional factors that may influence training success 
In addition to describing the training protocol and presenting data on group 
training success, I also present data on the effects of age, duration of single 
housing, degree of habituation and temperament on training success. These have 
been indicated to be important considerations for the selection of animals to take 
part in training procedures, yet relevant data are sparse either due to a lack of 
studies (e.g. Capitanio et al., 2006), or exclusion of individual factors from the 
analyses  (tamarin monkey: Banerjee et al., 2009; beagle: Nippak & Milgram, 
2005) 
 
Primate models of human aging have provided data that may be of use for the 
selection of monkeys for cognitive testing. For example, Bartus et al. (1979) 
examined visual discrimination and reversal learning in rhesus macaques between 
three and 18 years of age. There was a significant decline in reversal learning in 
the older animals, but no effect of age on learning the original visual 
discrimination task. Rapp (1990) found a significant effect of age on speed to 
learn an associative task, but not overall task success, suggesting that decline in 
attention with age affected speed to learn rather than ultimate ability to learn in 
older animals. Other studies have shown age-related decline in rhesus macaque 
memory (e.g. Presty et al., 1987). The above studies focused on computer-based 
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task performance. No published study has presented progressive data on the 
effects of age on ability to learn the range of tasks presented in this study (from 
simpler tasks such as entering a testing cage to more complex computer-based 
operant tasks). In the present study I therefore examined the effect of age on 
learning progressively more complex tasks. 
 
Few studies, if any, present quantitative data on the effects of degree of 
habituation, duration of single housing, or temperament on computer-task 
performance. Capitanio et al. (2006) provide a summary of the factors that may 
influence the selection of primates for research purposes, but does not review 
studies addressing operant training procedures specifically.  
 
Duration of single housing was defined in the present study as number of years a 
monkey had been in single housing, either at Sabana Seca field station, or at 
another location. Previous research suggests that separation from the social group 
and placement in single housing induces biobehavioural changes indicative of 
acute and chronic stress in rhesus macaques (Schapiro et al., 2000). There are no 
data directly addressing the impact of social- and housing-related stress on 
cognitive performance in learning operant tasks in rhesus macaques. In the present 
study, duration in single housing was identified as a possible factor that may 
influence training outcomes. The high rate of use of singly-housed animals in 
research laboratories where computer-based studies of cognitive performance are 
conducted, and the lack of published data on the effects of this significant social 
isolation factor necessitated exploration of the effects, if any, of duration of single 
housing on cognitive performance.  
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Habituation was measured as the increase in cooperative behaviours with 
increased familiarity with training procedures. Previous studies suggest that a 
cooperative working relationship between captive primates and humans enhances 
performance in a range of operant tasks related to husbandry procedures (Waitt et 
al., 2002). The impact of degree of behavioural habituation to a previously 
unfamiliar human was included as a factor that may impair performance in 
learning operant tasks. 
 
Three categories of temperament were identified in the present study. These were 
based loosely on previously identified personality dimensions in rhesus macaques 
(Capitanio, 1999). Due to difficulties in applying the same descriptors to singly-
housed versus socially-housed animals, I applied my own terminology as follows: 
‘aggressive’ (monkeys who respond to an unfamiliar human in an aggressive 
manner. This category is comparable to ‘confident’: Capitanio, 1999), 
‘submissive’ (monkeys who respond to an unfamiliar human in a submissive 
manner. This category is comparable to ‘excitable’: Capitanio: 1999), and 
‘cooperative’ (monkeys who respond to an unfamiliar human in an apparently 
calm manner. This category is comparable to ‘equable’: Capitanio, 1999).  
 
2.2 Aims and specific predictions: 
The general aim of Part A of this chapter is to describe the initial habituation and 
training phases conducted to establish a primate laboratory with 12-20 adult male 
rhesus macaques trained to participate in studies using a touch-sensitive monitor. I 
present data on behavioural changes in monkeys during habituation to a 
previously unfamiliar human, training success for monkeys learning to enter a 
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testing-cage, and training success for learning to touch a stimulus presented on a 
touch-sensitive monitor. A secondary aim is to explore the influence of age, 
duration of single housing and degree of habituation on training success.  
 
Aim 1: To habituate monkeys to a previously unfamiliar human and introduce to 
basic PRT procedures 
 
Aim 2: To train monkeys to enter a testing cage for transportation to the 
laboratory 
 
Aim 3: To train monkeys to perform operant responses to stimuli shown on a 
touch-sensitive monitor 
 
Aim 1: Habituate monkeys and introduce PRT 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Animals & Apparatus: 
Twenty one adult male rhesus macaques (10.1 ± 6.6 years: mean ± s.d. used 
throughout; range 3.6-24.7 yrs) housed at the Sabana Seca Field Station, 
Caribbean Primate Research Center (CPRC), Puerto Rico, participated in training 
to take part in a cognitive testing in a newly established cognitive laboratory. All 
animals had been born in captivity in the free-ranging colony at the Cayo Santiago 
Field Station, CPRC, (n=20) or in a semi-free-ranging corral at the Sabana Seca 
Field Station (n=1, monkey M232). Monkeys are captured yearly from the free-
ranging breeding colony at Cayo Santiago, and transported to Sabana Seca for 
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breeding purposes. All animals are placed under quarantine in single cages for a 
minimum of 6 months before being rehoused in breeding colonies or in Specific 
Pathogen Free (SPF) research groups. Males surplus to breeding requirements and 
not classified as SPF are singly-housed for other research purposes. The animals 
who participated in this study comprised monkeys surplus to breeding 
requirements.  
 
All monkeys had undergone normal weaning, which typically begins at around 16 
weeks of age and is largely complete by 30 weeks as part of the free-ranging 
colony of the CPRC on Cayo Santiago (Rawlins & Kessler, 1986b). No monkey 
was removed from the natal troop prior to one year of age, and most much later. 
Young male rhesus macaques typically emigrate from the natal troop between 2.5 
and 7 years of age (Berman, 1986; Colvin, 1986). The youngest monkey to take 
part in this research was 3.7 years at the start of the study. Male rhesus macaques 
reach puberty at around three years of age, reach sexual maturity around four 
years of age and reach adult size at around eight years (Cawthon Lang, 2005; 
Rawlins & Kessler, 1986b). 
 
Throughout the study, monkeys were singly-housed in metal cages (0.9 x 0.9 x 
1m) in an outdoor enclosure (10 x 20 x 3.5m). The enclosure was designed to 
provide shelter from direct sunlight and rain, yet allow natural daylight to reach 
the cages. The participant monkeys’ cages were in two pens within the enclosure, 
while a breeding harem group (2 male:2 female) occupied the third pen. All 
participant monkeys had visual access to each other, the harem group, and to a 
large corral containing >100 rhesus macaques, situated 10m from the home 
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enclosure. All internal and external enclosure walls were constructed from thick 
wire mesh attached to an outer metal frame. The home caging was positioned 
against the outer fence of each pen. Each cage had a 4cm x 12cm aperture in the 
rear wall so that monkeys had visual access to the area surrounding the enclosure. 
The layout of the home enclosure was designed to allow every monkey maximal 
visual access to the outside of the enclosure, while minimising disturbance to the 
animals by outside events. The group had been housed in single caging for 4.1 ± 
4.0yrs (range one month: monkey 16P; to 15.5 yrs: monkey M232) prior to the 
start of training for this study, and had been housed in the outdoor enclosure 
where they resided during this study for 1.0 ± 1.1 years (range: 1 week to 13.5 
years).  
 
Training began in February 2006 (n=12) and July 2006 (n=9). Identical training 
protocols were used for both groups, and training data for all monkeys are 
presented together. Examination by the attending veterinarian revealed monkeys 
were in good health at the start of habituation. No food deprivation schedule was 




Days 1-9: Assessment of behavioural habituation to the investigator 
Training goals and outcomes are summarised in Table 2-1. On days 1-3, I fed the 
daily food ration to each of the monkeys in the presence of the enrichment officer, 
Josue Alejandro, with whom all animals were familiar. This process introduced 
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monkeys to my presence, and allowed the development of an association between 
my arrival and feeding time. Monkeys were fed in the same order each day. I 
placed ~10 monkey chow and 1/3 of a fruit (apple or pear) in the food well at the 
front of the first monkey’s cage and then moved on to place food in the well of the 
adjacent cage. Once all animals had been fed, the enrichment officer and I left the 
enclosure. 
 
During the initial three day feeding phase, I kept a record of monkeys’ reactions 
to my approach to the cage. Reactions to approach and presentation of food were 
classified in three broad categories chosen to reflect fight or flight responses, or 
apparent absence of an overt fight or flight response. An assessment of each 
monkey’s primary response was coded as ‘aggressive’ (fight: the monkey 
primarily responds with a threat face, shakes his cage or vocalises), ‘submissive’ 
(flight: the monkey primarily crouches, flees, startles, lip smacks, bares his teeth, 
presents his hind quarters, coos or engages in repetitive or self-directed 
behaviours) or ‘cooperative’ (the monkey makes no aggressive or submissive 
responses and takes the food offered). An increase in ‘cooperative’ responses and 
a corresponding decrease in ‘aggressive’ or ‘submissive’ responses were here 
taken as evidence of behavioural habituation occurring. Functionally defined, 
therefore, behavioural habituation reflects a shift from primarily responding to the 
presence of a human to responding to the presence of the food.  
 
On days 4-9 of the habituation phase, animals were fed by hand in order to 
maintain the association of the investigator with food and introduce positive 
reinforcement for desired behaviours. A daily food ration of ~10 monkey chow 
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and a portion of preferred food (such as fruit, vegetables, seeds or flowers) were 
fed to each animal in turn. I approached each animal in his home cage in the same 
order whilst holding two monkey chow. I presented one chow through the hole in 
the front of the cage for one minute to encourage the animal to approach the front 
of the cage to collect it. I held the second chow in view at the front of the cage out 
of the monkey’s reach. As the monkey took the pellet I gave a reinforcing verbal 
‘click’ and offered the second chow. I withdrew the second chow if the monkey 
did not take it within two seconds. I then moved on to the next cage and repeated 
the procedure. Once I had offered each monkey two chow in this way I returned to 
the first cage and repeated the procedure for a total of six feeding trials per animal 
per day over six consecutive days. On each approach I made a record of the 
primary behavioural responses. 
 
If a monkey did not take the first chow within the one minute time frame, the 
chow was withdrawn for 20 seconds and then offered again for one minute. If the 
monkey still did not take the chow, it was withdrawn and I moved on to the next 
cage and repeated the procedure. If the monkey took the first chow but did not 
take the second chow within the two-second time frame, the second chow was 
withdrawn and I moved on to the next cage. On each day animals were presented 
with monkey chow during trials 1-5, and preferred foods such as fruit slices, seed 
pods or flowers on trial 6. All monkeys received the remainder of the daily chow 
ration at the end of the training session irrespective of performance. The primary 




On each subsequent day of training to take food from hand I held food items at 
increasing distances from the front of the cage. On days 4-6 (i.e. the first three 
days on which food was offered by hand) I presented food items through the front 
of the cage. On day 7 I presented food items approximately10cm from the front of 
the cage, approximately 20cm on day 8 and approximately 30cm on day 9. This 
encouraged animals to reach out of the cage to take food, a desired behaviour in 
later studies. The hole through which animals were encouraged to extend their 
arm was small (only one arm could be extended through it at one time), and was 
positioned towards the bottom of the cage (approximately 40cm from the floor). 
The position and size of the aperture prevented animals from being able to reach 
out to grab personnel at other times. In order to track ongoing behavioural 
habituation, data were also collected on days 20, 30 and 40, for comparison with 
data from days 1-3. 
 
2.3.3 Data analysis 
Habituation data were longitudinal, recorded as the number of monkeys who 
responded to a previously unfamiliar human with a particular behaviour 
(aggressive, submissive, cooperative or variable) on each day of the habituation 
phase. These data were assessed for normality using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
which showed all data were normally distributed, and were analysed using a 
Pearson’s correlation. Longitudinal training latency data were also assessed using 




Approximate median splits were used to group monkeys for each of age (older: 
10+ years, versus younger: <10 years) and duration of single housing (short-term: 
<2.5 years, versus longer-term: 2.5+years). Monkeys were also divided into two 
groups according to whether they showed evidence of behavioural habituation or 
not (habituated versus non-habituated).  
 
Fisher’s Exact tests were conducted to test whether age, duration of single 
housing or habituation influenced performance for learning to enter a testing cage 
and learning to perform operant responses to stimuli shown on a touch sensitive 
monitor. Data were categorical variables of group (e.g. older versus younger for 
age; long-term versus short term for duration of single housing; and habituated 
versus non-habituated for behavioural habituation) and performance (criterion 
met: yes/no). For each factor (age, housing, habituation), data were entered into a 
2 x 2 contingency table, and a Fisher’s Exact test was conducted. Fisher’s Exact 
test is a conservative form of χ
2 
which is calculated according to the difference of 
the observed cell values from the expected cell values for the null hypothesis. 
Fisher’s Exact is a suitable alternative to χ
2 
when cell values fall below 5, as is the 
case with a small sample size (Sokal & Rohlf, 1995).  
 
Age-related and habituation-related differences in performance were assessed 
using one-tailed tests since previous studies indicate increased age is associated 
with impaired cognitive performance. A lack of habituation should logically result 
in impaired performance on a cognitive task, although there are no published data 
on this. The influence of duration of single housing on performance was assessed 
using two-tailed tests since these analyses were exploratory with regards to the 
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effects of short term (acute) stress versus longer term (chronic) stress. An unequal 
spread of data meant it was not possible to assess quantitative effects of 
temperament on performance. Therefore data on the influence of temperament on 
performance are descriptive only. 
 
2.4 Results: 
2.4.1 Habituation  
The number of monkeys who responded aggressively, submissively or 
cooperatively on each of days 1-9 are shown in Figure 2.1. A Pearson’s 
correlation revealed a significant increase in the number of monkeys who 
responded cooperatively to a previously unfamiliar human’s approach to the cage 
from day 1 to day 9 of habituation (r = 0.721, n = 9, P = 0.028). 
 
There was a significant decrease in the number of monkeys who responded 
aggressively from day 1 to day 9 of habituation (r = -0.758; n = 9; P = 0.018), but 
no significant change in the number of monkeys who responded submissively      
(r = 0.333; n = 9; P = 0.382).  
 
The data collected on days 20, 30 and 40 following the start of habituation are 
also shown in Figure 2.1. The nine monkeys who responded with predominantly 
cooperative behaviour on two or more of days 20, 30 and 40 were deemed to have 
met the criterion for behavioural habituation to have occurred. The remaining 12 
monkeys did not meet the criterion for behavioural habituation as defined here. 
Four of the 12 monkeys (C55, M232, 94E & 94K) showed varied response 
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patterns, responding cooperatively on one of the three days but not on the other 
two. Five monkeys (O22, X57, 45A, 92R & AI73) responded aggressively on all 
three days, and three monkeys (T52, 66S & 79S) responded submissively on all 
three days. These results indicate there are inter-individual differences in 
behavioural responses to the investigator’s approach. These differences remained 
largely consistent throughout the research period (pers obs).  
 
In summary, there was an increase in the number of monkeys who demonstrated 
predominantly cooperative behaviours when a previously unfamiliar human 
approached the cage from day 1 to day 9 of the habituation phase. This was 
accompanied by a reduction in the number of monkeys who responded with 
predominantly aggressive behaviours. Criterion for behavioural habituation was 
cooperative responses on two or more of days 20, 30 and 40 after the start of 
habituation. Nine monkeys met this criterion. 
 
2.4.1.1 The effects of age, duration of single housing and temperament  
The age, years spent in single housing and temperament for each monkey are 
shown in Table 2-2. There was no significant difference between age groups in 
the number of monkeys who met criterion for behavioural habituation (4/11 older 
monkeys versus 5/10 younger monkeys: Fisher’s Exact, P=0.670). There was also 
no effect of duration of single housing on behavioural habituation (5/9 short-term 
versus 4/12 longer-term: Fisher’s Exact, P=0.28). 
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Figure 2.1 The number of monkeys who responded aggressively, submissively or cooperatively on the first nine days of habituation and 
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Table 2-2 Individual training outcomes for habituation, cage- and touchscreen training. ‘1’ indicates task was learnt to criterion. ‘0’ indicates 
task was not learnt to criterion. Median split for age shown by solid line. LT: long term confinement in single housing; ST: short-term single 
housing (dashed lines represent median spilt for confinement for either age group). 
ID 
 Age (yrs) Years captive 















O22 17.80 LT     (11.0) Agg 0 0
~ 
- 
M232 15.50 LT     (13.5) Sub 0
~ 
0 - 
X57 14.90 LT       (3.9) Agg 0 0 - 
66D 11.33 LT       (2.5) Sub 1 1 0 




G62 22.80 ST       (1.9) Agg 1 1 0 
T52† 15.80 ST       (1.8) Coop 0 - - 
45A 13.20 ST       (2.0) Agg 0 0
~ 
- 
29C 12.05 ST       (2.0) Sub 1 1 1
[3] 






86O 5.30 LT       (3.0) Coop 1 1 1
[12] 
92R 4.75 LT       (2.5) Agg 0 1 1
[13] 
79T 3.65 LT       (2.5) Coop 1 1 1 
[4] 
AI73 3.60 LT       (2.5) Agg 0 1 1 
[4] 
06H 9.90 ST       (1.9) Agg 1 1 1
[13]` 
16P 5.15 ST       (0.1) Agg 1 1 1 
[9] 
27S 4.66 ST       (2.4) Sub 1 1 1
[12] 
66S 3.80 ST       (1.6) Sub 0 1 1 
[5] 
79S 3.70 ST       (1.6) Sub 0 1 1
[11] 
Success rate (%)  42.86 80.00 81.25 
†Removed from study on medical grounds; ~ Showed some evidence of learning but failed to reach criterion; - Did not begin training; [x] the number 
of trials required to reach criterion; [NRT] Negative Reinforcement Training was required to reach criterion 
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Monkeys were scored for temperament on the basis of predominant behavioural 
responses to human approach on days 1-9 and days 20, 30 and 40. The most 
frequent behavioural response across the 12 days was taken as that most reflective 
of a given monkey’s temperament. Monkeys were categorised as aggressive 
(n=10), submissive (n=6) and cooperative (n=4: Table 2-2). One monkey 
responded variably and did not have a predominant behavioural response (C55: 
‘variable’). 
 
In summary, a total of nine monkeys met criterion for behavioural habituation to a 
previously unfamiliar human. This was not affected by age or duration of single 
housing. A global examination of behavioural responses over days 1-9 and days 
20, 30 and 40 identified monkeys who predominantly responded in an aggressive, 
submissive and cooperative manner respectively.  
 
2.4.2 Introduction to Positive Reinforcement Training (PRT) 
Twenty of the 21 monkeys learned to take chow from my hand within the 1 
minute (first chow) and two-second (second chow) intervals, on each of days 4-9 
during the habituation phase. On day 4 (the first day that food was offered by 
hand) the 20 monkeys took both chow from my hand on 70% of trials. Of these, 
nine monkeys took both chow on all trials, five monkeys took both chow on over 
50% of trials, three monkeys took both chow on less than 50% of trials and four 
monkeys failed to collect both chow on any trial. On day 5 the 20 monkeys took 
both chow on a total of 81% of trials. On days 6-9, 20 monkeys took both chow 
on 100% of trials. One monkey never took food from my hand and was removed 
from the study at the end of habituation due to illness. In summary, 20 monkeys 
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learned to take food from my hand over a six day period and appeared familiar 
with the association of secondary reinforcing clicks and delivery of food. These 
20 monkeys were considered suitable for PRT to enter a cage. 
 
Aim 2: Training monkeys to enter a testing cage  
2.5 Methods 
2.5.1 Animals & Apparatus: 
Twenty rhesus macaques participated in training to enter a transport cage for 
relocation to a testing area in later studies. The metal testing cage measured 0.6 x 
0.8 x 0.6m. The sliding door to the testing cage was positioned so that it was level 
with the door of the home cage. Animals were tested in the same order on each 
day of training starting at 0700hrs, at least 30mins after the daily cleaning routine 
for the enclosure had been completed by a member of care-staff. 
 
2.5.2 Procedure: 
2.5.2.1 Days 10-24: Positive Reinforcement Training (PRT) to enter a 
testing cage 
I used PRT to encourage monkeys to enter the testing cage and remain there to 
feed on the daily food ration. To do this, I positioned the testing cage in front of 
the home cage, placed two chow on top of the testing cage in view of the monkey, 
and stood behind the testing cage holding a stop watch and small food rewards 
(Figure 2.2a). Chow could not be pulled through the bars. However its presence 
encouraged monkeys to enter the cage.  
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PRT was used to shape monkeys’ behaviour. Initially, if the monkey made any 
move towards the testing cage I gave a secondary reinforcing click and offered a 
chow through the aperture at the back of the testing cage. Using this approach, 
behaviour was shaped gradually so that only when the monkey touched, then 
partially entered and finally fully entered the cage was he rewarded with 
secondary and primary reinforcers. 
 
On each day of training each monkey’s progress was scored according to the 
degree to which he entered the cage. Entrance to the testing cage was scored as 0 
(no part of the monkey passes through the testing cage door), 0.25 (head and 
shoulders pass through testing cage door but no limb passes through), 0.5 (head, 
shoulders and one or more arms pass through testing cage door: Figure 2.2b), 0.75 
(head, shoulders, forearms and at least one hind limb enter testing cage) and 1.00 
(animal enters testing cage fully so that the door may be closed: Figure 2.2c). On 
each subsequent day of training, the monkey was only rewarded for each approach 
that scored equal to or above the highest score for the previous day. The rate at 
which PRT progressed was adjusted for each individual according to their 
progress.  
 
When a monkey fully entered the testing cage so that the door could be closed I 
immediately reinforced the behaviour with the delivery of the remainder of the 
















Figure 2.2 Cage training. a) the testing cage (right) is positioned in front of the home cage (left). Food on top of the cage encourages the monkey 
to enter. The door to the testing cage is pulled upwards to allow the monkey to enter. b) The monkey moves from the home cage to the testing 
cage. c)  The monkey collects his reward while the testing cage door is closed. 
 
 a             b              c 
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On the first few days the cage was moved to the end of the enclosure, which 
allowed full view of a neighbouring corral of 100+ rhesus macaques. While in the 
new location the monkey was further rewarded with an additional preferred food 
(grapes, maize or juice in place of water). Animals were allowed to feed for 20 
minutes, uninterrupted and observed from a distance. This was repeated until a 
monkey appeared relaxed on entering the cage and while being transported to the 
end of the enclosure.  
 
Once a monkey appeared relaxed while being transported within the enclosure, on 
subsequent days the monkey was then transported in the cage to the laboratory, 
where each monkey was left to feed undisturbed in front of the operant training 
apparatus. The laboratory was a windowless room measuring 3 x 4 x 5m with a 
high degree of soundproofing. Chow rations were always adjusted where 
additional preferred foods were offered. A record was kept of the time taken for 
each monkey to enter the testing cage on each day. Criteria for successful training 
were identified as voluntary entry to the cage on three consecutive days for 
transportation to the laboratory. Each monkey was trained daily. 
 
If a monkey did not fully enter the cage during the five minute PRT phase the 
daily food ration was placed inside the testing cage. The monkey was then left to 
feed, uninterrupted, for a further five minutes. The door was kept open during this 
time. No attempt was made to close the door if the monkey fully entered the 
testing cage after the daily food ration had been delivered.  
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2.5.2.2 Days 25+: Introduction of negative reinforcement training 
Negative reinforcement training was employed for monkeys who failed to learn to 
enter the testing cage fully during the PRT phase. The testing cage was presented 
in front of the home cage as before. The monkey was allowed to enter the cage for 
one minute, and reinforced for fully entering the cage as above (door closed, full 
food ration given, positioned in view of social information). Where a monkey did 
not fully enter the testing cage within one minute the investigator and the 
enrichment officer used the squeeze-back to reduce the size of the home cage 
progressively and encourage the monkey to enter the testing cage. This is the 
method by which care staff at the Sabana Seca Field Station immobilise animals 
in the home cage for venipuncture prior to handling. Entry to the testing cage was 
immediately reinforced with the delivery of the daily food ration and additional 
preferred foods, the door was closed and the testing cage positioned in view of the 
neighbouring corral. This was repeated on three daily testing sessions. On the 
fourth session the testing cage was presented for 5 minutes as in the exploratory 
phase, with food items on show but out of reach. If an animal did not enter the 
cage fully during this time the squeeze-back was employed again as described. 
 
NRT was continued until a monkey entered the testing cage without the need for 
negative reinforcement procedures. Where a monkey showed extreme resistance 
to the training procedures an assessment was made of progress and training was 
ceased where this was considered the most ethical move. Following three 
consecutive days on which the monkey entered the cage following NRT, PRT was 




2.6.1 Cage-training success 
Sixteen of the 20 monkeys learned to enter the testing cage for a food reward 
(Table 2-2). Fourteen monkeys learned to enter the testing cage for a food reward 
following PRT alone (3.7 ± 2.79 daily PRT training sessions, range: 1-9: Figure 
2.3) and two monkeys learned to enter the cage consistently for a small food 
reward following both PRT and NRT (14 daily PRT training sessions followed by 
11 [06H] and four [L03] daily NRT training sessions). Four monkeys failed to 
learn the task. 45A and O22 occasionally entered the cage for a small food reward 
following both PRT and NRT, but failed to reach criterion. X57 and M232 failed 
to enter the cage fully for a food reward during either PRT or NRT, usually 
keeping one limb in the home cage so the door could not be closed. The four 
monkeys who did not reach criterion were removed from the study. 
 
2.6.1.1 The effects of age, duration of single housing and habituation  
There was a significant difference between the younger and older age groups in 
training success (10/10 younger versus 6/10 older monkeys: Fisher’s Exact, P = 
0.04, one-tailed: Table 2-2). There was no effect of duration in single housing on 
training success (7/8 short-term versus 9/12 longer-term, Fisher’s Exact, P= 0.62). 
There was a non-significant trend for monkeys who demonstrated behavioural 
habituation to have greater success in learning to enter the cage than did monkeys 
who did not show behavioural habituation (9/9 versus 7/11 respectively: Fisher’s 
Exact, P = 0.07, one-tailed). 
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Figure 2.3 The number of daily training sessions required for each monkey to learn to enter the testing cage following PRT (grey bars – 
begun on day 10) and NRT (black bars – begun on day 25 for monkeys who did not learn using PRT within the time frame). x indicates 
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A Pearson’s correlation revealed a significant negative correlation between day of 
training and latency to enter the cage (r = -0.895, n=22, P<0.001: Figure 2.4). 
Latency to enter the testing cage decreased from a group average of 165 seconds 
on the first day on which each monkey fully entered the cage (169 ± 187 seconds 
older group; 162 ± 190 seconds younger group), to a group average of 19 seconds 




Figure 2.4 Latency (seconds) to enter the testing cage over training sessions.  
Daily training session

































When grouped according to temperament, 7/10 aggressive, 4/6 submissive and 3/3 
cooperative monkeys learned to enter the testing cage.  
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In summary, 16 monkeys learned to enter the testing cage. Fourteen of these 
learned after PRT alone. Younger monkeys were significantly more likely to learn 
to enter the testing-cage within the given time than were older monkeys, and there 
was a non-significant trend for monkeys who demonstrated behavioural 
habituation to be more likely to learn to enter the cage within the training phase 
than monkeys who did not show behavioural habituation. All monkeys became 
faster to enter the cage throughout the training phase. 
 
Aim 3: Training monkeys to perform operant responses to stimuli 
shown on a touch-sensitive monitor 
2.7 Methods 
2.7.1 Animals & Apparatus 
The 16 male rhesus macaques who had been trained to enter a testing cage for 
transportation to the laboratory participated in training to respond to stimuli 
presented on a computer monitor (Figure 2.5). During the first phase of training, a 
15inch training monitor was used to avoid risk of damage to the touch-sensitive 
monitor to be used in the later studies. The training monitor was placed in the 
wooden casing which would ultimately house the touch-sensitive monitor (Figure 
2.5a). All other aspects of the apparatus were set up and functioning as they would 
be during the main experimental studies. These comprised a solenoid-operated 
lunch box for delivery of the daily food ration (purpose built for the study at the 
Department of Psychology, Oxford University), an automatic pellet dispenser 
(Biomed Associates Pedestal 45mg mount dispenser, ENV-203), a pellet tray for 
delivery of pellets, and a plastic chute from dispenser to tray (Figure 2.5b and c).  
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Figure 2.5 Laboratory apparatus. a) Touchscreen in wooden casing. b) Lunch box containing part of daily food ration. c) Pellet tray into 






The training stimulus comprised a white square measuring 40mm x 40mm. 
Stimuli were presented at one of five locations on the training monitor using a 
Toshiba Satellite Pro A60 laptop computer. This laptop was also used to trigger 
the pellet dispenser and to remotely open the lunch box at the end of each session. 
During the initial training phase, I was positioned to the right of the apparatus 
where I could observe progress, yet was out of the view of the monkey.  
 
2.7.2 Procedure 
On the first day of training to use the apparatus I covered the computer monitor 
with honey and leaves, to encourage the monkey to reach out and touch the 
screen. The testing cage was positioned at a distance of 30cm from the monitor. I 
sat to the side of the cage with the laptop, which was used to trigger secondary 
reinforcing tones, and from where I could manually trigger the pellet dispenser to 
deliver one pellet down the chute for each screen press. Tones and pellets were 
delivered immediately after each touch to the screen. 
 
Each training session lasted for a maximum of 20 minutes or until a monkey had 
performed 50 screen presses. At the end of the session a second tone was sounded 
to signal the end of the session and the lunch box was manually triggered to open 
to allow access to the daily food ration. Each monkey was then left to feed for 20 
minutes in front of the screen, until the majority, or all, of the food ration had 
been consumed. 
 
The number of leaves and amount of honey placed on the screen at the start of 
each session was reduced over consecutive days until no honey or leaves were 
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required. The rate of reduction was adjusted individually for each monkey 
according to speed of learning. Once a monkey was repeatedly touching the 
computer monitor in order to gain pellets, with no signs of frustration and without 
the need of initial prompts, an onscreen stimulus was introduced. The stimulus 
was a white square measuring 40mm x 40mm. Touches to the screen were now 
only reinforced with delivery of the tone and pellet when they occurred at the 
location of the stimulus. Criterion was reached when a monkey performed 30 
correct responses within a 20 minute window.  
 
Once a monkey had reached criterion and was working consistently and calmly 
with the training apparatus, the computer monitor was replaced with the touch-
sensitive screen that would be used during the main experiments. Performance on 
the task was monitored for a further three days to ensure monkeys were working 
effectively and safely with the touch-sensitive screen. Once monkeys were 
working with the touch-sensitive monitor I observed progress from a video 
monitor in an adjacent room. 
 
2.8 Results 
Thirteen monkeys learned to touch a white square stimulus presented on a 
computer monitor in order to receive a small food reward (Table 2-2, final 
column). One monkey (G62) failed to touch the stimulus, one monkey (66D) 
touched the stimulus initially but failed to maintain performance. A third monkey 
(L03) was removed from the study due to poor health. 
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2.8.1 The effects of age, duration of single housing and habituation 
There was a significant difference between the younger and older age groups in 
training success (10/10 younger versus 3/6 older monkeys: Fisher’s Exact, P = 
0.04, one-tailed; Table 2-2). There was no effect of duration in single housing on 
training success (6/7 short-term versus 7/9 longer-term, Fisher’s Exact, P=1.00), 
nor was there an effect of habituation (6/7 habituated versus 7/9: Fisher’s Exact,  
P = 0.684). 
 
In summary, thirteen monkeys learned to touch a white square presented on a 
computer monitor in order to gain a pellet reward. Younger monkeys were 
significantly more likely to learn the task within the given time span than were 
older monkeys. There were no effects of duration of single housing or habituation 
on training success. 
 
2.9 Discussion 
In Part A of this chapter I presented the methods used to train adult male rhesus 
macaques to undertake operant procedures in a laboratory setting, along with 
training success for monkeys of different ages and captive histories. The general 
aim of the animal training procedures reported here was to establish a working 
laboratory of ~12 singly-housed adult male rhesus macaques. This aim was 
achieved. Of the 21 monkeys who participated in training, 13 learned all tasks up 
to, and including, touching a stimulus presented on a touch-sensitive monitor. 
These 13 monkeys were considered suitable to take part in experiments examining 
the effects of emotion state on cognition using computer-based methods. A further 
three monkeys (G62, L03 and 66D) learned to enter the testing cage and were 
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suitable for inclusion in studies which did not involve operant responses using the 
touch-screen. Here, I discuss the significance of the training stages employed to 
train adult male rhesus macaques to perform a range of tasks necessary for 
participation in the experiments reported in this thesis.  
 
Nine rhesus macaques demonstrated behavioural habituation to the presence of a 
previously unfamiliar human, as defined by an increase in predominantly 
cooperative behaviours over nine days. This pattern remained consistant 20, 30 
and 40 days later. There was a non-significant trend for monkeys who 
demonstrated behavioural habituation to demonstrate greater success in learning 
to enter a testing cage within the time span of the training phase used here. 
‘Habituated’ monkeys were no more likely to learn to work with the touchscreen 
than monkeys who did not meet the criteria for behavioural habituation. The 
results of this study suggest that monkeys who predominantly respond to a human 
in a cooperative manner may demonstrate a tendency for enhanced ability, or 
speed, to learn tasks where a human is present, but may not demonstrate enhanced 
success in tasks where a human is not immediately present.  
 
Twenty monkeys were categorised as aggressive (n=10), submissive (n=6) or 
cooperative (n=4: one of whom was removed from the study for health reasons) 
based on their predominant behavioural responses to a previously unfamiliar 
human. This finding supports previous work which suggests macaques exhibit 
stable personality traits. For example, Capitanio (1999) investigated persistent 
temperamental differences in male rhesus macaques. Monkeys rated as 
‘confident’ (aggressive) in one environment were more likely to engage in 
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aggressive behaviours under a new set of environmental conditions. The uneven 
distribution of monkeys between the three classes of temperament identified in the 
current research made analyses unviable, therefore these data remained 
descriptive. 
 
Learning success of the monkeys who took part in training to work in the 
laboratory was generally good. Twenty monkeys learned to associate the 
secondary reinforcer with food. Initially monkeys learned that on taking a food 
item from a human’s hand a secondary reinforcer (‘click’) signalled that a primary 
reinforcer (a second food item) would be delivered shortly. The learnt association 
of secondary reinforcer with primary reinforcer was carried over to train monkeys 
successfully to enter the testing cage for transportation to the laboratory (n=16) 
and respond to stimuli presented on a touch sensitive monitor (n=13). The 
majority of monkeys responded to PRT alone. NRT was attempted with six 
monkeys who failed to enter the testing cage, and only two of these monkeys 
subsequently learnt the task. It is likely, therefore, that PRT alone may provide a 
successful means of training most rhesus macaques to perform tasks in a 
laboratory setting.  
 
The training data presented here highlight the role of the processes of habituation, 
learning associations between primary reinforcers (unconditioned stimuli such as 
food), learning about secondary reinforcers (conditioned bridging stimuli such as 
the verbal ‘click’) and successive approximation (shaping) techniques, in training 
animals to perform complex tasks (Prescott, Bowell & Buchanan-Smith 2005; 
Laule, Bloomsmith & Schapiro, 2003). The animals who participated in this study 
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had never previously worked in a laboratory setting nor undergone behavioural 
training. Therefore, the procedures were new to all animals.   
 
Age had a significant influence on some aspects of learning, in support of 
previously published data. Younger monkeys were more likely to learn tasks 
during the training phase than older monkeys. However, there was large inter-
individual variation in learning success and both the oldest and youngest animals 
completed all stages of training. For example, age was a good predictor of cage-
training success. All younger monkeys learned to enter the testing cage (10/10), 
while significantly fewer older monkeys (6/10) learned the same task. Age also 
predicted success in operant training. All younger monkeys (10/10) learned to 
touch a stimulus presented on a computer monitor, while significantly fewer older 
monkeys (3/6) learned the same task. The overall training success for younger 
monkeys was therefore 100% (10/10), while the overall training success for older 
monkeys was only 30% (3/10). The differences may be due to cognitive decline in 
older monkeys such that older monkeys are no longer capable of learning the 
tasks (Bartus et al., 1979), reduced speed of learning such that older monkeys 
required longer than the training phase used here to learn the tasks (Rapp, 1990), 
or covariates of age such as temperament, duration of single housing or 
pathologies not identified in the current studies. 
 
Duration of single housing did not influence training success on any tasks. This is 
in contrast to previous studies which show that single housing leads to stress in 
non-human animals which, in turn, may impair cognition (e.g. Mendl, 1999; 
Schapiro et al., 2000). However, the data do not allow us to distinguish shorter-
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term (acute) and longer-term (chronic) single-housing-related stress effects since 
both may lead to impaired learning. Further the division of animals according to a 
median split may not present an accurate categorization of ‘short term’ or ‘long 
term’ housing. 
 
Speed of progression through successive approximations of behaviour varied 
between animals. Fast progression in one phase of training did not reliably 
indicate fast progression on the subsequent aspect of training. The rate of 
progression through each training stage was individually tailored according to 
each individual’s apparent comfort in performing the current task and response to 
the incremental changes in task difficulty. 
 
In summary, the protocols described here were effective for training 
experimentally naïve rhesus macaques aged between 3.6 and 24.7 years, to work 
in a laboratory environment on a range of tasks: from entering a testing-cage to 
responding to stimuli presented on a touch sensitive monitor. Older monkeys (>10 
years) may be less suited to training than younger monkeys (<10 years). 
Individual differences may necessitate flexible training procedures tailored to the 
training needs of each monkey.  
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Part B: Development of stimuli and refinement of the operant 
procedures 
2.10 Introduction 
Here, I describe the development of stimuli suitable for testing cognitive 
processes in rhesus macaques, and describe the refinement of the operant training 
procedures specific to each of the experimental studies presented in Chapters 4-6 
of the thesis. To begin, I give a brief summary of the primate visual system and 
the implications of morphological and functional similarity to the human visual 
system for the development of visual stimuli and paradigms. 
 
2.10.1 Developing stimuli suitable for use with primates 
Primates have been widely used in studies that use images presented on a 
computer monitor. In particular, pictures of conspecific faces have been validated 
for use in a range of laboratory studies with rhesus macaques (Perrett & Mistlin, 
1990). Rhesus macaques will attend to pictures of conspecific faces on a computer 
screen, and may respond to face pictures with species-typical socioemotional 
behaviours (Perrett & Mistlin, 1990; Capitanio, 1999). These responses are 
species-specific so that animals respond differently to pictures of conspecific 
faces than they do to pictures of other species (Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1998; 
Humphrey, 1974; Dahl et al., 2009). Rhesus macaques look longer towards some 
conspecific faces than they do towards others (female rhesus macaque preference 
for male sexual skin coloration: Waitt et al., 2003), look preferentially towards 
conspecific faces than towards other areas of the body, with greatest interest in the 
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eye region (Nahm et al., 1997; Dahl et al., 2009), and demonstrate holistic face-
processing in a comparable manner to humans, as evidenced by disrupted 
processing of inverted faces (Dahl et al., 2009). Further, there is evidence that 
some primates can distinguish between different facial expressions of emotion in 
pictures of conspecific faces in match-to-sample tests (chimpanzees: Parr, 2001; 
rhesus macaques: Parr & Heintz, 2009) and crossmodal identification looking 
paradigms (rhesus macaques: Ghazanfar & Logothetis, 2003).  
 
The primate visual system is similar to the human visual system and rhesus 
macaques are a widely-used primate model of human visual system function 
(Calder, 2007; Rolls, 2007). Human and other old world anthropoids, such as 
rhesus macaques, have trichromatic colour vision, due to the presence of three 
types of colour-sensitive cones in the retina (Jacobs, 1996). Humans and other 
primates have direct magnocellular and parvocellular neural pathways from the 
retina to subcortical (magnocellular) and cortical (parvocellular) brain regions 
(Laycock et al., 2008). The magnocellular pathway incorporates the amygdala 
among other subcortical structures and allows rapid appraisal of the threatening 
value of salient stimuli that appear anywhere in the visual field (LeDoux, 1996). 
This rapid, low-level processing of visual information provides a ‘magnocellular 
advantage’ in the detection of threatening stimuli, such as threatening faces, for 
which there is evidence in both humans and primates (Laycock et al., 2008).  
 
Evidence from fMRI studies with humans, and single-cell recordings from rhesus 
macaques, indicates that both humans and rhesus macaques have face-selective 
populations of neurons in the superior temporal sulcus (where information about 
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emotion expression, eye gaze and movement is coded: Rolls, 2007). These 
neurons pass on information about faces to other face-specific populations of 
neurons in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (for further processing of 
identity, emotion expression and other aspects relevant to social communication 
and emotional behaviour. The orbitofrontal cortex also processes social feedback, 
such as changes in facial expression: Rolls, 2007). Data from split-brain monkeys 
with lesion to the corpus callosum demonstrate a right-hemispheric superiority for 
processing faces, as is also seen in humans (Vermeire et al., 1998).  
 
The behavioural and neurophysiological data together demonstrate that colour 
photographs of conspecific faces presented on a computer monitor represent 
salient socio-emotional stimuli to rhesus macaques, which may be processed in a 
manner comparable to that seen in humans. (i.e. there is comparable colour cone 
value, face-specific brain regions that process socio-emotional information from 
faces, and neural pathways that preferentially link the left and right visual fields to 
the right and left hemispheres respectively). Therefore, the use of such stimuli is 
valid in a study of the effects of cognition-emotion interaction with respect to, for 
example, threatening versus non-threatening visual social information, such as 
that conveyed by facial expressions.  
 
Face stimuli were used in two of the three main cognitive studies presented in this 
thesis (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). I collected a separate stimulus set for either 
study so that all stimuli would be novel to each participant monkey at the start of 
each study. For each stimulus set I took digital photographs of male monkeys 
housed at the CPRC (from herein ‘stimulus monkeys’). The stimulus monkeys 
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were housed in enclosures that were out of visual access to the monkeys who were 
to take part in the studies. Therefore, stimulus monkeys were unfamiliar to the 
participant monkeys. Photos were cropped, sized and adjusted for colour and 
brightness using Adobe Photoshop 7. Full details of the stimuli are given in the 
relevant chapters. 
 
For the study presented in Chapter 4, a set of 10 threatening and 10 non-
threatening face pictures was required for the testing sessions. These were to be 
presented in threatening versus non-threatening face pairs on two adjacent 
monitors so that monkeys had a choice of looking towards one of the two faces in 
the pair. I collected a set of 20 face stimuli, with one threatening (open-mouthed 
threat with forward gaze) and one neutral (closed mouth, forward gaze) face for 
each of 10 different stimulus monkeys. The staring open-mouthed face is used by 
rhesus macaques as a threat and a signal of attack (van Hooff, 1976; Chevalier-
Skolnikoff, 1973). A neutral face does not signal threat. However, direct gaze is a 
signal of dominance in rhesus macaques (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973; van Hooff, 
1976). Neutral faces were therefore considered to be non-threatening insofar as 
they were less threatening when presented next to the staring open-mouthed face.  
 
Prior to testing I needed to familiarize the monkeys with the testing apparatus and 
encourage them to look centrally between the screens in between trials and 
towards the screens when stimuli appeared. To do this, monkeys were shown 
colour images of female perinea (rumps) following evidence that male macaques 
visually attend to stimuli containing images of sexual skin (Waitt et al., 2006). A 
series of training stimuli were compiled from colour photographs of 10 female 
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monkeys housed at CPRC, who were unknown to the participant monkeys (see 
Appendix 2). For each of the 10 female monkey identities, one picture with the 
rump in clear view was selected. Female pictures were trimmed so that the full 
body and rump were visible and superimposed on a grey background enclosed in 
a rectangular frame measuring 154mm x 164mm. Female rump stimuli were 
always presented in duplicate so that the same stimulus appeared, in mirror image, 
on both screens on each trial.  
 
For the study presented in Chapter 5, I needed a second set of 10 threatening and 
10 non-threatening face pictures. This study differed from the study in Chapter 4 
since only one face was shown on each trial in Chapter 5, compared with paired 
stimuli in Chapter 4. Therefore, it was important when selecting faces that the 
non-threatening face, when viewed on its own, was unambiguous in its signal as a 
low-threat stimulus. I took digital photographs of a new set of 10 adult male 
stimulus monkeys and, for each stimulus monkey, selected one face picture with 
direct gaze (frontal face with neutral expression and direct gaze) as the threatening 
face and one face with averted gaze as the non-threatening face (profile face with 
neutral expression, looking away from the participant monkey). During the initial 
training phase, for which data are presented here, a grey square stimulus 
measuring 154mm x 164mm was used and no faces were presented. 
 
For the study presented in Chapter 6, abstract stimuli were used, and do not 
require further discussion here.  
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2.11 Methods for the refinement of the operant procedures 
Prior to running each experiment presented in Chapters 4-6, it was necessary to 
train monkeys to criteria in the specific protocols for each study. The order in 
which the studies presented in this thesis progressed was, in large part, determined 
by task difficulty. In this section I briefly describe the training protocol, and 
present training data, for each study, since each differed in terms of operant 
contingencies. Detailed descriptions of the procedures are given in each of 
chapters 4-6, so the following present a summary of the main features of each 
operant procedure. The aim of this section is to present training data and identify 
the processes behind selecting monkeys for inclusion in each of the main 
experimental studies. Where data allow, I explore the effects of age and duration 
of single housing on training success. 
 
2.11.1 Monkey training for Chapter 4: Developing a method to study 
attentional bias in rhesus macaques using eye-gaze 
The 16 monkeys who had learned to enter the testing cage (see Table 2-2) took 
part in training for the study. Training stimuli were matched pairs of photographs 
of female rumps, of the same dimensions as the face stimuli to be used during the 
final study (see Chapter 4 and Appendix 2). Stimuli were presented on two 
computer monitors and the monkey’s gaze towards the stimuli was recorded by a 
video camera placed between the screens. Stimulus pairs were presented for 10 
seconds on each trial. Monkeys were required to look centrally between the 
screens in between each trial and to look towards the screens during each trial. A 
pellet was delivered down a chute to a pellet tray in between the screens to 
encourage monkeys to look centrally. A daily training session consisted of 20 
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trials. Criterion was met if a monkey completed 20 trials within 40 minutes (i.e. 
looked centrally between the screens in between trials). This study presented 
monkeys with two stimuli on each trial and required no operant response. 
 
2.11.2 Monkey training for Chapter 5: Developing a method to study 
emotion evaluation using basic operant responding 
The 13 monkeys who learned to touch the white square presented on the touch-
sensitive monitor (see Table 2-2) took part in training for the study. The training 
stimulus was a grey square, of the same dimensions as the stimuli used in the final 
study (Chapter 5). The grey square was presented for 60 seconds at one of three 
locations on the screen (left visual field: LVF; right visual field: RVF; or 
centrally). If the monkey touched the grey square within the 60 seconds he was 
rewarded with a pellet via the chute and the next trial began. Correct responses 
were eventually rewarded on only 40% of correct responses (reduced over trials 
from an initial 100% fixed reinforcement ratio: 100%FRR). A daily training 
session lasted 80 trials or 40 minutes, whichever occurred sooner. Criterion was 
met when a monkey made 80 correct responses within 40 minutes on three 
consecutive days. This procedure required monkeys to respond to one stimulus on 
each trial with one operant response. 
 
2.11.3 Monkey training for Chapter 6: Developing a method to study 
judgement bias using a ‘Go-NoGo’ paradigm 
The 13 monkeys who learned to touch the white square presented on the touch-
sensitive monitor took part in training for this study. Monkeys were required to 
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learn that touching one stimulus (e.g. a long line) led to a pellet reward, and that 
touching another stimulus (e.g. a short line) led to a punisher (white noise and a 
delay until the onset of the next trial). Stimuli were presented for 2 seconds on 
each trial. Criterion was met when monkeys made correct responses on 80% of 




Individual training data for task success (whether it was learnt or not) and number 
of daily training sessions to reach criteria are presented in Table 2-3.  
 
2.12.1 Training success during the development of a method to study 
attentional bias presented in Chapter 4 
Fifteen out of 16 monkeys looked towards pictures of female rumps presented on 
two monitors and looked centrally between the two monitors in between trials. 
These monkeys completed 20 trials within 40 minutes each and therefore met 
criterion for inclusion in the study. One monkey (66D) did not look towards the 
pictures presented on the screens nor did he look centrally in between the screens 




Table 2-3 Training success for monkeys learning operant procedures used in the studies presented later in the thesis.  
‘1’ indicates task was learnt to criterion. ‘0’ indicates task was not learnt to criterion. 












Look towards stimuli 
on two screens 
2 stimuli: no response 
Touch stimulus on screen. 
1 stimulus: 1 response 
Go/NoGo (touch or don’t touch) 
stimuli on screen 
2 stimuli: 2 response options 
  C55 24.70 1 1 1
[16] 
0 
  G62 22.80 1 1 0 - 
 L03† 18.90 1 - 0
 
- 
  45a‡ 13.20 0
~ 
1 - - 
  29C 12.05 1 1 1
[3] 
0 
  66D 11.33 1 0 0 - 
  94E 10.15 1 1 1
[16] 
0 
  06H 9.90 1 1 1
[13] 
0 












  92R 4.75 1 1 1
[13] 
0 
  27S 4.66 1 1 1
[12] 
0 
















Success Rate (%) 93.8 81.25 53.85 
†Removed from study on medical grounds;‡Monkey included in study despite poor performance in cage training; ~ Showed some 
evidence of learning but failed to reach criterion; - Did not begin training; [x] the number of trials required to reach criterion;  
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2.12.2 Training success during the development of a method to study 
emotion evaluation presented in Chapter 5 
All 13 monkeys learned to touch a grey square stimulus presented on the touch-
sensitive monitor for a pellet reward on 40% of 80 trials within 40 minutes, and 
all therefore met criterion for entry to the main study. 
 
2.12.3 Training success during the development of a method to study 
judgment bias presented in Chapter 6 
Seven out of 13 monkeys learned to perform the Go-NoGo task to criterion, 
performing at 80% accuracy with at least 70% correct responses on each of the 
‘Go’ and ‘NoGo’ responses respectively. All seven monkeys who learnt the task 
were in the younger age group. None of the three monkeys in the older age group 
learned the task, and this difference between the groups was significant (Fisher’s 
Exact, P=0.03). Of the seven monkeys who learnt the task, there was no 
correlation between age and number of daily training sessions required to reach 
criterion (r=0.227, n=7, P=0.624). 
 
2.13 Discussion 
Sixteen monkeys who had learned to enter a testing cage for transportation to the 
laboratory took part in a selection process for participation in a series of cognitive 
studies. (A further monkey, 45a, failed to regularly enter the cage, but did take 
part in the study presented in Chapter 4 on an ad hoc basis.)  Fifteen out of the 16 
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monkeys learned to look towards pictures of female rumps presented on two 
computer monitors and met criteria to participate in the study of attentional bias 
presented in Chapter 4. Thirteen monkeys who had learned to touch a white 
square presented on a touch sensitive monitor undertook further operant training 
for selection to take part in a simple operant task (Chapter 5). All 13 monkeys 
learned this task. This is unsurprising given the similarity of the task to the 
original operant training task using the white square. The 13 monkeys then 
underwent training on a more complex Go-NoGo task (Chapter 6). Seven of the 
monkeys learned the task. Age was a significant factor in training success since all 
the successful monkeys were in the younger age group. Progression of training 
stages, and training success for the group, are summarized in Figure 2.6. 
 
The data presented in this chapter indicate that rhesus macaques under the age of 
10 years are the most suitable candidates for training to take part in cognitive 
testing. Younger monkeys had higher training success rates and also learnt tasks 
in anything between a few daily testing sessions and a month of training. Within 
the younger age group there were no linear effects of age on speed to train 
suggesting that individual differences may influence training speed more than age 
within the younger age group. Three older monkeys (C55, 29C and 94E) met 
criteria to take part in the simple operant task developed for use in Chapter 5, but 
did not reach criteria in the more complex Go-NoGo task developed for use in 
Chapter 6. This suggests that age is not an absolute predeterminant of training 
success, although it may preclude monkeys from learning more complex cognitive 
tasks within the time frame presented here. 
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Figure 2.6 Overall training outcomes for 21 monkeys who underwent 
training in the basic operant procedures involved in working in a cognitive 
laboratory. (+1)* signifies an additional monkey, 45a, who did not meet 
criterion for successful cage training but did enter the cage on occasion and 
consequently took part in the study presented in Chapter 4.   
 
 









3 General methods 
In this chapter I describe two treatments that were used to manipulate affective 
state in the monkeys who took part in the studies presented in chapters 4-6. A key 
aim of these studies is to assess the relationship between affective state and 
cognition. Two treatments were identified that, it could be inferred, would induce 
positive and negative shifts in affective state, respectively, in male rhesus 
macaques. A week of enrichment was selected as a treatment likely to induce an 
increase in positive affect, and a veterinary health-check was selected as likely to 
induce an increase in negative affect. There are several measures that are widely 
used to assess shifts in inferred affective state in primates based on contextual 
cues. In this chapter I describe two traditional measures (behavioural and 
physiological) that were used to assess relative differences in inferred affective 
state in monkeys following the two treatments (a week of enrichment and a 
health-check).  
 
Published data suggest that introducing environmental enrichment regimes may 
lead to physiological and behavioural changes in primates suggestive of reduced 
arousal and improved welfare (Schapiro et al., 1993; Honess & Marin, 2006b). 
Improved welfare is typically defined and assessed as a reduction in physiological 
and behavioural measures assumed to reflect stress (Honess & Marin, 2006b). A 
reduction in these stress-related measures is taken to indicate a positive shift in 
affective state, however it does not indicate positive affect per se. Measures of 
inferred positive affect in animals are less well understood, or studied, and it is 
unclear what a truly positive marker would be (Boissy et al., 2007). However, 
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based on available data (e.g. Honess & Marin, 2006b), a week of environmental 
enrichment was chosen as a treatment likely to induce a positive shift in affective 
state among singly-housed male rhesus macaques. 
 
Published data indicate that invasive husbandry procedures, such as restraint and 
injection for veterinary purposes, lead to physiological and behavioural changes 
suggestive of increased levels of physiological arousal, and a negative shift in 
affective state (Bercovitch & Clarke, 1995; Ruys et al., 2004; Honess & Marin, 
2006a). At the Caribbean Primate Research Centre (CPRC), where the present 
research was conducted, monkeys undergo a statutory health-check performed by 
the facility veterinarian, once every three months. During the health-check each 
monkey is restrained in the home cage and sedated with an injection of Ketamine 
Hydrochloride (KHCl). This procedure has been shown to act as a physiological 
stressor in captive primates (Ruys et al., 2004; Heistermann et al., 2006). There is 
evidence cortisol measures increase in rhesus macaques following physical 
restraint for injection with KHCl, but not following administration of KHCl to 
monkeys trained to extend an arm for venipuncture (Bentson et al., 2003). This 
suggests that changes in cortisol measures following restraint for injection reflect 
a response to restraint per se, rather than a physiological response induced by the 
presence of KHCl in the system (Fuller et al., 1984; Bentson et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the health-check was adopted as a husbandry treatment that could be 
incorporated into the current research as a treatment likely to induce a negative 




The aim of this chapter is to present data on the influence of two treatments (a 
week of enrichment versus a health-check) on the physiology and behaviour of 
captive male rhesus macaques. A further aim is to discuss what any observed 
differences in physiology and behaviour between the two treatments may tell us 
about possible differences in underlying affective state.  
 
In Part A, I discuss the impact of the enrichment and health-check treatments on 
the physiology of a subset of the monkeys who participated in the cognitive 
studies presented in chapters 4-6. I report on methods used to collect and analyse 
a measure of physiological arousal: excreted metabolites of the corticosteroid 
hormone, cortisol. This is a widely used measure of physiological stress in 
primates, and cortisol levels may be assessed through the measurement of 
excreted faecal glucocorticoids, as has been done for a range of primate species  
(Abbott et al., 2003; Hodges & Heistermann, 2003a; Heistermann et al., 2006; 
Honess & Marin, 2006a; Lane, 2006). I then present data on the impact of the 
enrichment and health-check treatments on the levels of excreted glucocorticoid 
metabolites in the monkeys who took part in this study. I conclude Part A by 
discussing the extent to which the enrichment and health-check treatment 
conditions induced changes in excreted glucocorticoid metabolites indicative of 
the expected changes in affective arousal. 
 
In Part B of this chapter, I discuss the impact of the enrichment and health-check 
treatments on rhesus macaque behaviour. I report on methods used to collect and 
analyse behavioural correlates of inferred affective state: namely self-directed, 
stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours. Self-directed behaviours are a widely 
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used measure of anxiety (a subcomponent of stress that occurs particularly in 
situations of uncertainty) in free-ranging primates (Maestripieri et al., 1992). 
Stereotypical and self-harm behaviours are abnormal behaviours seen only in 
captive animals. They are associated with psychological pathology arising from 
poor housing, rearing or other impaired socio-environmental factors, and are 
widely used by welfare researchers (Novak, 2003; Honess & Marin, 2006a; 
Reinhardt, 2008). 
 
I conclude this chapter with a general discussion of the utility of the two 
treatments (a week of environmental enrichment and a health-check) for inducing 
behavioural and physiological changes indicative of changes in inferred affective 
states in captive male rhesus macaques. 
 
 
Part A: Assessing physiological arousal 
3.1 Introduction 
When an animal encounters a stressor, the classic endocrine response is the 
release of glucocorticoids (GCs: Sapolsky et al., 2000). GCs are a class of steroid 
hormone that plays a role in the regulation of glucose metabolism, immune 
function and inflammatory responses. They are found in nearly all vertebrate 
tissues. Among primates, the physiological component of the stress response 
includes the release of the GC cortisol (Abbott et al., 2003; Lane, 2006). The 
exact functions of the cortisol stress response remain strongly debated (Sapolsky 
et al., 2000) and are beyond the scope of this review. However, there is general 
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agreement that, across vertebrates, the stress response is characterized, in part, by 
elevated levels of circulating GCs, and the immediate and pronounced availability 
of energy afforded by circulating GCs provides increased resources for an 
organism to respond to stimuli, including stressors, with a fight or flight response 
(Sapolsky et al., 2000; Carere et al., 2003; Young et al., 2004).  
 
An important issue in the interpretation of GC measures is that they indicate 
physiological arousal, and are non-specific with respect to affective state. 
Therefore, while anxiety is, in part, characterized by an increase in GC levels, not 
all increases in GC levels reflect increased anxiety. Changes in GC levels have 
been associated with a range of energy-demanding activities not associated with 
stress, such as locomotion (Honess & Marin, 2006a), seasonal reproductive 
activity (sifakas: Fichtel et al., 2007), environmental factors such as minimum 
ambient temperature (baboons: Weingrill et al., 2004), and life-history factors 
such as age (chimpanzees: Anestis et al., 2006). In addition, where changes in 
GCs are assumed to reflect a stress-related response, factors such as initial basal 
levels, speed and extent of response and time taken for GC levels to return to 
baseline are all factors that vary between individuals, for example as a function of 
dominance rank (Sapolsky, 1982).  
 
Circulating GCs show marked circadian patterns of release over the 24 hour cycle 
with peak levels in the early morning and a nadir at night (humans: Stone et al., 
2001; rhesus macaques: Jacoby et al., 1974). GC levels also change throughout 
the year with generally higher levels during colder months than warmer months 
(humans: Persson et al., 2008; baboons: Weingrill et al., 2004). Therefore, these 
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factors must be considered when assessing changes in GCs over days, months or 
years. 
 
The general pathway of the endocrine response to stress, the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal axis, is shown in Figure 3.1. A physical or psychological stressor 
causes the hypothalamus to release corticotrophin-releasing factor (CRF). CRF 
binds to specific receptors on anterior pituitary cells, triggering the release of 
adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH). ACTH is transported in the blood from the 
pituitary to the adrenal glands, stimulating the secretion of GCs from the adrenal 
cortex (Sapolsky et al., 2000). GCs (along with other hormones such as 
epinephrine, norepinephrine and glucagon) function to mobilise energy resources 
(glucose, amino acids and free fatty acids) from storage tissues.  
 














The increase in circulating cortisol levels initiates a series of metabolic effects 
aimed at alleviating the harmful effects of physiological stress through negative 
feedback to both the hypothalamus and the anterior pituitary. This negative 
feedback decreases the concentration of ACTH and cortisol in the blood once the 
state of stress subsides. Circulating plasma GCs are ultimately passed to the liver 
where they are converted to soluble, non-specific, metabolites and excreted in 
urine and faeces. A negative feedback mechanism functions to return circulating 
hormones to baseline levels once a stressor has passed (Sapolsky et al., 2000). 
 
There are well-developed and validated techniques for analysing cortisol levels in 
primates. Circulating cortisol levels are typically measured directly from blood 
plasma (e.g. Clarke et al., 1988), or indirectly from saliva (e.g. Lutz et al., 2000). 
Circulating GCs show a rapid pattern of response, reflecting changes in GC levels 
over minutes or hours. Blood and salivary GC levels therefore provide valuable 
information about specific physiological responses to known stressors and may 
capture changes in GCs over short, as well as longer, periods of time. Such ‘point 
sampling’ techniques require stressful capture, training to present a limb for blood 
draw, or to chew on a swab so that saliva may be collected. These methods are 
invasive and prone to confounding results by inducing stress. Where changes in 
stress levels over hours, days, weeks or months are of interest, the use of non-
invasive methods which detect more pervasive cortisol levels is more 
representative, ethical and applicable.  
 
GC metabolites excreted in urine and faeces provide a non-invasive indirect 
measure of physiological arousal (namely the stress response) in a range of taxa 
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including birds, primates and carnivores (Carere et al., 2003; Young et al., 2004; 
Heistermann et al., 2006). Faeces, in particular, may be collected non-invasively 
with simple equipment, both from captive and free-ranging animals (Hodges & 
Heistermann, 2003b; Young et al., 2004; Dubuc et al., 2009). A single faecal 
sample contains GC metabolites (GCMs), which have been converted by the liver 
and excreted over many hours. Faecal samples therefore provide an indirect 
measure of circulating cortisol levels, reflecting cumulative stress of an animal 
over a period of time. These can therefore be used to detect stressful events. For 
example, Bergman et al. (2005) tracked the effects of socially significant events 
on the concentration of GCM in faeces ([fGCM]: [] used to signify concentration 
throughout) in free-ranging chacma baboons over a period of 14 months, using 
data derived from over 400 faecal samples. Arlet et al. (2009) collected a 
comparable number of faecal samples from male gray-cheeked mangabeys for a 
similar analysis over a period of 20 months. Large numbers of samples collected 
non-invasively over time therefore allow the time course of responses to chronic 
(longer lasting), or accumulative, stressors to be assessed.  
 
The assay used here (5β-androstane-3α-11β-diol-17-one) to measure [fGCM] has 
been validated for use with rhesus macaques (Michael Heistermann, pers. comm.), 
and several other primate species, including two further species of macaque 
(Barbary macaque, Macaca sylvanus, and the longtailed macaque, M. fascicularis: 
Heistermann et al. 2006). Here, I describe the methods I applied to measure 
changes in [fGCM] in captive adult male rhesus macaque faeces in response to 





The general aim of Part A is to assess physiological responses to two treatments (a 
week of environmental enrichment versus a health-check) which were used to 
manipulate inferred affective state in the male rhesus macaques that took part in 
the cognitive tests reported later in the thesis. In the health-check treatment 
condition, each monkey underwent the statutory three-monthly health-check 
which involved restraint for sedation with KHCl. Data collected prior to, and 
following, restraint and sedation are labelled Pre- and Post-health-check, 
respectively. This treatment was predicted to induce physiological arousal 
indicative of a stress response. In the enrichment treatment condition, monkeys 
received a week of environmental enrichment. Data collected following the week 
of enrichment are labelled Post-enrichment (although enrichment was maintained 
until the end of all data collection for the enrichment phase). Due to time 
constraints it was not possible to collect samples prior to the start of enrichment, 
therefore a general baseline calculated from samples collected at other times was 
used. The enrichment treatment was expected to induce a reduction in 
physiological arousal. It was anticipated that the effectiveness of the two 




3.1. [fGCM] will increase Post-health-check relative to Pre-health-check levels.  
3.2. [fGCM] will decrease Post-enrichment relative to general baseline levels. 




3.4.1 Animals and treatments 
Faecal samples for analysis of [fGCM] were collected from eight monkeys 
(Monkeys: O22, 06H, 86O, 94K, 92R, 66S, 79S & 79T; X  age: 6yrs±2.7) 
between July 2006 and February 2007. All monkeys were housed at the CPRC, as 
described in Chapter 2.  
 
3.4.1.1 Health-check 
The health check consisted of restraint for sedation by injection with Ketamine 
Hydrochloride (KHCl), followed by a routine veterinary inspection. Immediately 
prior to the veterinary health-check, the dedicated Veterinary Technologist 
(Carlos Pacheco, CP) entered the monkeys’ enclosure with a trolley containing the 
necessary equipment. CP restrained the first monkey in his home cage using the 
squeeze-back mechanism and administered an intramuscular injection of KHCl 
(0.1cc/kg). Once sedated, the monkey was removed from the cage for the 
veterinary health-check (approximately 10 minutes duration per monkey). On 
return to the home cage each monkey was observed until he had recovered from 
the anaesthesia (approximately 15 minutes until mobile), and was then fed the 
daily food ration. The veterinary health-check consisted of weighing, inspection 
of nails, teeth and pelage and administration of a test for Tuberculosis bacteria. 
No further drugs were administered as routine. All monkeys on other medications 




Veterinary health-checks were conducted according to the facility schedule which 
stipulates all monkeys must be examined at three-monthly intervals. All monkeys 
housed within the enclosure were assigned to groups according to the timing of 
their next veterinary health-checks. CP examined all monkeys within a group on 
the same day, at approximately midday (Figure 3.2).  
 
3.4.1.2. Enrichment 
The environmental enrichment treatment involved seven days of environmental 
enrichment in the home cage, followed by a further three days of maintenance 
enrichment concurrent with cognitive testing (Figure 3.3). The week of 
enrichment was used to induce a positive shift in affective state. The three day 
maintenance enrichment concurrent with cognitive testing was included to prevent 
any negative shift in affective state that might be induced by removing the 
enrichment prior to the end of testing. Throughout the thesis, ‘Post-enrichment’ is 
used to refer to the period immediately following the initial seven days of 
enrichment. Enrichments were provided throughout all Post-enrichment testing 
phases until testing had ceased.  
 
On each day of enrichment monkeys were given between one and three 
enrichment devices. Enrichment devices were designed to deliver part of the 
standard daily food ration, and require maximal processing time. Enrichments 
included kong toys containing fruit and leaves frozen in ice, ice lollies of various 
sizes containing part, or all, of the fruit ration and fleece boards holding frozen 
fruit pieces and seeds (Reinhardt, 2008). During the enrichment treatment the 
daily chow ration was always placed on top of the home cage to increase foraging 
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time. Monkeys had to manipulate the chow, or chew them through the holes in 
order to reduce their size so that they would fit through the wire mesh. During the 
maintenance of enrichment concurrent with cognitive testing, devices were always 
delivered in the afternoon, after testing. In addition, extra care was taken to ensure 
the area around the animal housing was kept free of disturbances throughout the 
enrichment phase. 
 
The timings of the environmental enrichment phases were set according to the 
date of the veterinary health-check. Therefore, the week of environmental 
enrichment was always conducted either 10 days before, or 10 days after, the date 
of the veterinary health-check. During the enrichment week, all monkeys housed 
in the enclosure were provided with environmental enrichment, regardless of 
whether they took part in that study or not. Where food enrichments were used, 
daily food rations were adjusted to maintain calorie intake. All procedures were 
approved by, Roehampton University ethics board and CPRC Institutional Animal 
Care and Use Committee, and faecal samples were shipped from Puerto to the UK 
under licence from DEFRA (Appendix 1). 
 
3.4.2 Faecal sample collection 
I collected faecal samples using a protocol adapted from Hodges and Heistermann 
(2003a). Samples were collected around three veterinary health-checks conducted 
between July 2006 and February 2007. Detailed collection protocol is given in 
Appendix 3.1. Cognitive testing was timetabled so that the first day of cognitive 
testing during the health-check treatment was always conducted on the day after 
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the veterinary health-check (Figure 3.2), and the first day of cognitive testing 
during the enrichment treatment was conducted on the day after seven days of 
enrichment had been completed (i.e. day 8: Figure 3.3). 
 
I collected three sets of faecal samples for analysis. One set was collected to 
obtain data about general baseline [fGCM] when no experimental manipulations 
had been conducted. Two sets were collected to obtain data about changes in 
physiological stress in response to the two treatments: Pre- versus Post-health-
check, and general baseline versus Post-enrichment. The number of monkeys 
from whom samples were collected at any one time was determined by time 
constraints imposed by other aspects of the project and the number of animals 
producing solid stools. A pilot study determined that samples could be collected 
efficiently from up to six monkeys on any single day. 
 
Set 1 samples were collected from the eight monkeys according to the schedule 
for the health-check shown in Figure 3.2. Faecal samples were collected for 48 
hours immediately prior to the administration of the stressor (i.e. from day -2 until 
12 noon on day 0: Pre-health-check), and for 80 hours Post-health-check, 
concurrent with cognitive testing (days 1-3). Samples were collected for 80 hours 
Post-health-check aiming to capture the return to baseline [fGCM] following the 
anticipated peak increase Post-health-check (after Heistermann et al., 2006). On 
each day, samples were collected during one morning time block (6am–12 noon) 
and one afternoon time block (12noon-6pm). These data were used to assess 






Figure 3.2 Faecal sample collection timetable during the health-check treatment. Samples were collected for two days (from day -2 pm 
to day 0 am) prior to the health check (conducted on day 0), and for three days Post-health-check, concurrent with any cognitive testing 
(from day 1 to 3). 
 Day 
 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 




















Time blocks for faecal sample collection 
 × Health check (12 noon day 0) 







Figure 3.3 Faecal sample collection timetable used during enrichment treatment. Enrichments were provided for seven days (day -6 to 0, 
and maintained until day 3). Samples were collected for three days (days 1 to 3) concurrent with any cognitive testing (from day 1 to 3). 
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 -6… …-1 0 1 2 3 
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Set 2 samples were collected from the same eight monkeys according to the 
schedule for the Post-enrichment cognitive testing phases between July 2006 and 
February 2007 shown in Figure 3.3. During the Post-enrichment cognitive testing 
phase samples were collected during the same time windows (morning: 6am-12 
noon; afternoon: 12 noon-6pm), concurrent with cognitive testing (days 1-3) for 
80 hours. These data were used to calculate [fGCM] following a week of 
environmental enrichment, and to determine whether this differed significantly 
from general baseline [fGCM] (Hypothesis 3.2). 
 
Set 3 ‘Baseline’ samples were collected from the eight monkeys at intervals 
outside the cognitive testing periods between July 2006 and February 2007. 
Samples were collected during four-day collection blocks on days when no 
stressor or enrichment had been administered, when no experimental sessions 
were conducted, and at least three days (72hrs) after the end of any cognitive 
testing sessions. A 72 hour buffer period was selected to allow [fGCM] to return 
to baseline and stabilise following any response to the experimental manipulations 
(after Heistermann et al., 2006). These samples were used to determine individual 
baseline [fGCM] values against which changes in [fGCM] following the week of 
enrichment were compared (Hypothesis 3.2).  
 
An additional eight samples were collected at random from four of the eight 
monkeys. These samples were used to measure the recovery rate of fGCMs from 





At the end of the research period all tubes containing frozen faecal samples were 
packed upright in foam-insulated shipping crates filled with ice packs for 
transportation to the UK for analysis. Crates were packed with ice-packs and 
shipped under a CITES licence for export of animal derivatives (licence number 
#06US126118/9) and a DEFRA licence for importation of animal pathogens 
(licence number AHZ/2537/2006/2: Appendix 1). On arrival in the UK samples 
were immediately placed in frozen storage at -20
0
C (February 2006) until the 
beginning of the extraction phase (March 2006). 
 
3.4.3 Hormone metabolite extraction and measurement 
To extract GCMs from solid faecal matter, I used a double extraction technique 
adapted from Ziegler et al. (2000). The procedure is given in full in Appendix 3.2. 
The efficiency of the extraction technique was validated by radioactive recovery. 
GCM extraction began within two weeks, and ended within six weeks, of sample 
transportation to the UK. 
 
3.4.3.1 Recovering hormone metabolites from faeces 
The efficacy of an assay must be validated by considering the degree of recovery 
of hormone or metabolite from a given substrate during the extraction procedure 
(Buchanan & Goldsmith, 2004). Eight faecal samples were treated with a 
radioactive label ([6,7,-
3 
H] Oestradiol, 500dpm/50µl) whilst still in the collection 
tubes, prior to running the extraction procedure. The quantity of radioactive label 
found in the resulting supernatant was measured in a beta-gamma scintillation 




therefore gives a measure of the proportion of total GCM present in the original 
sample we may assume to be extracted using the extraction procedure described. 
The full procedure for recovery of labelled fGCM is given in Appendix 3.3. 
 
The average percentage recovery across the eight samples was 104% ± 4%. A 
recovery rate of 100% of the GCMs from the faecal samples was therefore 
assumed in all calculations. 
 
3.4.3.2. Enzymeimmunoassay 
The enzymeimmunoassay (EIA: 5β-androstan-3α-11β-diol-17-one: Appendix 
3.4.) used here has previously been validated for measurement of GCs in non-
human primates (Heistermann et al., 2006) including rhesus macaques (M. 
Heistermann, unpublished data). Each sample was aliquoted, in duplicate, with 
standards, quality controls, reagents and buffers as described in Appendix 3.5.  
 
3.4.3.3. Dilution factors and parallelism  
Two microtitre dilution plates (see Appendix 3.6) were run to test for the most 
appropriate dilution of samples for the linear range of the assay standard curve, 
and to test for parallelism of sample performance to the standard curve. Six 
samples of extract obtained from three monkeys were used, each at five dilutions 
(1/10, 1/20, 1/40, 1/80 and 1/160). For each monkey, one sample expected to have 
a high [fGCM] and one sample expected to have a low [fGCM] were selected 
according to the testing conditions under which the samples were collected. A 
dilution factor of 1/80 produced Optical Density (OD) values that fell within the 




To test for parallelism, OD readings were plotted against dilution factors for the 
sample dilutions and standard concentrations for the standard curve values. The 
dilution series samples mostly, but not all, were parallel to the standard dilution. It 
was therefore desirable that all samples were assayed at the same dilution factor, 
1/80. Some samples (26/444) had to be measured at a dilution of 1/40 in order that 
this fell within the linear range. 
 
3.4.3.4. Assay performance: Intra- and inter-assay variability and sensitivity 
The EIA is sensitive to environmental factors, such as light and temperature, 
which may cause variability in readings across a single plate and between plates. 
To assess degree of intra-assay variation a test plate was run on which 17 high (H) 
and 16 low (L) concentration duplicates were measured (Appendix 3.7). Each pair 
of duplicates was averaged, resulting in 17 H concentration values and 16 L 
concentration values. The coefficient of variation (CV) was calculated as 
CV=(SD/ X )*100 for the 17 mean H values and the 16 mean L values, separately. 
A predetermined value of 10% was used as the maximum acceptable level of 
intra-assay variability for a plate to be accepted as reliable. Intra-assay CVs for 
the test plate were H: 6.32% (n=17) and L: 6.46% (n=16).  
 
To monitor inter-assay variability of the sample plates, four pairs of Quality 
Controls (QCs) were included on each plate (as shown in Appendix 3.5.): two 
pairs of a high concentration (QCH) and two pairs of a low concentration (QCL). 
The coefficient of variation (CV) was calculated for the two sets of QCH and QCL 
across all plates. The criterion level for CV was 15% variability across all plates. 




have internal reliability. Sensitivity of the assay at 90% binding was 116pg/50µl. 
The linear range of the standard curve on plates was 120-1950pg GCM/50µl. 
 
3.4.4 Calculations and presentation of hormonal data 
3.4.4.1. Calculation of [fGCM] 
The [fGCM] (ng fGCM/g faecal matter) for each sample was calculated using the 
following formula: 
 
[fGCM] (ng/g)= ([Sample] pg/50µl x Supernatant volume ml x Dilution factor) 
    (Faecal weight g x Recovery %) 
Where: 
[Sample]=output reading (pg/50µl). 
Supernatant volume=total volume of sample supernatant (ml) following 
extraction. 
Dilution factor=80 (where a dilution factor of 1/80 was used) or 40 (1/40). 
Faecal weight=weight of dried faecal sample at the end of the drying stage (g). 
Recovery=% recovery of hormone from the sample. 
 
3.4.4.2. Data treatment and statistics 
All [fGCM] are presented as ng fGCM/g faeces. Data to test hypothesis 3.1, that 
[fGGM] will increase Post-health-check relative to Pre-health-check, were 
[fGCM]s from Set 1 samples (samples collected during the 48hrs Pre-health-
check and the 80 hrs Post-health-check, as shown in Figure 3.2). Criteria for 




[fGCM] for each monkey was derived from at least two samples, and that there 
was at least one sample for each of the 18+hr, 24+hr, 42+hr, 48+hr and 66+hr 
Post-health-check time blocks. Data for the 66+hr and (where present) 72+hr time 
blocks are shown for illustration of return to baseline, but were omitted from the 
analyses for standardisation.  
 
Data to test hypothesis 3.2, that [fGGM] will decrease Post-enrichment relative to 
general baseline levels, were [fGCM]s from Set 2 and 3 samples (collected during 
the 80hrs Post-enrichment, as shown in Figure 3.3, and at intervals outside of 
testing and treatments for the general baseline). Criteria for inclusion in the 
analysis were that the general baseline [fGCM] for each monkey was calculated 
from at least two Set 3 samples, and that there was at least one sample for each of 
the 18+hr, 24+hr, 42+hr, 48+hr and 66+hr Post-enrichment time blocks. 
 
Data to test hypothesis 3.3, that [fGCM] will be significantly higher Post-health-
check than Post-enrichment, were [fGCM]s from Sets 1 and 2. Criteria for 
inclusion in the analysis were that data were available during a Post-health-check 
and Post-enrichment phase, per monkey, and that data were available for at least 
two of the 18+hr, 24+hr, 42+hr and 48+hr time blocks per condition per monkey.  
 
There were three analyses for each hypothesis. The first analysis was a visual 
inspection of individual fGCM profiles in which the [fGCM] for every sample 
produced within an 80hr period Post-treatment (i.e. Post-health-check or Post-
enrichment) was plotted along a time line (after Heistermann et al., 2006). 




Heistermann et al., 2006, although it is noted that Time 0 data in that paper 
represent values obtained from samples collected during different baseline 
periods). This allowed circadian patterns, peak [fGCM] and return to baseline to 
be identified per monkey. This informed data grouping for subsequent analyses. 
 
The second analysis was a calculation of the maximum magnitude of increase in 
[fGCM] for each monkey. This was calculated as the ratio of the peak [fGCM] 
from 18-48hrs Post-treatment, divided by X [fGCM] Pre-treatment (health-check 
treatment) or general baseline (enrichment treatment; after Heistermann et al., 
2006). Heistermann et al. (2006) detected rises in [fGCM] following 
administration of ACTH or restraint for sedation with KHCl in a range of primate 
species, in the order of 1.6–7.4 times the baseline level.  
 
The third analysis involved grouping data for statistical analysis, for each 
individual, separately. To avoid confound of circadian patterns, data were 
separated into six-hour time blocks representing a morning (6am-12pm) and an 
afternoon (12pm-6pm) time block for each day. The Post-treatment time blocks 
are labelled as 18+hrs, 24+hrs, 42+hrs and 48+hrs. For example, the 18+hrs time 
block included all data from samples collected between 6am and 12pm on day 1 
Post-treatment. Baseline data derived from samples collected between 6am and 
12pm Pre-treatment (or during the general baseline phase for enrichment) were 
used for comparison with samples collected between 6am and 12pm Post-
treatment (i.e. the 18+ and 42+ time blocks). Afternoon baseline data were 
compared with the afternoon Post-treatment data (24+ and 48+ time blocks). A 




produced within each Post-treatment time-block differed significantly from the 
equivalent (i.e. Am or Pm) baseline time block. Where data were available from 
more than one sample for both the baseline and Post-treatment time-block, and 
variance between both sets of data was equal (assessed using Levene’s test), an 
independent t-test was conducted. Where variance was not equal the adjusted 
independent t-test, with equal variances not assumed, was used, as provided in 
SPSS. Where only one datum was available for either of the time blocks, a one-
sample t-test was used, with the single value used as the test value. Bonferroni 
adjusted P values are used throughout. The number of samples within each time 
block is indicated in each of Tables 3-2 and 3-4.  
 
3.5 Results 
A total of 444 faecal samples were used in the analysis ( X =56 ± 39 
samples/monkey, range 14 – 137; Set 1=154 samples; Set 2=89 samples; Set 
3=201 samples). The mean dried faecal weight of all samples was 0.43g ± 0.21g, 
range 0.1-1.6g. Measured [fGCM] ranged from 128–4063ng/g dried faeces.  
 
3.5.1 Assessing physiological arousal Post-health-check 
Individual [fGCM] profile plots are shown in Figure 3.4. Data from three 
monkeys (collected during four collection phases) met the criteria for inclusion in 
the analysis (monkey O22: n=13 samples; monkey 86O: n= 15 samples; monkey 
66S: n=24 samples and n=24 samples collected during two different health-check 




Figure 3.4 Individual [fGCM] profiles Post-health-check. Average 48 hour Pre-health-check baseline is shown at T0 (+-2SD). 















































Figure 3.4 (Continued). 















































Post-health-check, with peaks above 2SDs of the Pre-health-check [fGCM] 
baseline level. For O22, 86O and 66Sa (but not 66Sb) [fGCM] showed an apparent 
return to baseline levels within 80 hours Post-health-check.  
 
Data for the peak rise in [fGCM] are shown in Table 3-1. Magnitudes of increase 
ranged from 2.1 (monkeys O22 and 66Sb) to 2.5 (monkey 66Sa). There was no 
effect of baseline [fGCM] on magnitude of response (r(4) =0.511, P=0.49).  
 
 
Table 3-1 Pre-health-check baseline [fGCM], Post-health-check (PHC) peak 
[fGCM], delay to peak and magnitude of maximum increase in [fGCM] in 
the 48 hours Post-health-check. (x) number of samples entered into analysis 
 
Excretion rates of GCMs into faeces were calculated from the timing of peak 
[fGCM] between 18-48hrs Post-health-check for monkeys O22, 86O and 66Sa. 
Data for monkey 66Sb were not included in the analysis since there was no return 
to baseline. Average delay to peak [fGCM] Post-health-check was 20hrs ± 2.65. 
 
Data were divided into six-hour (AM/PM) time blocks and t-tests (Bonferroni-
corrected P= 0.013) were conducted to compare AM baseline versus AM Post-












O22 529 (2) 1105 (11) 23 2.1 
86O 489 (4) 1071 (7) 18 2.2 
66Sa 669 (9) 1678 (9) 19 2.5 




treatment [fGCM] (i.e. 18hr+ and 42hr+ time blocks), and PM baseline versus PM 
Post-treatment [fGCM] (i.e. 24hr+ and 48hr+) time blocks ( X =2.3 ± 0.93 
samples/time block/monkey: Table 3-2).  
 
 
Table 3-2 Mean [fGCM] (ng/g) Pre-health-check, and at each of the time 
blocks between 18+ and 48+ hours Post-health-check. * P<0.05; ** P<0.013 
 
 
The t-tests revealed no clear pattern of results. There was a significant increase in 
[fGCM] at 18+hrs from the AM baseline for two monkeys (O22: t1=92.38, 
P=0.007; 66Sa: t7=3.386, P=0.012; Table 3-2), a significant increase at 24+hrs for 
one monkey on one occasion (66Sa: t3=5.291, P=0.013; note: 66Sb: t6=2.914, 
P=0.027), and a significant increase at 42+hrs for two monkeys (O22: t1=77.75, 
P=0.008; 66Sb: t8=7.083, P<0.001). Monkey 86O showed no elevation in [fGCM] 
at any time-block between 18+ and 48+ hours Post-health-check.  
 
In summary, these data indicate that the health-check did not lead to a consistent 
pattern of physiological response with respect to [fGCM] in male rhesus 
macaques. Three monkeys showed a significant rise in [fGCM] Post-treatment 
ID Pre-health-check Post-health-check time block 
 [fGCM] (ng/g) 18+ 24+ 42+ 48+ 
 (Am) (Pm) (Am) (Pm) (Am) (Pm) 
O22 529 (2) - 1105** (1) 782 (3) 1013** (1) 635 (2) 
86O 716 (1) 413 (3) 924 (2) 481 (1) 825 (4) 437 (2) 
66S(a) 774 (6) 459 (3) 1430** (3) 1178** (2) 1008 (3) 1593** (2) 




compared with Pre-treatment levels, while one monkey showed no such response. 
The maximum magnitude of increase (≤2.5 times the Pre-health-check baseline) 
occurred, on average, 20hrs Post-health-check, and fell within the range of 
increase detected in other primate species (Heistermann et al 2006). These data 
indicate a tendency for excreted [fGCM] to rise following the health-check: for all 
four monkeys: [fGCM] rose above 2SD from baseline levels in the 48 hours Post-
health-check, but on no occasion did they fall 2SD below the mean baseline.  
 
3.5.2 Assessing physiological arousal Post-enrichment  
Data from three monkeys met the criteria for inclusion in the analysis (monkey 
94K: n=38 samples; monkey 66S: n=86 samples; monkey 79S; n=37 samples). 
Individual [fGCM] profiles are shown in Figure 3.5. Inspection of the individual 
plots revealed a general trend for Post-enrichment [fGCM] levels to fluctuate 
within 2SD from baseline X [fGCM].  
 
Data were inspected for the maximum nadir in [fGCM] Post-enrichment (Table 3-
3). Magnitudes of decrease ranged from 1.4 to 2.6. To determine whether the 
decrease in Post-enrichment [fGCM] was significant for each individual, data 
were separated into six-hour time blocks as described previously ( X =7.5±14.2 
samples/time-block/monkey) and a series of t-tests conducted (Bonferroni 
P=0.013; Table 3-4). One monkey showed a significant decrease in Post-
enrichment [fGCM] relative to general baseline (monkey 79S: 24+hrs: t8=4.105, 
P=0.003; 48+hrs: t8=3.856, P=0.005, and a trend at 18+hours). Two monkeys 




Figure 3.5 Individual [fGCM] profiles Post-enrichment. General baseline from Set 3 samples is shown at T0 (+-2SD). 
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Figure 3.5 (Continued) 
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t21=3.210, P=0.04; monkey 94K: t11.9=2.486, P=0.03). Monkey 94K showed a 
significant increase in [fGCM] Post-enrichment relative to general baseline at 18+hrs 
(t15=4.248, P=0.001). 
 
Table 3-3 The general baseline [fGCM], Post-enrichment nadir [fGCM], delay to 
nadir and magnitude of maximum decrease in [fGCM] in the 48 hours ‘Post-
enrichment’. (x) number of samples from which value was derived. 
 
 
Table 3-4 Mean [fGCM] (ng/g) for general baseline, and at each of the time 
blocks between 18+ and 48+ hours Post-enrichment. * P<0.05; ** P<0.013; **
H 
Post-enrichment time-block [fGCM] higher than baseline. 
ID Baseline  Time block 
 [fGCM] (ng/g)  18+ 24+ 42+ 48+ 
 (Am) (Pm)  (Am) (Pm) (Am) (Pm) 
79S 498 (16) 580 (9)  278* (3) 202** (1) 316 (2) 225** (1) 
66S 995 (50) 1141 (20)  723 (4) 826 (2) 576 (3) 630* (3) 






1305 (4) 969* (1) 
‡ Monkey 94K exhibited extreme signs of frustration on days 2 and 3 of the Post-enrichment testing 
phase. He repeatedly shook his cage and stopped working on the cognitive task on both days. Monkeys 
66S & 79S showed no such behavioural signs of frustration during the equivalent testing phase. 
 
These data suggest that for one monkey (79S) the enrichment treatment resulted in 
significantly lower [fGCM] relative to general baseline levels. For one monkey (66S) 






enrichment to nadir 
[fGCM] 
Magnitude of max 
[fGCM] decrease 
79S 528 (25) 202 (7) 24 2.6 
66S 1036 (70) 489 (9) 45 2.1 




there was no significant change, and for one monkey (94K) the enrichment treatment 
resulted in a significant rise in [fGCM].  
 
In summary, these data indicate that a week of environmental enrichment did not 
result in a consistent pattern of physiological response with respect to [fGCM] in male 
rhesus macaques. One monkey exhibited significantly lower [fGCM] relative to a 
general baseline during the period for which samples were analysed. One monkey 
showed no change in [fGCM] and a third monkey exhibited a significant rise in 
[fGCM] relative to general baseline, following the enrichment treatment. These data 
suggest the need for a larger sample size and consideration of possible individual 
differences in responses to environmental enrichment in singly housed male rhesus 
macaques. 
 
3.5.3 Assessing differences in physiological arousal Post-health-check versus 
Post-enrichment  
Five monkeys met the criteria for inclusion in the analysis (06H, 94K, 66S, 79S & 
79T). Data were available for each monkey from one Post-health-check and one Post-
enrichment testing phase (Post-health-check: n=67 samples, X =2.5±2.0 samples/time 
block/per monkey; Post-enrichment: n=60 samples, X =2.3±1.4 samples/time 
block/monkey). Individual comparative [fGCM] profiles are shown in Figure 3.6. 
Inspection of the individual plots revealed a general trend for higher [fGCM] Post-





To determine whether [fGCM] differed significantly between Post-health-check and 
Post-enrichment phases, data were clumped into six-hour time blocks and a series of 
independent or one-sample t-tests conducted (Table 3-5: Bonferroni adjusted 
P=0.013). For each test, data were [fGCM] Post-health-check within a given time 
block versus [fGCM] Post-enrichment within a given time block, for each monkey, 
separately.  
 
Two of the five monkeys showed significantly higher [fGCM] Post-health-check 
versus Post-enrichment, as predicted. Monkey 66S showed significantly higher 
[fGCM] Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment at two time blocks (18+hrs: 
t5=6.183, P<0.01; 48+hrs: t3=7.504, P<0.01). Monkey 79S showed significantly 
higher [fGCM] Post-health-check at 24+hrs (t1=54.74, P=0.01). Two monkeys 
showed no difference in [fGCM] between the two treatments (monkeys O6H & 79T).. 
Monkey 94K showed the opposite pattern, with significantly higher [fGCM] Post-
enrichment at 48+hrs (t3=5.413, P=0.01), and a trend for higher [fGCM] Post-
enrichment at 18+hrs (t4=3.87, P=0.02). 
 
Planned comparisons were conducted to examine group-level trends in [fGCM]. 
Missing data precluded a RMANOVA, therefore a permutations test was used 
(Mundry, 1999: see Chapter 4, p201). In brief, this test is suitable for data sets with 
small sample size, with missing cell values, where data may not be normally 
distributed and where the same individuals are used in the different pairwise 
comparisons. This revealed no significant group-level difference in [fGCM] at any 





































































































Table 3-5 Mean [fGCM] (ng/g) Post-health check (PHC) versus Post-
enrichment (PE) at each time block. * P<0.05; ** P< 0.013; **
H 
Post-
enrichment [fGCM] higher than Post-health-check [fGCM] 
  Time block/ Treatment 
  18+  24+  42+  48+ 
ID  PHC PE  PHC PE  PHC PE  PHC PE 
66S  1430** 723  1178 826  1008 576  1593** 630 
79S  - 303  869** 214  549 317  436 225 
06H  - 418  1584 -  1708
 
747  1266 - 
79T  1268 959  - 708  1408
 
967  822 - 
94K  1115 1691*
H 





In summary, these data indicate varied physiological profiles following the two 
treatments. For two monkeys, the health-check resulted in higher [fGCM] relative 
to the same time blocks during the enrichment treatment. For two monkeys there 
was no difference in [fGCM] between the two treatments, and for one monkey 
[fGCM] was higher Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check, contrary to the 




The effect of two treatments on levels of excreted faecal glucocorticoid 
metabolites in male rhesus macaques was assessed. Overall, the data suggest 




elevated [fGCM] Post-health-check compared with a Pre-health-check baseline, 
while a fourth monkey showed no such increase. There was no evidence for the 
predicted decrease in [fGCM] following a week of environmental enrichment: one 
each of three monkeys showed significantly elevated, significantly decreased, and 
no significant change in [fGCM]. When Post-health-check [fGCM] was compared 
against Post-enrichment [fGCM] at each of the time blocks two monkeys showed 
significantly higher [fGCM] Post-health-check, two monkeys showed no 
difference between the two treatments, and one monkey showed significantly 
higher [fGCM] in the enrichment treatment (versus Post-health-check). These data 
suggest the pattern of fGCM variation is not clear-cut, and must therefore be 
interpreted with caution, for example, due to individual differences in response.  
 
The data presented here partially concur with previous studies which demonstrate 
increased indices of cortisol in primates following contexts assumed to be 
negative (Sapolsky et al. 2000; Bergman et al., 2005; Honess & Marin, 2006a). 
For example, restraint for injection has been shown to result in elevated levels of 
plasma cortisol in captive rhesus macaques (Fuller et al., 1984; Bentson et al., 
2003; Ruys et al., 2004) and excreted metabolites of cortisol in faeces 
(Heistermann et al., 2006).  
 
The data presented here do not concur with previous studies which found reduced 
indices of cortisol in primates following contexts assumed to be positive (insofar 
as those situations meet likely appetitive drives). For example, Shutt et al. (2007) 
measured [fGCM] among free-ranging female Barbary macaques (M. sylvanus) 




suggesting that the giving of grooming may function to reduce stress in this 
species. Doyle et al. (2008) measured [fGCM] in singly housed male rhesus 
macaques Pre- versus Post-pair-housing. Monkeys showed a significant decrease 
in [fGCM] between the single-housing and the settled pair-housed condition, 
suggestive of a reduction of social-isolation related stress. 
 
The findings here are in agreement with studies that report no reduction in plasma 
cortisol among rhesus macaques provided with environmental enrichment 
(Schapiro et al., 1993). The current findings are of particular interest since one 
criticism of Schapiro et al. (1993) is the use of blood draw to collect samples for 
analysis. The lack of evidence for reduced [GC] in both studies suggests 
environmental enrichment may not always lead to a reduction in physiological 
indicators of stress such as circulating, or excreted, glucocorticoids. Alternatively, 
environmental enrichments may lead to increased physiological markers of 
general arousal not associated with stress (eg increased motor activity). 
 
Several issues in the use of non-invasive analysis of cortisol indicators arose 
during the study. Sample collection, storage, shipping and analysis were time-
consuming and relatively expensive. There was some waste of samples, where too 
few samples were available to allow a cortisol profile to be established. There 
were limiting factors such as (possible) constipation, and diarrhoea, the latter 
particularly in response to acute stressors (for example, during a storm). These 
limitations resulted in a small sample size, and missing cell values in some 
analyses, both of which reduced statistical power. The large inter-individual 




Monkeys showed a large degree of variation in the Pre-treatment [fGCM] levels. 
This may reflect true individual differences in baseline cortisol levels, or may be 
an artifact of the timing of the collection of baseline samples (e.g. following a 
stressor such as a storm). Monkeys also differed in the direction of change in 
cortisol Post-treatment. Again, this may reflect true differences in physiological 
stress-responsivity to a stressor (the health-check), reflect different psychological 
responses (eg appraisal of the treatments as more or less negative or positive), or 
may simply be an artifact of the differences in Pre-treatment baselines. 
 
In summary, the analysis of excreted cortisol metabolites in faeces revealed no 
clear pattern of physiological response to two treatments, nor did it reveal a clear 
difference in the physiological profiles of the monkeys during the cognitive 
testing phase of each treatment. Analysis of the data was hampered by small 
sample sizes and missing data. A fuller interpretation of the effects of the 
treatments on the monkeys should rely on additional data such as those obtained 
from behavioural and cognitive approaches. However, although the current data 
are insufficient to clearly either rule in or rule out (in a statistical sense) a clear 
contrasting patterns of HPA function between the two treatments the small 
differences in physiological arousal found between the two treatments suggest a 
waek trend for increased arousal Post-health-check, and reduced physiological 
arousal following the week of enrichment. Differences in physiological arousal 
should therefore be considered when interpreting data from the cognitive studies 





Part B: Assessing behavioural indicators of wellbeing and stress 
3.7 Introduction 
Behaviour is used widely to document changes in inferred affect in primates 
(Capitanio, 1999; Aureli et al., 2002; Novak, 2003; Honess & Marin, 2006a). The 
behaviour of free-ranging primates such as rhesus macaques, and the contexts in 
which these behaviours occur, have been well documented (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 
1973; van Hooff, 1976; Rawlins & Kessler, 1986a). Importantly for the current 
research, changes in captive rhesus macaque behaviour following certain 
experimental manipulations or husbandry routines have been used to document 
the stress-inducing or stress-abating effects of these procedures (Schapiro et al., 
1993; Novak et al., 1998; Honess & Marin, 2006b; Bassett & Buchanan-Smith, 
2007). Here, I introduce traditional behavioural measures used to assess the 
welfare of rhesus macaques housed in captivity, and present data on the extent to 
which two treatments (introduced previously: a week of enrichment and a health-
check) induced changes in behaviour indicative of underlying changes in affect. 
 
3.7.1 Behaviour as a measure of affect in primates 
Behaviour is a widely used proxy measure of affective state in primates (Baker & 
Aureli, 1997; Novak, 2003). The behavioural displays of rhesus macaques have 
been well documented in free-ranging (Widdig, 2002; Maestripieri, 2007) and 
captive groups (Sackett et al., 1981; Augustsson & Hau, 1999; ILAR, 2008). We 
have reliable lists of natural patterns of rhesus macaque behaviour, and the 




affective states associated with those behaviours. Behaviours that occur in 
contexts that are presumed to be positive are considered to reflect positive affect 
(e.g. play behaviour, allogrooming: Honess et al., 2004). Behaviours that occur in 
contexts assumed to be negative are considered to reflect negative affect (e.g. self-
directed displacement activities such as scratching: Maestripieri et al., 1992; 
Baker & Aureli, 1997; Kutsukake, 2003).  
 
In free-ranging primates, self-directed behaviours such as scratching and hair-
pulling occur most frequently in situations of uncertainty, and are therefore 
considered to be associated with anxiety-like affective states (Maestripieri, 1993; 
Baker & Aureli, 1997; Kutsukake, 2003). These are context-dependent and 
subside relatively quickly (Baker & Aureli, 1997). However, the extent to which 
behaviours provide a direct measure of affect, or whether the same behaviour may 
have different affective underpinnings in different contexts is not known (e.g. 
Ruys et al., 2004). For example, Maestripieri (1993) suggests the increased 
vigilance and scratching seen in female rhesus macaques when their infants were 
in spatial proximity to the adult male or higher ranking females reflect differential 
components of anxiety. Maestripieri (1993) suggests increased vigilance reveals 
anticipation of danger, while scratching reveals uncertainty due to motivational 
conflict. Studies of scratching rates following aggression have shown that rate of 
scratching decreases faster when animals reconcile post-conflict than when they 
do not (Aureli et al., 1989). Furthermore, the presence of conspecifics may 
alleviate self-directed behavioural and physiological responses to aversive events 




Neuropharmacological data provide more direct evidence for behaviour-affect 
associations. Rhesus macaques are used as a primate model of human affective 
disorders such as anxiety (e.g.; Schino et al., 1996; Palit et al., 1998), post-
traumatic syndromes and depression (e.g. Paul et al., 1996; Hugo et al., 2003). 
Anxiolytic drugs (drugs which reduce anxiety in humans) temporarily reduce the 
frequency of stereotypical behaviours in rhesus macaques (Schino et al., 1996; 
Hugo et al., 2003). Anxiogenic drugs (drugs which induce anxiety in humans) 
increase the frequency of stereotypical and self-directed behaviours in captive 
rhesus macaques (Schino et al., 1996; Palit et al., 1998). In both humans and 
primates, social stress is considered a primary contributing factor to the onset of 
depressive symptoms (Shively et al., 2009). 
 
In captivity, primates may develop specific patterns of behaviour that are not seen 
in free-ranging populations. Stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours are 
associated with anxiety or pathologies associated with captivity, especially poor 
housing, rearing history and social isolation (Novak et al., 1998; Novak, 2003). In 
particular, early separation from the mother, and social isolation during infancy, 
have the most profound effects on the development of long term stereotypical and 
self-injurious behaviours in primates (Novak, 2003; Latham & Mason, 2008). By 
noting the conditions under which stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours 
arise, it is possible to identify conditions that reflect poor welfare for captive 
primates. In addition, self-directed behaviours may be used to identify anxiety-
eliciting situations for primates in captivity. For example, self-scratching occurs at 




et al., 2006) or may occur in response to temporary stressors such as high visitor 
numbers at zoos (lowland gorillas: Carder & Semple, 2008).  
 
Together, ethological and neuropharmacological data suggest behaviours 
observed to occur in contexts assumed to be anxiety-eliciting, may arise from 
affective mechanisms also involved in human affective states, including anxiety. 
Data from captive primates suggest that in conditions of poor housing or social 
isolation, new sets of behaviours (i.e. behaviours not seen in free-ranging 
populations) may arise. The strong association of these behaviours with poor 
housing and social (particularly developmental) isolation, suggest a link with 
psychopathology and poor psychological welfare. 
 
One difficulty with interpreting animal behaviour is that there is great inter- and 
intra-species variation in both the context in which a given behaviour may be 
performed, and the behaviours performed in a given context (e.g. Clarke et al., 
1981; Sackett et al., 1981; de Waal & Luttrell, 1989). The extent to which 
behaviour can be used as a valid indicator of affect, therefore, is debated. The 
National Research Council states that there are very few direct behavioural 
correlates of stress, and even fewer, if any, for psychological distress in animals 
(ILAR, 2008). Recognising stress and distress in captive animals based on 
behavioural changes alone therefore remains a significant challenge, and indirect 
measures such as behaviour are typically used. Despite difficulty in interpreting 
indirect measures such as behaviour, the prevalence of behavioural data in the 




may be collected make them a useful proxy measure of welfare (Dawkins, 2004). 
Further, the consideration of behavioural indicators of affect may allow 
comparability between studies. 
 
3.7.2 The influence of husbandry procedures on behaviour in captive 
rhesus macaques 
Changes in behaviour following changes in physical or social environment have 
been used as indicators of improved or decreased wellbeing in captive animals. In 
Part A of this chapter I introduced two husbandry procedures conducted at CPRC 
that were used during the studies presented in chapters 4-6 in this thesis to induce 
changes in inferred affective state in adult male rhesus macaques. These were a 
week of enrichment and the three-monthly health check. Welfare studies have 
revealed that enrichment and husbandry interventions may have an impact on 
captive primate behaviour (Novak et al., 1998; Honess et al., 2004; Honess & 
Marin, 2006b). 
 
Behaviours associated with negative affect in captive rhesus macaques have been 
revealed in studies in which aspects of housing, rearing history or husbandry 
procedures have been manipulated (Lutz et al., 2003b; Honess & Marin, 2006b). 
Paulk et al. (1977) monitored the behaviour of monkeys moved from standard to 
smaller caging. There was an increase in stereotypical behaviours, with individual 
variation in the types of stereotypies exhibited. In a similar study (Eaton et al., 
1994), singly-housed rhesus macaques were moved to pair-housing, and 




Controls engaged in more self-directed, self-injurious behaviour and stereotypical 
behaviours (including auto-grooming, nail-biting, hair-pulling and cage licking). 
It was suggested these behaviours were performed in the absence of the ability to 
perform social affiliative behaviours with a cage-mate. Controls also moved less 
than paired animals. Paired animals did not show a reduction in abnormal 
behaviours. Maintenance of abnormal behaviours (for >36 months) in paired 
animals was interpreted as evidence that social housing may not improve well-
being for all monkeys. Data on reproductive and immunological factors indicated 
that singly-housed females had higher rates of infant mortality, but no significant 
reduction in health status (Eaton et al., 1994). Honess et al. (2004) recorded the 
Pre- and Post- air transportation behaviours of juvenile long-tailed macaques. 
They found an increase in inactivity and negative behaviours (especially hugging 
between cage mates, a behaviour associated with fearful contexts) immediately 
following transportation. Several weeks following transportation monkeys 
continued to show altered patterns of social interaction, with a reduction in 
allogrooming and an increase in play-fighting, which the authors argue reflect 
maintained behavioural or social disruption. 
 
Monkeys raised in social, often sensory, isolation are at increased risk of 
developing stereotypical behaviour (Isolation syndrome: Sackett et al., 1978 and 
1981). Stereotypical behaviours associated with isolation syndrome include 
stereotyped locomotion, rocking, repetitive, self-directed and aggressive 
behaviours. Lutz et al. (2007) monitored monkeys raised from birth to 10 months 




higher rates of self-biting behaviour than monkeys who were mother-reared or 
reared in peer groups of four monkeys for the first 10 months of life. Self-biters 
also engaged in fewer social interactions or contact. Reinhardt (2008) makes a 
distinction between self-biting and hair-pulling, which are forms of self-injurious 
behaviour, and stereotypies associated with anxiety and distress such as self-
directed and stereotypical behaviours he believes not to be unequivocal indicators 
of stress (such as pacing and headflipping which may instead be coping 
mechanisms). The link between stereotypical behaviours and well-being is 
ambiguous, since their presence may reflect a proactive coping strategy that 
monkeys who do not exhibit the same behaviours lack. Data from a range of 
animals suggest that individuals with proactive stereotypical coping strategies 
suffer fewer stress-related illnesses, such as stomach ulcers, than their reactive 
coping counterparts (e.g. mice, rats and pigs: Koolhaas et al., 1999). Depressed 
posture is also associated with social isolation (Reinhardt, 2008). 
 
Husbandry and research procedures may be particularly disruptive to captive 
animals (Waitt et al., 2002). Clarke et al. (1988) measured behavioural and blood 
cortisol responses to restraint, harnessing and transport in a cage. Rhesus 
macaques showed elevated levels of locomotion immediately following the 
stressor with a decrease over time, and corresponding increase in time spent 
inactive. Clarke et al. (1994) measured behavioural and heart-rate (HR) responses 
of three species of macaque (rhesus, bonnet and cynomolgus) to a novel 
environment (mild stressor) and physical restraint (acute stressor). Rhesus 




macaques, and showed the fastest return to baseline levels following introduction 
to the novel environment, but HR remained high following physical restraint. HR 
was negatively correlated with rates of locomotion in the rhesus macaques, 
suggesting locomotion (and general motor activity) does not provide a reliable 
measure of arousal, and low levels may reflect tonic immobility (although the 
authors do not discuss learned helplessness as a possible explanation). HR was 
considered to provide a more reliable measure of psychological distress than 
behavioural measures in rhesus macaques. Comparison with other species 
suggests species-specific patterns of stress responsivity mean behaviours are not 
generalisable between even closely related species (Clarke et al., 1994). 
 
These studies reveal that poor housing or rearing conditions or other negative 
contexts may lead to an increased incidence of self-directed, stereotypical and 
self-injurious behaviours. High rates of self-directed behaviours are associated 
with anxiety-inducing situations in both free-ranging and captive populations. 
Stereotypical behaviours are associated with social isolation (e.g. single-caging) 
although it is not known whether they provide a direct indicator of negative affect, 
or active coping strategies to reduce arousal under conditions of acute stress. Self-
injurious behaviours are most common in monkeys with disrupted social 
development and dysregulation of the HPA axis. Self-injurious behaviours are 
considered an extreme pathological behaviour. There is converging evidence that 
self-injurious behaviours may function as a coping strategy to reduce arousal 





Changes in physical and social environment may also induce behavioural changes 
associated with positive affect, although in captive animals such changes arguably 
reflect reduced negative affect rather than ‘positive affect’ per se (Olsson & 
Westlund, 2007). Fontenot et al. (2006) measured behavioural responses of rhesus 
macaques following transfer from single indoor cages to single- or group- housing 
outdoors. There was a significant reduction in rates of self-biting, stereotypical, 
object-directed, yawning and scratching behaviour in both groups, and a reduction 
in pacing and autogrooming among group-housed monkeys only. There was no 
effect on self-injurious behaviour. These results were considered to reflect 
reduced anxiety following the improvements in the physical and social 
environments (daylight, larger enclosures, social housing), as well as opportunity 
to engage in more (‘positive’) behaviours due to the increase in space and 
opportunity for social contact (Fontenot et al., 2006). However, rates of scratching 
and autogrooming returned to baseline levels within 12 weeks.  
 
In another study of social housing effects, Doyle et al. (2008) recorded 
behavioural and physiological (heart rate and faecal cortisol) responses of 80 
singly-housed male rhesus macaques pre- and post-pairing. Fecal cortisol levels 
and heart rate declined post-pairing, as did ‘indices of psychological disturbance’ 
(body shake, scratch, autogroom, depressed posture, vigilance and yawning), time 
spent foraging and time inactive. An initial peak in foraging time immediately 
following introduction was suggested to be a displacement activity to relieve 
stress. There was no change in abnormal behaviour overall. This was suggested to 




In a study of the effects of visual barriers on the behaviour of captive rhesus 
macaques, addition of visual barriers was found to have no effect on overt 
behaviours such as aggressive threats or bared teeth displays, although there was 
an increase in the amount of time monkeys spent in close proximity (Basile et al., 
2007). The low frequency of aggressive and bared-teeth displays made analysis 
problematic, highlighting the problem of monitoring changes in behaviours that 
may occur infrequently.  
 
These studies reveal that, in primates, improved social or physical context may 
lead to a reduction in behaviours typically associated with negative contexts. It 
was therefore predicted that the enrichment treatment would lead to a reduction in 
behaviours assumed to reflect negative affect in monkeys: self-directed, 
stereotypical, and self-injurious behaviours. The health-check treatment was 
assumed to be negative and, therefore, it was predicted that an increase in self-
directed, stereotypical, and self-injurious behaviours would occur Post-health-
check. 
 
3.7.3 Developing an ethogram for measuring captive male rhesus macaque 
behaviour  
As a result of the literature review, it was identified that most available ethograms 
define rhesus macaque behaviour in the broad categories of self-maintenance 
behaviours (natural behaviours such as feeding, drinking, resting, sleeping and 
locomoting that are involved with day-to-day survival), affiliative behaviours (e.g. 




threat bark) and self-directed, stereotypical behaviours and self-injurious 
behaviour (e.g. scratching, hair-pulling, pacing, rocking). 
 
Self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours were identified as 
behaviours likely to increase Post-health-check, and subside Post-enrichment. 
Locomotion was not included as a behaviour of special interest since both 
increased and decreased levels of locomotion may be associated with negative 
contexts, and so the link between locomotion and affect may be highly dependent 
on context (cf. Clarke et al., 1988). Aggression has been used by some authors as 
a measure of negative affect. However, others view it as a natural (coping) 
response to threatening stimuli (e.g. Sackett et al., 1981). Sackett et al. (1981), in 
a study of social isolation effects on pigtailed, crab-eating and rhesus macaques, 
list aggression as a positive social behaviour, insofar as it is behaviour that 
animals with normal social functioning would be expected to exhibit. Further, 
there are varied definitions of aggression. For example, Honess and Marin 
(2006b) identify self-injury as a form of aggressive behaviour (redirected 
aggression), whereas Lutz et al. (2003a) argue self-injurious behaviour occurs in 
response to stressful situations, while aggression is mediated by social context.  
 
The similarity between stereotypies and self-injurious behaviour seen in captive 
primates and those exhibited in some human psychopathologies is well 
documented (Hugo et al., 2003; Lewis et al., 1996; Lutz et al., 2003b). In addition, 
Kalin (1999) differentiates between offensive and defensive aggressive 




aggression is an active coping strategy associated with reduced serotonergic 
activity, increased levels of testosterone, and lower levels of cortisol, while 
defensive aggression is linked to anxiety and is associated with extreme right 
frontal brain activity and high cortisol levels. 
 
The ethogram I developed for the present research was designed to meet several 
criteria (after Bakeman & Gottman, 1997). Firstly, the ethogram was designed to 
provide an exhaustive list of behaviours suggested by previous research to be 
indicative of affect in rhesus macaques, with emphasis on non-social behaviours, 
since the subjects for the present study are monkeys in single housing. Secondly, 
the behaviours selected were required to demonstrate a clear distinction between 
behaviours associated with negatively-valenced affective state and those 
associated with positively-valenced affective states. Thirdly, the ethogram needed 
to allow all other (e.g. self-maintenance) behaviours to be coded. 
 
Here, I present the development of the ethogram and present data from a 
preliminary study which was conducted to test the applicability of the ethogram 
developed during the initial literature review, and to test the software and analysis 
package. This development phase was conducted with the captive rhesus macaque 
colony at the Psychology Department of Oxford University, UK (2005). Having 
developed the ethogram and tested the software and analysis package in the UK, I 
then tested the reliability of the ethogram at the CPRC, Puerto Rico (2006). The 
finalised ethogram was then used to quantify changes in behavioural indicators of 





The general aim of this section is to assess the extent to which the two treatments 
(a week of enrichment and a health-check) lead to changes in behaviour indicative 
of changes in inferred affective state in captive rhesus macaques over three days 
during each treatment. To do this, I first developed an exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive ethogram of behaviours in captive male rhesus macaques. This was 
done at the Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford University, UK. 
Secondly, I assessed the reliability of the ethogram as the degree of agreement 
between two observers in its application. This was conducted at the CPRC, Puerto 
Rico. Thirdly, I applied the ethogram to document behavioural changes Pre- 
versus Post-enrichment, Pre- versus Post-health-check, and to assess differences 
in behaviour between the two treatments: The hypotheses relate to the application 
of the ethogram.  
 
3.9 Hypotheses: 
3.4 Monkeys will spend an increased proportion of time engaged in stress-related 
behaviours in the 72 hours Post-health-check versus the 72 hours immediately 
Pre-health-check.  
 
3.5 Monkeys will spend a decreased proportion of time engaged in stress-related 
behaviours during the last 72 hours of a 10 day enrichment phase versus the 72 





3.6. Monkeys will spend an increased proportion of time engaged in stress-related 




Aim 1: Developing the ethogram  
3.10 Methods: 
3.10.1 Animals & Apparatus: 
Five adult male rhesus macaques (Hugh, Jamie, Jared, Jip and Shiny) housed in 
the Department of Experimental Psychology, Oxford University, UK, were 
observed during the development of the ethogram. Three monkeys (Hugh, Janie 
and Jip) were singly housed in metal cages (0.9 x 0.9 x 1m), one monkey (Shiny) 
was singly housed in the same size metal cage with access to two further cages 
(total area 2.7 x 0.9 x 1m), and one monkey (Jamie) was pair-housed with a more 
dominant male in a metal cage (0.9 x 0.9 x 1m) with adjoining wood and mesh 
enclosure (1.5 x 3 x 4m). Caging was positioned along two opposing walls in each 
of two rectangular animal housing rooms in the case of the four singly-housed 
individuals. Four monkeys (Hugh, Jared, Jip and Jamie) were housed in rooms 
that contained at least 10 other male rhesus macaques. Hugh, Jared and Jip were 
housed together throughout the study. Jamie was pair-housed in a second room. 






Behavioural data were recorded on an IBM ThinkPad 755CD notebook computer 
using JWatcher
TM
 0.9 software (JWatcher Animal Behaviour Laboratory 
Macquarie University, Australia, 2000). This software package was specifically 
designed for the continuous recording of behaviours, incorporating an event 
recorder that logs the moment at which a key (signifying a pre-specified 
behavioural code) is pressed. The software is flexible so that any given behaviour 
may be treated as both a state and event, and codes may be redefined as mutually 
exclusive, or not, during analysis. A 26-behaviour pilot ethogram constructed 
from published data on behaviours exhibited by rhesus macaques both in the wild 
and captivity (see Table 3.6), was used to guide the initial continuous behavioural 
coding. An additional category ‘out of view’ was included for animals that could 
not be seen clearly, for example when turned away or obscured by objects in the 
cage. All animals were in good health at the time of observation and were under 
regular veterinary supervision. No food deprivation schedule was employed and 
animals had access to water ad libitum day and night while in the home cage. 
 
3.10.2 Procedure 
Data were collected throughout June and July 2005. Monkeys were each observed 
for one morning and one evening session on randomly selected days over a total 
of five weeks. Morning observation sessions were conducted between 08:00-
11:30 hours and afternoon observation sessions were conducted between 14:00-
17:30 hours. Each of the five monkeys was selected for observation from a 
pseudo-randomised list so that each monkey was observed during a different 




Table 3.6 The ethogram used to measure behavioural changes reflective of underlying affective state in male rhesus macaques. 
Behaviour Definition Paper 
Self-directed 
Autogroom Grooms self, includes masturbation. 
e,g,i,k  




Turns around repeatedly in a single location, or locomotes along a fixed repetitive (often circular, but can be linear) route two 
or more times in succession. Includes pacing back and forth along any fixed route. 
a,e,i,k 
Body shake Shakes whole body vigorously 
e,i 
Head flip Flips head backwards in a violent circular motion (often incorporated into circling or pacing repertoires). 
e,i,k 
Repetitive Performs an action two or more times in succession. Includes all repetitive behaviours not otherwise listed 
e,I  





Self-injury Bites self (including nails), pulls hair or causes harm to self by any other means (usually repetitive actions)  
e,g,j,k 
All other behaviours 




Aggressive behaviour directed towards another individual (monkey or human) including lunging with open mouth or 
vocalising, staring (with ears often forwards or flicking back and forth), lips protracted to reveal teeth, shaking cage 
c,f,i,l 




Actively searching/foraging for food, holding food in hand and placing in mouth or chewing on it. Does not include instances 









Leaps/moves rapidly away from a stimulus that is potentially aversive. In the case of single housing, animals may flee 
towards the back of the cage away from the observer, or when another person enters the room. Often accompanied by threat 
or submissive behaviours. 
e, 
Inverted Turns head upside down to view surroundings. Usually hangs from cage roof by forearms to do so. 
e,i,k 
Shake cage Shakes cage using hands, feet or both 
e,i,  
Lip smack Smacks lips 
i,m 
Movement 
Moves from one part of cage to another. Includes fast and slow forms of quadrupedal and bipedal locomotion and 
brachiating. 
c,g,h,i 




Manipulates object that is not food (although this may include food-related enrichments where no eating occurs), such as a 




Presents rear quarters towards another individual. Tail is raised, often looks back over or under shoulder towards the 




Silent bared teeth display. Lips are protracted to reveal teeth and closed or partially open mouth. e,f,l 
Vigilant 
 
Visually searches surrounding environment: eyes and/or head move continually with alert posture (sitting or standing upright, 




Crouches down so that body is close to the floor, often appears alert, may be staring with ears pricked, vocalising or pulling a 
threatening facial expression with mouth open 
e, 
Inactive Passive or sleeping. Includes apparently ‘relaxed’ and ‘depressed’ postures 
c,d,i,k 
a: Paulke et al. (1977).b: Maestripieri (1993).c: Clarke et al. (1988).d: Augustsson & Hau (1999).e: Sackett et al. (1978 and 1981).f: de Waal & Luttrell (1989).g: Eaton 




The narrowness of the animal housing rooms required the observer to sit at a distance 
of one metre from the front of the cage, facing the cage at an angle of 45
0 
and 
avoiding directly staring at the focal animal. 
 
Five-minute morning and afternoon continuous-behavioural observation sessions 
were then conducted with JWatcher for each monkey on randomly selected days over 
the following five weeks. On entering the room, I allowed the monkeys five minutes 
to settle before I began coding. A focal observation session started once I was 
positioned in front of the focal monkey’s cage and the timer on the notebook 
computer read at least five minutes from entry to the room. The behaviour being 
performed at the onset of the observation session was recorded and all subsequent 
changes in behaviour recorded by pressing the assigned keys on the notebook 
computer at the moment of onset of the behaviour. When a behaviour was observed 
that did not fit any of the previously assigned behaviours it was noted and added to 
the ethogram and assigned a code within JWatcher at the end of the session. 
 
3.11 Results 
The five monkeys were observed for a total of 430 minutes comprising 86 five-minute 
observation sessions ( X =17.2 ± 1.48 sessions; range: 15-19 sessions). The pilot 
resulted in the ethogram shown in Table 3.6. Behaviours identified in the published 
literature were adopted with a few amendments specific to the current study. The 
behaviour ‘depressed posture’ was not included the ethogram. Although this category 




between ‘resting’ and ‘depressed posture’ was considered to be unreliable. Both codes 
could de used to describe monkeys who were motionless and not responding to 
surrounding events. Therefore, one gross category of ‘inactive’ was created to 
incorporate all instances when a monkey was not moving or engaging in any other 
activity, regardless of whether he appeared to be depressed or not. ‘Head flip’ was 
added as a conspicuous stereotypical behaviour often incorporated into circling 
displays. Vocalisations were combined into a single category (after Honess, Johnson 
and Wolfensohn, 2006). However, often it was not possible to identify calls or callers 
during real-time coding.  
 
In summary, an ethogram of behaviours was created. Nine of the behaviours were 
identified as self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours, of particular 
interest for the current research.  
 
 
Aim 2. Testing the reliability of the ethogram 
3.12 Methods: 
3.12.1 Animals & Apparatus: 
Ten monkeys housed at the Caribbean Primate Research Centre, Puerto Rico, took 
part in the study (Monkeys: 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26 & 27; X age=7.52 years 
± 6.54; range: 3.66 – 24.70). All monkeys were singly housed in the same enclosure, 
details of which were given in Chapter 2. Data were recorded using JWatcher 





Data were collected in April 2006. Initially, two observers (EB and a trainee 
veterinarian, Libette Romane: LR) observed and discussed the behaviours performed 
by different monkeys. Data were then collected to test inter-observer reliability. Ten 
monkeys were each observed for two-minutes per monkey, and behaviours recorded 
concurrently by the two observers. Monkeys were selected for observation randomly 
from a list. Continuous data were recorded by each observer concurrently on 
notebook computers with no conferring. Observation sessions were conducted 
between 6am and 6pm. Agreement between observers was calculated by dividing 
each two-minute observation session into 120 one-second time windows, and scoring 
agreement (1/0) for the behaviours coded within each window.  
 
3.12.3 Statistics: 
The number of agreements and disagreements for each behaviour were entered into a 
matrix and degree of reliability was calculated using Cohen’s kappa (k) statistic 
(Bakeman & Gottmann, 1997). k is a statistical measure of inter-rater reliability. It 
provides a more robust measure than % agreement since it contains an adjustment for 
the level of agreement arising by chance alone. k values range from 0 (no agreement 
above chance) to 1 (complete agreement). Following Bakeman & Gottmann (1997) a 
predetermined kappa value of 0.70 was selected as the criterion level for good levels 






Data for agreement between the two observers are presented in Table 3-7. A total of 
1200 seconds of data were collected by each observer. During observation a new 
behaviour ‘Jumping’ was added to the ethogram as a conspicuous stereotypical 
behaviour that occurred during periods of high activity in the surrounding area, and 
which had not been identified during the literature review, nor seen during the pilot 
study at Oxford University. Crouching and bared teeth display were the only  
behaviours not observed during coding for reliability, although they were seen at 
other times. Overall agreement between observers was 75.25%, k=0.72. The 
ethogram was therefore considered to provide a mutually exclusive and exhaustive list 
of behaviours (with respect to the interests of the study) that may be applied reliably 
by two or more observers to document the behaviour of singly-housed male rhesus 
macaques. 
 
Aim 3: Applying the ethogram  
Changes in behaviour Pre- versus Post-health-check 
3.14 Methods: 
3.14.1 Animals & Apparatus: 
Eleven monkeys housed at the Caribbean Primate Research Station, Puerto Rico, were 
observed to test each of the three hypotheses (Monkeys 06H, 29C, C55, 16P, 86O, 
94K, AI73, 92R, 27S, 66S & 79S: X  age=8.1±4.5). Details of the enrichment 




Table 3-7 Agreement matrix for coding by two observers. Bold: number of agreements. Non-bold: number of non-agreements. Behaviours 
listed in abbreviated form in the same order as they are presented (in full) in the ethogram in Table 3-6 on page 129 
Obs 1   Observer 2 
 Au Scr Cir Bs Hf R Rk Y Sh V Ag L Eat Fl Inv Sh Lp M J Ov Py P S Vg C Ina Total 
Autogrm 42 3                       4  49 
Scratch 8 29                         37 
Circle   15  3             8         26 
B’shake    4                       4 
Head flip   2  6                      8 
Rep’tive      14             8        22 
Rock       43                    43 
Yawn        6                  1 7 
S-injury         7                 1 8 
Vocalise       5  3 34 3     8 2   12    3   70 
Aggress           12             6   18 
Lick cage            3 1              4 
Eat          1  2 56           4   63 
Flee              9    2   4      15 
Invert               6         8   14 
Shake cg    1      4 2     15           22 
Lipsmack                 2          2 
Move   3        5  9 4 2   132      9   164 
Jump      5            4 3        12 
Oov          5          89      21 115 
Play             2        15      17 
Present                      7     7 
SBT           1                1 
Vigilant              11     6     101  15 133 
Crouch                  2         2 
Inactive 9 4      1  7          32    31  253 337 





Data were collected between April 2006 and February 2007. Monkeys were 
selected for observation from a pseudo-randomised list to provide equal numbers 
of morning and afternoon observation sessions per monkey. Observation sessions 
were conducted between 6am and 6pm on the three days immediately prior to the 
health-check and on the three days immediately following the health-check. Due 
to the fact that monkeys were sedated with KHCl during the health-check no data 
were collected on the day of the health check itself. Each monkey was observed 
for one five minute morning observation session and one five minute afternoon 
observation session on each day. This resulted in six Pre-health-check and six 
Post-health-check observation sessions per monkey per health check. Data were 
collected during three veterinary examination periods at three-monthly intervals. 
 
3.14.3 Statistics & data treatment: 
Data on proportion of time engaged in behaviours were pooled for analysis. 
Firstly, the average number of seconds a monkey engaged in a given behaviour 
was calculated for each of the three morning observation sessions, and for each of 
the three afternoon observation sessions, for each of the Pre- and Post- treatment 
phases for each monkey. Averages were then calculated across the three days of 
morning and afternoon observation sessions, separately, for each of the Pre- and 
Post- treatment phases. The Pre-treatment morning and afternoon values were 
then averaged to produce a single Pre-treatment value per monkey. This was 




This resulted in a Pre- and a Post-treatment data set for comparison in the 
analysis. Where data were available from more than one health-check or 
enrichment phase, data were then averaged across the successive treatment phases 
for each monkey. Finally, data from the nine behaviours which comprised self-
directed, stereotypical and self-injurious behaviour categories were pooled for 
each Pre- and Post-treatment phase. Wilcoxon signed ranks tests were conducted 
on paired proportion data (e.g. Pre-health-check versus Post-health-check) for 
both the pooled behavioural categories of self-directed, stereotypical and self-
injurious behaviours, and for assessing changes in individual behaviours. Where 
table-wide values are examined, a Bonferroni adjusted P value is used. The 
Bonferroni adjusted P value for significance was P<0.002. All data collected 
within each five-minute focal were included in the analyses.  
 
3.15 Results: 
A total of 128 observation sessions were conducted ( X =11.64 ± 5.22 observation 
sessions/monkey). There was no significant difference in the proportion of time 
monkeys spent engaged in self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious 
behaviours Pre-health-check versus Post-health-check (Z=0.80, P=0.42).  
 
Planned comparisons were performed to examine changes in behaviours, 
individually. There was no significant difference in proportion of time engaged in 
any single behaviour at the adjusted P level Pre- versus Post-health-check (Table 




Table 3-8. Table of z-scores for proportion of time spent engaged in 
behaviours Pre- versus Post-treatments. –Z values signify a reduction from 









 Z P Z P Z P 
Autogroom 
0.09 0.93 0.80 0.42 1.51 0.13 
Scratch 
1.69 0.09 -1.24 0.21 -0.62 0.53 
Circle 
-1.60 0.11 -2.20* 0.03 1.48 0.14 
Body shake 
0.42 0.67 -0.36 0.72 0.00 1.00 
Head flip 
1.60 0.11 1.34 0.18 -1.00 0.32 
Repetitive 
1.83 0.07 -0.67 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Rock 
-1.57 0.12 -0.73 0.46 0.13 0.89 
Yawn 
0.06 0.95 -0.71 0.48 0.05 0.96 
Self-injury 
1.60 0.11 0.67 0.50 -1.07 0.29 
Vocalise 
1.95* 0.05 -0.18 0.86 -0.09 0.93 
Aggressive threat 
0.37 0.72 -2.80** 0.005 0.00 1.00 
Bite cage 
-0.94 0.35 -0.56 0.58 0.37 0.72 
Eat, drink, forage 
1.26 0.21 0.80 0.42 -1.33 0.18 
Flee 
1.00 0.32 -1.34 0.18 1.00 0.32 
Inverted 
1.83 0.07 -0.77 0.44 0.74 0.46 
Shake cage 
0.31 0.75 -0.18 0.86 -0.13 0.89 
Lip smack 
-1.00 0.32 -0.51 0.61 -0.37 0.72 
Move 
0.62 0.53 0.18 0.86 -1.07 0.29 
Jump 
0.00 1.00 -0.73 0.46 -0.94 0.35 
Out of view 
1.57 0.12 -2.67** 0.007 1.84 0.07 
Manipulate object 
-0.18 0.86 2.58** 0.009 -0.80 0.42 
Submissive present 
1.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 -1.00 0.32 
Bared teeth display 
0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Vigilant 
-0.53 0.59 -2.58** 0.009 -0.36 0.72 
Crouch 
0.00 1.00 1.41 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Inactive 
-0.09 0.93 2.04* 0.04 -1.16 0.25 
* significant at unadjusted P level (P<0.05); ** (P<0.01), no changes in behaviour were 




Changes in behaviour Pre- versus Post-enrichment 
3.16 Methods: 
The procedure was as described above. Data were collected on three consecutive 
days immediately preceding the week of enrichment, and on days 8-10 of the 
enrichment phase, during which monkeys were provided with enrichment on each 




A total of 391 observation sessions were conducted ( X =37.27±19.39 observation 
sessions/monkey, range 10 - 62). There was no significant difference in the 
proportion of time engaged in self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious 
behaviour Pre-enrichment versus Post-enrichment (Z=0.178, P=0.86). 
 
Planned comparisons were performed to examine changes in each behaviour, 
separately. There was no significant change in the proportion of time monkeys 
engaged in any behaviours Pre- versus Post-enrichment at the Bonferroni adjusted 
P level. Behaviours which showed a significant change at the unadjusted P level 
are indicated in Table 3-8. These were: reduced time spent engaged in circling, 
aggressive threat, vigilance, and inactivity; and increased time spent manipulating 





Changes in behaviour Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check  
3.18 Methods: 
A new set of data was collected from the same 11 monkeys. The procedure was as 
described above except that data were collected for three days Post-health-check 
and for three days Post-enrichment. 
 
3.19 Results: 
A total of 92 observation sessions were conducted (mean=8.36 ± 4.93 observation 
sessions/monkey). Monkeys spent significantly more time engaged in pooled self-
directed, stereotypical and self-injurious behaviour Post-health-check versus Post-
enrichment (Z=2.401, P=0.016: Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7 Proportion of time monkeys engaged in self-directed, stereotypical 
and self-injurious behaviours (when data for these three categories were 






































Planned comparisons for each behaviour separately revealed that no single 
behaviour was accountable for the significant difference in overall proportion of 
time engaged in self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours between 




An ethogram was developed for measuring changes in rhesus macaque behaviour 
following two routine husbandry procedures (a week of environmental enrichment 
and a health check) which, it was proposed, should lead to different affective 
states in captive rhesus macaques. Changes in behaviour associated with negative 
and ‘positive’ contexts were identified from the literature, namely a general 
observed increase in self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours 
associated with negative contexts, and a reduction in these behaviours following 
an improvement in conditions. In the current study, monkeys spent significantly 
more time engaged in self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours 
Post-health-check (when data for these three categories were pooled together), 
than they did Post-enrichment, supporting the hypothesis that the health-check 
should induce behaviours associated with negative context and the week of 
enrichment should decrease behaviours associated with negative context. It is 
likely the difference in behaviour following the two treatments arose from subtle 




change in behaviour between the Pre- and Post-health-check phases nor between 
the Pre- and Post-enrichment phases.  
 
The finding that monkeys spent significantly more time engaged in self-directed, 
stereotypical and self-injurious behaviour Post-health-check versus Post-
enrichment concurs with previous studies which show a similar pattern of change 
following ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ husbandry interventions (Capitanio, 1999; 
Lutz et al., 2003b; Fontenot et al., 2006), although no published study has 
compared more aversive versus more positive husbandry procedures directly. 
 
The pattern of results when either treatment (enrichment and health-check) is 
considered separately is unclear. Firstly, there was no significant change in the 
proportion of time monkeys spent engaged in self-directed, stereotypical and self-
injurious behaviour Post- versus Pre-health-check. This suggests the health-check 
had no significant impact on the performance of these behaviours. This may 
reflect several possibilities: the health-check was not a negative treatment for the 
monkeys; the behavioural categories used do not reliably reflect increases in 
negative affect in the monkeys; the monkeys have behavioural coping strategies 
that do not incorporate all or some of the behaviours identified; individual 
differences in behavioural responses to stress mask any group-level effects; the 
sample size was too small to detect any general level trends in the data; there were 
too many small behavioural categories, resulting in too few data per category and 
a highly reduced Bonferroni P value; or, the three-day windows were not 




respect to the last point, analyses of data on the first day only revealed a similar 
pattern of results. The Z-scores presented in Table 3-8 suggest shifts in a few 
behaviours, but these did not reach significance at the Bonferroni-adjusted P level, 
and only the increase in vocalizations reached significance at the unadjusted level. 
 
There was a trend for monkeys to spend less time engaged in circling, aggressive 
threat, vigilant and inactive behaviours, during the three days Post-enrichment 
versus the three days Pre-enrichment. There was also a trend for monkeys to 
spend more time manipulating objects and presenting submissively Post- versus 
Pre-enrichment. These trends were not significant at the adjusted P level, but were 
significant at the unadjusted P level. The increase in the proportion of time spent 
manipulating objects Post-enrichment versus Pre-enrichment may be explained by 
the provision of additional environmental enrichment devices in the Post-
enrichment phase. Any reduction in the remaining behaviours may be an artifact 
of increased opportunity to manipulate objects, since behaviours were mutually 
exclusive categories, therefore and increase in time spent on one activity leaves 
less time available to engage in any other activities..  
 
The trend for reduced circling Post-enrichment concurs with data from previous 
studies. However, there was no reduction in the other self-directed, stereotypical, 
and self-injurious behaviours that were identified as behavioural indicators of 
changes in inferred affective state. The reduction in aggressive threats and 
vigilance may reflect reduced arousal. There was an increase in the amount of 




interpretation. Maestripieri (1993) suggests vigilance levels reflect anxiety. An 
alternative interpretation may therefore be that reduced vigilance Post-enrichment 
reflects reduced anxiety, although there were no significant changes in other 
behaviours also believed to reflect anxiety-like states in rhesus macaques, such as 
rates of scratching (Maestripieri et al., 1992).  
 
The reduced aggression Post-enrichment may reflect reduced negative affective 
states associated with fear and anger in humans. However, there was also an 
increase in submissive presentations Post-enrichment. The increase in submissive 
presentations may reflect not a shift in affective state, but simply a shift in the 
behavioural coping strategies employed to deal with potentially stressful 
situations. 
 
In summary, the behavioural data are difficult to interpret with respect to inferred 
affective state of the monkeys following two treatments (a week of enrichment 
and a health-check). The clearest differences were found when comparing 
between the two treatments (Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment). 
However, there was a confound in the presence of extra enrichment devices in the 
cages Post-enrichment. Therefore, while these data suggest monkeys behaved 
differently following the two treatments, they show no clear patterns of change 





3.21 General Discussion 
Two treatments were introduced which were used in the main studies presented in 
Chapters 4-6 to induce changes in inferred affective state in captive male rhesus 
macaques: a week of environmental enrichment and a health check. Two 
traditional methods for assessing inferred affective state in primates were also 
introduced: a physiological measure (excreted cortisol metabolites) and 
behavioural measures (self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious behaviours). 
 
It was predicted that the health-check treatment presented a negative context, and 
would lead to an increase in physiological arousal and behaviours assumed to 
reflect negative affect in rhesus macaques. Conversely, it was predicted that the 
enrichment treatment presented a positive (or less negative) context, and would 
lead to a reduction in physiological arousal and a reduction in behaviours assumed 
to reflect negative affect in rhesus macaques (there were no behaviours identified 
as likely to reflect ‘positive affect’ per se in singly-housed rhesus macaques).  
 
The data resulting from the application of the two traditional methods following 
the two treatments gave conflicting results. When comparing Pre- versus Post-
treatment data, the data indicated a partial increase in physiological arousal Post-
health-check compared to the Pre-health-check baseline, with no consistent 
decrease in arousal Post-enrichment compared with general baseline levels. The 
behavioural data suggested there was no change in behaviour Post-health-check 




enrichment from the Pre-enrichment baseline that could not be accounted for by 
the presence of enrichment devices. 
 
The clearest patterns of data were evident when data from the Post-enrichment 
treatment were compared with data from the Post-health-check treatment. 
Monkeys were generally more physiologically aroused, and spent a greater 
proportion of their time engaged in self-directed, stereotypical and self-injurious 
behaviours, Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment. However, again data were 
difficult to interpret since the differences in physiological and behavioural data 
between the two treatments do not allow differentiation of the valence of inferred 
underlying affective state. The measures highlight differences, but do not provide 
information on whether the differences are qualitative (i.e. both high and low 
arousal may be associated with both positive and negative affect), or simply slight 
shifts in valence that are marginally significant in terms of wellbeing (i.e. highly 
negative versus fairly negative). 
 
The faecal cortisol metabolite and behavioural data presented in this chapter are 
difficult to interpret in terms of whether the two treatments resulted in the 
predicted shifts in underlying affective state. Measures that tap into other 
components of affect, such as the cognitive component, may provide much 
needed information. A new (cognitive) angle will allow us to reconsider existing 
knowledge of physiological and behavioural measures of affect in primates in 
terms of underlying cognitive changes that, in humans at least, are considered a 








4 Attentional Bias 
Attentional bias is a bias to attend preferentially to one type of information over 
another (MacLeod et al., 1986). Studies with humans have shown that affective state 
influences attentional bias (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). People high in anxiety, for 
example, demonstrate a bias to attend to threatening information. This may have 
important implications for the onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders and 
psychological wellbeing. If primates exhibit a similar cognitive capacity to attend 
preferentially to negative stimuli when stressed, this may also have implications for 
their psychological wellbeing. 
 
In this chapter I review existing research on attentional bias (Part A), and present 
empirical data from the first study to investigate attentional bias in a species of 
primate (Part B). Part A is divided into three sections. In the first of these I discuss 
the theory and background for attentional bias research conducted with humans. This 
focuses on the development of theories and models that account for biases in initial 
orienting towards threatening information (early vigilance effects), maintenance of 
attention towards threatening information (sustained vigilance, or avoidance effects), 
and subsequent disengagement of attention from threatening information. Attentional 
bias, as it is defined here, has only been studied in humans, therefore the studies I 
review were conducted with humans unless otherwise specified. In the second section 
I review the methods used to study attentional bias in humans. In particular, I 
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describe the recent development of methods that use eye-gaze to measure overt 
attention. In the third section I discuss the implications of human-based research for 
the development of a novel method to study attentional bias in primates. I conclude 
this section with the main aims and alternative hypotheses that informed the design of 
the present study. 
 
The study is detailed in Part B, which is also divided into three sections. In the first of 
these I describe the method I developed. In the second section I present the first data 
on attentional bias for threatening faces in a species of primate. In the third section I 
discuss the results of the study in light of the alternative hypotheses and available 
data from humans. 
 
 
Part A: Literature Review 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Attentional bias in humans: theory and background 
Attentional biases have been studied in humans using a wide range of experimental 
paradigms and participant populations. As such, there exists a range of theories 
regarding the role of affect in orienting attention towards or away from threatening 
stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Data arising from different paradigms and 
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populations probably tap into different aspects of attention (i.e. attentional 
engagement, maintenance, and disengagement) and different aspects of affect (e.g. 
trait versus state anxiety, and comorbidity with depression). There is a clear 
consensus that affective state and attentional processes interact (Bar Haim et al., 
2007). However, because of the different methods and populations employed, and the 
divergent results, there is general disagreement as to the functional significance of 
this interaction and its underlying mechanisms. In this section I review existing 
literature with specific emphasis on research which most directly relates to the current 
study, namely studies which focus on spatial orienting of attention relative to 
socioemotional stimuli (specifically faces) and those which consider state anxiety 
effects on attention. The following is a review of the main cognitive theories and 
empirical findings regarding the role of cognition in anxiety. This is organized 
according to the function of anxiety in directing attention towards or away from threat 
at different stages of processing (Table 4.1).  
 
Early cognitive theories of the interaction between affect and cognition predicted a 
general bias in attention allocation towards threat, that is consistent throughout all 
levels of processing, and is enhanced in anxiety (e.g. schema theory: Beck, 1976; 
semantic network theory: Bower, 1981). Early cognitive theories provided the 
foundation on which more recent information processing models are based. Existing 
theories and models differ in the suggested direction of the attentional bias among 
anxious individuals (towards or away from threat), in the stages of processing at 
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which biases arise (i.e. early attentional engagement versus later attentional 
disengagement), and the differential roles of state and trait anxiety.  
 
Vigilance theories predict rapid allocation of attention towards threat (Biological 
Preparedness: Seligman, 1971; Öhman, 2005; Information Processing model: 
Williams et al., 1988; Hypervigilance theory: Mathews, 1990; Eysenck, 1992; 
Cognitive model of Selective Processing: Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Cognitive-
Motivational model: Mogg & Bradley, 1998, although it should be noted that the 
latter also incorporates later influences such as avoidance and maintenance). 
Vigilance models generally emphasise the importance of early attentional processes 
(rapid initial orienting to threat), and typically assume vigilance for threat to occur in 
both high and low anxiety, although it may be enhanced in the former. 
 
Table 4.1 A summary of the main cognitive theories of the role of early and late 
stages of (human) cognition in directing visual attention towards, or away from, 
threatening information in anxiety.  
Theory  Stage of processing 
  Early  Late 
Early cognitive theories
a 
 Towards  Towards 
Vigilance  Towards   
Delayed disengagement    Towards 
Avoidance  Away  Away 
Vigilance-Avoidance  Towards  Away 
a: Early cognitive theories considered processing biases to occur independently of affective 
state. All other theories listed consider the direction of attention for threatening information 




Delayed disengagement theories make no predictions about early attentional 
processes, but do predict that once a threat stimulus has been attended, attention is 
captured, resulting in a dwell of attention towards threat (Fox et al., 2001; Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001; Georgiou et al., 2005). As such, delayed disengagement reflects 
biases that arise at later stages of processing. 
 
Avoidance theories predict rapid and sustained allocation of attention away from 
threat (Mansell et al., 1999; Garner et al., 2006b). Avoidance of threatening 
information may occur at both early and late processing stages, however, evidence for 
avoidance in the absence of initial vigilance effects is scarce.  
 
Vigilance-avoidance theories predict that initial vigilance for threatening 
information is followed by rapid avoidance of that information (Williams et al., 1988; 
Mogg et al., 1987 and 1997; Mansell et al., 1999; Amir et al., 1998a). These are the 
only theories to consider differential patterns of response by early and later 
processing stages together.  
 
Here, I discuss each of the competing theories regarding the spatial orienting of 
attention in humans with specific reference to the stage of processing (early versus 
late) and direction (towards versus away from threat). I conclude with an explanation 
of how the competing theories regarding attentional bias in humans informed the 
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hypotheses underlying the development of the first study to investigate attentional 
bias in a primate. 
 
4.1.1.1  Early cognitive theories 
Schema theory (Beck, 1976) proposed that the brain has processing biases for 
specific kinds of information and these biases are guided by schemas. In anxious 
individuals, schemas are particularly biased towards threat, therefore threat-related 
material is favoured over non-threat-related information, and this bias occurs at all 
stages of processing (‘primal threat mode’). Because processing is directed by 
schemas, Beck and Clark (1997) consider the distinction between clinical and sub-
clinical anxiety to be quantitative rather than qualitative. According to Schema 
theory, evolution has equipped the human brain with a processing ‘schema’ for 
threat-relevant information. This is a natural processing bias across animal species 
that arose during evolution because of its survival value in alerting an animal to 
potential danger. The extent to which the schema biases the processing of threat-
relevant information in humans, and the correlation between this bias and the 
presence of real threat in the environment, distinguish between low- and high-, and 
sub-clinical and clinical, anxiety. Beck’s schema theory considers both early 
automatic orienting of attention towards threat (vigilance) and later strategic 
processing of threat-relevant information (interpretation, recall) to play a central role 




Schema theory led to the development of several network theories of the interplay 
between affect and attention, with specific reference to the role of attention in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety disorders. The first of these, Semantic 
network theory (Bower, 1981), proposed each emotional state is represented by a 
series of nodes which, when activated during a current mood state, bias information 
in a mood-congruent manner (see also Foa & Kozak, 1986). As with Schema theory, 
biases would be expected at all stages of processing. Subsequent studies identified 
mood-congruent attentional biases in anxiety (MacLeod et al., 1986; Broadbent & 
Broadbent, 1988) and phobia (Watts et al., 1986), and recall biases in depression (e.g. 
Mathews & Bradley, 1983), but not recall biases in anxiety (Mogg et al., 1987) nor 
early attentional biases in depression (MacLeod et al., 1986). These discrepant 
findings suggested that early and late stages of information processing may be 
governed by separate underlying mechanisms, contrary to schema and semantic 
network theories’ suggestion that valence-specific schemas direct all stages of 
processing. This revised view is consistent with Posner and Peterson’s (1990) account 
that visuo-spatial attention incorporates at least three distinct neural subsystems that 
co-ordinate the 1) shifting, 2) engagement and 3) disengagement of visual attention. 
Subsequent models therefore needed to allow for separate underlying mechanisms for 
early and late processing. These are summarized in the following sections, according 




4.1.1.2  Vigilance theories 
Vigilance theories (e.g. Seligman, 1971; Eysenck, 1992; Öhman, 2005; Williams et 
al., 2007) propose that anxious individuals are highly sensitive to threat-relevant 
information and attention is captured by threatening stimuli at very early, automatic 
stages of processing. Snake and spider-phobic individuals, for example, are faster to 
detect snake and spider stimuli respectively when these stimuli are presented in an 
array of competing non-threatening stimuli, regardless of stimulus location within the 
display (Öhman et al., 2001a). Similar effects have been found for schematic 
threatening faces amongst arrays of positive, neutral and other negative faces 
(children: Waters & Lipp, 2008; adults: Öhman et al., 2001b). An early form of 
vigilance theory, biological preparedness (Seligman, 1971; Mineka & Öhman, 2002), 
suggested that vigilance for threatening stimuli is an innate function of the 
mammalian brain which arises from a ‘fear module’, an evolutionarily-shaped 
behavioural system involving sub-cortical pathways via the amygdala (Öhman et al., 
2007). 
 
The most compelling evidence for an innate, automatic system for processing threat 
relevant information is provided by data on the role of the amygdala and thalamic 
pathways in the formation of selective associations during fear conditioning in a 
range of species including rats and humans (LeDoux et al., 1983; LeDoux, 1996; 
Öhman & Mineka, 2001). When the to-be-conditioned stimulus is threat-relevant 
(e.g. a threatening face), conditioning to an aversive unconditioned stimulus (e.g. 
shock) is facilitated, compared with conditioning to non-threat-relevant stimuli 
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(humans: Esteves et al., 1994). Similar selective association effects have also been 
demonstrated in rats (LeDoux, 1996) and rhesus macaques (Cook & Mineka, 1989 
and 1990). LeDoux (1996) emphasises dissociable ‘high road/low road’ processing 
routes of the brain. The ‘low road’ processing route is proposed to occur via 
subcortical systems (amygdala and associated structures with direct magnocellular 
inputs from the retina) which allow rapid appraisal of the threat value of a stimulus 
presented foveally or peripherally, and is tuned to low spatial frequency inputs 
(Holmes et al., 2003; Laycock et al., 2008; see also Holmes et al., 2005). This coarse, 
rapid processing is accompanied by slower, top-down processing of more fine scale 
information (the ‘high road’), via a parvocellular processing route from the retina to 
cortical areas. This pathway is sensitive primarily to stimuli presented foveally 
(Holmes et al., 2006; Eimer & Holmes, 2007). Together, the two pathways lead to an 
appropriate psychophysiological or behavioural response (e.g. fear or freezing), 
according to the species and environmental context. LeDoux (1996) provided 
evidence for separate pathways directing early and later attentional processes, as well 
as appropriate behavioural responses to threat. These collective findings guided the 
formation of most, if not all, subsequent theories and models of information 
processing in anxiety.  
 
The information-processing model proposed by Williams et al. (1988: Figure 4.1) 
makes specific predictions about the respective roles of early automatic and later 
strategic processing as well as differential effects of state and trait affect in 
information processing. According to the model, state anxiety interacts with an 
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Affective Decision Mechanism (ADM), which guides early pre-attentive processing 
of stimulus threat value. High state anxiety results in evaluation of high threat output 
from the ADM. Low state anxiety results in low threat output.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 The information processing model (Williams et al., 1988) of attention 
for threat in anxiety suggests different mechanisms underlie early and later 











According to Williams et al.’s (1988) model, trait anxiety interacts with later 
attentional processes, which are guided by a Resource Allocation Mechanism (RAM). 
The RAM receives output from the ADM and symbolizes a more stable tendency for 
an individual to direct attention towards (vigilance in high anxiety) or away from 
(perceptual cognitive avoidance in low anxiety) threatening stimuli. Despite a later 
revision, a key problem with the model remains a lack of evidence for an avoidance 
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of threat-relevant stimuli by low anxious individuals (e.g. Mogg et al., 2000b) as well 
as conflicting results for the respective roles of state and trait anxiety on attention 
allocation. 
 
An offshoot of Williams et al.’s (1988) information-processing model was Eysenck’s 
hypervigilance theory of anxiety (Eysenck, 1992). This incorporated aspects of the 
biological preparedness hypothesis. According to hypervigilance theory, anxious 
individuals continuously scan the environment for threat and exhibit heightened 
selectivity and maintenance of attention towards threat-relevant stimuli. As well as 
early spatial orienting of attention towards threat, Eysenck (1992) considers 
‘secondary appraisal’ processes to feed into the maintenance of anxiety and the 
hypervigilant attentional state. 
 
Other cognitive models develop Williams et al.’s (1988) information processing 
model still further. Mogg & Bradley’s (1998) Cognitive-Motivational model (Figure 
4.2) emphasises the role of early stimulus appraisal processes in the development and 
maintenance of anxiety. According to Mogg & Bradley (1998), early stimulus 
appraisal by a Valence Evaluation System (VES) results in information output to a 
Goal Engagement System (GES). State and trait anxiety, biological preparedness, 
prior learning and situational contextual factors all feed into the VES, such that 
anxiety affects stimulus appraisal for threat, but not the allocation of resources, which 
should be stable across individuals according to whether threat is present or not. 
Where Williams et al. (1988) predict that high-trait anxious (HTA) and low-trait 
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anxious (LTA) individuals should exhibit qualitatively different attentional responses 
to threat (vigilance versus avoidance, respectively), with state anxiety mediating 
stimulus appraisal for threat, Mogg and Bradley (1998) predict that high anxious and 
low anxious individuals should differ in their appraisal of the threatening value of a 
stimulus (more threatening or less threatening, respectively), but not in their 
attentional response (see also Mogg et al. 2000b). In the latter case, both should 
attend preferentially to highly threatening stimuli, irrespective of current goals, and 




Figure 4.2 The cognitive-motivational model (Mogg & Bradley, 1998) places 
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Mathews & Mackintosh (1998) put forward a cognitive model of selective 
processing in anxiety (Figure 4.3). This model, like that of Mogg & Bradley (1998), 
incorporates LeDoux’s (1996) work on the role of automatic information processing 
via the amygdala-thalamic pathway, allowing anxiety-related interference from 
stimuli presented outside of awareness. According to this model the emotional 
valence of a stimulus is assessed in a Threat Evaluation System (TES), which utilizes 
the fast-acting amygdala-thalamic pathway. Anxiety level influences the degree to 
which the stimulus is appraised as threatening. The appraisal directly affects the 
prioritization given to such information over competing non-threat-related 
information, which is processed via a slower cortical pathway.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 The cognitive model of selective processing (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
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The extent of the bias is modulated by the relative dominance of top-down task-
related conscious processes compared to bottom-up, automatic threat-related output 
from the TES. Anxiety state, distractor task demands, prior learning and stimulus 
type may all affect the dominance relationship between competing processing 
pathways. These factors are suggested to account for the disparate patterns of findings 
among different populations and between different experimental designs. 
 
 
4.1.1.3 Delayed disengagement theories 
Delayed disengagement/maintenance theories (Fox, 1994; Fox et al., 2001; Yiend & 
Matthews, 2001; Georgiou et al., 2005) propose anxiety has little effect on early 
attentional capture, but a greater effect on later processes that modulate the 
maintenance of attention towards threat. Anxiety therefore leads to a delay in 
disengagement from threatening information. The delay may be due to an inability to 
disengage attention from a stimulus presently being visually attended to (e.g. delay to 
detect the absence of a discrepant face among an array of angry faces in a visual 
search task: Fox et al. 2000; reduced ability to detect peripheral targets when a 
threatening stimulus is presented at fixation: Georgiou et al., 2005), or due to 
attentional ‘dwell’ on a previously visually attended stimulus (e.g. during exogenous 




4.1.1.4 Avoidance theories 
Avoidance of emotional information has been demonstrated when emotional faces are 
paired with non-social stimuli (Mansell et al., 1999; e.g. pictures of household 
objects: Chen et al., 2002). For example, Chen et al. (2002) tested social phobic 
patients and matched controls on a dot-probe task in which positive (happy), neutral 
and negative (angry, sad, disgusted and fearful) faces were shown paired with 
pictures of household objects. Patients were faster to detect probes presented at the 
location of household objects versus both positive and negative emotional faces, 
while the matched controls were equally fast to detect probes at both locations. A 
similar study found evidence for attention away from emotional faces by a non-
clinical sample with high social anxiety scores following a social stressor (Mansell et 
al., 1999). However, a more recent study failed to show avoidance of faces versus 
household objects (Garner et al., 2006b). It should be noted that evidence for 
complete avoidance of emotional faces has only been demonstrated when non-social 
alternative cues have been used. 
 
4.1.1.5 Vigilance-Avoidance theories 
Vigilance-avoidance theories focus on both early and later aspects of information 
processing (Mathews, 1990; Williams et al., 1996; Mogg et al., 1997; Heinrichs & 
Hofmann, 2001; Mogg et al., 2004; Garner et al., 2006b; Holmes et al., 2008). 
Specifically, early automatic attention towards threat is followed by later strategic 
avoidance. This attentional pattern allows early detection of threat (alerting the 
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individual to the presence and location of potential danger), followed by avoidance of 
threat (a possible mechanism to reduce anxiety arising from the presence of the 
threat-related stimulus itself: Derakshan et al., 2007). Mogg et al. (2004) presented 
high- and low-threat scenes to HTA and LTA, and blood-injury phobic, individuals 
during a dot-probe task. Pictures were presented for 500ms and 1500ms, to capture 
the early and later stages of attention allocation. HTA individuals were more vigilant 
for high-threat scenes at the shorter exposure, with no attentional bias evident for 
either anxiety group at the longer exposure. Blood-injury phobic individuals showed 
significant vigilance for high-threat scenes at the short duration and significant 
avoidance at the longer duration, suggesting a vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention 
allocation.  
 
Vigilance-avoidance accounts incorporate a changing pattern of attention over time. 
Methods which map the temporal dynamic of the response are therefore more 
appropriate: namely electroencephalogram (EEG: Holmes et al., 2008) and eye-gaze 
measures (e.g. Garner et al., 2006b). Event-Related-Potential (ERP: a particular form 
of EEG) responses to centrally presented emotional faces suggest that HTA 
individuals demonstrate enhanced initial threat evaluation of fearful faces. This is 
followed by cognitive avoidance, as evidenced by attenuated threat processing among 
HTA individuals. While an enhanced initial threat evaluation was also evident in 
LTA individuals, no subsequent change in ERP response was evident (suggesting 
sustained attention towards fearful faces).  
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Derakshan et al. (2007) suggest the vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention allocation is 
particular to the repressive coping style. According to this model initial vigilance 
towards threatening information reflects early, rapid, automatic cognitive and 
physiological responses typical of HTA individuals. Initial vigilance is followed by 
controlled, strategic, top-down processing that disengages attention from the 
threatening stimulus as part of a coping strategy to reduce anxiety (e.g. Williams et 
al., 1996; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
 
A non-linear account of the vigilant-avoidant processing style is provided by Garner 
et al. (2006b). They suggest that attentional biases subsume different processes that 
operate in parallel (i.e. when there is competition for attentional resources between 
two competing stimuli). These parallel processing pathways will be revealed most 
effectively where responses reveal defensive or socially submissive behaviours, e.g. 
where anxious individuals are provided with an opportunity to avoid social cues (such 
as shifts in gaze from social to non-social cues). This account is further supported by 
the findings of Calvo et al. (2006) who measured fixation latency and duration to 
emotional faces in a visual search task. They found speeded orientation, but reduced 
fixation duration, towards angry faces versus other-emotional and neutral faces 
presented for three seconds. However, Calvo et al. (2006) interpret the reduced 
duration of gaze towards angry faces in terms of enhanced processing efficiency of 
such faces, in contradiction to an avoidance of such stimuli. Further, anxiety 
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measures were not recorded to distinguish stress-related effects on attention 
allocation. 
 
4.1.1.6 An Integrative model 
A recent meta-analysis of all published research up to May 2005 has led to an 
integrative model of the cognitive mechanisms underlying threat processing (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007; Figure 4.4). This model suggests vigilance towards threat in 
anxiety is a robust phenomenon, though one with low-to-medium effect size. The 
integrated model proposes four primary processing stages. The first two of these 
represent early automatic processing stages (Preattentive Threat Evaluation System, 
PTES, and a Resource Allocation System, RAS). The subsequent two represent 
strategic processing stages (Guided Threat Evaluation System, GTES, and Goal 
Engagement System, GES). Anxious individuals may exhibit processing biases at 
each and any of the four processing stages. The direction, strength and stage at which 
such biases in processing occur depends on the level of anxiety, stimulus intensity 
and relative influence of state and trait effects.  
 
Bar-Haim et al. (2007) conclude there is strong evidence for a link between affect and 
attention, and for the role of this link in the development and maintenance of anxiety 
and other affective disorders. Underlying mechanisms may be broadly separated as 
early automatic and later strategic stages. Initial rapid preattentive threat evaluation 
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(directed by the PTES) via fast and direct magnocellular pathways to the amygdala 
and associated subcortical structures, directs early spatial orienting of attention 
towards threat, which is accompanied by an appropriate physiological response 
(directed by the RAS). Subsequent strategic evaluation of the threat (following 
retrieval of information from memory, assessment of context, prior learning effects 
and available coping strategies, directed by the GTES) combined with consideration 
of current goals (directed by the GES) allows strategic feedback and override or 
maintenance of the automatic orienting of attention and physiological response. 
 
Figure 4.4 The integrated model (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) incorporates previous 
models to reconcile differential effects of early and later processing stages on 
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In summary, several themes emerge from the existing human literature which 
informed the design of the current study. Firstly, there are conflicting data regarding 
the direction of attentional biases (towards, or away from, threatening stimuli). Most 
studies indicate a vigilant pattern of initial orienting of attention towards threat in 
anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), which occurs rapidly and automatically. Therefore, a 
design which measures direction of orienting towards, or away from, threatening 
versus non-threatening information would allow comparison of direction of attention 
with respect to threatening information in primates. 
 
Secondly, there is a general consensus that both early automatic and later strategic 
processing stages influence allocation of attention to threat-related stimuli. The 
relative contribution of each, and the strength of feedforward/feedback pathways 
remain unresolved (cf Williams et al., 1988; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). It is clear that later strategic processing may 
be involved in attentional dwell and avoidance, although the conditions that elicit 
either tendency have yet to be fully elucidated. Given the evidence for face-
processing by rhesus macaques reviewed in Chapter 2, a design which measures 
latency of initial orienting towards threatening versus non-threatening information, as 
well as latency to disengage, would allow comparison of early and later processing 
stages. 
 
Thirdly, emotional faces are now widely used as threat- and non-threat-relevant 
stimuli in human studies, partly due to the automaticity of face processing in the 
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human brain, and the special salience of faces over other kinds of stimuli (e.g. 
Cresswell, 2008). Attentional biases may be mediated by valence differences between 
faces (e.g. enhanced vigilance for angry but not disgust faces in anxiety: Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 1999), be valence-non-specific (e.g. vigilance for both positive and 
negative emotional faces over neutral faces in anxiety: Garner et al., 2006b; Brosch et 
al., 2008), or may vary as a function of stimulus intensity (e.g. increased vigilance for 
high- versus medium-threat pictures in anxiety: Mogg et al., 2000b; Yuan et al., 
2007). Therefore, a design using face stimuli which differ in threat value, e.g. 
aggressive versus neutral faces, would provide data comparable with that available 
from humans. 
 
Typically, the different theories are supported by data from different experimental 
paradigms. It is therefore likely that these methods tap into different aspects of spatial 
attention, and that conflicting results reflect a complexity of competing parallel 
attentional processes, and limitations of current paradigms. In the next section I 
review the methods used to measure spatial attention in humans, and discuss their 
implications for the design of a suitable paradigm for measuring spatial attentional 
processes in nonhuman primates. 
 
4.1.2 Current methods for studying attentional bias 
The appropriate method for measuring attentional bias is determined by the stage of 
processing that is of interest (early engagement, ongoing maintenance or later 
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disengagement). A summary of studies, detailing methods used and findings with 
respect to direction of attentional biases is given in Table 4-2. Studies are organized 
according to the direction of attention with respect to threatening information 
implicated in each study. Only studies in which attention for threatening versus non-
threatening faces are included.  
 
The most common experimental paradigms used to measure attentional biases are 
those that tap into spatial attention. The dot-probe paradigm (MacLeod et al., 1986) 
is the most widely used method. Less frequently employed methods include visual 
search (e.g. Öhman et al., 2001b) and exogenous cueing tasks (e.g. Stormack et al., 
1995; Fox et al., 2001). A recent development, of particular importance to the current 
research, is the additional mapping of eye-gaze during the aforementioned tasks (e.g. 
Rohner, 2002; Calvo & Avero, 2005). Eye-gaze and preferential looking measures 
are discussed in the final section with specific reference to their utility for use with 
primates (e.g. Waitt et al., 2003). 
 
4.1.2.1 The dot-probe task 
The dot-probe task (developed by MacLeod et al., 1986) is the most widely used 
paradigm for measuring spatial orienting to emotional stimuli. In its simplest form the 
task involves the simultaneous presentation of two stimuli, one neutral and one 
threat-related, equidistant from a central fixation point. After a predetermined time 
(e.g. 500ms) the stimuli are removed from the screen and a probe appears at the
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High v Low TA 
(LTA v HTA:  
STAI) 
Supports Cognitive-Motivational model, and stimulus 
intensity effects. HTA+LTA were faster to detect probes 
replacing high-threat compared with mild- or non-threat 
scenes. LTA were slower to detect probes replacing 
mild-threat versus non-threat scenes, suggesting 
avoidance, with no difference for high threat scenes. 
HTA were faster to detect probes replacing high-threat 
scenes versus non-threat scenes, suggesting vigilance. 
 
Mogg et al. 
(2000b) 










High v Low SA 
and TA (STAI) 
Supports emotionality effect. Vigilance for angry and 
happy faces in HA group (versus neutral faces). No 
delay to disengage, once data were adjusted for 
response-slowing  
Mogg et al. 
(2008) 












High v Medium v 
Low SA (STAI) 
Supports threat-specificity effects. MSA and HSA were 
faster to detect probes replacing angry faces and made 
more initial eye shifts to angry faces than others. 
 
Bradley et al. 
(2000) 
1
 Where (s) = stimulus presentation time; (isi) = inter-stimulus/probe-interval; (soa) = stimulus onset asynchrony; and (p) signifies probe presentation time. EM 
signifies Eye Movement used as measure of (overt) attention. For visual search tasks values in brackets signify array size e.g. (2x2) signifies four pictures arranged in 
a 2 x 2 square.  
2
 Only scales used in the classification of participants for the final analyses are given. STAI: Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; RCMAS: Revised Child’s 
Manifest Anxiety Scale; FNE: Fear of Negative Evaluation questionnaire; SADS: Social Avoidance and Distress Scale; POMS: Profile of Mood States questionnaire.  
3
 Data are from adults unless otherwise stated. TA: Trait Anxiety; SA: State Anxiety; SocA: Social Anxiety 
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Papers supporting vigilance theories (continued) 
Visual search + 
EM 
(1x7) 










- Supports happy face superiority effect. The most 
visually salient expressions direct initial orienting to 
faces (in order: happy, surprised, disgusted, fearful, 
angry, sad), driven by bottom-up stimulus-bound 
featural processing (of the most salient features, i.e. the 





Visual search  
(2x2 – 4x4) 







- Supports threat-specificity effect. Slower to detect 
absence of a discrepant face in all-angry displays versus 
all-happy or all-neutral displays. Faster to detect an 
angry face in an array of happy or neutral faces than a 
happy face in an array of angry or neutral faces. Effects 
of array size suggest serial processing and not ‘pop-out’.  
 
Fox et al. 
(2000) 
Visual search  
(3x4) 
(s) until response 










Supports threat-specificity effect. Faster to detect angry 
faces in an array of neutral or happy faces than happy 
faces among neutral or angry faces. GSPs were faster to 
detect angry faces than NACs, and faster to detect angry 





(2x2, 2x3, 2x4) 








Children, High v 
Low TA 
(RCMAS) 
Supports threat-specificity effect. Faster to detect angry 
faces among scrambled arrays than to detect happy or 
neutral faces. Effects of array size suggest serial 
processing and not ‘pop-out’. 























Papers supporting vigilance theories (continued) 
Visual search  
(2x2 – 5x5) 








- Supports threat/anger superiority effect. Angry faces 
were detected faster and with greater accuracy than 
other-emotion and neutral faces. Effects of array size 
suggest serial and parallel processing and not ‘pop-out’.  
 
Öhman et al. 
(2001b) 
Visual search with 
distractor task 
(2x2) 






- Supports negativity effect. Faster to detect negative faces 
in neutral or happy arrays. Slower to count the number 
of arcs in displays of negative faces than happy or 
neutral faces. Inversion effect negates interference 
effects. 
 
Eastwood et al. 
(2003) 
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Infants of low 
and high social 
phobic mothers 
 
Supports threat-specificity and emotional-intensity 
effects. Infants looked for longer towards high intensity 
angry faces than low intensity angry faces (10 wks). 
Same pattern for fearful faces (10 mos). No effect of 
maternal social phobia on infant. 
 
Cresswell et al. 
(2008) 












High v Low TA 
(STAI) 
HTA individuals were slower to detect probes presented 
concurrently with fear faces compared to trials with 
happy and neutral faces. There were no effects of face 
valence for LTA individuals. 
 





































High v Low SA 
(STAI) 
HSA individuals were slower to detect probes following 
(invalid) angry faces than either invalid happy or neutral 
faces. There were no effects of face valence on valid 
trials, of for LSA individuals. 
Fox et al. 
(2001) 
Papers supporting avoidance theories 
Dot-probe 
(s) 500ms 
(isi) not given 









phobia v matched 
controls 
Supports non-specific bias away from emotional faces. 
Social phobic patients were significantly faster to detect 
probes occurring at the location of household objects 
versus emotional faces. Controls showed no bias. 
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Supports non-specific bias away from emotional faces. 
High socially anxious individuals under social evaluative 
stress were slower to detect probes at location of 
emotional faces, suggesting avoidance of emotional 
faces. 
Mansell et al. 
(1999)  











High v low TA 
(STAI) 
Initial anxiety-independent vigilance towards angry 
faces, followed by subsequent avoidance by HTA but 























Papers supporting vigilance-avoidance theories (continued) 








neutral faces.  
Non-clinical 
Social Anxiety. 
High v Low (TA: 






Supports non-specific bias for emotional faces mediated 
by SA, but not TA. HSA individuals were relatively 
faster to fixate 
+
- emotional faces than neutral faces, 
compared with LSA. However, LSA looked for longer 
towards 
+
- emotional faces than neutral faces (no bias for 
HSA). 
 
Garner et al. 
(2006b) 
Dot probe 








High v Low TA 
(POMS) 
Inconclusive results. Early vigilance for threat in HTA 
versus LTA, revealed by faster RT on 500ms trials. On 
1250ms trials vigilance was reduced in HTA and did not 
differ from LTA suggesting possible beginnings of 
avoidance, but evidence unclear.  
 
Bradley et al. 
(1998) 
Visual search with 
EM coded from 
video (2x2) 







- Supports threat-specificity effect. Faster to fixate, and 
preferential initial orienting towards angry versus other-
emotional and neutral faces at 150ms exposure. Fewer, 
shorter, fixations towards angry faces during later 
processing, suggesting avoidance. Enhanced processing 
efficiency for threat stimuli suggested as mechanism.  
 




location of one of the two previous stimulus locations. Participants are instructed 
to respond as fast as possible in identifying the location of the probe (e.g. 
left/right, up/down). Fast responses to a probe indicate attention was directed 
towards that location at probe onset, while slow responses suggest attention was 
located away from that location at probe onset. Changing the stimulus 
presentation times and stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) allows the time course 
of attention allocation to be mapped. For example, fast responses to the probe, 
following a subliminal (below threshold for awareness) or supraliminal (above 
threshold for awareness) presentation of a threat-relevant stimulus with a short 
SOA (<500ms) indicate rapid spatial orienting of attention towards the threatening 
stimulus (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Holmes et al., 2005; Carlson & Reinke, 
2008). Response latencies to the probe following supraliminal stimulus exposure, 
with a longer SOA (>500ms), reflect later processing stages, such as maintenance 
or disengagement effects.  
 
In addition to temporal sensitivity, the dot-probe paradigm removes response bias 
effects (since the probe is always a neutral stimulus, such as a circle or cross) and 
arousal effects (since a threat-relevant stimulus appears on all response trials). 
Combination of dot-probe with ERP recordings has allowed precise measurement 
of the timings of differential attentional processes (e.g. Holmes et al. 2009), while 
combination with eye-tracking techniques has allowed dissociation of covert and 




4.1.2.2 Exogenous cueing task 
The exogenous cueing task (Stormack et al., 1995; Fox et al. 2001; Georgiou et 
al., 2005) is an adapted version of Posner’s (1980) spatial cueing paradigm. The 
procedure is similar to the dot-probe task, except that only one stimulus (either 
emotional or neutral) is presented on the screen on each trial (left/right location) 
and cues the location in which a target probe will appear on the majority of trials 
(valid trials). Stormack et al. (1995) suggest the speeding of response to valid 
emotional cues compared with valid neutral cues indicates attentional 
engagement, while the relative slowing of responses to invalid emotional cues 
(those where the probe appears at the opposite location to the cue) compared with 
invalid neutral cues indicates a delay to disengage attention from emotional 
stimuli. Koster et al. (2006) included a measure of trait anxiety in their emotional 
cueing task, along with manipulation of the stimulus presentation times to 
measure the time-course of allocation of attentional resources. Their data suggest 
that HTA enhances attention towards, and delays disengagement from, negative 
stimuli presented for 100ms. At longer stimulus presentations (200 and 500ms), 
faster responses to invalidly cued probes suggest attentional avoidance of negative 
stimuli among highly anxious individuals.  
 
A restriction of the exogenous cueing task is that it lacks sensitivity to distinguish 
delayed disengagement due to attentional capture from arousal-related response 
slowing in the presence of threatening stimuli (Mogg et al., 2008). This method is 
increasingly considered less appropriate for measuring attentional shift than tasks 
such as the dot-probe. A variant of the exogenous cueing task (Georgiou et al., 
2005) measures speed to orient attention away from an emotionally-valenced 
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stimulus, presented at fixation, towards an uncued, peripherally presented probe. 
Instead of cueing the likely position of the probe, the emotional stimulus in this 
case is a distractor, so that time taken to locate the probe provides a measure of 
the time required to disengage attention away from the stimulus. Angry and 
fearful faces presented at fixation delay detection of peripheral targets among 
anxious individuals (angry faces: Fox et al., 2001; fearful faces: Georgiou et al., 
2005), while sad faces do not (Georgiou et al., 2005). 
 
4.1.2.3 Visual search task 
The visual search task requires participants to locate a target stimulus within an 
array of distractor stimuli (for example, a snake among flowers: Öhman et al., 
2001a: an angry face in a crowd: Öhman et al., 2001b; Calvo et al., 2006). Studies 
have demonstrated an effect of trait anxiety on search times for negatively and 
positively valenced faces among arrays of neutral or emotional faces in both 
adults (enhanced detection of angry relative to happy faces in social phobics: 
Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999) and children (enhanced detection of angry 
relative to happy or neutral faces: Hadwin et al., 2003). The extent to which 
variation in search times can be attributed to early or late attentional processes is 
unclear. In a modification of Öhman et al.’s (2001a) experiment, Lipp et al. 
(2004) presented both fear- and non-fear-relevant animals among arrays of 
mushrooms and flowers. Faster detection times for all animals suggest that the 
original conclusion of an evolved fear module for detecting dangerous animals 
may be incorrect, and instead reflect constraints of using stimulus arrays, rather 




More consistent results have been provided by studies using face stimuli (the ‘face 
in the crowd’ effect: Hansen & Hansen, 1988). Fox et al. (2000) ran a series of 
visual search tests in which combinations of happy, angry and neutral schematic 
faces were shown on a screen. Angry faces were detected faster than happy or 
neutral faces, and angry faces were a distraction to identifying the presence of 
other-valenced faces. In another variant of the visual search task Eastwood et al. 
(2003) asked participants to count the number of arcs presented on a screen. The 
arcs were presented in configurations that formed upright or inverted schematic 
positive (happy), negative (sad) and neutral faces. The presence of negative 
schematic faces on the screen slowed response time relative to when happy or 
neutral faces were present, despite containing the same number of component 
parts. This suggests, that the presence of negative faces in an array captures 
attention, despite ongoing task demands (counting arcs).  
 
Recent findings for a superiority effect of happy faces in a visual search task, 
bring previous threat- or negative-superiority theories into question. Calvo & 
Nummenmaa (2008) found faster detection for happy faces over all other 
emotional faces in visual search. They suggest enhanced detection of happy faces 
is due to increased saliency of the mouth region specifically, and attribute 
enhanced detection to stimulus-bound bottom-up featural processing which occurs 
independently of top-down appraisal of the emotional content of the face. 
Therefore the mechanism by which the ‘face-in-the-crowd’ effect arises, and the 




4.1.2.4 Gaze measures 
Eye movement and preferential looking measures have been used with both 
human adults (e.g. Bradley et al., 2000; Calvo & Avero, 2005; Garner et al., 
2006b) and infants (e.g. Cresswell et al., 2008) in the context of attentional bias 
research. Fixation of one of two competing stimuli is interpreted as indicating a 
visual bias for the fixated stimulus. Bradley et al. (2000) used infra-red eye-
tracking equipment to record direction of first eye movement towards emotional 
versus neutral faces presented for 500ms during a dot-probe task. Faster responses 
to threat-valid probes by high-state-anxious (HSA) and medium-state-anxious 
(MSA) individuals correlated positively with initial orienting of gaze towards 
threatening faces. Therefore direction of first look towards stimuli may provide a 
valid analogue measure of the spatial orienting of attention as revealed by reaction 
time data from dot-probe studies.  
 
Following their finding, Bradley et al. (2000) suggested that the addition of 
duration of gaze may provide a valid measure for teasing apart early and later 
stages of attention allocation (initial orienting and later maintenance stages), a 
point Bradley made in a previous dot-probe study in which the limitations of the 
timings of stimulus presentations within a dot-probe paradigm failed either to 
reveal, or rule out, a vigilant-avoidant account (Bradley et al., 1998). This 
triggered a number of studies using gaze measures to map the time course of 
attentional bias (gaze direction and duration to threat scenes: Calvo & Avero, 
2005; Nummenmaa et al. , 2006; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007; gaze towards 
faces: Calvo et al., 2006; Garner et al., 2006b; electro-oculographic, EOG, 




Garner et al. (2006b) measured latency and duration of gaze towards faces by high 
and low socially anxious individuals during a dot-probe study in which emotional 
versus non-emotional face pairs and face versus non-face pairs were shown. This 
was the first study to use duration of gaze as a measure of attention allocation 
towards emotional and non-emotional faces by individuals who differed in 
anxiety. Their data revealed effects of state and social anxiety on both latency and 
duration of gaze. Socially anxious individuals were relatively faster to gaze 
towards both positive and negative emotional versus non-emotional faces, 
compared with low-socially-anxious individuals, but spent less time overall 
looking towards emotional faces than did low-socially anxious individuals. This 
finding suggests a vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention allocation towards 
emotional faces by socially anxious individuals. 
 
The Garner et al. (2006b) study demonstrates the value of gaze as a measure for 
revealing both early vigilance and later avoidant attentional strategies, which 
cannot be teased apart from reaction time data alone. Calvo et al. (2006) measured 
latency, duration and frequency of eye movements, coded from video, towards 
emotional faces in a visual search task. They found speeded detection of, but 
shorter gaze duration towards, angry faces, compared with other-emotion and 
neutral faces, suggesting eye movements coded from video provide a valid 





In addition to its value in mapping the direction of early and later stages of spatial 
attention within a single trial, eye movements also provide a suitable tool for 
measuring spatial attention in non-linguistic participants. Human infants, at 10 
days of age, gaze for longer towards faces versus non-faces, at 10 weeks gaze for 
longer at high-intensity angry faces compared with low-intensity angry faces, and 
high versus low intensity fearful faces at 10 months (Cresswell et al., 2008). 
Increased fixation times are often discussed in terms of an attentional ‘preference’ 
for that stimulus but, depending on the design of the task, may also indicate a 
response to other factors such as novelty or expectation violation (e.g. Walden et 
al., 2004).  
 
While no study has used eye gaze to investigate attentional biases for emotional 
versus non-emotional faces in a species of non-human primate, many studies have 
used eye-gaze to measure primate spatial attention, including attention towards 
conspecific faces. I discussed these studies in Chapter 2. Of particular relevance 
here, is validation of preferential looking paradigms for use with primates (e.g. 
preference for facial colouration in rhesus macaques: Waitt et al., 2003), and 
demonstrated reliability in coding primate eye gaze (chimpanzees: Bethell et al., 
2007). These studies reveal that direction, duration and shifts in eye gaze may 
vary as a function of differences in social relevance of different faces, and these 
shifts may be reliably coded by human observers. However, there are few studies 
that document shifts in eye-gaze between two competing faces (cf. Waitt et al., 
2003), and there are no studies that investigate shifts in eye-gaze between faces 
that differ in facial expression, nor between faces and non face stimuli, and the 
effects of different experimental treatments on these patterns.  
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4.1.3 Implications of human-based research for the development of a novel 
method to study attentional bias in primates 
Several themes arose from the literature review that informed the design of the 
current study. Firstly, attention is componential. It comprises early attentional 
engagement, ongoing maintenance, and later disengagement stages. Therefore, a 
paradigm that measures each of these stages (such as eye-gaze) will provide a 
more complete picture of the attentional response than paradigms that capture 
only early or later stages (e.g. dot-probe versus exogenous cueing tasks 
respectively). Recent studies have argued for the importance of eye-gaze as a 
valid measure of preferential attention in attentional bias research (Bradley et al., 
2000; Calvo & Avero, 2005; Garner, et al., 2006). Comparison of eye movement 
and reaction time data by Bradley et al. (2000) revealed that initial orienting of 
gaze predicted speeding of responses to threat-valid probes in a dot-probe task. 
Taken together with validation of gaze as a measure of preferential looking at 
faces in human infants (Farroni et al., 2002; Cresswell et al., 2008) and other 
species (monkeys: Waitt et al., 2004; sheep: da Costa et al., 2004), a preferential 
looking paradigm was selected for use in the current study.  
 
Secondly, attentional biases may represent a bias to orient attention towards 
threatening versus non-threatening stimuli (vigilance), or away from threatening 
versus non-threatening stimuli (avoidance), in humans. Disagreement in the 
literature is partly due to the temporal specificity of the different paradigms used. 
Therefore, a test of alternative hypotheses with respect to the direction of any 




Thirdly, attentional biases may be either threat-specific or emotion-general. The 
majority of studies point towards a threat-specific attentional bias in face 
processing among humans. Therefore, threatening versus non-threatening were 
selected for the stimuli, specifically aggressive versus neutral conspecific faces. I 
refer to these interchangeably as emotional versus non-emotional, threatening 
versus non-threatening and aggressive versus neutral to reflect data from humans. 
 
Fourthly, attentional biases may be revealed in both trait and state anxiety, and 
both within, and between, human subjects. As a first investigation into the 
phenomenon in a species of primate, the two treatments described in Chapter 3 
were considered applicable to this study. When working with small sample sizes, 
the within-subjects approach is more robust than between-subjects, allowing for 
tighter control of any extraneous factors which may influence the results (for 
example, trait characteristics). The design selected for the present study was 
therefore within-subjects, with experimental manipulations to increase 
physiological indicators of stress (Post-health-check), and reduce physiological 
indicators of stress (Post-enrichment). 
 
In addition to the points listed here, laterality effects in attention have been 
revealed in humans (ERP: Holmes, et al., 2008; fMRI: Grand et al., 2003; dot-
probe: Mogg & Bradley, 1999) and other animals (Tsao et al., 2008; Broad et al., 
2000). A general right hemisphere (left visual field: LVF) superiority for 
processing faces has been shown in humans (Mogg & Bradley, 1999), including 
infants (Cresswell et al., 2008). Mogg & Bradley (1999) revealed a LVF 
advantage for processing faces presented subliminally, as revealed by faster 
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detection of probes occurring at the location of threatening faces presented to the 
LVF, compared with the right visual field (RVF), suggesting right hemisphere 
involvement (see also Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2007; Calvo & Avero, 2008). 
Comparable evidence for a right hemisphere advantage for processing faces has 
also been shown for rhesus macaques (fMRI: Tsao et al., 2008; split-brain: 
Vermeire et al., 1998), chimpanzees (tympanic membrane temperature: Parr & 
Hopkins, 2000), and sheep (Broad et al., 2000; Peirce et al., 2000), as discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2. The possibility of a LVF processing bias was considered 




The general aim of this chapter is to describe the development of a method for 
measuring attentional bias in rhesus macaques. The method is applied to test 
competing hypotheses about the possible mechanisms underlying such biases, 
namely to distinguish early and late stages of processing and direction of the bias 
towards, or away from, threat. The following hypotheses relate to spatial orienting 
of attention to one of two stimuli when an aggressive face and a neutral face are 
presented concurrently within view. Differences in attention allocation to 
aggressive versus neutral faces are tested during two treatment conditions 




4.2.1 Alternative hypotheses and specific predictions: 
4.1 Monkeys exhibit a vigilant pattern of attention allocation towards threatening 
(aggressive faces) versus non-threatening (neutral faces) stimuli, when both are 
shown together. This effect is mediated by affective state. 
 
a. Monkeys will gaze first towards an aggressive face when an aggressive-
neutral face pair is shown. 
b. Monkeys will be faster to gaze towards an aggressive face versus a neutral 
face. 
c. Monkeys will be slower to disengage first gaze from an aggressive face 
versus a neutral face.  
d. Monkeys will gaze towards an aggressive face for more time than a neutral 
face.  
e. The above effects will be greater Post-health-check (i.e. after a stressor) 
versus Post-enrichment (i.e. following a period of low stress). 
 
4.2 Monkeys exhibit an avoidant pattern of attention allocation with respect to 
threatening (aggressive faces) versus non-threatening (neutral faces) stimuli. This 
effect is mediated by affective state. 
 
a. Monkeys will not gaze first towards an aggressive face when an aggressive- 
neutral face pair is shown. 
b. Monkeys will be slower to gaze towards an aggressive face versus a neutral 
face. 
c. Monkeys will be faster to disengage first gaze from an aggressive face 
versus a neutral face.  
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d. Monkeys will gaze towards an aggressive face for less time than a neutral 
face.  
e. All of the above effects will be greater Post-health-check (i.e. after a stressor) 
versus Post-enrichment (i.e. following a period of low stress). 
 
4.3 Monkeys exhibit a vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention allocation towards 
threatening (an aggressive face) versus non-threatening (a neutral face) stimuli 
which is mediated by affective state. 
 
a. Monkeys will gaze first towards an aggressive face when an aggressive-
neutral face pair is shown. 
b. Monkeys will be faster to gaze towards an aggressive face versus a neutral 
face. 
c. Monkeys will be faster to disengage first gaze from an aggressive face 
versus a neutral face.  
d. Monkeys will gaze towards an aggressive face for less time than a neutral 
face.  
e. All of the above effects will be greater Post-health-check (i.e. after a stressor) 




Part B: Development of the new method 
In Part A, I presented the background and rationale for the development of a 
method to study attentional bias in rhesus macaques. In Part B, I detail the method 




Eight monkeys took part in the study (Monkeys 45A, 06H, 29C, G62, 86O, 94K, 
92R, & 27S; range: 4.66 – 22.8 years old; average age: 10.0±6.3years). All 
monkeys had previously begun operant touchscreen training in the laboratory 
during the preceding six months. Five monkeys (29C, 86O, 94K, 92R and 27S) 
had responded well to previous training and worked in the laboratory on a daily 
basis. Three monkeys (45A, 06H & G62) had responded less well to earlier 
touchscreen training and worked infrequently in the laboratory (see Table 2-3, 
p71).  
 
4.3.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
The face stimuli consisted of 20 colour photographs of 10 male monkeys 
(‘stimulus monkeys’) housed at CPRC. The stimulus monkeys were unknown to 
the participant monkeys. For each stimulus monkey, one photograph showing a 
frontal view of the face with aggressive expression (from herein ‘Aggressive 
face’), and one photograph showing a frontal view of the face with neutral 
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expression (‘Neutral face’) were selected. This resulted in one ‘Aggressive face’ 
and one ‘Neutral face’ per stimulus monkey (Figure 4.5a and b).  
 
Face pictures were selected for a clear frontal view of the face with open eyes, and 
were trimmed so that only the head was visible. Face pictures were cropped 
around the face and matched for size before being superimposed on a grey 
background and enclosed in a rectangular frame measuring 154mm x 164mm, 
thereby subtending 14.71 x 15.66 degrees of visual angle when presented 
centrally on a computer monitor at a 60cm viewing distance (170 x 230 pixels on 
a 256 greylevel scale). The face stimuli were paired, according to stimulus 
monkey identity, to give 10 aggressive-neutral face pairs (Appendix 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Examples of the face stimuli used during the study.  a) aggressive, 
b) neutral and c) scrambled face from one stimulus monkey. 








Aggressive-neutral face pairs were assessed for equivalence of luminance (L) and 
contrast energy (C). This is standard practice in studies with humans (e.g. Holmes 
et al., 2008) and is of importance for studies with primates such as rhesus 
    
 
190 
macaques (Waitt & Buchanan-Smith, 2006). L is a measure of brightness, and is 
measured in candela per square metre (cd/m
2
) emitted by the stimulus on the 
screen. L values were not available for the stimuli, and so an indirect measure 
(luminosity: Ly) was used in the calculations here. The Ly function in Adobe gives 
a measure of the lightness of pixels (with white being lightest), and is based on the 
Red, Green and Blue (RGB) value for each pixel. Ly is a property that underlies L, 
therefore it is a suitable proxy measure for comparing equivalence between 
stimuli where absolute L values are not required. 
 
C is a measure of the range of Ly within a given stimulus. It is important that two 
stimuli within any given pair do not vary significantly from one another in Ly or 
C. A difference in Ly or C would mean the two stimuli are perceptually different 
in terms of brightness. Differential gaze to such stimuli may therefore be 
accounted for by brightness effects rather than, for example, emotional content. 
The mean Ly value for each face stimulus was provided by the histogram function 
in Adobe Photoshop 7. The mean Ly for each face stimulus was entered into a 
paired-samples t-test to assess equivalence of Ly across aggressive-neutral face 
pairs. Aggressive and neutral faces were paired according to stimulus monkey 
identity. Aggressive-neutral face pairs did not differ in Ly (t(9)=0.97, P=0.36). C 
was calculated from the Ly values (minimum, maximum and mean, as provided 














where Lymax and Lymin are the maximum and minimum Ly values of the 
stimulus. C ranges from 0 to 1.0 (MacIntyre & Cowan, 1992). The C value for 
each face was entered into a paired-samples t-test to assess equivalence of C 
within aggressive-neutral face pairs. Aggressive-neutral face pairs did not differ in 
C (t(9)=2.197, P=0.92). Therefore, the Ly and C of the aggressive faces were 
equivalent to that of the neutral faces with which they were paired. An additional 
check was run to examine the degree of variation between the different stimulus 
monkey face pairs. Mean Ly and C values for all face stimuli fell within 2SD of 
the mean Ly and C values for the entire set of 20 face stimuli. Therefore, variance 
in Ly and C was low across the entire stimulus set. 
 
For each of the 10 neutral face stimuli a corresponding scrambled face stimulus 
was compiled (Figure 4.5c). Scrambled face stimuli were created using the batch 
process function in Adobe Photoshop 7. The marquee tool was used to randomly 
select a rectangular area of one of the neutral faces, and horizontally, or vertically, 
flip the selected area. This procedure was repeated for all areas of the face until 
the configuration of facial features was disrupted. Copies of the remaining nine 
neutral face stimuli were then batch processed using the same series of 
manipulations. This resulted in 10 identically processed scrambled face stimuli 
(Appendix 4). In total there were therefore 30 stimuli (10 each of neutral, 
aggressive and scrambled faces). Each stimulus monkey was assigned a number 
from 1-10. The 10 aggressive-neutral pairs were divided into two subsets, with 
aggressive-neutral face pairs numbered 1-5 in subset one, and aggressive-neutral 
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face pairs numbered 6-10 in subset two. The corresponding scrambled faces were 
then assigned to their matching stimulus subset.  
 
Face stimuli were presented in pairs, matched for stimulus monkey identity, on 
two adjacent Sony 16in. computer monitors situated in the laboratory. The 
computer monitors were positioned to the left and right of a pellet tray which was 
connected via a chute to a (concealed) automatic pellet dispenser. The horizontal 
distance between the mid-points of the two screens was 45cm, so that the distance 
of each stimulus mid-point from the central line of fixation on each trial was 
22.5cm. The screens were set at a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels, and did not 
differ in illuminance readings when set to black screen, or when the same stimulus 
was shown on either screen (paired samples t-test: t29=0.151, P=0.880).  
 
The computer monitors in the laboratory were connected via a junction box with 
split-screen monitor (Figure 4.6a), to a Satellite Pro A60 laptop running Microsoft 
Office Powerpoint 2003 software. The junction box, split-screen monitor and 
laptop were all situated in an adjacent control room, from where the experimenter 
ran the observation. All sessions were filmed using a Samsung VP-L150 digital 
video camera placed centrally and behind the two monitors (Figure 4.6 b). The 
camera was positioned to film the monkey’s direction of gaze. A live video feed 
to the control room allowed the experimenter to observe the monkey on a video 
monitor. Two small mirrors on the front of the cage revealed changes in light 
levels which allowed stimulus onset and offset to be detected on the video during 
later coding (Figure 4.6c). 
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Figure 4.6 The apparatus. a) The split screen monitor situated in the control 
room. This gives an indication of the size and location of the stimuli as they 
appeared on the two computer monitors in the laboratory. b) Monkey 94K 
gazes at an image on the computer monitor to his left. The inside edge of the 
monitor (black casing outlined in white dashed line) is visible to the right 
hand side of the image. The white pellet chute is visible on the left hand side 
of the image. c) The two mirrors on the front of the cage reflected light 
changes at stimulus onset and offset without allowing the stimuli to be viewed 
on the video. 
 
      a)       b) 
 




4.3.3 Design and Procedure 
Face pairs were presented in a randomised order in the pair combinations: 
aggressive-neutral (experimental trials: Figure 4.7 top row); aggressive-
aggressive, neutral-neutral, scrambled-scrambled and neutral-scrambled (control 
trials: Figure 4.7 bottom row). Experimental trials (aggressive-neutral face pairs) 
were included to test the experimental hypotheses about the allocation of attention 
towards emotional versus non-emotional faces. Control trials (aggressive-
aggressive, neutral-neutral and scrambled-scrambled face pairs) were included to 
reveal any side-biases in viewing faces and abstract stimuli in general. Additional 
control trials (neutral-scrambled) were included to reveal any vigilance or 
avoidance effects for social versus non-social stimuli in general.  
 
The procedure for a testing session was as follows. The Powerpoint presentation 
was opened so that the two screens showed the first black slide. The monkey was 
then transported to the laboratory in the testing cage, positioned in front of the 
apparatus and allowed to settle (this varied between monkeys: some settled 
instantly, others required several minutes). The experimenter immediately moved 
to the adjacent room, and set the video to record events. The monkey was 
encouraged to gaze centrally, between the two screens, by the delivery of a single 
primate pellet into the pellet tray. When the monkey gazed centrally between the 
screens the experimenter triggered the onset of the first trial (i.e. the next 
Powerpoint slide: Figure 4.8). On each trial a pair of faces was presented for 10 
seconds. Stimulus offset was triggered automatically by the Powerpoint software 
at a latency of 10 seconds post-stimulus-onset. At stimulus offset, a plain black 
slide was shown until the monkey gazed centrally and the next trial began.  
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Figure 4.7 The three trial types. On experimental trials aggressive-neutral pairs were shown. On control trials aggressive-aggressive, 
neutral-neutral or scrambled-scrambled face pairs are shown  
Experimental trials 




           
Aggressive-Aggressive          Neutral-Neutral 
 
           




Figure 4.8 The experimental procedure for presentation of face pairs on the two adjacent screens 
Black screens until 
monkey’s gaze is 
central
Trial     
10 seconds
Time
Black screens until 





All monkeys were tested once Post-enrichment and once Post-health-check. The 
order of testing was counterbalanced across individuals so that four monkeys were 
first tested Post-enrichment (Group 1), and four were first tested Post-health-
check (Group 2: Figure 4.9).  
 
The order of events was as follows. On days -7 to -1, all monkeys housed in the 
enclosure received enrichment in the home cages, as described in Chapter 3. On 
days -2 and -1, Group 1 underwent familiarisation with the apparatus. During this 
phase each monkey in Group 1 was transported individually to the laboratory 
where he was shown the female rump stimuli and allowed to feed in front of the 
apparatus. On day 0, Group 1 took part in the Post-enrichment testing session, 
following the procedure described below. On days 1-5, all monkeys engaged in 
their normal daily routine (either participation in training for other laboratory 
tasks, or remaining in the home cage). On days 6 and 7, Groups 1 and 2 
underwent a (re)familiarisation with the laboratory equipment, viewing female 
rumps on the screen and feeding in front of the apparatus. On day 8, all monkeys 
in the enclosure received their three-monthly health-check, conducted by the 
facility veterinarian. On day 9, Groups 1 and 2 took part in Post-health-check 
testing. On day 10, all monkeys in the enclosure began a second week of 
enrichment during which Group 2 underwent familiarisation on days 15 and 16. 
On day 17, Group 2 underwent Post-enrichment testing. 
 
The experiment consisted of a series of 21 randomised trials within each testing 
session (Post-enrichment and Post-health-check: Table 4-3). There were six 
experimental trials during which the aggressive-neutral face pairs were presented, 
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Figure 4.9 The counterbalanced order of testing sessions conducted post-enrichment (p-e) and post-health (p-hc) check. Prior to each 
testing session monkeys underwent two days of familiarisation with the laboratory. All monkeys were provided with enrichment during the 
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counterbalanced for number of presentations of either face stimulus to the left and 
right visual fields LVF and RVF respectively. There were 15 control trials, 
composed of three each of aggressive-aggressive, neutral-neutral and scrambled-
scrambled trials, and six neutral-scrambled trials. A record was kept of the order 
of trials, including the left/right orientation of the stimulus face-pairs, for later 
interpretation of gaze data coded from video. 
 
Videos were later digitised and blind coded for direction of gaze on an AppleMac 
computer by the experimenter using iMovie HD version 6.0.3 software at 
Roehampton University. Video was scored for direction of gaze, on a frame by 
frame basis. Gaze was here defined as orientation of the eyes with respect to the 
two monitors. The codes were ‘central’ (eyes directed forwards and between the 
two monitors), ‘left’ (eyes directed towards the left-hand-side monitor), ‘right’ 
(eyes oriented towards the right-hand-side monitor), ‘away’ (head turned away so 
that both screens are outside of peripheral vision in any direction). When it was 
not possible to determine direction of gaze because either the head or eyes were 
out of view: ‘out of view’ was scored. When the video quality was too poor to 
code: ‘NA’ was scored. Reliability for coding was tested by two coders (EB and 
Magdalena Kobus), who had previously discussed and practiced scoring the gaze 
categories. A subset of previously uncoded video (10 trials) was coded by each on 
a frame-by-frame basis, and agreements and disagreement entered into an 






Table 4-3 The presentation of face-pairs to the left and right visual fields 
during experimental and control trials. Testing was conducted during one 



















       
 Aggressive - Neutral  3
 
 3 
 Neutral - Aggressive  3  3 
 
Control trials 
       
 Aggressive - Aggressive  3  3 
 Neutral - Neutral  3  3 
 Scrambled - Scrambled  3  3 
 Scrambled - Neutral  3  3 
 Neutral - Scrambled  3  3 
Total N trials     21  21 
 
 
4.3.4 Data analyses for experimental trials (aggressive-neutral face pairs) 
Experimental trials (aggressive-neutral face pairs) were included to test the 
competing hypotheses regarding spatial orienting towards aggressive versus 
neutral faces. Separate analyses were conducted for each of the gaze measures. 
The measures were direction of first gaze, latency to first gaze, latency to 
disengage first gaze and total duration of gaze. In all of the subsequent analyses, 
order of testing (Post-enrichment first versus Post-health-check first) did not have 
an effect on the results, therefore this between-groups factor was removed from 




for reference purposes. Due to evidence for hemispheric specialisation in the 
processing of emotional faces, visual field is included in those analyses where 
sufficient data were available.  
 
All data were checked for a normal distribution using a one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) test. Homogeneity of covariance was assessed with Levene’s Test 
for equality of variance. All K-S and Levene’s tests revealed data did not differ 
significantly from a normal distribution or equality of variance, unless stated 
otherwise in the text. Repeated Measures Anovas (RmAnova) were conducted to 
test interactions of treatment condition and stimulus type on gaze measures. 
Where there were missing cell values, which precluded a RmAnova, Mundry’s 
(1999) permutation test for related samples with missing values was used, 
maintaining the position of missing values and running 10,000 permutations. This 
test is a variant of Friedman’s One-way ANOVA, except that empty cells are 
retained in the analysis. Therefore Mundry’s (1999) permutation test is 
appropriate for analyses of datasets with small sample sizes, with missing cell 
values, where data may not be normally distributed and where the same 
individuals are used in the different pairwise comparisons. All descriptive data are 
reported as mean ± 1SE. Significant findings are presented in figures. Where there 
were missing cell values, data are presented in tables to identify the location of 
missing data. In all cases where data were collapsed across conditions, and there 
were missing cell values, only data which were represented in both conditions 





Direction of first gaze was measured as the proportion of trials on which 
monkeys gazed first towards an aggressive face on experimental trials. Only those 
trials on which each monkey was gazing centrally between the two screens at 
stimulus onset were included in the analysis.  
 
Latency to first gaze was measured as the number of seconds monkeys took to 
direct their gaze towards the first stimulus to be gazed at. Only those trials on 
which each monkey was gazing centrally between the two screens at stimulus 
onset were included.  
 
Latency to disengage first gaze was measured as the number of seconds 
monkeys gazed towards the first stimulus to be gazed at before disengaging gaze. 
All trials were included in the analysis, regardless of where the monkey was 
gazing at stimulus onset.  
 
Duration of gaze was measured as the total number of seconds per 10 second trial 
that monkeys gazed towards aggressive faces and neutral faces on experimental 
trials. All trials were included in the analysis.  
 
4.3.5 Data analyses for control trials  
Control trials (aggressive-aggressive, neutral-neutral and scrambled-scrambled 
trials) were included to check for side biases in viewing faces in general. In 
addition, neutral-scramble control trials were included to examine biases for 




for two reasons. Firstly, studies with humans have revealed visual field 
preferences for gazing towards emotional and non-emotional faces which are 
interpreted in terms of hemispheric specialisation for processing emotional faces. 
Aggressive-aggressive and neutral-neutral face pairs were included to examine 
laterality effects for emotional and non-emotional faces in the monkeys. Secondly, 
it is important to establish that each monkey has no intrinsic bias in the direction 
in which he gazes towards the two screens per se. Scrambled-scrambled trials 
were included to examine side biases in orientation towards non-face stimuli 
shown on the two screens. Following existing literature, only direction of first 
gaze and total duration of gaze were used in these analyses.  
 
Following evidence that avoidance of social cues is evident when a non-social 
alternative cue is provided (Garner et al., 2006b), neutral-scrambled control trials 
were also included. These trials were designed to provide monkeys with 
competing social and non-social cues (after Mansell et al., 1999). Separate 
analyses were conducted for each of the four gaze measures, following the 
procedures outlined above. 
 
4.4 Results 
Seven of the eight monkeys completed the study. One monkey (monkey 27S) 
failed to settle in the testing cage Post-health-check. He did not gaze centrally 
between the screens and showed signs of agitation throughout. Video for this 
monkey was not scored and he was removed from the study. In total, 266 trials 




two screens. Reliability for coding was attained by two coders at k=0.76, which is 
considered a good level of reliability (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997). 
 
4.4.1 Experimental trials (aggressive-neutral face pairs) 
a) Direction of first gaze  
A 2 x 2 RMANOVA was performed to determine whether treatment condition 
mediated direction of first gaze (alternative predictions ‘a’ and ‘e’) towards 
(vigilance), or away from (avoidance), emotional stimuli, and to investigate visual 
field effects. Data were proportion of experimental trials on which monkeys gazed 
first towards the aggressive face, with within-subjects factors of treatment (Post-
enrichment versus Post-health-check) and visual field (LVF versus RVF: Table 4-
4). There was a main effect of visual field which approached significance (F1,4 
=6.370, P=0.06). There was no main effect of treatment (F1,4 =0.00, P=1.00), nor 
interaction between treatment and visual field (F1,4=2.67, P=0.18). 
 
Planned one-sample t-tests were conducted to investigate the main effect of visual 
field, separately for each treatment (Post-enrichment and Post-health-check: Table 
4-4). The test value was 0.5. The proportion of trials on which monkeys gazed 
first towards aggressive faces presented to the RVF was significantly less than 
0.5, both Post-enrichment (t6=5.28, P=0.002) and Post-health-check (t5=3.16, P= 
0.02). The proportion of trials on which monkeys gazed first towards aggressive 
faces presented to the LVF did not differ significantly from 0.5 (Post-enrichment: 





Table 4-4 The proportion of trials on which monkeys oriented first towards aggressive faces on experimental trials 
 
   Treatment 
   Post-enrichment  Post-health-check 




 1  0  0.5  0 
92R  1  0  1  0 
94K  0.67  0  0  - 




 0  0  0  0.5 
29C  1  0  1  0 
86O  1  0.5  1  0.5 
G62  -  0.33  0  0 
Visual field bias none  avoid**  none  avoid* 
-   missing cell values signify there were no valid trials for analysis, either because the monkey was not gazing centrally at the start of the trials, or 
because data were lost due to poor recording. A visual field bias is revealed when the proportion of trials on which monkeys oriented first towards the 
aggressive face differs significantly from 50%: avoid = a significant bias not to orient first towards aggressive faces presented to the specified visual field 




A further one-sample t-test was performed to determine whether monkeys 
exhibited a bias in direction of first gaze towards, or away from, aggressive versus 
neutral faces. Data were proportion of trials on which monkeys gazed first 
towards the aggressive face in an aggressive-neutral face pair, collapsed for visual 
field and treatment. The proportion of trials on which monkeys gazed first 
towards aggressive faces did not differ significantly from 0.5 (t6=1.17, P=0.29).  
 
In summary, data for direction of first gaze provided no support for any of the 
alternative hypotheses (predictions ‘a’ and ‘e’). There was some evidence for 
visual field effects in direction of first orientation towards aggressive-neutral face 
pairs which support an avoidance account of attention for emotional versus non-
emotional faces: monkeys avoided gazing first towards aggressive faces presented 
to the RVF. This pattern was not influenced by treatment condition, and is 
contrary to previous studies which suggest a LVF bias in face processing in both 
humans and rhesus macaques. There was no evidence for a LVF bias for 
emotional faces in the present study. 
 
b) Latency to first gaze  
A 2 x 2 RMANOVA with within-subjects factors of stimulus type (aggressive v 
neutral face) and treatment (Post-enrichment v Post-health-check) was performed 
to determine whether treatment condition mediated latency to gaze towards 
aggressive versus neutral faces (alternative predictions ‘b’ and ‘c’). Because 
monkeys avoided gazing first towards aggressive stimuli presented to the RVF, 




treatment (F1,3 =0.47, P=0.54), nor stimulus type (F1,3 =2.12, P=0.24), and no 
interaction of treatment x stimulus type (F1,3 = 0.24, P=0.65). However, data from 
only four monkeys were included in the analysis (missing cell values: Table 4-5). 
 
 
Table 4-5 Latency (seconds) to gaze first towards aggressive versus neutral 
faces, Post-enrichment and Post-health-check. - signifies the monkey never 
oriented first towards the stimulus. 
 
To address the problem of missing cell values, a Post-Hoc Mundry permutations 
test (1999) was conducted to determine whether monkeys were faster or slower to 
gaze towards aggressive versus neutral faces, when these were the first to be 
gazed at (alternative predictions: ‘b’). Latency data were collapsed across the two 
treatment conditions for each monkey, so that data from all seven monkeys could 
be included in the analysis. Monkeys were significantly faster to gaze towards 
   Stimulus to which monkey first oriented 


















 0.12  0.16  0.32  1.60 
92R  0.46  0.52  2.12  0.06 
94K  0.26  -  0.87  0.24 




 -  0.16  0.59  0.48 
29C  4.06  0.04  3.12  0.04 
86O  0.15  0.36  0.24  2.08 















aggressive faces ( X =0.48±0.27 seconds) than neutral faces ( X =0.95±0.14 
seconds: Mundry’s ranked permutation test: P=0.03: Figure 4.10). 
 
 
Figure 4.10 The latency (seconds) to first gaze towards aggressive and neutral 
faces when aggressive-neutral face pairs were shown.  






























In summary, these data support a vigilance (or a vigilance-avoidance) account of 
attention for emotional versus non-emotional faces. Monkeys were faster to gaze 
towards aggressive faces versus neutral faces when aggressive-neutral face pairs 
were shown. Treatment condition did not appear to influence this bias, although 
missing cell values meant only four monkeys were included in this analysis. Due 
to a general avoidance of aggressive faces presented to the RVF, it was not 




c) Latency to disengage first gaze: 
A 2 x 2 RMANOVA was performed to determine whether treatment mediated 
latency to disengage first gaze (alternative predictions ‘c’ and ‘e’), with within-
subjects factors of stimulus type (aggressive v neutral face) and treatment (Post-
enrichment v Post-health-check). Visual field was excluded due to missing cell 
values for the RVF. There was a significant interaction of treatment x stimulus 
type (F1,6=5.39, P=0.05; Figure 4.11). There were no main effects of either 
treatment condition (F1,6 =2.56, P=0.16) nor stimulus type (F1,6 = 0.64, P=0.45).  
 
To unpack the interaction between stimulus type and treatment condition, a Post-
Hoc permutations test was conducted (Mundry, 1999). Pairwise comparisons 
revealed monkeys were faster to disengage gaze from aggressive faces Post-
health-check versus Post-enrichment (P=0.0004). There was a trend for faster 
disengagement from aggressive versus neutral faces Post-health-check (P=0.064). 
There were no other significant differences or trends. 
 
In summary, these data suggest that affective state may influence latency to 
disengage gaze from aggressive versus neutral faces. Post-health-check, all seven 
monkeys rapidly disengaged gaze from aggressive faces, and did so significantly 
faster than they disengaged gaze from the same aggressive faces Post-enrichment 
(although there was a greater degree of individual variation in latency to 
disengage gaze from aggressive faces Post-enrichment). There was also a trend 
for monkeys to disengage gaze more rapidly from aggressive faces than from 




avoidance) account of attention for emotional versus non-emotional faces in the 
health-check treatment. 
 
Figure 4.11 The latency (seconds) to disengage first gaze from aggressive and 
neutral faces.  

































d) Duration of gaze  
A 2 x 2 x 2 RMANOVA was performed to determine whether treatment condition 
mediated duration of gaze towards emotional stimuli (alternative predictions ‘d’ 
and ‘e’), and to investigate visual field effects, with within-subjects factors of 
stimulus type (aggressive v neutral face), treatment condition (Post-enrichment v 
Post-health-check), and visual field (LVF v RVF). The interaction of treatment 
condition x stimulus type was significant (F1,6 =5.89, P=0.05: Figure 4.12). There 
were no main effects (treatment: F1,6 = 0.26, P=0.62; stimulus type: F1,6 = 0.22, 




Figure 4.12 Mean duration of gaze (seconds) towards aggressive and neutral 
faces Post-enrichment and Post-health-check.  
 
 
To examine the two-way interaction in more detail, data were collapsed for visual 
field, and a Post-Hoc permutations test was conducted as above. Pairwise  
comparisons revealed significant differences for duration gaze to the stimuli 
between the two treatments. Monkeys spent less time gazing towards aggressive 
faces Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment (P=0.034), and spent more time 
gazing towards neutral faces Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment (P=0.021). 
Post-health-check, monkeys showed a near-significant trend to spend less time 
gazing towards aggressive faces versus neutral faces (P=0.057). Post-enrichment, 
monkeys spent more time gazing towards aggressive faces versus neutral faces 
(P=0.012).  
 































A further permutations test was conducted to determine whether monkeys gazed 
for more or less time towards aggressive versus neutral faces overall. Data were 
total number of seconds spent gazing towards each stimulus per 10-second trial, 
collapsed across the two treatments. Monkeys did not differ in duration of gaze 
towards aggressive versus neutral faces overall (P=0.96).  
 
In summary, the data for duration of gaze support an avoidance account of 
attention for emotional versus non-emotional faces in monkeys, which is 
enhanced following the health-check. This is in line with patterns of bias seen in 
the vigilant-avoidant and avoidant accounts of attention for emotional faces seen 
in (socially) anxious humans. The finding that monkeys spent significantly more 
time gazing towards aggressive versus neutral faces Post-enrichment suggests a 
possible vigilance for emotional faces in this treatment. This is in line with data 
from humans that suggests a general vigilance for emotional faces across the 
population as a whole.  
 
4.4.2 Control trials  
a) Direction of first gaze 
A 3 x 2 RMANOVA was performed on proportion of trials in which monkeys gazed 
first towards stimuli presented to the LVF during control trials, with within-
subjects factors of stimulus pair (aggressive-aggressive, neutral-neutral and 
scrambled-scrambled) and treatment (Post-enrichment and Post-health-check). 




=12.24, P=0.01, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted; Figure 4.13). There were no main 
effects of either stimulus type or treatment. 
 
Figure 4.13 The proportion of trials in which monkeys gazed first towards 













































Planned one-sample t-tests, with a test value of 0.5, revealed a significant bias to 
avoid gazing towards aggressive faces presented to the LVF when aggressive-
aggressive face pairs were shown Post-health-check (t6=6.58, P<0.01: Figure 
4.13). Monkeys therefore demonstrated a significant bias to orient first towards 
aggressive faces presented to the RVF, when aggressive-aggressive face pairs 
were shown. There was a non-significant trend towards a LVF bias in first gaze 
towards neutral faces when neutral-neutral face pairs were shown Post-health-




towards scrambled faces when scrambled-scrambled face pairs were shown (Post-
enrichment: t6=1.38, P=0.21; Post-health-check, t5=0.00, P=1.00). 
 
In summary, visual-field effects were evident for monkeys viewing aggressive-
aggressive face pairs and, to a lesser extent, neutral-neutral face pairs Post-health-
check. Monkeys exhibited a significant RVF bias for viewing aggressive faces, 
and a trend towards a LVF bias for viewing neutral faces. Data for scrambled face 
pairs revealed monkeys exhibited no side bias for viewing non-face stimuli. 
 
b) Duration of gaze 
A 3 x 2 x 2 RMANOVA was performed on mean duration of gaze, with within-
subjects factors of stimulus pair (aggressive-aggressive, neutral-neutral and 
scrambled-scrambled), treatment (Post-enrichment, Post-health-check) and visual 
field (left, right). There were no interactions or main effects (for example, the 
interaction of stimulus x treatment x visual field was F2,5=1.74, P=0.27; and 
treatment x visual field was F1,6=2.5, P=0.16). For all remaining tests, P>0.28. 
Therefore, there was no side bias for duration of viewing matched pairs of 
emotional faces, non-emotional faces, nor scrambled face stimuli in general. 
 
4.4.3 Control trials (neutral-scrambled faces) 
a) Direction of first gaze  
A 2 x 2 RMANOVA was performed to determine whether treatment condition 
mediated direction of first gaze towards, or away from, faces versus scrambled-




which monkeys gazed first towards the neutral face, with within-subjects factors 
of treatment (Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check) and visual field (LVF 
versus RVF). There were no main effects of treatment (F1,6 = 0.07, P=0.80) nor 
stimulus type (F1,6 = 1.14, P=0.33), nor interaction of treatment x stimulus type 
(F1,6 = 0.22, P=0.65).  
 
A one-sample t-test was performed to determine whether monkeys exhibited an 
overall bias in first gaze towards faces versus scrambled-faces. Data were 
proportion of trials on which monkeys gazed first towards the neutral face when a 
neutral-scrambled pair was shown, collapsed for visual field and treatment. The 
proportion of trials in which monkeys gazed first towards the neutral face did not 
differ significantly from 0.5 (t6=1.02, P=0.35).  
 
In summary, monkeys were equally likely to gaze first towards neutral faces and 
scrambled-faces when the two were presented together. There was no evidence for 
an influence of treatment condition on direction of first gaze. 
 
 
b) Duration of gaze 
A 2 x 2 x 2 RMANOVA was performed to determine whether treatment condition 
mediated duration of gaze towards faces versus non-faces, and to investigate 
visual field effects. Data were mean duration of gaze per 10-second trial, with 
within-subjects factors of stimulus type (neutral face v scrambled), treatment 
(Post-enrichment v Post-health-check), and visual field (LVF v RVF). There were 




x treatment x visual field was F1,6=0.18, P=0.69). There was a main effect of 
treatment approaching significance (F1,6=4.55, P=0.08). However, this was lost 
when data were collapsed for visual field. For all remaining tests, P>0.40). 
 
A Mundry permutations test was conducted to determine whether monkeys gazed 
for more or less time towards faces versus scrambled-faces. Data were total 
number of seconds spent gazing towards each stimulus per 10-second trial, 
collapsed for visual field and treatment. Monkeys did not differ in duration of 
gaze towards neutral faces versus non-faces (Permutation test, P=0.61). 
 
In summary, monkeys gazed towards neutral faces and scrambled-faces for 
equivalent amounts of time throughout the 10 second trial. There was no evidence 




Seven monkeys viewed pairs of emotional versus non-emotional conspecific faces 
and scrambled stimuli presented on two adjacent computer monitors, during two 
treatments: Post-enrichment and Post-health-check. Direction, latency and 
duration of gaze were reliably blind-coded by two observers, on a frame-by-frame 
basis from video. The experimental paradigm therefore provided a reliable means 





The suggested patterns of attentional bias, as measured by gaze, are shown in 
Table 4-6. The data are partially in agreement with findings from human studies 
which suggest affective state has a modulating effect on attention to emotional 
social cues in humans. Monkeys demonstrated both vigilance for, and avoidance 
of, threatening faces and this pattern was, in part, mediated by treatment 
condition. This is the first study to reveal possible affect-related attentional bias 
for threatening information in a species of primate, using methods typically used 
with humans.  
 
The main findings of this study were as follows. Monkeys were significantly 
faster to gaze towards aggressive versus neutral faces, irrespective of treatment 
condition. This suggests that rhesus macaques demonstrate a general vigilance for 
emotional faces: emotional faces engage attention and lead to an initial overt 
orienting response towards highly salient (possibly threatening) cues within the 
environment, and this occurs independently of affective state. This is in line with 
data from humans which suggest vigilance for threat (versus non-threat) may 
occur in both high and low anxiety (vigilance theories: Seligman, 1971; Eysenck, 
1992; Öhman, 2005). Studies which suggest that vigilance is enhanced in high 
anxiety, tend to use the dot-probe paradigm (e.g. Bradley et al. 2000), which is 
able to tap into covert shifts in attention that may not be detected by video-coding 
of eye-gaze.  
 
The second major finding of the present study was that treatment condition 
influenced the speed with which monkeys disengaged gaze from aggressive 





Table 4-6 Suggested patterns of attention allocation towards aggressive versus neutral faces Post-health-check and Post-enrichment as 












Latency to disengage 
 
‘c’ 
Total duration of 
gaze 
‘d’ 
 Attentional pattern 
          
   
Post-health-check 
    
Faster (trend only) 
 
Shorter (trend only) 
  
Vigilance-avoidance 
Aggressive face    No bias 
(RVF avoidance)* 
Faster*     
  Post-enrichment    No bias (indiv diffs?) Longer (trend only)  Vigilance  
     
 
     
          
   
Post health check 
    
No bias  
 
Longer (trend only) 
 Vigilance 
(delayed onset) 
Neutral face    No bias 
(LVF vigilance)* 
Slower*     





 (and spent less time gazing towards) aggressive faces Post-health-check, versus 
Post-enrichment. Further, within the health-check treatment, monkeys showed a 
strong trend to disengage gaze faster from (and spend less time looking towards) 
aggressive faces, versus neutral faces.  These findings suggest that, following the 
health-check, monkeys demonstrate an enhanced avoidance of emotional or 
threatening stimuli. These data are consistent with Garner et al. (2006b) who 
reported that, following a stressor, humans were faster to gaze towards emotional 
faces (both positive and negative) than neutral faces, and were also faster to 
disengage gaze from emotional faces. Further, Garner et al. (2006b) found that, 
following a stressor, socially anxious humans gazed towards emotional faces for 
less time than did low socially anxious controls, who gazed towards emotional 
faces for more time than neutral faces.  
 
Garner et al. (2006b) discuss their findings in terms of avoidance of emotional 
information by anxious individuals, subsumed under a vigilant-avoidant pattern of 
attention allocation over the whole time course of the orienting response to 
emotional versus neutral faces. This is similar to the pattern of vigilance-
avoidance for aggressive faces Post-health-check in the current study (Table4-7, 
top row). During the enrichment treatment, initial general vigilance for aggressive 
faces was followed by a trend for longer duration of gaze towards aggressive 
versus neutral faces, suggesting sustained vigilance for threatening faces in this 
treatment (Table 4-6, second row). 
 
While it is impossible to make direct comparisons with data from the human 




versus between-subjects designs), there are certain similarities in the shifts in 
patterns of attention between the two groups which indicate a need for further 
investigations of the influence of affective state on patterns of attention towards 
threatening social stimuli by rhesus macaques. 
 
The current data may be considered in terms of alternative explanations which do 
not infer emotion-mediated attentional biases. The findings reported here are in 
partial agreement with previous work with humans which has shown enhanced 
processing efficiency of threatening faces. Calvo et al. (2006) claim that enhanced 
processing efficiency for threatening faces is revealed by shorter gaze duration 
towards angry than other-emotional and neutral faces. Shorter gaze towards 
aggressive faces may, therefore, reflect enhanced processing by the monkeys, 
rather than avoidance. However, this explanation is difficult to reconcile with the 
finding that monkeys gazed for longer towards aggressive faces versus neutral 
faces Post-enrichment. This suggests duration of gaze towards faces reflects 
attentional engagement and maintenance, rather than processing efficiency.  
 
Whether the general early vigilance for aggressiveing faces is threat-specific or 
emotion-specific is unclear. The present study used only aggressive emotional 
faces. The reduced maintenance of attention towards emotional faces revealed by 
Garner et al. (2006b) was apparent for both angry-neutral and happy-neutral face 
pairs. The effect revealed in the present study may therefore reflect an emotion-
general rather than threat-specific bias in attention. A necessary extension to the 
existing paradigm is inclusion of submissive-neutral face pairs. An appropriate 




fear-grin, or appeasement-gesture, due to its proposed function as a signal of 
benign intent: Parr et al., 2005). 
 
During the matched-pairs control trials, monkeys gazed equally towards the three 
classes of stimuli. This finding suggests either that a) the monkeys did not find 
any of the three classes of stimuli more or less aversive than any of the others; or 
b) duration of looking behaviour indicates different underlying processes, such 
that the differential effects of preference, novelty, interest, hypervigilance, delay 
to disengage and so forth may be difficult to separate out using the current 
paradigm. Only when visual field and treatment were considered did differential 
looking patterns emerge for control trials. Monkeys gazed first towards aggressive 
faces presented to the RVF when aggressive-aggressive face pairs were shown, 
Post-health-check. Monkeys also showed a tendency to gaze first towards neutral 
faces presented to the LVF when neutral-neutral face pairs were shown, Post-
health-check. 
 
There was no effect of treatment condition on the amount of time that monkeys 
gazed toward each of the sets of control stimuli. This finding suggests that 
treatment condition does not influence general levels of interest in socially 
relevant information, or in stimuli presented on a monitor in general. Monkeys 
were therefore equally visually engaged with the stimuli during both treatments. 
Again, this experimental paradigm lacks the power to distinguish possible 
variation in the mechanisms underlying gaze towards stimuli presented on the 
screens (e.g. interest versus hypervigilance). Previous studies with cynomolgus 




low ranking males gaze towards a single primate or human face stimulus for more 
time than towards non-face stimuli, however, the behaviours accompanying the 
vigilance suggest different underlying motivational factors (Kyes et al., 1992). 
 
Stimulus intensity may have an effect on attentional bias. Mogg et al. (2000b) 
showed high-threat versus non-threat, and mild-threat versus non-threat picture 
pairs to participants during a dot-probe task. Participants exhibited vigilance for 
high-threat scenes (responding faster to probes at the location of high-threat 
pictures relative to probes at the location of non-threat scenes), but no bias in 
vigilance towards mild-threat scenes. This bias was strongest in low-trait anxious 
individuals, and is comparable with the increased duration of gaze towards high-
threat (aggressive) relative to lower-threat (neutral) stimuli by the monkeys Post-
enrichment. Mogg et al. (2000b) also found a weak bias for high-threat stimuli 
among the high anxious group, contrary to the data reported here. 
 
An assumption of the current study is that the aggressive faces were perceived by 
the monkeys to be more threatening than the neutral faces. Both stimulus types 
contained frontal images of faces with direct gaze, a signal of dominance among 
male rhesus macaques (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973; van Hooff, 1976). The neutral 
faces used in this study are assumed to have been perceived by the monkeys as 
less threatening than the aggressive faces, and results have been interpreted 
accordingly. A proposed development to the existing design would be to 
incorporate faces without direct gaze (e.g. with eyes closed, averted gaze), to 





Another assumption was that all monkeys viewed the same faces as equally 
threatening or non-threatening. Data from humans reveal dominance motivation 
may influence perception of facial expressions and therefore influence the extent 
to which attention is captured by different faces (Schultheiss et al., 2005; 
Schultheiss & Hale, 2007). For example, a smiling face may be a negative signal 
in a competitive context, and a sad or angry face may be a positive signal in a 
retributive context (Schultheiss et al., 2005). Power-motivated individuals (i.e. 
dominant individuals who seek to have an impact on others, and therefore find 
submissive facial expressions rewarding) show enhanced learning of a visuomotor 
task when low threat (e.g. same gender surprise) faces are shown, and impaired 
learning performance when high threat (e.g. same gender happy or angry) faces 
are shown (Schultheiss et al., 2005). Affiliation-motivated individuals (i.e. 
individuals who seek close affiliative relationships with others), on the other hand, 
show impaired learning when neutral faces are presented, but not when emotional, 
including angry, faces are presented. In a follow-up dot-probe study Schultheiss 
and Hale (2007) found that power-motivated individuals orient their attention 
towards faces signaling low dominance and away from faces signaling high 
dominance, while affiliation-motivated (possibly rejection-averse) individuals 
show vigilance for faces signaling rejection and a trend towards vigilance for 
faces signaling acceptance. These data were interpreted in terms of facial 
expressions as motivational incentives which may shape a perceiver’s behaviour 
in accordance with that individual’s motivational stance. The differential orienting 
to neutral versus aggressive faces in the current study may be partially explained 
in terms of the different socio-motivational stances of the monkeys Post-




There was no evidence for a bias in first gaze towards aggressive versus neutral 
faces, as has been shown in humans. This may be due either to a) a lack of 
attentional capture by threatening emotional stimuli, or b) an artifact of the 
experimental design. Stimuli were presented on two computer monitors positioned 
200mm apart, so that the stimuli themselves were separated by a distance of 
450mm between midpoints. The inter-stimulus distance was selected to allow 
reliable discrimination of gaze direction when coding from video. The inter-
stimulus distance (centre-centre), and therefore corresponding visual angle, used 
for supraliminal presentation of emotional faces in studies with humans is shorter 
(e.g. 115mm: Mogg & Bradley, 1999; 186mm: Garner et al., 2006b; 
145mm/13.8
0
: Holmes et al., 2005). The paired stimuli were here presented 
peripherally, outside of the central field of vision. At peripheral locations, 
stimulus processing is degraded in both humans (Whiteside, 1976) and rhesus 
macaques (Fridman and Nadler, 2005). This may account for the lack of evidence 
for stimulus effects on direction of first gaze in the present study, although the 
presence of visual field effects for some stimulus combinations suggest that, even 
at peripheral locations, a degree of processing of stimuli may have occurred prior 
to detectable shifts in gaze. 
 
The finding for visual field effects on direction of first gaze towards emotional 
versus non-emotional face stimuli is not in accordance with existing literature. 
Bradley (1999) revealed a LVF advantage in humans for processing threatening 
faces presented subliminally, suggesting that the right hemisphere processes 
information about emotional faces rapidly, and significantly faster than the left 




enhanced affective priming by emotional stimuli presented parafoveally to the 
LVF, but not the RVF. In the current study, monkeys avoided gazing first towards 
aggressive (versus neutral) faces presented to the RVF, irrespective of treatment 
condition. However, during the aggressive-aggressive control trials, monkeys 
avoided orienting towards aggressive faces presented to the LVF. This may reflect 
enhanced processing of emotional faces by the right hemisphere in rhesus 
macaques, thereby negating the need to shift gaze overtly towards the LVF. The 
control trial data for aggressive-aggressive face pairs are also in accordance with 
previous studies with rhesus macaques which suggest laterality in face processing 
in this species (Vermiere & Hamilton, 1998; Tsao et al., 2008). Further tests 
would be needed to identify whether this effect is real, or an artifact of small 
sample size and number of trials. 
 
In summary, this chapter presents the first data on emotion-mediated attentional 
bias for faces in a primate. The method developed here was successful in 
documenting rhesus macaque gaze towards either of two competing stimuli 
presented on separate computer monitors. Monkeys showed differential gaze 
towards aggressive versus neutral faces according to whether they had recently 
been exposed to a stressor (a veterinary examination: Post-health-check) or a 
week of enrichment (Post-enrichment). The data lend most support to vigilance 
and vigilance-avoidance accounts of attentional bias for threatening facial 
information. Further, differences in the patterns of attention allocation between 
the treatment conditions suggest attentional bias in rhesus macaques may be 





These findings are important for several reasons. Firstly, these are the first data on 
attentional bias in a species of primate. Secondly, the data reported here concur 
with recent data from humans, suggesting that, when using eye-gaze as a measure 
of attention, monkeys and humans exhibit similar patterns of attentional response 
to threatening and non-threatening information. This, in turn, suggests that 
attentional biases may involve evolutionarily old processing pathways in the 
primate brain. The visual field preferences in gaze suggest hemispheric 
specialisation for processing threatening faces specifically. Such specialisation 
would indicate emotional faces are an especially important source of socio-
emotional information in macaque society, which is processed differently to other 
types of (non-emotional) social and non-social information. Finally, differential 
gaze towards threatening versus non-threatening information between the two 
treatments suggest attention in rhesus macaques may be mediated by internal 
factors in a comparable manner to humans.  
 
Given the acceptance of attentional bias for threatening information as a marker 
for vulnerability to anxiety in humans, the data presented here may also present 
the first evidence of a cognitive marker of vulnerability to anxiety in a species of 
primate, other than humans. These data present a strong case for further 
investigation of attentional bias in primates, and the functional implications of 









Emotion evaluation and response-slowing 
 
In Chapter 4 I reviewed literature and presented data on the effects of emotion 
state on the spatial orienting of attention (gaze) towards one of two competing 
stimuli that occur in different spatial locations. In the present chapter I review 
literature and present data on non-spatial attention, specifically the effects of 
emotion state on competition of attentional resources between two different types 
of information (emotional versus non-emotional) that are presented in the same 
location. People high in anxiety experience impaired (e.g. slower) performance on 
a non-emotional task when an emotional distractor component is introduced 
(MacLeod, 1991; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The emotional component captures 
attention and interferes with the processing of, and/or behavioural response to, the 
task-related non-emotional information (Mathews and MacLeod, 1985). People 
who are low in anxiety, however, are typically unimpaired in performance on a 
non-emotional task when an emotional distractor component is introduced (Bar-
Haim et al. 2007). For such individuals, the emotional component does not 
preferentially capture attention and so does not interfere with the processing of, 
and/or behavioural response to, the task-related non-emotional information. 
Increased anxiety is therefore associated with a slowing in task performance when 
emotional information is present.  
 
As with the spatial orienting effects discussed in Chapter 4, the enhanced saliency 
of emotional versus non-emotional information among anxious humans may have 




psychological wellbeing. If primates exhibit a similar cognitive capacity for 
enhanced processing of, particularly negative, emotional stimuli over neutral task-
related stimuli, this may have implications for their psychological wellbeing also. 
 
In this chapter I review existing research on the interference effects of emotional 
information on (non-spatial) task performance (Part A), and present empirical data 
from the first study to investigate emotional interference effects in a species of 
primate (Part B). Part A is divided into three sections. In the first of these I discuss 
the theory and background for emotion-evaluation and response-slowing research 
conducted with humans. In the second section I review the methods used to study 
emotion-evaluation and response-slowing in humans, and complementary 
approaches used with non-human participants. In the third section I discuss the 
implications of human-based research for the development of a novel method to 
study emotion-evaluation and response-slowing in primates. I conclude this 
section with the main aims and hypotheses that informed the design of the present 
study. 
 
The present study is detailed in Part B, which is also divided into three sections. 
In the first of these I describe the method I developed. In the second section I 
present the first data on emotional evaluation and response-slowing to threatening 
versus non-threatening faces in a species of primate. In the third section I discuss 





Part A: Literature Review 
5.1. Introduction 
5.1.1. Emotion-evaluation and response-slowing in humans: theory and 
background 
People are generally slower to perform an attentional task when an emotional 
distractor is introduced (Macleod, 1991). This effect is arguably enhanced for 
negative distractors, and among anxious populations (Williams et al., 1996; Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). The methods used to measure the extent to which an emotional 
distractor impairs performance on an otherwise non-emotional task vary, as do the 
proposed underlying mechanisms. 
 
The following is a review of the main cognitive and non-cognitive theories and 
empirical findings regarding the effects of emotion state on slowing of responses 
on a cognitive task when an emotional element is introduced. This has not been 
studied in a non-human animal species. Therefore, I draw on three broad 
literatures (Figure 5.1). The first literature draws on studies in humans which 
demonstrate impairment on a cognitive task, or in valence judgements, when an 
emotional distractor component is presented. The second literature draws on more 
recent neuroscientific and computer modeling approaches to explore the 
interruption of ongoing cognitive processes caused by the onset of a threatening 
stimulus. The third literature draws on studies which measure responses to 
emotional stimuli irrespective of other cognitive demands. The latter literature 




Figure 5.1 Overview of the main approaches to studying the influence of affective state on the processing of emotional information 
Model 
 Information processing models  Attentional control 
models 




Traditional approaches that 
measure effects of affective state 
and emotional information on 
cognitive task performance, or on 
emotional evaluations of 
ambiguous stimuli.  
 Bottom-up processing 
of highly salient stimuli 







Approach           
System (BAS): a 




 Freeze-Flight-Fight         
System (FFFS): a 
defense-withdrawal 
system associated 
with high arousal 
which underlies fear-
related avoidance and 
defensive attack. 
 
Behavioural Inhibition    
System (BIS): a system 
sensitive to punishers 
that inhibits ongoing 







Places current study in the 
historical context of human 
research. The *eStroop paradigm 
partially informed design of the 
current study. 
 Provides a recent 
account of the 
mechanism by which 
task-relevant goals and 
motivation feed into 
attention and emotion-
evaluation of negative 
stimuli. 




i.e. the *WGTA, 
partially informed 
design of the current 
study. 
 System underlies 
physical withdrawal 
from aversive stimuli. 
May lead to 
attenuation of 
approach behaviours. 
 System underlies early 
attentional orienting to 
stimuli. Activated 
when BAS and FFFS 
are in conflict. May 
lead to attenuation of 
approach behaviours 
during conflict of 
response. 
Methods Computer-based cognitive tasks: 
impairment (RT) when emotional 
distractor is present (e.g. eStroop)  
 Neuroscientifc and 
computer modelling 
techniques. 
 Behavioural (e.g. conditioned responses), physiological and neural responses 
to emotional information (human and animal studies). 
*eStroop: emotional Stroop task; *WGTA = Wisconsin General Testing Apparatus. Measures latency to approach a positive reinforcer (typically food) when a 




In the first case, I review data from human cognitive studies, which have 
traditionally focused on Information processing models of cognition using the 
emotional Stroop (eStroop) paradigm and, to a lesser extent, emotion-evaluation 
paradigms. These studies aim to investigate the interference effect of emotional 
information on an ongoing cognitive task, and on emotion-evaluation of 
ambiguous emotional information (emotion-evaluation paradigms). Information 
processing models of cognition focus on competition for attentional resources 
between two competing types of information, with emphasis on how the two types 
of information pass through the brain. Information processing explanations of 
emotion-evaluation and response-slowing assume that slowing of responses on 
threat-relevant trials reflects Stroop-like interference by one processing pathway 
(threat-relevant) over the other (task-relevant). Early models considered the 
relative speed of processing between two pathways to account for the difference 
in processing priorites (e.g. Cattell, 1886, reviewed in MacLeod, 1991). More 
recent models consider that the relative strength of processing pathways account 
for the effect (e.g. Cohen et al., 1990).  
 
Having placed the human research in its historical context, I conclude with current 
opinion on the utility of cognitive studies for investigating responses to emotional 
stimuli. This leads on to the second literature, where more recent approaches 
combine neuroscientific and computer modeling techniques to map the interplay 
between emotional, attentional and goal-directed circuits in the human brain. 
 
Attentional control models (Cohen et al., 1990; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 




processing circuits. Inhibitory action by the ventral circuit on the dorsal circuit 
acts as a circuit breaker, triggered by highly salient or novel stimuli. This feeds 
into, and is mediated by, motivation and arousal.  Together, these components of 
the system act to interrupt ongoing, task-related, attentional processes, and 
redirect attention towards salient or novel stimuli for more focused processing. 
 
The third literature I draw on focuses on Reinforcement sensitivity models of 
responses to emotional stimuli (e.g. McNaughton & Corr, 2004). I present each of 
the attentional-behavioural systems within this model as independent, for clarity. 
However, there is likely to be some interaction between the various systems, that 
is beyond the scope of this review. Each system receives input from an emotion-
evaluation system in the amygdala which is implicit within the model. The 
Behavioural Approach System (BAS) is an attentional system, sensitive to signals 
of reward, which triggers approach behaviours. This system underlies positive 
emotions. The Freeze-Flight-Fight System (FFFS) is a defense-withdrawal 
system, sensitive to punishers, which triggers survival and escape behaviours. 
This system underlies fear. The Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) is an 
attentional system sensitive to conflicting cues of punishment and reward. This 
system underlies anxiety and, in the presence of negative stimuli, triggers a (non-
spatial) attentional orienting response towards potentially harmful stimuli. The 
system resolves response conflict between the BAS and FFFS via inhibition of 
approach/withdrawal behaviours, allowing elicitation of behaviours concerned 





5.1.1.1. Information processing models 
Traditionally, emotion-evaluation and response-slowing in humans has been 
studied using a single task, the eStroop. The eStroop was the first task developed 
to measure attentional bias for threatening information in humans (Mathews and 
MacLeod, 1985; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The eStroop task is a modified form of 
the classic colour-naming Stroop interference paradigm (Stroop, 1935). The 
original Stroop effect describes the difference in performance in identifying one of 
two competing types of information within a stimulus. Traditionally this is the 
difference in colour-naming performance (measured as latency to name the 
colour) on congruent trials (e.g. the word blue written in blue ink) compared with 
non-congruent trials (e.g. the word red written in blue ink). The difference in 
latency to respond between the two types of trial is attributed to facilitation of 
information processing when there is semantic congruence between the two types 
of information (word and colour are matched), compared with interference 
between competing processing pathways when there is semantic incongruence 
between the two types of information (word and colour are not matched). 
Interference reflects non-symmetry in the strength of the two competing 
processing pathways.  
 
The eStroop shares the same basic premise as the classic Stroop: that participants 
must respond to stimuli that vary in two dimensions, one of which they must 
ignore. In the eStroop the dimension to be ignored has either an emotional or non-
emotional component (Williams et al., 1996). Interference occurs where 




to that of the task-relevant non-emotional information. Slowing of responses to 
emotional stimuli during eStroop studies has been demonstrated in both trait and 
state anxiety (Williams et al., 1996). 
 
Early eStroop studies measured colour-naming performance for threat-related 
versus non-threat-related words (MacLeod, 1991; Williams et al., 1996). Anxious 
individuals are typically slower to name the colour of threat-related versus non-
threat-related words. Later studies incorporated naturalistic emotional 
components, such as faces, to investigate automaticity of processing effects (e.g. 
Anes & Kruer, 2004; Mauer & Borkenau, 2007; Beall & Herbert, 2008). Some 
authors then pointed to the fact that the classic Stroop and eStroop tap into 
different underlying processes (Algom et al., 2004). Algom et al. (2004) discuss 
the problem of comparing studies in which semantic congruency of competing 
stimulus dimensions is manipulated (both physical colour of the word, and colour 
meaning, in the classic Stroop), with studies in which there is no semantic 
relationship between the two dimensions of the stimulus (there is no semantic 
relationship between valenced words/pictures and the colours in which they 
appear, in the eStroop). This led to a reframing of the eStroop effect in broader 
physiological and behavioural terms, such as arousal, orienting and freezing 
responses, and a renaming of the task in terms of emotion-evaluation and 





5.1.1.2. Attentional control models: dorsal and ventral circuits and the 
‘circuit-breaker’ system  
Neuroscientific (e.g. LeDoux, 1996; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) and computer 
modeling (e.g. Cohen et al., 1990; Fragopanagos & Taylor, 2005; Taylor et al., 
2005; Korsten et al., 2006) techniques have recently been combined (Taylor & 
Fragopanagos, 2005) to address the role of cognition in emotion, and specifically 
the effects of emotional information on ongoing task performance. Based on 
evidence from neuroimaging studies with humans, Corbetta and Shulman (2002) 
first proposed that the brain contains a ‘circuit-breaker’ system which functions as 
a ventral alerting system in the presence of highly salient sensory stimuli (i.e. 
stimuli of high behavioural importance). At the onset of a salient stimulus, 
typically one that is sudden or unexpected, the circuit-breaker functions to reorient 
attention (e.g. from an ongoing task) by interrupting ongoing processing in the 
dorsal circuit (dealing with ongoing goal- or task-directed motor and cognitive 
activities), facilitating attention to the source of interest. The circuit breaker 
system is proposed by Corbetta and Shulman (2002) to be strongly lateralized to 
the right hemisphere in humans.  
 
Taylor and Fragopanagos (2005) placed the circuit-breaker concept in the context 
of previous work with humans and other species (e.g. LeDoux, 1996). LeDoux’s 
work, which is based largely on brain-lesioning studies with rats, revealed the 
classic ‘quick and dirty’ direct pathway by which stimuli are tagged for valence in 
the amygdala (emotion) circuit. This information is then passed forward to 




detailed processing and matching with task-related goal-directed process in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; LeDoux, 1996: Figure 5.2).  
 
In addition to brain lesion studies, fMRI mapping studies have highlighted the 
inhibitory effect of the amygdala-OFC emotion circuit on the dorsal attentional 
circuit. Armony and Dolan (2002) mapped people’s responses to negatively 
conditioned faces presented for 50ms during a dot probe task. Enhanced activity 
in the amygdala and OFC was associated with a significant delay to respond to 
probes following conditioned primes. The response-slowing to probes revealed 
interference in processing non-emotional task-related information following an 
emotional distractor, suggesting the amygdala-OFC emotion circuit may function 
automatically and preattentively to inhibit processing in the DLPFC. Conversely, 
studies of emotion regulation incorporating fMRI techniques have highlighted the 
relative strength of top-down inhibitory processes on the amygdala-OFC emotion 
circuit. Beauregard et al. (2001) presented people with erotic images and asked 
them to inhibit emotional responses to the images. Results suggested that the 
inhibitory effects between OFC and the dorsal attentional circuit are reciprocal, 
such that top-down control of emotional processes may be achieved via output 
from the DLPFC (Beauregard et al., 2001). Where emotional information is 
congruent with task demands, facilitation of the dorsal attentional circuit may 
occur (Taylor & Fragopanagos, 2005). 
 
Taylor and Fragopanagos (2005) combined these various approaches to present a 




brain (Figure 5.2). A direct bottom-up preattentive emotion circuit carries 
emotional (stimulus-bound) information from the amygdala to the DLPFC via 
OFC (Figure 5.2a blue arrows). Emotional information may inhibit DLPFC 
activity (goal-driven processes) or enhance it depending on the relevance of the 
emotional information to individual goals. Top-down effortful inhibition of 
emotional processing may occur via projections from the DLPFC to areas such as 
OFC (Figure 5.2a green downwards arrow). This is the route implicated in 
emotion regulation.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 The two routes by which emotional information may influence cognition 
in the human brain. a) A direct bottom-up preattentive emotion circuit from the 
amygdala to the DLPFC via OFC. b) An indirect emotion circuit from the amygdala 
to the ventral attention circuit, where salient emotional information becomes 
attended. This is given priority of processing according to its relevance to emotional 
goals. c) Feedforward to the dorsal attention circuit may interrupt outputs from the 
dorsal attention circuits, resulting in a temporary circuit-breaker effect (red) on 










The second, indirect, pathway carries emotional information from the amygdala to 
the ventral attention circuit, situated in the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC: Figure 5.2b blue arrow). The VMPFC is involved in cognitive 
processing of emotional information and is where salient emotional information 
becomes attended. The VMPFC has onwards projections to the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC: Figure 5.2c, blue arrow) and therefore acts as a bridge 
between subcortical and higher cortical executive areas. This bridge may either 
facilitate processing of task-relevant emotional information by higher cortical 
areas, or interrupt ongoing task-relevant processing to allow reorientation of 
attention towards sudden or unexpected emotional stimuli, via the ‘circuit 
breaker’ (Figure 5.2c, in red). The DLPFC is concerned with executive functions 
such as goal-directed task-relevant processes. Selection of information by the 
DLPFC is guided by the relevance of that information to ongoing task demands, 
i.e. the relevance of the stimulus with respect to an individual’s goals, irrespective 
of its emotional content. This is given priority of processing according to its 
relevance to emotional goals. Feedforward to the dorsal attention circuit may 
interrupt outputs from the dorsal attention circuits, resulting in a temporary 
circuit-breaker effect on cognitive goal-directed outputs (c: green arrow). 
 
5.1.1.3. Reinforcement sensitivity models 
Gray (1971 and 1981) first proposed the reinforcement sensitivity theory as a 
neuropsychological framework for describing the mechanisms underlying 
behavioural outputs in response to emotional information, and the regulation of 




to emotionally charged stimuli arise as a result of the relative strength of three 
motivational systems. The three systems are differentiated by their sensitivity to 
reward (appearance of a positive reinforcer, or omission of a negative reinforcer: 
BAS) or punishment (appearance of a negative reinforcer or termination of a 
positive reinforcer: FFFS) and reward-punishment conflict (e.g. when both BAS 
and FFFS are activated: BIS). The three motivational systems feed into emotional 
systems (BAS: positive emotions; FFFS: fear; BIS: anxiety; McNaughton & Corr, 
2004). 
 
Behavioural Approach System (BAS) 
The BAS is a motivational system sensitive to signals of reward
1
. It functions to 
direct behaviour towards positive reinforcers. High BAS sensitivity or activation 
is associated with approach behaviours ranging from optimism to fun-seeking. 




 My definition of BAS contrasts with that of some other authors. This reflects the variety of 
definitions of BAS in the literature. I concur with authors who relate BAS to approach towards 
reward (Gray, 1981; McNaughton & Corr, 2004). However, others define BAS as a Behavioural 
Activation System, which activates goal-driven behaviour regardless of direction (approach or 
avoid: e.g. Amodio et al., 2008). Such authors consider BAS to incorporate, for example, angry 
approach (e.g. Harmon-Jones, 2003). Within this alternative framework, data from humans suggest 
lateralisation of approach and active withdrawal components of the BAS to the left and right 





Overactivation of BAS has been associated with impulsivity, bipolar-disorder, 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and addictive behaviours for positive 
reinforcement (O’Connor et al., 2008). The system is governed mainly by the 
dopaminergic neurotransmitter system, which promotes goal-directed behaviour 
in response to rewards, particularly in the DLPFC, and is linked to approach 
motivation orientation (McNaughton & Corr, 2004; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). 
 
Data from humans suggest the BAS is lateralized to the left hemisphere (Harmon-
Jones, 2003), although this effect may more truly reflect a reduction in activity in 
the right hemisphere (Coan & Allen, 2003). More recently, it has been argued that 
the BAS may comprise overlapping systems including early stage motivational 
factors and later stage emotional responsiveness to biological reinforcers (Smillie 
et al. 2006; Corr, 2008; O’Connor et al., 2008). 
 
Freeze-Flight-or-Fight System (FFFS) 
The FFFS (Freeze, Flight or Fight system) is a defense and withdrawal system 
that functions to move an animal away from danger. The FFFS has been mapped 
in terms of a temporal series of response options (freeze then flight then fight: 
Figure 5.3). Selection of a response is determined by defensive distance (i.e. threat 
far away versus threat near) and availability of escape options (Blanchard & 
Blanchard, 1988; McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Upon detection of a threat (e.g. a 
predator) the (prey) animal freezes, becoming hypervigilant to signals of threat 




will then usually, in the first instance, flee. When there are no flight options, the 
animal will remain frozen (e.g. where a predator moves away) or, when defensive 
distance falls below a critical threshold, engage in defensive fight behaviour. 
Finally, if physically restrained, the animal may become tonically immobile 
(Erhard et al., 1999). The FFFS underlies fear, and involves periaqueductal grey, 
hypothalamus, amygdala, Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and prefrontal areas 
in the computation of response options (with precise neural substrates often 
determined by defensive distance: McNaughton & Corr, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 5.3 The stages of the FFFS. The typical series of events upon detecting 
a threat: freeze, flee or fight. Defensive distance may be loosely mapped from 
left to right, with detection of threat/greatest defensive distance to the left 
hand side and last-resort defensive fight/shortest defensive distance to the 
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Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) 
The BIS (Behavioural Inhibition System) was originally conceptualized by Gray 
(1981) as a motivational system that inhibits behavior in the presence of novel or 
highly salient stimuli. Psychophysiological data have led to a reconceptualisation 
of the BIS as a bottom-up reflexive attentional orienting system, sensitive to cues 
of punishment, nonreward and novelty, especially where these signals conflict 
with positive cues from the BAS (McNaughton & Corr, 2004; Amodio et al., 
2008; see also: Tsetsenis et al., 2007: Figure 5.4).  
 
 
Figure 5.4 The Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) is sensitive to signals of 
punishment, nonreward and novelty, especially when these signals conflict 
with outputs from the Behavioural Approach System (BAS). After 
































It is now generally agreed that the BIS may be defined as an attentional system for 
monitoring response conflicts arising from outputs from the FFFS and BAS 
concurrently (the BIS is also implicated in approach-approach and avoid-avoid 
conflicts: Amodio et al., 2004)
2
. The BIS functions to interrupt ongoing cognitive 
processes and enhance attention towards the threatening cues. This enhanced 
processing may then feed into later stages of the FFFS to be revealed in the overt 
behavioural response. The system is governed by monoamine neurotransmitter 
systems such as the noradrenergic and serotonergic systems and associated neural 
substrates, including the locus coeruleus in the brain stem and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC). The latter plays a key role in detecting expectancy violations 
(Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). High BIS sensitivity or activation is associated 
with enhanced attention, arousal, vigilance and anxiety (Gray, 1981; McNaughton 
& Corr, 2004). Overactivity of the BIS has been associated with anxiety-related 
disorders (Gray, 1981). Psychophysiological data suggest there is no lateralisation 
of the BIS in the brain (Coan & Allen, 2003). This is unsurprising given the 
multiple inputs to BIS from competing approach-withdrawal systems. 
 




 My definition of BIS concurs with most authors, that the BIS as an attentional system for 
monitoring conflict within and between FFFS and BAS outputs. However, some authors continue 
to discuss the BIS in terms of an avoidance/withdrawal mechanism. In personality research BIS 
scales have traditionally been used as a measure of avoidance sensitivity, but are now generally 




5.1.1.4. Other factors: Motivation, arousal, response speeding and slowing 
The above systems are all mediated by additional factors, namely motivation and 
arousal (McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Motivation includes both top-down 
cognitive input (e.g. drive to perform a task) and bottom-up processes (e.g. 
implicit motivational systems such as thirst and hunger). Arousal describes the 
degree of psychophysiological activation of attentional and behavioural systems 
(McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Motivation and arousal have a largely quantitative 
effect on the processing of emotional evaluation (Gray, 1971). As such, they do 
not present competing theories, but factors that are a necessary component of the 
attentional and behavioural systems outlined above. The following is a brief 
overview of how motivation and arousal may influence attentional and 
behavioural responses to emotional stimuli, focusing on aspects that are most 
relevant to the current study. 
 
A range of individual motivational factors have a quantitative effect on responses 
to emotional stimuli (e.g. the degree of slowing induced by the presence of an 
emotional distractor may be less among individuals highly motivated to perform 
the ongoing task). The motivation priming hypothesis (Lang et al., 1998), for 
example, describes the enhancement of the startle reflex in individuals during an 
aversive motivational state (e.g. in a state of fear), and attenuation of the startle 
reflex in individuals during an appetitive motivational state. Therefore, while the 
response is the same (startle), the magnitude of the response is modulated by 





Motivational factors may also have a more qualitative effect on responses to 
emotional stimuli, particularly in humans (Lang et al., 1998). For example, 
motivation for social dominance influences people’s performance on a learning 
task when task-irrelevant emotional faces are shown (Schultheiss et al., 2005). 
Schultheiss et al. (2005) presented participants with an abstract learning task 
during which three distinct visuomotor sequences were followed each by an 
emotional face (angry, happy, surpise), a neutral face, or no face. Participants 
were ranked according to their implicit motives, gained from questionnaire scores, 
on a scale from submissive (affiliation motivated) to dominant (power-motivated). 
Results revealed an interaction of viewed facial expression with the viewer’s 
motivational need for dominance, influenced by whether the viewed face was of 
matched gender. For example, there was a negative relationship between task 
performance and dominance motivation for tasks followed by matched-gender 
happy faces (which impaired task accuracy) and both matched- and mismatched-
gender happy faces (which impaired task speed). This result suggests that happy 
faces may be more aversive to individuals seeking to dominate others, while they 
may have a more positive connotation to less power motivated individuals with a 
greater drive for affiliation.  
 
The equivalence of facial cues of dominance and emotion, and their interaction 
with individual motivational factors, is summarised in the Functional Equivalence 
Hypothesis (Hess et al., 2007). This states the signal value of facial expressions is 
determined not only by the expression itself, but is a function of an interaction of 




the signaler and receiver (Hess et al., 2007). In the present study the use of neutral 
faces, and a post-hoc examination of dominance motivation were included to 
investigate possible effects of these factors. 
 
Arousal may also influence responses to emotional stimuli. Stressed or anxious 
people have enhanced arousal relative to non-stressed or non-anxious people, 
hence differences in measures of arousal (e.g. galvanic skin responses) are used to 
distinguish stressed states from relaxed states (Howard & Hughes, 2008). 
Therefore, in studies where high-anxious versus low-anxious populations are 
studied, or where individuals undergo a stress manipulation, arousal levels 
typically differ between groups. This is reflective of the difference in arousal 
found in the monkeys in Chapter 3, Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment.  
 
The effects of general arousal levels on speed of responding in humans has been 
studied in applied fields such as sports performance and driver safety, as well as 
human cognitive performance (Ozel et al., 2004). Speeding effects are 
summarized by the Yerkes-Dodson Law which states that task performance (in 
this example, speed to respond) increases with arousal up to a degree of arousal 
beyond which task performance falls off again (resulting in a performance curve: 
Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Data from human studies using non-emotional stimuli 
indicate that small increases in arousal lead to speeded responding, and this 
speeding occurs at early information processing stages but not at later motor 
executive stages (Jepma et al., 2009). Arousal effects also account for differences 




(regardless of valence) are shown on separate trials (Mogg et al., 2008). Again, 
moderate increases in arousal lead to a speeding of motor responses (Bradley et 
al., 1992; Ozel et al., 2004). Bradley et al. (2006) found that increased arousal in 
humans speeded reaction times for recognizing both pleasant and unpleasant 
slides which had been shown previously. Arousal may therefore speed task 
performance with emotional stimuli irrespective of stimulus valence 
(negative/positive). Matching levels of arousal between negative and positive 
emotional states in human studies remains methodologically problematic, and 
differences are typically accounted for by including control trials (typically 
neutral faces) against which experimental (emotional face) trials are compared. To 
control for the effects of general motor-speeding of response when comparing 
between states associated with higher and lower levels of anxiety or stress, non-
emotional control trials were incorporated in the current study.  
 
Recent formulations have replaced theories of a non-specific stress response and 
general performance (arousal) effects with identification of components of the 
stress response that may act to influence cognition via different pathways (e.g. 
anxiety versus fear) and more clearly delineated definitions of the types of 
cognitive processes that may be affected (e.g. attention versus learning versus 
memory: Mendl, 1999). For example, in rats, prenatal stress increases 
emotionality and fear-related behaviour as reflected in impaired avoidance 
learning in adulthood (Lehmann et al., 2000b). Postnatal stress, on the other hand, 
enhances attentional processes which may lead to improved avoidance learning in 




Where stimuli have arguably comparable levels of associated arousal but different 
valences (e.g. angry versus happy faces), arousal and valence factors may begin to 
be teased apart. Generic slowdown theories were developed to account for the 
relative slowing of responses on trials on which emotionally salient information is 
present relative to trials on which neutral information is present (e.g. MacLeod et 
al., 1986; Algom et al., 2004; Mogg et al., 2008). Delay to respond may result 
from a combination of acute physiological arousal, emotion-evaluation and 
attentional processes. Mogg et al. (2008) conducted a central cueing task during 
which either a neutral, angry or happy face was shown in the center of the screen. 
Participants were asked to respond by identifying the orientation of a subsequent 
probe. High anxious individuals were slower to respond to probes following angry 
and happy faces compared to neutral faces. Low anxious individuals were slower 
to respond to probes following happy (but not angry) versus neutral faces. These 
data suggest high anxious individuals demonstrate a slowing of response to all 
arousing stimuli, regardless of valence, while low anxious individuals show a 
slowing of response to arousing positive stimuli only. 
 
In summary, it is likely that the way competing information is processed, the 
pathways through which it passes, the intrinsic salience of a stimulus (bottom-up 
stimulus processing), the emotional value attributed to it (bottom-up stimulus 
processing and top-down goal-related assessment), interaction with motivational 
systems, the behavioural system activated (approach/withdraw) and degree of 




5.1.2. Current methods for studying emotion-evaluation and response-
slowing 
The methods used to test information processing and emotion-evaluation models 
in humans are based on the eStroop task. These were discussed in section 5.1.1.1. 
More recent approaches incorporate data from neuroscientific and computer 
modeling techniques. These were discussed in section 5.1.1.2. In both cases 
methods have been applied using human participants.  
 
The methods used to test reinforcement sensitivity theories of emotion-evaluation 
are more varied and have been applied using both human and non-human 
participants. These methods may be broadly divided into approaches that utilise 
conditioning procedures, versus those that focus on spontaneous responses to 
unconditioned (fear-relevant) stimuli. 
 
No study to date has investigated the influence of affective state on emotion-
evaluation and response-slowing in a non-human species using an adapted version 
of the computerized tasks typically used with humans. The following briefly 
discusses methods currently used with non-human animals to investigate 
comparable processes, with the aim of developing a unified approach, which is 





5.1.2.1. Conditioning studies 
Conditioning studies have played a key role in the development of our 
understanding of emotions (Gray, 1971). They have demonstrated that neutral 
stimuli may be conditioned to become fear-inducing (Pavlov, 1927; Gray, 1971) 
and that fear-relevant stimuli are more readily associated with an aversive 
unconditioned stimulus (UCS), and are more resistant to extinction, than are non-
fear-relevant stimuli, in both humans and primates (rhesus macaques: Cook & 
Mineka, 1989 and 1990). The influence of affective state on the strength of these 
selective associations has only been studied in humans, particularly in individuals 
with phobias (Öhman, et al., 2001; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
 
A test which has been used frequently with primates is the Wisconsin General 
Test Apparatus (WGTA: e.g. Cook et al., 1985; Rudebeck et al., 2006). During 
this task participants are required to reach their arm over a plexiglass box which 
contains a threatening object to reach a food reward. Appraisal of the threat value 
of the object placed within the plexiglass box is measured as a function of latency 
to reach towards the food. The presence of a snake in the plexiglass box has no 
effect on latency to reach in snake-naïve rhesus macaques. However, following 
observation of a conspecific responding fearfully to the snake (UCS), latency to 
reach over the WGTA in the presence of a snake slows significantly (Cook et al., 
1985). Therefore latency to reach in the WGTA may reflect the outcome of 
competing approach and withdrawal processes in the presence of threatening 
stimuli. It should be noted that a comparable design has been used with humans 




from the body (withdraw) has been used to measure approach-withdrawal 
tendencies to emotional stimuli (faces) in socially anxious humans and non-
anxious controls (Roelefs et al., 2009). 
 
Brain lesioning and electrode implant studies have been combined with 
conditioning studies to determine the brain regions underlying the processing of 
emotional information (e.g. lesions in rats: LeDoux, 1996; single cell recording in 
macaques: Rolls, 2000). Again, while these studies have demonstrated differential 
responses to emotional (or emotionally-conditioned) stimuli, they have not tested 
the effects of preexisting emotional states on responses to such stimuli. Some 
preliminary work has been conducted with serotonin receptor knockout mice 
(Tsetsenis et al., 2007). The knockout mice showed enhanced fear conditioning 
(freezing) to emotionally-conditioned stimuli, relative to non-knock-out mice, 
when those stimuli were partial, but not perfect, conditioned cues. Freezing to 
perfect predictors did not differ between groups. Inhibition of neurons in the 
amygdala and hippocampus revealed a role of the hippocampus in the processing 
of ambiguous threatening cues and the amygdala in the processing of both 
ambiguous and unambiguous threat-relevant cues. 
 
Conditioning approaches have been most valuable in identifying the types of 
stimuli which most easily become associated with positive and negative UCS, the 
speed with which positive and negative selective associations may be formed, 
their resistance to extinction following removal of previous reinforcement 




5.1.2.2. Non-conditioned responses to stimuli 
Studies that focus on spontaneous responses to unconditioned (fear-relevant) 
stimuli have demonstrated the effects of these stimuli on approach and withdrawal 
behaviours. For example, Rodd et al. (1997) used duration of tonic immobility as 
a measure of attentional bias in domestic fowl chicks. Chicks were exposed to 
uncontrollable shock treatment which induced a state of learned helplessness 
(dissociation of behavior from outcomes – the antithesis of operant learning). 
Controls were exposed either to an escapable shock or no shock pretreatment. At 
24 hours post-shock the chicks were exposed to threatening (artificial ‘predator’ 
eyes) and non-threatening (conspecifics present, predator eyes absent) external 
cues and handled by an experimenter to induce a state of tonic immobility. 
Number of attempts required to induce immobility and duration of immobility 
were measured. Chicks with learned-helplessness remained immobile for longer, 
and became immobile more readily than controls. However, the pattern of results 
with respect to the presence of external cues of threat was unclear. The presence 
of an experimenter may provide a more threatening cue than inanimate predator 
eyes, for example. It is therefore difficult to reconcile data from this approach 
with attentional processes. As with conditioning studies, the influence of 
preexisting affective factors on responses remains untested.  
 
The startle reflex is a reflexive response to a sudden (startling) stimulus and has 
been measured in both humans (Kumari et al., 2001; Hess et al., 2007) and 
animals (rats: Lehmann et al., 2000a; rhesus macaques: Lutz et al., 2007). In 




amplitude of eye-blink responses to a startling auditory, visual or tactile stimulus 
(Lang et al., 1998). Patients with the anxiety disorder Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD), for example, show speeded onset and greater amplitude of 
eyeblinks to a startling acoustic stimulus compared with non-anxious controls 
(Kumari et al., 2001). Amplitude of eyeblinks is enhanced in both anxious and 
non-anxious individuals while watching a negative film (e.g. horror) versus a 
positive film (e.g. comedy: Kumari et al, 2001). Prepulse inhibition/facilitation 
techniques have been used to elucidate the effects of attentional modulation on the 
startle reflex (Davis et al., 2008). When a non-startling prepulse tone is sounded 
immediately before the startling tone, the magnitude of the startle reflex is 
reduced compared with responses to the startling tone alone (Lehmann et al., 
2000a; Davis et al., 2008). This indicates reduced available attentional resources 
for automatic processing of the startling tone. In contrast, a longer interval 
between prepulse tone and startling tone elicits an enhanced startle reflex. This 
reflects the effects of increased and sustained arousal and attention on the startle 
response. Among humans with depressive symptoms, the startle reflex is 
attenuated to both positive and negative emotional stimuli (Mneimne et al., 2008). 
While the startle reflex is typically measured in humans in terms of magnitude of 
eyeblinks, in animals such as rhesus macaques and rats it is usually measured as 
whole-body movements (Gewirtz et al., 1998; Lehmann et al., 2000a; Lutz et al., 
2007; Davis et al., 2008). Enhanced startle is attributed to hyperexcitability of the 





5.1.3. Implications of human- and animal-based research for the 
development of a novel method to study emotion-evaluation and 
response-slowing in primates 
Several themes arose from the literature review that informed the design of the 
current study. Firstly, emotion-evaluation processes and response-slowing reflect 
several underlying mechanisms that include approach (BAS) and withdrawal 
(FFFS) behaviours and resolution of conflict of these responses (BIS). There is a 
trade-off between stimulus saliency, emotional tagging, goal-directed motivation 
to perform the task, arousal, attention and consequent activation of approach or 
withdrawal behaviours.  No study to date has directly adapted human paradigms 
to measure emotion-evaluation and response-slowing in non-human participants. 
Only a few previous studies have used a classical Stroop paradigm with monkeys 
(Japanese macaque: Lauwereyns et al., 2000; rhesus macaque: Washburn, 1994), 
but none of these considered the effects of affective state, nor used emotional 
stimuli. Therefore, a task based broadly on the cognitive paradigms used with 
humans (e.g. eStroop), incorporating aspects of the WGTA commonly used with 
primates, was developed.  
 
Emotional stimulus content was selected for comparability with human studies, 
and a measure of task performance based on reaction time was selected. Aspects 
of the human paradigms which were adopted included non-emotional control 
trials to provide a measure of baseline task performance (in this case, tendency 
and latency to touch a grey square presented on a touch-sensitive monitor in order 
to receive a pellet reward), and experimental trials on which emotional distractor 




line with recent work with humans (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg et al., 2008). 
Tendency and latency to respond by touching a stimlus presented on a touch-
sensitive screen provides a measure of behavioural approach and withdrawal 
systems, comparable with reach measures during the WGTA. Such data will allow 
further hypotheses regarding underlying mechanisms to be formulated. For 
example, speeding of responses may reveal an activation of approach behaviours 
(BAS), possibly modulated by general arousal effects, while slowing of responses 
may reveal activation of withdrawal behaviours (FFFS), and conflict of 
responding (BIS). 
 
Secondly, arousal may affect baseline task performance, speeding motor 
responses as arousal increases (Ozel et al., 2004). In order to account for arousal 
effects on baseline response tendency and latency, control trials are required (see 
Mogg et al., 2008). Control trials would also enable consideration and control of 
side preferences in baseline responding.  
 
Thirdly, studies with humans demonstrate that emotional distractor content 
impairs ongoing task performance. The emotional content must be incorporated 
without changing the structure of the basic task. The inclusion of a conspecific 
face framed within the non-emotional control stimulus was selected, in line with 
studies with humans (Mogg et al., 2008). Highly salient emotional distractor 
content has been shown to impair task performance to a greater extent than less 
emotionally salient distractor content (Mogg et al., 2008). The inclusion of both 
types of emotional distractor content allows comparison of saliency/emotional 




evaluation and response-slowing in rhesus macaques, conspecific faces with direct 
gaze (highly salient/threatening) and averted gaze (less salient/less threatening) 




Finally, emotion-evaluation and response-slowing effects in humans have been 
revealed in both trait and state anxiety (Williams et al., 1996), both within the 
same individuals following a social anxiety stress manipulation (e.g. Roelofs et 
al., 2007 and 2009), and between individuals with different trait anxiety scores  
(e.g. Mogg et al., 2008). A within-subjects design with manipulation of state 
affect (i.e. using the Post-enrichment and Post-health-check conditions described 
in Chapter 3) was therefore considered appropriate for the present study. 
 
In addition to the main points listed above, secondary themes were identified. 
Laterality effects in emotion-evaluation and response-slowing exist in humans 
(Davidson, 1992). Approach behaviours (BAS) are considered to be lateralized to 
the left hemisphere (Trevarthen, 1996). The right hemisphere has been implicated 
in enhanced circuit breaking (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) and FFFS responses 
(horses: Austin & Rogers, 2007; birds: Koboroff et al., 2008; primates: Rogers, 




 Studies with humans typically use facial expressions of emotion or gaze measures based on eye 
direction alone (direct versus averted). Due to the threatening value of direct gaze to rhesus 
macaques full frontal faces with direct eye-gaze were selected as threatening faces and profile 




2009; dogs: Siniscalchi et al., 2008; humans: Thompson et al., 2009). It may 
therefore be possible that approach behaviours will be enhanced for stimuli 
presented to the left hemisphere (RVF, although this advantage is weak for stimuli 
presented in lateralised locations: Harmon-Jones, 2003), and withdrawal 
behaviours will be enhanced for stimuli presented to the right hemisphere (LVF). 
These effects may be further influenced by the right hemisphere advantage for 
processing faces in rhesus macaques (Vermeire et al., 1998; Tsao et al., 2008). 
Due to these laterality effects in humans, visual field was considered in the 
analyses presented here. 
 
Priming and trait dominance effects also arose as factors that may influence 
response to emotional stimuli. Effects of the stimulus shown on the previous trial 
on response time on the current trial were investigated to ensure there were no 
significant carry-over effects between trials and to ensure the eight second inter-
trial-interval (ITT) was sufficient to prevent this. Human dominance traits 
(specifically high dominance motivation) have been shown to slow responses to 
angry (threatening) faces in studies using a similar design to that used here 
(Schultheiss et al., 2005; Roelofs et al., 2007 and 2009). Therefore, monkeys were 
ranked for aggressive-approach tendency, based on data presented in Chapter 2, to 








The general aim of this chapter is to describe the development and application of a 
method for measuring emotion-evaluation and response-slowing to socio-
emotional stimuli in rhesus macaques. A further aim is to examine the influence 
of two treatments, assumed to induce shifts in inferred affective state, on these 
processes. I test competing hypotheses about possible mechanisms underlying 
such biases, namely arousal and emotion evaluation. The paradigm is based on 
human cognitive studies which present an emotional distractor at the same 
location as a task-relevant stimulus, and measure slowing in responses to the task-
relevant stimulus as a function of distractor saliency/emotionality. 
 
 
5.3. Hypotheses and specific predictions: 
1. Stress-related arousal increases baseline tendency and speed to respond (control 
trials) 
a. Monkeys will make more responses to a non-emotional control 
stimulus when highly aroused (Post-health-check) than when less 
aroused (Post-enrichment). 
b. Monkeys will be faster to touch a non-emotional control stimulus 







2. Emotional distractor content impairs task performance 
a. Monkeys will make fewer responses on trials with direct gaze 
faces than on trials with averted gaze faces.  
b. Monkeys will be slower to respond on trials with direct gaze faces 
than on trials with averted gaze faces.  
 
3. Affective state mediates task impairment effects of emotional distractor content 
a. Monkeys will make fewer responses on trials when emotional 
distractor content is present (experimental trials) Post-health-check 
than Post-enrichment  
b. Monkeys will be slower to respond on trials when emotional 
distractor content is present (experimental trials) Post-health-check 
than Post-enrichment  
c. The above effects will be enhanced for faces with direct gaze 





Part B: Development of the new method 
In Part A I presented the background and rationale for the development of a 
method to study approach and withdrawal responses to emotional stimuli in 
rhesus macaques and the influence of affective state on these processes. In Part B 





Twelve monkeys took part in the study (Monkeys C55, 29C, 86O, 16P 79T, AI73, 
06H, 94K, 92R, 27S, 66S and 79S; average age: 7.39 years; range: 3.60 – 24.7 
years old). All monkeys had previously begun operant touch-screen training in the 
laboratory during the preceding nine months and worked in the laboratory on a 
daily basis.  
 
5.4.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
The face stimuli consisted of 20 colour photographs of 10 male monkeys 
(‘stimulus monkeys’) housed at CPRC. The stimulus monkeys were unknown to 
the participant monkeys. For each stimulus monkey, one photograph showing a 
frontal view of the face with neutral expression (hereafter ‘Direct gaze’), and one 
photograph showing a profile view of the face with neutral expression (‘Averted 




photograph per stimulus monkey (Figure 5.5a and b). Face pictures were selected 
for use according to good resolution of image, availability of both frontal and 
profile images from the same individual, and neutral facial expression. Images 
were trimmed so that only the head was visible. Face pictures were superimposed 
on a grey background and enclosed in a rectangular frame measuring 154mm x 
164mm, thereby subtending 14.71 x 15.66 degrees of visual angle when presented 
centrally on a computer monitor at a 60cm viewing. The face stimuli were paired, 
according to stimulus monkey identity, to give 10 direct-averted gaze face pairs 
(Appendix 5.1). A single stimulus consisting of the grey rectangular frame alone 
was also composed for training purposes and baseline control during testing 
(Figure 5.5c). The grey hue of the rectangular frame was selected for 
comparability with the hue of the monkeys’ enclosures, against which monkeys 
viewed conspecifics in the home environment. 
 
Direct-averted gaze face pairs were assessed for equivalence of luminosity (Ly) 
and contrast energy (C) using Adobe Photoshop 7, following the procedure 
described in Chapter 4. Direct gaze and averted gaze faces were paired according 
to stimulus monkey identity. The mean Ly for each face stimulus was entered into 
a paired-samples t-test to assess equivalence of Ly across direct gaze and averted 
gaze face pairs. Direct gaze and averted gaze faces did not differ in Ly (t(9)=0.39, 
P=0.70). The C value for each face was entered into a paired-samples t-test to 
assess equivalence of C within direct-averted gaze face pairs. Direct gaze and 
averted gaze faces did not differ in C (t(9)=2.10, P=0.07). Therefore, the 




from that of the averted gaze faces with which they were paired. An additional 
check was run to examine the degree of variation between the different stimulus 
monkey face pairs. Mean L and C values for all face stimuli fell within 2SD of the 
mean L and C values for the entire set of 20 face stimuli. Therefore, variance in 
luminance and contrast energy was low across the entire stimulus set. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Examples of the stimuli used during the study: a) direct gaze and 
b) averted gaze from one stimulus monkey; c) a grey square was presented 









Stimuli were divided into two subsets for counterbalanced order of presentation 
between individuals. Each stimulus monkey was assigned a number from 1-10. 
The 10 direct gaze-averted gaze pairs were divided into two subsets, with direct 
gaze-averted gaze pairs numbered 1-5 in subset one, and direct gaze-averted gaze 
pairs numbered 6-10 in subset two (Appendix 5.1).  
a)        b)                 c) 






One stimulus was presented on each trial. Stimuli were presented at one of three 
locations: left visual field (LVF), right visual field (RVF) and midpoint. Stimuli 
were presented on the screen so that the midpoints of each of the LVF and RVF 
locations were 100mm from the screen midpoint, along the horizontal midline. 
Averted gaze probes were presented on the screen in either a left or a right 
orientation so that the direction of gaze of the averted face was always directed 
away from the midpoint of the screen. Both orientations of averted gaze probes 
were presented at the central location. All stimuli were presented against a black 
background. 
 
Stimuli were presented on a 15” Protouch Aspect TS17LBRAI001 touch-sensitive 
LCD monitor connected to a Toshiba Satellite Pro A60 laptop computer running 
EPrime experimenter-generator software, with all aspects of the equipment set-up 
as described in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.7). All sessions were filmed using two video 
cameras. One video camera (Samsung VP-L150 digital video camera) was 
positioned to one side of the apparatus to film responses made at the touch screen 
interface (capturing both the stimulus location, image identity and the ‘touch’ 
response). A second camera (JVC 700x digital zoom) was positioned above and 
behind the touch screen to film the monkey’s behavioural responses in the cage. 
Cameras were placed out of direct view of the monkey. A live video feed to the 
control room allowed the experimenter to observe the monkey on a split-screen 
video monitor. All responses were rewarded with a secondary reinforcing tone, 




of a Noyes 190mg food pellet triggered by the pellet dispenser. Full details of 
reinforcement features and equipment are given in Chapter 2.  
 
5.4.3. Design and Procedure 
Main terminologies are given in Table 5-1. All monkeys initially underwent a 
series of training sessions to learn the basic task contingencies. During training 
only the grey square was presented, and monkeys learned to touch this in order to 
gain a pellet reward. Data for training sessions are presented in Chapter 2. The 
monkeys then took part in testing sessions during which control trials (grey 
square) were interspersed with experimental trials (grey square plus emotional 
distractor content: direct gaze or averted gaze face).  
 
During testing, stimuli were presented in a randomised order. Experimental trials 
were those on which faces with direct-gaze and averted-gaze were presented 
(Figure 5.6a). Experimental trials were included to test the experimental 
hypotheses about the effects of emotional distractor content on task performance 
(measured as latency to touch the stimulus). Control trials were those on which 
the grey square was presented (Figure 5.6b) and were included to gain baseline 
response latencies. 
 
The procedure for a testing session was as follows: the EPrime program was 
opened and participant monkey details entered into the initial information screen 




Table 5-1 Terminologies used in the study 
Term  Definition 
Training 
session 
 Sessions conducted prior to testing during which monkeys 
learnt to perform a basic task (touch a grey square to gain a 




 Sessions on which experimental trials were conducted and 
experimental data were collected. Each monkey took part in 
two daily testing sessions following one week of enrichment 
(Post-enrichment) and two daily testing sessions over the two 
days immediately following the veterinary inspection (Post-
health-check). 
 









 Face stimuli (direct gaze and averted gaze faces superimposed 
upon the grey square used during control trials) were designed 
to contain emotional information which may capture attention 
and impair task performance. 
 
Treatment  Testing was conducted in two treatment conditions for each 




 A correct response was defined as a touch to any stimulus 
shown on the screen within the 60000ms presentation time. If 
the monkey failed to touch the stimulus within the 60000ms 






Figure 5.6 Examples of stimuli as they appeared at the three screen locations for a) Experimental trials and b) Control trials.  
 
a)            Experimental trials 








Averted gaze                 Direct Gaze                       Averted Gaze 













Grey square      Grey Square     Grey Square 
(LVF presentation)   (Central presentation)    (RVF presentation) 




Figure 5.6 (Continued) c) Example of the experimental procedure. 
 
 
Black screen for >8080ms 
Trial (control trial, central 
location shown) 
60000ms or until response 
If response is made 
secondary reinforcing tone is 
sounded and a pellet is 
delivered 
Black screen for >8080ms 
Trial (experimental trial, 
RVF, shown) 
60000ms or until response 
If response is made 
secondary reinforcing tone is 
sounded and a pellet is 
delivered 
Time 




laboratory in the testing cage, positioned in front of the apparatus at a viewing 
distance of approximately 60 cm, and allowed to settle. The experimenter 
immediately moved to the adjacent room, and set the video to record events. The 
experimenter triggered the onset of the experiment by pressing the return key on 
the keyboard. On each trial a single stimulus was presented for 60 seconds, or 
until the monkey touched the stimulus: Figure 5.6c). Stimulus onset was triggered 
automatically by the EPrime software. Stimulus offset was triggered either by the 
monkey touching the stimulus, or automatically if the monkey did not touch the 
stimulus during the 60 second trial. All touches to stimuli were rewarded by 
immediate delivery of a pellet and reinforcing tone at a 100% fixed reinforcement 
ratio. At stimulus offset, a plain black screen was shown until the onset of the next 
trial.  
 
Inter-trial interval (ITI) was set to a minimum of 8080ms. If the monkey touched 
the screen during the inter-trial interval the Eprime program automatically reset 
the inbuilt interval counter to 0ms. This ensured that stimulus onset only occurred 
when the monkey was not currently touching the screen, and had not touched the 
screen in the preceding 8080ms. The ITI allowed monkeys time to collect and eat 
pellets before the onset of the next trial. Further, extending the inter-trial interval 
reduces carry-over effects between trials. All responses (stimulus shown and 
latency to respond) were recorded by the computer. 
 
Testing sessions consisted of an initial block of three practice trials during which 




Table 5-2 The number of experimental and control trials on which stimuli 
were presented to the left, central and right visual fields during one daily 
testing session (left hand columns). Right hand columns show total number of 
experimental and control trials over all testing sessions for each monkey. 
 
 
 One daily testing session  
(n trials) 
 
 All daily testing sessions  
(n trials) 
 




















































       
Control trials 
 






















screen Figure 5.6b). This was included to remind monkeys of the operant task and 
to ensure each monkey was working prior to the onset of the first experimental 
trial in each daily testing session. The practice block was followed by one 
experimental block of 75 trials (Table 5.2). The experimental block comprised 60 
experimental trials and 15 control trials, presented in a randomized order. During 
the experimental block, the 60 experimental trials comprised stimuli from either 
subset one, or subset two (each subset comprising 10 faces: five x direct gaze; five 
x averted gaze). Each of the 10 faces was presented twice at each of the three 
locations (LVF, center, RVF). Control trials occurred five times at each of the 
three locations. 
 
All monkeys were tested on two daily testing sessions Post-enrichment and on 
two daily testing sessions Post-health-check. The order of testing was 
counterbalanced across individuals so that six monkeys were first tested Post-
enrichment (Group 1), and six were first tested Post-health-check (Group 2: 
Figure 5.7). The order of events was as follows. Group 1 monkeys (Post-
enrichment first) received four days of contingency training concurrent with 
enhanced enrichment in the home enclosure. This was followed by two daily 
testing sessions (Post-enrichment), then seven daily maintenance sessions, the 
health-check, and finally two daily testing sessions (Post-health-check), Group 2 
monkeys followed a similar procedure which ran in the following order: training – 
health check – Post-health-check testing – maintenance during the week of 




Figure 5.7 The counterbalanced order of testing with group 1 taking part in the enrichment treatment first (from day-7 until day 1). 
Group 2 took part in the health-check treatment first, alongside the monkeys from group 1 (from day 5-11). 
 
Group  Day 
  -7…-5 -4…-1  0 & 1 2…4 5…8  9  10 & 11  12…18  19 & 20 
                
                
1 (n=6)   Training  Test (Post-
enrichment) 
Maintenance    Test (Post-
health-check) 
     
                 
2 (n=6)       Training    Test (Post-
health-check) 
 Maintenance  Test (Post-
enrichment) 









Days on which enrichment was 






Day on which health check was conducted 
(12 noon on day 8) during the health-check 
phase 
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The full series of events was as follows, and as summarized in Figure 5.7. On 
days -7 to -1, all monkeys housed in the enclosure received enrichment in the 
home cages, as described in Chapter 3. On days -4, -3, -2 and -1, Group 1 
underwent training with the apparatus. On each day each monkey in Group 1 was 
transported to the laboratory where he was presented with a three-trial practice 
block followed by a 75 trial training block. Across all trials during a training 
session the control stimulus was presented 25 times at each of the LVF, central 
and RVF locations, in a randomized order (total 75 trials). As with testing 
sessions, the control stimulus was presented once at each of the three locations 
during the initial practice block. All correct responses were rewarded with a 
secondary reinforcing tone and a pellet. The training criterion was predetermined 
at 80% correct responses to the control stimulus at each of the three locations (i.e. 
20 responses at each of the LVF, central and RVF locations). To assess feeding 
motivation, the number of pellets left in the pellet tray and the number of monkey 
chow left in the lunch box at the end of each session, were recorded. 
 
On days 0 and 1, Group 1 took part in two consecutive daily Post-enrichment 
testing sessions (Figure 5.7), following the procedure described. On days 2-8 the 
six monkeys in Group 1 engaged in daily sessions during which the control 
stimulus only was shown for a total of 78 trials, as during days -4 to -1. On days 
5, 6, 7 and 8, the six monkeys in Group 2 took part in three daily training sessions. 
On day 9, all monkeys in the enclosure received their three-monthly health-check, 
conducted by the facility veterinarian. On days 10 and 11, all 12 monkeys in 
Groups 1 and 2 took part in Post-health-check testing. On day 12, all monkeys in 
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the enclosure began a second week of enrichment during which the six monkeys 
in Group 2 engaged in daily maintenance sessions during which the control 
stimulus only was shown for a total of 78 trials, as during days 5 to 8. On days 19 
and 20, Group 2 underwent Post-enrichment testing. 
 
Throughout the study, care was taken to maintain a regular daily working routine. 
Staff access to the area in and around the animal housing was restricted and all 
non-essential husbandry procedures postponed until the end of the study. During 
the training and enrichment phases monkeys were provided with regular 
enrichments as described in Chapter 3, with daily food rations adjusted 
accordingly for calorie intake.  
 
5.4.4. Data selection and treatment  
Criteria for inclusion of each monkey in the analyses were a) performance to the 
80% criterion for control trials on at least one daily testing session in each testing 
condition; and b) during test sessions, the monkey ate a comparable proportion of 
pellets and daily food ration to that consumed during training sessions. The latter 
were assessed according to the number of pellets left in the pellet tray, and the 
number of chow pellets and fruit slices left in the lunch box, at the end of each 
session. Daily testing sessions which met these criteria were considered valid and 
included in the analyses. Daily testing sessions that failed to meet these criteria 




For analysis of proportion of responses made, frequency data are presented as  
 
n (correct responses) 
n (trials) 
 
for each of control trials, direct gaze experimental trials, and averted gaze 
experimental trials. It is signified in the text whether data originate from one or 
two sessions within a given testing condition (n=60 or n=120 experimental trials, 
and n=15 or n=30, control trials, respectively).  
 
For analysis of reaction times, latency data for all monkeys who met the above 
criteria were treated in line with human studies (e.g. Mauer & Borkenau, 2007; 
Beall & Herbert, 2008). All trials in which no response was made were discarded. 
All trials in which responses were made faster than 400ms post-stimulus onset 
were also discarded. Four hundred ms was selected as the minimum cut-off based 
on the assumption that this was the approximate minimal perception-reaction 
time. This was calculated as (perception time: ~140ms) + (motor signal time: 
~160ms) + reach time (~100ms). Latency data for the remaining trials were then 
normalized using a Log10 transformation.  
 
In line with the human literature, ratio scores were calculated for each monkey by 
dividing experimental trial reaction time (RT) by control trial RT. 
 
Ratio score =  mean log10 experimental trial RT 




A positive ratio score indicates a slowing of responses on experimental trials 
compared with control trials.  
 
In all of the subsequent analyses, order of testing (Post-enrichment first versus 
Post-health-check first) did not have an effect on the results, therefore this 
between-groups factor was removed from the analyses presented here. Groupings 
for order of testing are shown in all tables for reference purposes. Due to evidence 
for hemispheric specialisation in the processing of emotional faces and gaze, 
visual field is included in all analyses. All data were checked for a normal 
distribution using a one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. All K-S tests 
revealed data did not differ significantly from a normal distribution, therefore 
parametric tests are used throughout. For t-tests, a Levene’s test of equality of 
variance was also conducted. These were all non-significant. All descriptive data 
are reported as mean ± 1SE. Significant findings are presented in figures. Where 
there were missing cell values, data are presented in tables to identify the location 
of missing data. 
 
5.4.5. Data analyses for control trials (grey square) 
Control trials (grey square) were included to collect baseline performance data, 
investigate the effects of stress-related arousal on task performance, to check for 
side biases in responding, and to distinguish valid from invalid testing sessions. 
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Invalid testing sessions were defined as sessions during which performance on 
control trials fell below 80% (i.e. fewer than 12 out of 15 correct responses).  
 
To test the effects of stress-related arousal on tendency to respond (Hypothesis 1), 
a repeated measures ANOVA (RMANOVA) was conducted. Data were mean 
frequency of responses Post-enrichment versus mean frequency of responses Post-
health-check at each of the three screen locations.  To test whether stress-related 
arousal affects latency to respond, a second RMANOVA was conducted. Data were 
mean latency to respond Post-enrichment versus mean latency to respond Post-
health-check, at each of the three screen locations. 
 
5.4.6. Data analyses for experimental trials (direct- and averted-gaze faces) 
Experimental trials were included to investigate the effect of emotional distractor 
content and affective state on task performance. The measures were frequency of 
responses and latency to respond. Frequency data were included to measure 
effects of emotional distractor content (direct gaze and averted gaze faces) and 
affective state on tendency to respond. Latency data were included to measure the 
effects of emotional distractor content and affective state on speed to respond. 
Screen location (as a proxy measure of visual field) was included to test for 
hemispheric differences in processing of emotional stimuli.  
 
To test the two hypotheses that the presence of emotional distractor content 
impairs task performance (Hypothesis 2), and that this may be mediated by 
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affective state (Hypothesis 3), frequency data were entered into one RMANOVA. 
Data were frequency of responses on direct gaze and averted gaze trials, at each of 
the three screen locations, during the Post-enrichment and Post-health-check 
testing conditions. To test the hypothesis that the presence of emotional distractor 
content slows the latency to respond, and this may be mediated by affective state, 
latency data were entered into one RMANOVA. Data were ratio scores (log10 
transformed latency to respond on experimental trials divided by log10 
transformed latency to respond on control trials), for direct gaze and averted gaze 
faces separately at each of the three screen locations, during the Post-enrichment 
and Post-health-check testing conditions. All main effects and interactions arising 
from the higher-order RMANOVAs were then examined using appropriate lower-
order tests. 
 
Post-hoc Bonferroni corrected paired samples t-tests were conducted to address 
possible confounding factors and explore the data. Following evidence that the 
emotional distractor content presented on the previous trial may affect 
performance on the current trial (Algom et al., 2004), and that anxious individuals 
are more sensitive to such priming (Richards et al., Unpublished data), an 
investigation of possible priming effects of the previous trial was conducted. The 
aim of this analysis was to ensure that tendency and latency to respond on any 
given trial was not affected by the valence of the previous trial (control, direct 
gaze, averted gaze). A bivariate correlation was conducted to explore approach-
motivation characteristics, since data from humans suggest dominance motivation 




Seven of the 12 monkeys completed all phases of the experiment and met all 
criteria for inclusion in the analysis (Table 5-3). These seven monkeys responded 
on ≥80% of control trials during one or more daily testing sessions in each of the 
Post-enrichment and Post-health-check testing conditions. The monkeys collected 
a comparable number of reward pellets from the pellet tray during the Post-
enrichment and Post-health-check testing sessions to that collected during 
training. The seven monkeys also collected the daily food ration from the lunch 
box. Data on criteria measures are presented first. 
 
Performance data for experimental sessions are presented in Table 5-3. Seven of 
the 12 monkeys who took part in experimental sessions completed the study (four 
from Group 1 and three from Group 2). Three monkeys in each of Groups 1 (29C, 
C55 and 16P) and 2 (92R, 27S and 66S) reached criterion (80% responses to the 
grey rectangle) on all four testing sessions. One monkey (AI73: Group 1) reached 
criterion for just one daily testing session during either testing condition. A total 
of 1950 trials, from 26 testing sessions spread across seven monkeys therefore 
met the criteria for entry into the analysis.  
 
Five of the 12 monkeys who took part in experimental sessions failed to reach 
criterion (86O and 79T in group 1; 94K, 06H and 79S in group 2). Three of the 
five monkeys failed to reach criterion for responses during both sessions in a 
single testing condition (79T, 06H: 11% and 40% accuracy Post-enrichment; 79S: 
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Table 5-3 Seven monkeys reached criteria for inclusion in the analyses. * signifies criterion was not met. – indicates data not available. 
   
 N experimental sessions 







Training Post-enr Post-hc 
 




C55 24.70  2 2  0.99 0.95 0.99       
29C 12.05  2 2  0.98 0.99 1.00       
86O 5.30  2 0
*  1.00 1.00 -       
16P 5.15  2 2  1.00 1.00 1.00       
79T 3.65  0
*
 -








































   n = 4 
 06H 9.90  0
* 
2  1.00 - 1.00       
94K 7.40  0
* 
1  0.52 0.60 0.73       
92R 4.75  2 2  1.00 1.00 1.00       
Group 
2 
 27S 4.66  2 2  1.00 0.82 1.00       
 66S 3.80  2 2  1.00 0.65 1.00       
 79S 3.70  2 0









































     n = 7 
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33% accuracy Post-health-check). One of the five monkeys (94K) showed signs 
of agitation during testing sessions, frequently shaking his cage and failing to look 
at the screen. A fifth monkey (86O) failed to reach criterion due to external 
interruptions on both days of Post-health-check testing. Data for these five 
monkeys were removed from the analyses. 
 
A 1 x 3 RMANOVA was performed to examine whether motivation to work, 
measured as proportion of pellets eaten, varied with affective state. Data were 
proportion of pellets consumed with within-subjects factor of training/testing 
condition (training, Post-enrichment testing and Post-health-check testing) for the 
seven monkeys who passed all criteria to be included in the final analyses. The 
proportion of pellets eaten did not differ significantly between training and the 
two testing conditions (F2,12 = 2.204, P=0.203). Planned t-tests revealed there was 
no significant difference in pellet consumption between the testing conditions 
(Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check: t(6)=1.55, P=0.17) nor between either 
of the testing conditions and training (Post-enrichment versus training: t(6)=1.32, 
P=0.24; Post-health-check versus training: t(6)=1.44, P=0.20). All monkeys 
consumed the full daily food ration while in the laboratory after each training and 
testing session. 
 
These results suggest there was no significant reduction in appetite or motivation 
to work, as measured by consumption of pellets and daily food ration, between the 
training and Post-enrichment and Post-health-check testing sessions. The seven 
monkeys consumed pellets at comparably high rates during both training and 
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testing phases. It is therefore likely that motivation to work on the task was 
maintained throughout the study. An increase in appetite or motivation would be 
difficult to assess, since these may be masked by a ceiling effect in the data. 
 
Data from the 1950 trials entered into the analysis were treated as follows. For 
frequency data all 1950 trials were included. For latency data, trials on which 
responses were made earlier than 400ms were removed (n=173 trials: 67 Post-
enrichment; 106 Post-health-check), as were trials on which the monkey did not 
respond (n=44 trials: 30 Post-enrichment; 14 Post-health-check). A total of 217 
trials were therefore removed, resulting in 1733 valid trials for inclusion in the 
following analyses of latency to respond. The number of invalid trials removed 
for each monkey is shown in Appendix 5.2. An exploratory repeated measures t-
test was performed to compare number of discarded trials Post-enrichment (n=97) 
versus Post-health check (n=120). There was no significant difference in the 
number of trials discarded between the two testing phases (t(6) = 1.04, P=0.34).  
 
5.5.1. Does stress-related arousal improve task performance? (Control 
trials)  
a) Frequency to respond  
A 2 x 3 RMANOVA was performed to determine whether stress-related arousal 
improves task performance (frequency of responses) when non-emotional control 
stimuli are shown (hypothesis 1, prediction a). Data were proportion of responses 
on control trials, with within-subjects factors of testing condition (Post-
enrichment versus Post-health-check) and screen location (left, central, right: 
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Table 5-4). There were no main effects of either testing condition (F1,6 = 2.273, 
P=0.182), nor screen location (F2,12 =0.000, P=1.00), and a trend towards an 
interaction of location x testing condition (F2,12 = 2.909, P=0.09).  
 
 
Table 5-4 Proportion of responses made on control trials presented to the 
left, central and right visual fields 











C55  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
29C   1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
16P  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
AI73  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0  0.9  1.0 
92R  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
27S  0.9   1.0  1.0  1.0  0.9  1.0 

















b) Latency to respond 
A 2 x 3 RMANOVA was conducted to test the hypothesis that stress-related arousal 
improves task performance (enhances speed to respond) when non-emotional 
control stimuli are shown (hypothesis 1, prediction b). Data were Log10RTs on 
control trials, with within subjects factors of testing condition (Post-enrichment 
versus Post-health-check) and screen location (left, central and right). There was a 
main effect of testing condition (F1,6 = 17.611, P=0.006). Monkeys were faster to 
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respond to non-emotional control stimuli Post-health-check than Post-enrichment 
(Figure 5.8). There was no main effect of screen location (F2,12 = 0.307, P=0.741), 
and no interaction of testing condition x screen location (F2,12 = 1.561, P=0.250). 
This suggests there were no side biases in speed to respond. To give an indication 





























In summary, monkeys were faster to respond to non-emotional control stimuli 
Post-health-check than they were Post-enrichment. This supports the prediction 
(hypothesis1, prediction b) that stress-related arousal may speed responses to non-
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emotional stimuli (see Figure 5.8). There was no difference in frequency of 
responses Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check (hypothesis 1, prediction a). 
 
These data suggest that stress-related arousal speeds baseline performance but 
does not affect tendency to respond. Any latency effects on experimental trials are 
therefore unlikely to be influenced by a speed-accuracy trade-off. Equivalence in 
frequency to respond may reflect a ceiling effect afforded by the long trial 
durations. There were no side biases in either frequency or speed of responding. 
As such, any differences in responses to stimuli at the three screen locations in the 
subsequent analyses are considered to be a reliable indicator of visual field 
preferences for emotional stimulus content. 
 
 
Table 5-5 Median latencies (msecs) to respond to stimuli 




 Direct  
Gaze 




 Direct  
Gaze 
 Averted  
Gaze 
29C  2803  2470  3031  8327  4000  6202 
C55  1409  5800  3513  4121  3876  3518 
16P  874  1313  1399  1817  1910  2195 
AI73  6973  10113  3147  16953  4927  13080 
92R  2513  1180  2153  2447  1500  2160 
27S  2607  1887  2120  4073  2593  5880 
66S  1144  1237  1303  5901  1946  3543 





5.5.2. Does emotional distractor content impair task performance, and is 
this mediated by affective state? Experimental trials (Direct gaze and 
Averted gaze faces) 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 (that emotional distractor content impairs task performance, 
and this may be mediated by affective state) were tested by running a higher-order 
RMANOVA separately for each data set (frequency and ratio latency data 
respectively). Specific predictions were tested with subsequent analyses.  
 
To test the effects of emotional distractor content and affective state on frequency 
of responses on experimental trials (hypotheses 2 and 3, prediction a in both 
cases), proportion data were entered into a 2 x 2 x 3 RMANOVA. The within 
subjects factors were testing condition (Post-enrichment versus Post-health-
check), trial type (direct gaze and averted gaze) and visual field (LVF, CVF, 
RVF). There were no main effects of testing condition (F1,6 = 2.006, P=0.206), 
trial (F1,6 = 0.607, P=0.561), nor visual field (F2,12 = 0.538, P=0.598). There were 
no interactions (all Ps >0.3). There was therefore no support for either of 
predictions 2a or 3a. 
 
A 2 x 2 x 3 RMANOVA was performed to determine whether emotional distractor 
content and affective state influence latency to respond to emotional stimuli 
(hypotheses 2 and 3, prediction b in both cases, and hypothesis 3, prediction c). 
Data were ratio scores, with within-subjects factors of testing condition (Post-
enrichment versus Post-health-check), trial type (direct gaze and averted gaze) and 
visual field (LVF, CVF and RVF). There was a significant effect of testing 
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condition (F1,6 = 11.749, P=0.01). Ratio scores were greater than 1 Post-health-
check, suggesting slowing of responses on experimental trials relative to control 
trials, and were less than 1 Post-enrichment, suggesting speeding of responses on 
experimental trials relative to control trials. This supports hypothesis 3, prediction 
b, which states that monkeys will be slower to respond on trials when emotional 
distractor content is present Post-health-check than Post-enrichment. There was a 
significant interaction between testing condition and trial type (F1,6=6.68, P=0.04: 
Fig 5.9). There were no other main effects (trial: F1,6 =1.79, P=0.23; VF: 
F2,12=0.25, P=0.78) nor other interactions (all Ps >0.40). The absence of a main 
effect for trial type provides a lack of evidence for Hypothesis 2, prediction b, 
which states that monkeys should be slower to respond on trials with direct gaze 
faces than on trials with averted faces. 
 
To examine the two-way interaction in more detail, and to test hypothesis 3, 
prediction c (that slowing of responses to direct gaze faces should be enhanced 
Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment), data were collapsed for visual field, 
and planned pairwise comparisons were conducted. These compared ratio scores 
Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check, separately for each of direct-gaze and 
averted-gaze trials. For direct gaze trials shown Post-health-check, ratio scores 
were above 1. This indicates monkeys were slower to respond on direct gaze 
experimental trials relative to control trials Post-health-check. Conversely, for 
direct gaze trials shown Post-enrichment, ratio scores were below 1. This 
indicates monkeys were faster to respond on direct gaze experimental trials 
relative to control trials Post-enrichment. A paired samples t-test (Bonferroni 
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adjusted P=0.025), with within-subjects factor testing condition (Post-enrichment 
versus Post-health-check) revealed a significant difference in the ratio scores for 
direct-gaze trials between the two treatments (t(6)=3.41, P=0.01; Figure 5.9). This 
is in partial support of Hypothesis 3, prediction c. There was no effect of 
treatment condition on ratio scores for averted gaze experimental trials (t(6)=1.82, 
P=0.12), also in partial support of hypothesis 3c (that slowing effects should be 
enhanced for direct gaze faces relative to averted gaze faces).  
 
 
Figure 5.9 Ratio scores for latency to respond on experimental trials with 
direct gaze and averted gaze emotional dstractor content.  = Post-health-































































In summary, ratio scores revealed trends towards slowing of responses to direct 
gaze faces (relative to control trials) Post-health-check, and a speeding of 
responses to averted gaze faces (relative to control trials) Post-enrichment. This 
bidirectional effect (relative slowing Post-health-check versus relative speeding 
Post-enrichment) resulted in a significant difference between the ratio scores for 
monkeys responding to direct gaze faces Post-health-check versus Post-
enrichment (but not for averted gaze faces). These data suggest emotional 
distractor content and affective state interact to influence latency to respond on a 
manual task when emotional distractor content is introduced. There were no visual 
field effects, nor were there effects on proportion of responses made. 
 
5.5.3. Additional Post-hoc analyses 
Two sets of post-hoc analyses were conducted to check for possible priming 
effects of previous trial shown, and to test possible effects of individual trait 
characteristics (i.e. approach motivation as measured by aggressiveness) on 
results. 
 
a) Priming effects of previous trial 
A 3 x 2 x 3 RMANOVA was performed to examine whether the stimulus presented 
on the previous trial influenced latency to respond on the current trial. Data were 
log10RT, with within-subjects factors current trial (control, direct gaze, averted 
gaze), testing condition (Post-enrichment and Post-health-check) and previous 
trial (control, direct gaze, averted gaze). There was no main effect of previous trial 
290 
 
on response latency on the current trial (F2,8 =2.435, P=0.149), nor were there any 
interactions (all Ps>0.5).  
 
In summary, the stimulus shown on the previous trial did not affect response 
latency on the current trial. This suggests that the variable ITT of 8080ms was 
sufficient to negate inter-trial priming effects. 
 
b) Trait approach motivation 
A bivariate correlation was conducted to test the effects of trait approach 
motivation on response-slowing to threatening faces. This analysis was conducted 
following evidence from humans that high approach motivation (which is 
associated with characteristics such as dominance, higher basal testosterone 
levels, and heightened BAS activation) slows responses to threatening faces (e.g. 
Passamonti et al., 2008). For each monkey, an approach motivation score was 
calculated as the sum of aggression scores from the habituation data reported in 
Chapter 2, for days 1-9 and 20, 30 and 40 of the habituation phase. Therefore, 
each monkey had a BAS motivation score on a scale of 0-12, with 0 indicating 
low approach motivation (no aggressive responses towards the investigator on 
approach to the cage on any of the 12 days) and 12 indicating high approach 
motivation (predominantly aggressive responses on each of the 12 days). Data 
were latency ratio scores (log10RT experimental trials / log10RT control trials) 
separately for the Post-enrichment and Post-health-check conditions. There was 
no correlation between approach motivation and ratio response latencies for direct 
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gaze trials either Post-enrichment (r(7) = -0.167, P=0.36) or Post-health-check 
(r(7)=-0.052, P=0.456).  
 
In summary, these data suggest that approach motivation, as measured by 
tendency to act aggressively towards a human on approach to the home cage, did 
not correlate with response-slowing to direct gaze faces in this study. 
 
5.6. Discussion 
Seven monkeys learned an operant task during which they were required to touch 
a non-emotional control stimulus (a grey square) presented on a touch-sensitive 
monitor, in order to gain pellet rewards. The monkeys were then presented with 
the same task with the addition of experimental trials in which emotional 
distractor content was included (conspecific faces with either direct or averted 
gaze) during two testing conditions: Post-enrichment and Post-health-check. 
Frequency and latency of responses were recorded by the computer. Arousal 
affected baseline response speed (control trials). Affective state (as inferred by the 
Post-enrichment and Post-health-check treatment conditions) and emotional 
distractor content (direct gaze or averted gaze) influenced latency to respond on 
experimental trials. There were no effects for frequency of responses. The 
experimental paradigm therefore provided a reliable means of measuring the 
effects of inferred affective state, independent of arousal, on speed to respond on a 




The latency data presented here concur with evidence from humans that stress-
related arousal may speed performance on non-emotional tasks (e.g. Ozel et al., 
2004). I first predicted that increased arousal would lead to faster performance on 
control trials Post-health-check compared with Post-enrichment (hypothesis 1, 
prediction b). Data from control trials revealed that monkeys were, as predicted, 
faster to perform on control trials Post-health-check than Post-enrichment. This 
finding highlights the necessity of controlling for arousal when comparing 
between treatments.  
 
To remove the effects of arousal-related speeding of responses between the two 
treatments, ratio scores were calculated for experimental trials. For each monkey, 
latency to respond on experimental trials was divided by latency to respond on 
control trials, for each treatment, separately. This is equivalent to the process of 
calculating ratio or difference scores with human participants (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Mauer & Borkenau, 2007; Beall & Herbert, 2008). Ratio scores were 
chosen as preferable to difference scores (where subtraction in used instead of 
division) due to the small sample size and variability between monkeys in 
response latencies. Studies with humans use larger sample sizes and participants 
are instructed to respond as quickly as possible which reduces variability in  
latencies between individuals. 
 
Ratio scores were used to test the predictions for hypotheses 2 and 3 regarding the 
effect of emotional distractor content and affective state on task performance. 
These predictions were formulated following evidence from humans that highly 
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salient or threatening faces slow performance to a greater extent than low salience 
or non-threatening faces and this slowing in task performance is enhanced among 
anxious individuals (e.g. Eastwood et al., 2003; Algom et al., 2004; Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007; Mauer & Borkenau, 2007; Mogg et al., 2008). Ratio data revealed a 
significant interaction of testing condition and trial type. Monkeys were relatively 
slower to respond to experimental trials (i.e. those with emotional distractor 
content) Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment, and this was enhanced for the 
more highly salient, threatening faces (direct gaze), but not for the less salient 
non-threatening faces (averted gaze). 
 
The implications of the data for existing models of the influence of affective state 
on the processing of, and responses to, emotional information are given in Table 
5-6. The data are consistent with findings from human studies which indicate that 
affective state modulates the extent to which non-task-relevant emotional 
information may capture attention and impair an individual’s performance on an 
ongoing non-emotional task (Mogg et al., 2008). The data presented here provide 
the first evidence for emotion-mediated emotion-evaluation and response-slowing 
effects in a non-human. Monkeys were relatively slower to respond to direct gaze 
faces Post-health-check, and were relatively faster to respond to the same faces, 
Post-enrichment. This finding suggests direct gaze distractors capture attention 
and slow task performance when monkeys are in an increased state of stress. A 
non-significant trend for relatively slower responses to averted gaze faces Post-
health-check versus Post-enrichment was also evident. This suggests that 
response-slowing effects are enhanced for more highly salient threatening (direct- 
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Table 5-6 Implications of the main findings for existing models of the influence of affective state on emotional information processing. 
Model Information processing models  Attentional control models  Reinforcement sensitivity models 
Key aspects 
of model 
Competition between two types of information 
leads to slowing in the processing of one of 
them. ‘Relative speed of processing’ (RSpP): 
threatening information travels through the brain 
faster than non-threatening information. 
‘Relative strength of processing’ (RStP): 
strengthened pathways for threatening 
information mean it is processed preferentially 
over non-threatening information. 
 
 Onset of a highly salient or 
threatening stimulus acts as a 
circuit-breaker which 
inhibits ongoing goal-
directed processes. This 
allows orientation of 
attentional resources towards 
the threatening stimulus, 
revealed in a slowing in 
ongoing task performance. 
 
 Competition between three motivational 
systems sensitive to positive and negative 
reinforcers leads to approach (BAS) 
withdrawal (FFFS) and resolution of 
approach-withdrawal (and possibly 
approach-approach and withdrawal-






 RSpP: Monkeys exhibited both slowing and 
speeding of responses on DG trials relative to 
baseline.  
 
? RStP: short-term strengthening of pathways 
for threatening information following a stressor 
may be revealed by relative slowing of 
responses on DG trials PHC v PE (Hypothesis 
3b+c).  
  Relative slowing of 
responses on experimental 
trials PHC v PE support a 
possible trade-off of bottom-
up stimulus-bound and top-
down goal-directed  
processes, modulated by 
stimulus saliency (DG = 
high, AG = low), arousal and 
motivational factors.  
  BAS: motivation to gain pellet reward 
revealed in maintained task performance 
 
 FFFS and BIS: slowing of responses on 
DG trials versus AG trials, which is 
enhanced PHC, may be revealed by fear-
related defense/withdrawal (FFFS, e.g. 
freezing), or anxiety-related approach-
withdrawal conflict and ambiguity 
resolution (BAS-FFFS conflict with 
resolution by the BIS).  
 
PHC: Post-health-check; PE: Post-enrihcment; DG: Direct Gaze experimental trials; AG: Averted gaze experimental trials 
BAS: Behavioural Approach System; FFFS: Fear-Flight-Fight System; BIS: Behavioural Inhibition System 
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gaze) versus less salient or non-threatening (averted gaze) faces. These findings 
are in line with data from humans. 
 
Mogg et al. (2008) tested the response-slowing effects of threatening and non-
threatening faces using a manual spatial-cueing task with humans. They found a 
response-slowing effect of threatening faces for high (state/trait) anxious 
individuals, but not low (state/trait) anxious individuals. These data are in 
accordance with the baseline-corrected data presented here for monkeys 
responding on direct gaze (threatening) trials Post-health-check versus Post-
enrichment. The current data therefore support recent data from humans for 
response-slowing to threatening stimuli mediated by anxiety state. Mogg et al. 
(2008) emphasize the implications of response-slowing effects for the 
interpretation of attentional bias data from humans. Failure to consider response-
slowing to arousing or threatening stimuli may lead to misinterpretation of 
attentional processes where single stimuli that vary in valence are shown on each 
trial. An important output of the current study is therefore the knowledge that 
response-slowing to emotional stimuli occurs in rhesus macaques, and this needs 
to be considered in the design of future studies that use emotional stimuli with 
primates. 
 
Mogg et al. (2008; see also Algom et al., 2004) discuss the response-slowing 
effects on threatening trials in terms of a freezing response. This is consistent with 
Gray’s (1981) reinforcement sensitivity model which suggests that threat should 
have a slowing effect on responses (freezing), and empirical data which highlight 
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the generic slowdown effect of threat on motor responses (Algom et al., 2004). 
The current results therefore lend support for attentional control and 
reinforcement sensitivity models of the influence of affective state and emotional 
distractor content on the processing of emotional information.  
 
The current experimental paradigm does not allow differentiation of the 
underlying mechanisms. For example, relative slowing of responses to threatening 
stimuli Post-health-check may be due to circuit-breaking, freezing, flight or BIS 
activation, or any combination of these. However, the current study does provide 
the first demonstration that experimental paradigms currently being used with 
humans to investigate these processes may be adapted for use with rhesus 
macaques. Further, the current results suggest the data from such studies will be 
comparable to those from humans which is useful, both for furthering our 
understanding of the evolution of the psychological components of wellbeing, and 
for informing the adaptation of human psychological tools for use with other 
species. 
 
The data lend little support to information processing models, due to the 
differential pattern of responses to direct gaze faces, namely slowing Post-health-
check versus speeding Post-enrichment. This differential pattern of responding 
suggests the results cannot be attributed to relative speed of processing 
threatening information (RSpP) per se, since responses to direct gaze faces were 
slower Post-health-check. Interpretation of the current results in terms of relative 
strength of information processing models (RStP) is problematic since the current 
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study does not strictly use a Stroop paradigm, and therefore does not directly test 
interference in the parallel processing of two competing types of information. 
However, the finding that responses to threatening stimuli were faster Post-
enrichment, and slower Post-health-check, is highly suggestive that factors other 
than strength of processing effects alone account for the difference in latencies to 
respond.  
 
The current study makes an important contribution to existing knowledge in 
several ways. Firstly, it identifies the importance of controlling for arousal effects 
in cognitive studies of monkeys where manipulation of affective state and reaction 
time data are used. Secondly, it provides the first evidence for emotion-
evaluation-related response-slowing in a non-human species, a particularly 
important methodological consideration in the design of future studies in which 
stimuli of different arousal value are shown on separate trials. Thirdly, this study 
presents the first data on the mediating role of affective state on impairment on an 
ongoing task in the presence of emotional distractor content in rhesus macaques. 
Fourthly, these affective state-mediated effects are in line with data from humans, 
suggesting the possibility of some homology in the underlying mechanisms. 
Finally, taken together, these points provide a strong argument for the further 
development of methods to investigate the cognitive component of emotion in 
non-human species, and demonstrate the possible future utility of such an 




The experimental design presented here improves on existing methods used with 
humans. The use of a within-subjects design removes the potentially confounding 
factors associated with comparing between groups, especially where different 
patient populations are involved (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The majority of studies 
conducted with humans use a between-subjects design. A few studies of the 
therapeutic benefits of cognitive training use a pre- and post- training measure of 
cognitive bias (typically a Stroop-like task: Mogg et al., 1995; Nay et al., 2004). A 
particular issue with human studies is the difference in baseline motor response 
latencies between such groups (which is typically measured using responses to 
neutral face stimuli, and may therefore in itself be confounded by emotional 
relevance of neutral faces). While the mechanisms underlying differences in 
generic speed of responding, and the direction and size of the effect, may vary 
with task and group, the effects are often pervasive and pose a problem for 
drawing meaningful between-group comparisons (as highlighted by Algom et al., 
2004).  
 
Data presented here revealed a generic speeding of responses for control trials 
Post-health-check. The within-subjects design identifies that this difference in 
generic responses is tied to changes in state characteristics; the speeding of the 
response, together with the cortisol data presented in Chapter 3, suggest the 
speeding is likely to be tied to increased arousal in monkeys Post-health-check 
relative to Post-enrichment. The use of ratio scores in the present study, which 
control for this arousal-related speeding removed the effects of generic condition-
related arousal, so that any remaining changes in response latency must be due to 
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other factors related to the processing of and motor responses to emotional 
distractor content.  
 
There are several ways in which the current paradigm may be improved. It is 
beneficial for all monkeys, when confronted with a threatening face, to identify 
the face as threatening. It is therefore likely that the direct-gaze face was 
perceived as threatening (at a categorical level) in both treatments. The finding 
that monkeys showed a relative speeding of responses to direct gaze faces Post-
enrichment may reflect an aspect of the design, whereby touching the stimulus 
ended the trial and the stimulus was removed from the screen. The trend towards 
speeding of responses in this case may reflect animals’ learning of this fact 
(termination of a negative reinforcer functions as a positive reinforcer: Rolls, 
2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Lower physiological arousal levels (see 
Chapter 3), and possibly reduced stimulus-bound arousal/freezing effects (Algom 
et al., 2004; Mogg et al., 2008), may result in preferential activation of approach 
mechanisms, such as BAS, resulting ultimately in a form of pro-active coping 
strategy.  
 
To untangle the possibly confounding effects of the response-dependent stimulus-
offset, a design with shorter trial durations, and a not-response-dependent stimulus 
offset, is required. For example, Mogg et al. (2000a) discuss the discrepancy in 
results in their study comparable with those of a previous study by Dawkins & 
Furnham (1989), both of which used an emotional Stroop paradigm with 
emotionally valenced words. Mogg et al. (2000a) suggest the speeding of 
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responses on threatening trials in their own study may have arisen due to the fact 
that a direct effect of making a fast response was the early offset of the threatening 
stimulus from the screen. Thus, an avoidant attentional style, may be evidenced 
by slower reaction times in a study where response has no effect on stimulus 
presentation time, yet may result in a speeding of response in a study where 
responding reduces the stimulus presentation time. In the current study touching 
the stimulus resulted in its removal from the screen. Therefore, over time, 
monkeys may have learned to touch the threatening stimulus in order to remove it 
from view, therefore ‘avoiding’ further exposure to it. Additionally, designs that 
incorporate face stimuli morphed for intensity and valence of facial expression 
(e.g. neutral–angry, or happy-angry) would allow us to explore the influence of 
affective state on sensitivity to emotional distractors of different saliencies (e.g. 
Richards et al., Unpublished data). 
 
The possible future directions for this approach are many. For example, the effects 
of emotional distractors on attention may be investigated further using a more 
faithful replication of the eStroop task. The influence of emotional distractors on 
an ongoing cognitive task (one more cognitively challenging than the simple ‘go’ 
response used here: e.g. Go-NoGo or match-to-sample) would provide data which 
would be more directly comparable with data from human studies.  
 
In line with recent developments in the field, inclusion of a pressure-sensitive 
lever that requires responses by moving the lever either towards or away from 
stimuli, would allow a direct measure of approach and withdrawal tendencies, and 
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conflict between them (after Rotteveel & Phaf, 2004). The use of apparatus that 
directly tests motor approach and avoidance tendencies to affective stimuli is 
relatively new in the human literature. However, it has provided what some argue 
to be a direct measure and link between evaluative processes and motor responses 
in terms of approach-withdrawal models (Heuer et al., 2007; Roelofs et al., 2007 
and 2009). Published studies reveal rhesus macaques may be trained successfully 
to use a joystick for computer-based cognitive studies (e.g. Parr & Heintz, 2009). 
 
In summary, the findings reported in this chapter are important for several 
reasons. Firstly, they represent the first data on emotion-evaluation and response-
slowing in a species of primate. Secondly, these data concur with recent data from 
humans. This suggests that monkeys and humans exhibit similar patterns of 
attentional and behavioural responses to emotional distractors, and that these 
responses are similarly mediated by affective state. This, in turn, suggests that 
these attentional systems and their corresponding behavioural outcomes may 
involve evolutionarily old processing pathways in the primate brain. Finally, 
given the implications of emotion-evaluation studies for understanding the 
cognitive component of emotion and psychological wellbeing in humans, such 
approaches may further our understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
psychological wellbeing in other species. Given the comparability of the results to 
findings from humans, the current data provide a strong case for the further 
development of this experimental paradigm to provide a measure of psychological 












Judgement bias is a bias in the assessment of the positive or negative significance 
of information that is otherwise ambiguous in nature (Eysenck et al., 1991). 
Studies in humans have shown that affective state influences judgement bias (e.g. 
Richards et al., 2002 and 2007). People high in anxiety, for example, demonstrate 
a bias to interpret ambiguous information as more negative than do people low in 
anxiety (Richards et al., 2007). This bias in the appraisal of the threatening value 
of objects or events has been implicated in the onset and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders and therefore may lead to reduced psychological wellbeing (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2002). Negative judgement bias in humans has been shown to be a 
reliable predictor of experienced distress during stressful life events (Pury, 2002).  
 
Recent work with rats (Harding et al., 2004) and starlings (Bateson & Matheson, 
2007) has demonstrated that similar affect-mediated biases in information 
processing are evident in animals. The aim of the current chapter is to investigate 
whether the patterns of judgement bias evidenced in humans, rats and starlings are 
also evident in a primate, the rhesus macaque.  
 
In this chapter I review existing research on judgement bias in humans and other 
animals (Part A), and present data from the first study to investigate judgement 
bias in a species of primate (Part B). Part A is divided into three sections. In the 
first of these I discuss the theory and background for judgement bias research 




that account for affect-mediated biases in the judgements made about ambiguous 
information. In the second section I review the recent development of methods to 
study judgement bias in animals. In the third section I discuss the implications of 
human and animal-based research for the development of a novel method to study 
judgement bias in primates. I conclude this section with the main aims and 
alternative hypotheses that informed the design of the present study. 
 
The present study is detailed in Part B, which is also divided into three sections. 
In the first of these I describe the method I developed. In the second section I 
present the first data on judgement bias in a species of primate. In the third section 




Part A: Literature Review 
6.1. Introduction 
6.1.1. Judgement bias in humans: theory and background 
Judgement bias is a general term that describes a bias in the processing of, and 
response to, a stimulus. It incorporates cognitive (attention, appraisal and action 
selection) and behavioural (motor output) components. Work with humans has 
shown that people’s judgements about a given stimulus or scenario are influenced 
by affective state. For example, when asked about future expectations anxious 




controls, while anxious people who also suffer from depression additionally 
demonstrate a reduced expectation of future positive events (MacLeod & Byrne, 
1996; Garner et al., 2006a). When asked a posteriori to report the frequency with 
which angry, happy and neutral faces were shown during a cognitive task, socially 
anxious people reported that angry faces occurred more often in a series of faces 
than did non-socially anxious people (Garner et al., 2006a). Because judgement 
bias is a general term which describes the outcome of a range of underlying 
mechanisms, I will focus on the types of bias that are subsumed under the term, 
and then discuss the methods used to investigate them. The list is not exhaustive 
(for example memory bias is not included, but may equally feed into judgements 
about stimuli), but focuses on those aspects which are of greatest relevance to the 
current study. 
 
Expectancy bias is generally measured as an a priori expectation of positive or 
negative events occurring in the future (e.g. MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). 
Expectancy biases are measured in humans using personal-future tasks and 
questionnaires. Personal-future tasks have demonstrated an increased expectation 
of negative future events in anxious people compared with non-anxious controls 
(MacLeod & Byrne, 1996), and in depressed people versus non-depressed 
controls (Strunk & Adler, 2009).  
 
Evidence for a specific role for affect in the mediation of expectancy biases is 
inconclusive and varies with experimental design. Studies using biologically-
relevant stimuli (e.g. angry faces or snakes and spiders) show that both anxious 




expectancy bias for a selective association between negative stimuli and aversive 
outcomes (e.g. an aversive picture or a shock: Tomarken et al., 1989; Garner et 
al., 2006a). Therefore the expectancy bias for selective associations between fear-
relevant stimuli and negative outcomes may operate at a level of automaticity 
which is generally unaffected by affective state. A priori expectations may be 
mediated by the relevance of the unconditioned stimulus (UCS) to the conditioned 
stimulus (CS). Selective associations are more readily assumed between predatory 
fear-relevant animals and a pain-relevant UCS (e.g. shock), and non-predatory 
fear-relevant animals with a disgust-relevant UCS respectively (Davey et al., 
2003). During cognitive tasks, ‘on-line’ expectancy biases (expectancies reported 
on a trial-by-trial basis) have been shown to change over trials, demonstrating that 
expectancy biases may vary dynamically with (learning) context. Both socially 
anxious and non-socially-anxious people with an initial expectancy bias for a 
negative UCS (aversive pictures) following presentation of angry faces, showed 
no such expectancy bias during later stages of an illusory correlation task 
(described below), when asked to report expected outcomes on a trial-by-trial 
basis (Garner et al., 2006a).  
 
Covariation bias is a bias in the a posteriori covariation estimate of the 
occurrence of negative outcomes following a given stimulus. Tomarken et al. 
(1989) developed the illusory correlation paradigm during which fear-relevant and 
non-fear-relevant stimuli were presented, each equally likely to be followed by an 
aversive UCS (shock). Spider phobics over-estimated the occurrence of a shock 
following the presentation of slides showing pictures of spiders, while non-




learning that did not reflect true task contingencies. Garner et al. (2006a) reported 
no difference in selective associations developed by anxious and non-anxious 
individuals when viewing emotional faces (CS) and aversive pictures (UCS). 
These differential findings may reflect the nature of the CS and UCS used in each 
study. However, Garner et al. (2006a) did find that socially anxious people 
reported retrospectively a greater frequency of negative social cues (angry faces) 
to have been presented than did non socially anxious individuals. While illusory-
correlation paradigms have only been used with humans, it is likely they tap into 
the same mechanisms that underlie the tendency to develop selective associations 
between biologically-fear-relevant stimuli and aversive outcomes demonstrated 
during conditioning studies conducted with rhesus macaques (Cook et al., 1985; 
Cook & Mineka, 1989). 
 
Interpretive bias is a bias in the appraisal of a stimulus as being positive or 
negative. In studies with humans, interpretive biases are studied using 
biologically-relevant stimuli, including valenced, ambiguous and neutral words 
and scenarios (e.g. Eysenck et al., 1991; Richards & French, 1992). A recent trend 
in research has been to compare valence ratings of faces morphed between 
negative and positive expressions (e.g. Blanchette et al., 2007). Results from such 
studies point to an increase in the negative interpretation of these ambiguous faces 
with increased anxiety. Blanchette et al. (2007) presented pictures of morphed 
facial expressions to one group of participants under a mock filming procedure (to 
induce high state anxiety) and to a control group, under no filming procedure (to 
encourage low state anxiety). Face morphs were presented on a screen 




words. Participants were asked to judge faces as negative or positive. High-state-
anxious individuals were influenced to a greater extent by contextual cues when 
rating the valence of ambiguous faces than were the low-state-anxious group, 
despite the fact there was no overall bias among the high anxious group to 
interpret faces as negative. In a second study, high-trait-anxious and low-trait-
anxious participants were shown face morphs against positive and negative 
background pictures. High-trait-anxious participants rated morphed faces as 
negative significantly more often than did low-trait-anxious individuals, and this 
effect was independent of context. This study suggests an increase in trait anxiety 
leads people to make more negative judgements about ambiguous information (a 
negative interpretive bias) while an increase in state anxiety leads people to recruit 
additional sources of information to help resolve the ambiguity in meaning. The 
application of training-induced interpretive biases for the treatment of anxiety 
disorders, demonstrates the bidirectonal (cognitive-affective) nature of this bias in 
information processing (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). However, whether training 
outcomes are due to changes in perceptual sensitivity or induced response bias is 
unclear (e.g. Allan et al., 2007). 
 
In summary, there is range of processing biases that feed into judgement biases in 
humans. These reflect different underlying mechanisms such as anticipation 
(expectancy bias), appraisal (interpretive bias) and associative learning and 
selective association (covariation bias). Next I present a review of the methods 
used to measure judgement biases in humans and then review the initial work that 
has been conducted with animals before discussing the implications of these for 




6.1.2. Methods for studying judgement bias in humans 
The appropriate method for measuring judgement bias is determined by the 
particular aspect that is of interest (prior expectancy bias, ongoing ‘online
1
’ 
interpretive bias and online and a posteriori covariation bias). These are presented 
here in order to place the animal studies discussed later in the context of the 
longer-established field of study with humans, and also to highlight the utility of 
some approaches for the development of the methods presented here. 
 
6.1.2.1. Expectancy bias: ‘thought’ tasks 
Expectancy biases are typically measured in humans using the thought 
experiment. During the thought experiment participants are asked to report what 
they think should happen given a particular experimental scenario. Davey et al. 
(2003) conducted a thought experiment to examine people’s expectation of a fear-
relevant UCS (shock) and a disgust-relevant UCS (vomit-inducing drink) 
occurring after images of fear-relevant and disease-relevant animal pictures. 
Overall, participants had an increased expectation of shock occurring after 
pictures of fear-relevant animals and of bad tasting juice being administered after 
pictures of disease-relevant animals. These results suggest a survival function of 
expectancy biases when applied to threatening biologically-relevant stimuli. 
Evidence from depressed people suggests that depressed mood is associated with 
a more pessimistic expectation of future events, including social evaluation 
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(Strunk & Adler, 2009). Expectancy ratings may also be obtained from 
participants at the start of conditioning tasks simply by asking participants to rate 
the likelihood of each UCS occurring after each type of CS prior to exposure (e.g. 
Kennedy et al., 1997; Garner et al., 2006a). 
 
Garner et al. (2006a) measured online as well as a priori expectancy ratings. They 
asked socially anxious and non-socially anxious participants to indicate whether 
they expected a pleasant, unpleasant, neutral or no outcome to follow a picture of 
an emotional face on a trial-by-trial basis. This method allowed the authors to 
monitor changes in expectancy of outcomes over the course of the experiment. It 
is mentioned here because it is, in part, analogous to the Go-NoGo responses that 
have been adopted in the animal studies presented later. Broadly, where correct 
‘Go’ responses indicate the expectation of a reward following a poitively 
reinforced conditioned stimulus (CS+), they also signify the expectation of a 
reward following an ambiguous cue. Similarly, where correct ‘NoGo’ responses 
indicate no expectation of reward following a negatively reinforced conditioned 
stimulus (CS-), they also signify no expectation of reward following an 
ambiguous cue. 
 
6.1.2.2. Covariation bias: Illusory correlation and contingency 
judgement paradigms 
In the study mentioned previously, Garner et al. (2006a) applied an illusory 
correlation paradigm to measure high and low socially anxious individuals’ 




aversive, pleasant and neutral outcomes (pictures). On each trial participants were 
shown an emotional face, followed by a picture. Pictures were presented in a 
pseudorandomised manner so that each emotional face was succeeded by an equal 
number of aversive, pleasant and neutral pictures. At the end of the session 
participants were asked to report the percentage of trials on which each face was 
followed by each outcome. The high socially anxious group reported significantly 
more aversive outcomes following angry faces than did the low socially anxious 
group. The illusory correlation paradigm has also been used to examine phobics’ 
covariation estimates of shock following fear-relevant stimuli (Kennedy et al., 
1997). This study found a strong covariation bias in phobic individuals for shock 
following phobia-related slides.  
 
The contingency judgement task is an operant version of the illusory correlation 
paradigm. It is used to measure people’s perceptions of the level of control their 
actions exert over certain outcomes (Allan et al., 2007). Participants are presented 
with, for example, a button and a light. At the start of each trial the participant 
may choose whether or not to press the button. At the end of each trial the light 
illuminates at a set probability, irrespective of whether a button press occurred or 
not. At the end of the session participants are asked to report the level of control 
their button presses had on the light illuminating. Non-depressed individuals 
typically over-estimate their level of control over the light illuminating, while 
depressed people make more realistic contingency judgements. This phenomenon 
is known as ‘depressive realism’ (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). There is ongoing 
debate as to whether differences in contingency judgements reflect depressive 




1989) or depressive pessimism versus nondepressive realism (including processes 
such as negative response and judgement biases: Beck et al., 1987; Allan et al., 
2007; Strunk & Adler, 2009). 
 
6.1.2.3. Interpretive bias: Lexical decision and judgement tasks  
Interpretive biases are measured using lexical decision and judgement tasks. 
During lexical decision tasks participants listen to homophones (e.g. die/dye or 
pain/pane) or homographs (e.g. growth) and are asked to report the meaning, 
either verbally or by writing down the spelling of the word (e.g. Eysenck et al., 
1987; Mathews et al., 1989b; Rusting, 1999). Eysenck et al. (1987) found that the 
number of negative-meaning spellings for each homophone correlated 
significantly with trait anxiety scores. A later study (Eysenck et al., 1991) 
elaborated on the lexical decision task by presenting clinically-anxious, recovered 
clinically-anxious and non-anxious controls, with recordings of whole sentences 
which were ambiguous in meaning. Participants then underwent a recognition-
memory test in which disambiguous variants of the test sentences were presented 
on a computer screen. Currently-anxious participants recognized more of the 
negative variants as sentences which they had heard earlier, while non-anxious 
controls and recovered-anxious individuals recognized more of the neutral 
variants as sentences which they had heard earlier. There are several variants of 
the lexical decision task, namely story and scenario completion tasks (e.g. Amir et 





Judgement tasks require participants to make a positive or negative judgement of 
an ambiguous stimulus, typically a facial expression (Blanchette et al., 2007). For 
example, Richards et al. (2002) asked high- and low-trait anxious people to report 
verbally the emotion most prevalent in each of a series of morphed faces. High-
trait-anxious individuals were more sensitive to fear in faces morphed between 
fear and another emotion than were low-trait-anxious individuals. Following a 
mood induction, high-state-anxious individuals were more sensitive to anger in 
morphed faces that contained this emotion than were low-state-anxious 
individuals.  
 
Given the evidence reviewed in Chapter 5 for selective associations of threat-
relevant stimuli with a negative UCS in rhesus macaques (Cook & Mineka, 1989), 
it is likely that positive stimuli may be equally selectively associated with a 
positive UCS. This has yet to be tested, but the use of such selective associations, 
learned task contingencies (e.g. Go/NoGo and match-to-sample paradigms), 
inclusion of ambiguous stimuli and measures or manipulations of affective state, 
may provide the tools for the development of a measure of judgement bias in 
primates. 
 
6.1.2.4. Gaze measures (attentional, interpretive and expectancy 
bias) 
Eye-tracking techniques have been used to measure differences in eye-fixations 
among people reading sentences predictive of negative or neutral outcomes. Calvo 
and Avero (2002) measured high and low trait anxious individuals’ eye fixations 




followed by sentences containing target words that represented either the 
predictable event or an inconsistent event. High anxious people were faster to read 
post-target words following a predicted threatening target than were low anxious 
people. Conversely, high anxious people were slower to read post-target words 
when a sentence predictive of threat was followed by a mismatched neutral target. 
Calvo and Avero (2002) interpret these results as reflecting selective prediction of 
threat in high anxiety which facilitates reading when subsequent information is 
congruent with predicted meaning, and interference of processing where 
subsequent information is incongruent with the predicted negative meaning. Since 
eye-gaze has only been used in reading tasks of judgement bias, it does not 
present a suitable measure for use with non-linguistic subjects. 
 
6.1.2.5. Optimal discounting approaches 
Optimal discounting approaches have been used to investigate the effects of 
contextual and motivational factors on judgements and decision making 
processes. These approaches do not explicitly measure affect-mediated cognitive 
bias, but they do focus on the role of environmental and internal factors on the 
assessment of the positive and negative values of stimuli, and consequences of 
different types of behaviour (Wilson & Daly, 2004). Wilson and Daly (2004) 
applied an optimal discounting approach to determine whether situational context 
affected men’s propensity to discount future rewards over immediate rewards. 
Male participants first completed a discounting task during which they were asked 
to choose between a series of paired monetary rewards, for example $20 to be 
paid tomorrow, versus $50 to be paid up to 236 days later. From these choices 




to give attractiveness ratings for pictures of either attractive or unattractive women 
and then presented with a second discounting task. The change in individual 
discounting parameters between the two tasks revealed that men who rated 
attractive women (but not those who rated unattractive women) showed a 
significant change in discounting. Men who had rated attractive women were 
more likely to shift from choosing larger, delayed, rewards to choosing smaller, 
next-day, rewards. A similar, non-significant, trend was evident for females 
viewing male faces. Wilson and Daly (2004) implicate, but do not fully discuss, 
the role of each of arousal, motivation and affective systems in generating the 
pattern of results in their study. Studies such as this demonstrate the utility of 
optimal discounting approaches for tapping into decision-making and appraisal 
processes in the assessment of the positive or negative value of information. 
However, they have not been applied explicitly to the study of the influence of 
affective state on such processes.  
 
The human literature demonstrates that different methods are used to tap into 
different components of judgement biases, and both state and trait anxiety effects 
have been demonstrated. Rusting (1999) used a positive and a negative mood 
manipulation (music and imagery techniques) to induce changes in state affect. 
The mood manipulations induced interpretive biases for homophones and story 
completion tasks in the predicted directions, which were enhanced in individuals 
with trait characteristics complimentary to the mood induction (see also Rusting, 
1998; Richards et al., 2002). Therefore, state affect has been demonstrated to 
influence judgement biases in humans (although this may not necessarily be 




biases in primates. It is also noted that the absence of a state effect does not 
preclude the existence of trait effects. For example, Blanchette et al. (2007) did 
not find a state-anxiety related bias for rating morphed facial expressions but did 
find a trait-anxiety related interpretive bias for morphed faces. 
 
6.1.3. Methods for studying judgement biases in animals 
Emotion mediated judgement bias was first studied in animals by Harding et al. 
(2004), who measured the influence of affective state on cognitive bias for 
ambiguous tones in captive rats. Rats were trained on a Go-NoGo task during 
which they learned to press a lever on hearing a tone of particular frequency in 
order to receive a reward (’Go’ response), and to refrain from pressing the same 
lever on hearing a different tone in order to avoid a punishing burst of white noise 
(‘NoGo’ response). Prior to testing, rats were housed either in predictable or 
unpredictable housing conditions which was assumed to result in high-stressed 
and low-stressed animals respectively. During testing rats underwent the same 
Go-NoGo task they had learnt previously with the addition that ‘Go’ and ‘NoGo’ 
trials were randomly interspersed with probe trials on which one of three 
ambiguous tones intermediate to the positive/‘Go’ and negative/‘NoGo’ tones was 
played. Frequency and latency to respond on ambiguous probe trials were 
recorded and compared between the rats in the two housing conditions. Rats in 
unpredictable housing were significantly slower to respond to the food tone and 
the ambiguous probe tone closest to it compared to rats housed in predictable 




frequently to the food tone and closest ambiguous tone compared with rats housed 
in predictable housing. 
 
Harding et al. (2004) were the first group to present the development of a non-
linguistic judgement bias task for use with animals. Since the publication of that 
paper additional studies have extended the method to investigate cognitive biases 
in rats (Burman et al., 2008a; Burman et al., 2009), dogs (Casey et al., 2008) and 
starlings (Bateson & Matheson, 2007; Matheson et al., 2008). In this section I 
review the development of the original method with specific reference to the 
implications for the development of a method for use with rhesus macaques. 
 
6.1.3.1. The current state of judgement bias research with animals 
Table 6-1 lists published studies that have addressed emotion mediated judgement 
biases in animals. Criteria for inclusion in the table were that each study has been 
published in a forum where full methods and results are available (i.e. peer-
reviewed journals and completed theses, but not conference abstracts), and that 
each study compared responses to stimuli that were to some degree ambiguous, by 
groups or participants that differed in measures of affect. The table demonstrates 
that few studies have addressed judgement biases in animals, and of those, the 
majority have focused on judgement biases following the paradigm developed by 
Harding et al. (2004).  
 
Table 6-1 is divided into three parts, to reflect the distinction I make between 




general heading ‘judgement bias’. These studies measure the behavioural 
outcomes of judgement processes, but are difficult to interpret in terms of 
underlying mechanisms (i.e. do responses to ambiguous stimuli arise from biases 
in perceptual sensitivity, information acquisition, evaluation and interpretation, 
response tendencies, or other factors such as motivation, arousal, learning and 
memory effects).  
 
Some additional animal studies have addressed particular biases that may feed 
into judgement bias, specifically ‘expectancy’ and ‘interpretive’ biases. These are 
given separate headings in Table 6-1. Studies of expectancy biases are identified 
as those which investigate the influence of inferred affective state on behaviours 
indicative of expectation of reward. These use responses to stimuli that animals 
have learned indicate reward, as a measure of expectation. Studies of interpretive 
biases are identified as those which use biologically relevant stimuli and which 
therefore are likely to tap into processes involved in stimulus encoding. These are 
not absolute categorizations, rather an attempt to indicate the different approaches 
and their utility in addressing the many aspects of cognitive bias discussed in this 
thesis. Two studies from this thesis are presented in the Table to identify where 
they fit with existing studies. The study presented in this chapter is listed under 
the heading Judgement bias, since this study was largely based on the original 
method developed by Harding et al. (2004). The study presented in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis is listed under the heading Interpretive bias. While that study did not 
address Interpretive bias directly, it is likely that evaluation of the emotional 
significance of the faces to the monkeys contributed to the difference in responses 




Table 6-1 Published studies that investigate the influence of affective states or traits on cognitive biases in animals. CS: conditioned 
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Go+/NoGo-: a task in which participants learned to respond with one action (e.g. press lever: ‘Go’) to gain a reward and to perform another action (e.g. 
don’t press lever: ‘NoGo’) to avoid a punisher; AmbI: Ambiguous or Intermediate probe stimuli; CS: Conditioned stimulus; Prop: Proportion of 





















Judgement bias (Continued) 
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Judgement bias (Continued) 
Rat 
(n=7) 









mild or loud). 
 Visual CS (x 3 
lights, each light 




 Ranked   Trait anxiety 
measured using 
elevated plus 
maze and open 
arena 













until delivery of 
reward 10mins 
after cue. 








 Standard housing 
(U) v enriched 
housing (E) v 
control (C: CS 
and US presented, 
but not paired) 





compared to E 
or C 
 










 12 pellets or 1 










 Enriched (E) v 
unenriched (U) 
housing 
 Yes. U rats 
showed a more 
prolonged SNC 









Table 6-1 (Continued) 
Species  Method  Cues  Response  Design  Affect 
manipulation 
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The methods used in the studies presented in Table 6-1 vary according to the bias 
of interest. Nearly all published studies of judgement bias have used a modified 
version of the Go/NoGo paradigm first used by Harding et al. (2004). This 
approach involves operant training on the initial Go/NoGo task prior to the 
presentation of the ambiguous probes. The judgement bias tasks differ in the 
training cues used (auditory, visual or spatial), the response (lever press, latency 
to approach/touch), manipulation of inferred affect (enriched versus unenriched or 
poor housing, genetic strains, psychopharmacological manipulations, trait 
characteristics, veterinary inspection, playing predator vocalisations), and pattern 
of bias seen (e.g. changes in responses to the probe most similar to the rewarded 
stimulus [P+] are seen in some studies, while others find a change in responses to 
the probe most similar to the unrewarded or punished stimulus [P-], or the 
intermediate probe [Pi]). However, the tasks all share a learning stage during 
which the positive associations (all studies except for Tsetsenis et al., 2007) and 
negative associations (all studies) of one or more conditioned stimuli (CS) are 
established, and a testing stage during which responses to ambiguous stimuli are 
measured. Overall, the range of species studied and the general agreement 
between findings, suggest that this paradigm provides a robust method for further 
development.  
 
The method currently used to study expectancy bias in animals involves 
conditioning with no operant training. This approach requires less training than 
the judgement bias tasks. For example, van der Harst et al. (2003) presented rats 
who were housed in either standard or enriched caging with a simple conditioning 
procedure. A paired light and tone (CS) was followed by the delivery of a sucrose 
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reward (US). The CS-US interval was increased over 32 trials to 10 minutes, after 
which it was maintained at 10 minutes until a total of 42 trials had been 
completed. During the 10 minute time interval anticipatory activity was recorded 
(including exploratory, locomotory, foraging, freezing and self-directed 
behaviours). Three control groups were included. Two control groups were 
included to investigate activity in the presence of the CS alone (CS, no US) for 
each of enriched and standard housing, and to account for the effects of sucrose 
consumption (unpaired CS and US). Results showed that rats kept in standard 
housing showed more anticipatory behaviours during the CS-US interval than did 
rats in enriched housing. Control groups showed this difference was neither due to 
housing condition, nor to sucrose consumption, or arousal in general. The 
differences in anticipatory activities were therefore attributed to an interaction 
between housing condition and anticipation of a reward, although the underlying 
mechanisms, for example positive-affect-mediated sensitivity to expected reward 
loss (Nygren et al., 1996) or stress-mediated sensitivity to actual reward gain (e.g. 
Ambroggi et al., 2009), are not known. 
 
In another study, which partially taps into expectancy processes, Burman et al. 
(2008a) tested rats’ responses to reward loss. Rats were housed in enriched cages 
for 12 weeks, following which the enrichment was removed for half of the rats 
(U) and maintained for the other half (E). Half of the rats in each housing 
treatment were then trained to run down a runway for 12 pellets, and half for one 
pellet. Following training, rats running for 12 pellets ran faster than rats running 
for one pellet, irrespective of housing treatment, suggesting a greater reward value 
of 12 versus one pellet. The number of rewards was then reduced to one pellet for 
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all animals, and latency to run was measured again. Rats that had recently 
undergone reward loss ran significantly more slowly than those who had not 
undergone loss of reward. However, U rats ran slowly for a greater number of 
trials than E rats following loss of reward. A partial explanation for the slower run 
times may be that U rats had a lower expectation of reward value returning to its 
original level than did E rats (Burman et al., 2008b). Such differences in 
expectancy may be mediated by affective processes such as frustration or 
disappointment (e.g. Mason et al., 2001; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003) that feed into 
sensitivity to reward loss (Nygren et al., 1996). 
 
Table 6-1 includes the subheading Interpretive bias. Studies with humans have 
focussed on the positive or negative meaning attributed to homophones or 
ambiguous but biologically relevant stimuli such as faces (e.g. Blanchette et al., 
2007). The use of biologically relevant stimuli has been incorporated into studies 
with starlings and chickens. Brilot et al. (2009) recorded starlings’ latency to 
approach a food bowl in the presence of positive (colour card associated with 
food), negative (predator eyespot) and ambiguous (partial eyespot) stimuli. Prior 
to testing an auditory stimulus was sounded in order to alter the starlings’ 
affective state (a conspecific call, a predator call, or a burst of white noise). The 
presence of eyespots slowed starlings’ latency to approach the bowl, as did 
predator alarm calls and white noise. However, there was no interaction between 
visual and auditory stimuli, nor were there any effects for the ambiguous eyespots. 
The study therefore failed to find the expected bias (which may be due to design 
features such as stimulus saliency effects or relationship between auditory and 
visual stimuli: Brilot et al., 2009). The study does, however, highlight the 
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potential for combining ambiguous naturalistic stimuli with manipulations of 
affect and proxy measures of positive and negative ‘interpretation’ of those 
stimuli. 
 
An earlier approach attempted to measure the influence of affective state 
(specifically individuals with learned helplessness versus normal controls) on 
defensive responses in the presence of a positive cue (conspecifics), a negative 
cue (eyespots) and a neutral cue (no eyespots: Rodd et al., 1997). I described the 
method previously in Chapter 5. Chickens in a state of learned helplessness were 
faster to enter a state of tonic immobility when handled in the presence of 
eyespots than were controls, and remained tonically immobile for longer than 
controls (although the latter also occurred in the absence of eyespots). The data 
are difficult to interpret in terms of cognitive bias, due to the design of the study. 
However, this study demonstrates the utility of measuring natural responses to 
naturalistic stimuli under different manipulations of affect, as a tool for 
investigating ‘interpretive’ processes in other species, hence its inclusion here. 
 
There are no published studies investigating the influence of covariation bias in 
animals. In Chapters 4 and 5 I reviewed work which indicates rhesus macaques 
preferentially form selective associations between fear-relevant (e.g. snake) 
stimuli and a negative US (e.g. Cook & Mineka, 1990). The modification of 
illusory correlation paradigms used with humans (Kennedy et al., 1997; Garner et 





Optimal discounting approaches have not yet been applied to study the role of 
affect (specifically) in decision making processes, in either humans or other 
animals. Some optimal discounting studies have investigated the effects of 
contextual cues (which may lead to changes in affective state) on decision 
making. Work with domestic fowl, Gallus gallus domesticus, (e.g. Abeyesinghe et 
al., 2005) and blue jays, Cyanocitta cristata (e.g. Stephens & Anderson, 2001) 
demonstrates methods are available for measuring optimal discounting in other 
species using the ‘self control’ paradigm. This paradigm presents animals with the 
choice between small immediate rewards and delayed larger rewards, which are 
accessed using an operant procedure. Results from such studies suggest domestic 
fowl show self-control, but only when a delayed reward is large enough 
(Abeyesinghe et al., 2005). Similarly, blue jays may sacrifice smaller immediate 
rewards for later larger rewards where resources are patchy (Stephens & 
Anderson, 2001). Other relevant aspects of decision-making include state-
dependent-value-learning, whereby a range of animals from grasshoppers, fish 
and birds, to humans demonstrate a preference for stimuli associated with 
previous deprivation (Pompilio & Kacelnik, 2005; Pompilio et al., 2006; Aw et 
al., 2009; Woike et al., 2009). This effect arises from the increased reward value 
of mildly positive stimuli in poor conditions versus good conditions. It is therefore 
necessary to consider the interaction between motivational and affective states and 
reward learning and memory, as well as the enhancing effects of arousal 
(contextual cues: Woike et al., 2009) when assessing responses to stimuli using 




6.1.4. Implications for the development of a novel method to measure 
cognitive bias in primates 
The current study was informed by Harding et al. (2004). The main aim was to 
modify the procedure used with rats for use with rhesus macaques and to provide 
comparable data on responses to ambiguous stimuli in monkeys in different 
affective states. In the first instance a Go/NoGo task that closely followed that 
developed by Harding et al. (2004) was selected as the most approapriate starting 
point. As with the previous studies reported in this thesis, visual stimuli were 
presented on a touch-screen monitor. Abstract stimuli were selected for use as 
being those which would be easiest to manipulate in terms of ambiguity (cf Brilot 
et al., 2009) and to allow comparision with Harding et al. (2004). A repeated 
measures affect manipulation was again selected as the most appropriate for 
maximizing sample size, given the demands of learning the Go/NoGo task. 
 
6.1.5. Aims: 
The general aim of this chapter is to describe the development of a method for 
measuring judgement bias in rhesus macaques. Specifically the aim of this chapter 
is to adapt the method developed by Harding et al. (2004) in order to test 
predictions about monkeys’ responses to ambiguous probe stimuli following two 
treatments designed to induce changes in inferred affective state (a week of 
enrichment, suggested to induce a more positive affective state, and a health 




6.1.6. Hypothesis and specific predictions: 
Treatment condition affects responses to ambiguous probe stimuli (experimental 
trials) reflecting a more negative judgement about likely outcomes Post-health-
check and a more positive judgement about likely outcomes Post-enrichment. 
 
a) Monkeys will make fewer responses on trials when ambiguous probes are 
shown Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment  
 
b) Monkeys will be slower to respond on trials when an ambiguous probe is 
shown Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment. 
 
 
Part B: Development and outcomes of the new method 
In Part A I presented the background and rationale for the development of a 
method to study judgement bias in rhesus macaques. In Part B I detail the method 
developed, present data and discuss these in light of judgement bias research with 




Seven monkeys took part in the study (Monkeys 94K, 860, 16P, 66S, 79S, 79T, 
and AI73; average age: 4.46 years; range: 3.6 – 7.4 years old). All monkeys had 
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previously begun operant touchscreen training in the laboratory during the 
preceding six months and worked in the laboratory on a daily basis.  
 
6.2.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
The training stimuli consisted of two yellow lines (control trials: Figure 6.1a). 
Yellow lines were selected on the basis they did not readily resemble any stimuli 
the monkeys were exposed to in previous or subsequent experiments and therefore 
had no previously learnt positive or negative associations within the context of 
stimuli presented on the touch sensitive monitor. One line was long, and one was 
short. The long line measured 70 x 13 mm and the short line measured 16mm x 
11mm, thereby subtending 7.15 x 1.24 and 1.62 x 1.05 degrees of visual angle 
respectively when presented centrally on a computer monitor at a 60cm viewing 
distance.  
 
Three probe stimuli were composed for testing purposes. Probes were constructed 
to be intermediate forms of the two test stimuli in length and width. Probes were 
identical to test stimuli in colour (and so contrast energy) and overall shape. 
Luminosity (Ly) and contrast energy (C) were calculated from data derived using 
Adobe Photoshop 7 as described in Chapter 4. The dimensions of the stimuli and 
probes are presented in Appendix 6 (Table A.6.1). The probes comprised three 
yellow lines, each of which was 50% larger in area than the next smallest probe 
(or short line in the case of the shortest probe). This resulted in one line probe 
which was intermediate in size between the two training stimuli (Experimental 




Figure 6.1 a) The two stimuli used for training on the Go-NoGo task and for control trials during testing; b) The three intermediate 
probes used to test responses to ambiguous cues on experimental trials during testing. S+ Rewarded stimulus; S- Non-rewarded 
stimulus; P- probe most like unrewarded stimulus; Pi intermediate probe; P+ probe most like rewarded stimulus 
a)         Control trials 
                    
Short line (S+ or S-)     Long line (S+ or S-) 
b)              Experimental trials 
                                                                                 
     Short Probe (P+ or P-)    Middle Probe (Pi)    Long Probe (P+or P-) 
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and intermediate probe (Experimental probe P+, and Experimental probe P-: 
Figure 6.1b). All probes were yellow. 
 
One stimulus was presented on each trial. Stimuli were presented centrally on a 
15” Protouch Aspect TS17LBRAI001 touch-sensitive LCD monitor connected to 
a Toshiba Satellite Pro A60 laptop computer running EPrime experimenter-
generator software, with all aspects of the equipment set-up as described in 
Chapter 2. All sessions were filmed using two video cameras as described 
previously. 
 
6.2.3. Design and Procedure 
Main terminologies are given in Table 6-2. All monkeys initially underwent a 
series of training sessions to learn the Go-NoGo task contingencies (Table 6-3). 
During training only control trials (long and short lines: Figure 6.1a) were 
presented. On each trial a single stimulus was presented for 2000ms, or until the 
monkey touched the stimulus. Stimulus onset was triggered automatically by the 
EPrime software. Stimulus offset was triggered either by the monkey touching the 
stimulus, or automatically if the monkey did not touch the stimulus during the 
2000ms trial. Pellets were given as rewards for correct ‘Go’ responses at an initial 
one-pellet/100%FRR (one pellet delivered on 100% of correct ‘Go’ responses), 
reduced incrementally to two pellets/40%VRR (two pellets delivered on 40% of 
trials on a variable reinforcement ratio) over successive training sessions. The two 




Table 6-2 The main terminologies used in the study 
Term  Definition 
Training 
session 
 Sessions conducted prior to testing during which monkeys learnt to 




 Sessions on which experimental trials were presented and 
experimental data were collected. Each monkey took part in three 
daily testing sessions following one week of enrichment (Post-
enrichment) and three daily testing sessions over the three days 
immediately following the veterinary inspection (Post-health-check). 
 
Control trial  A trial on which the longest or shortest line was shown. Responses to 
control trials were recorded as ‘correct’ (S+ ‘Go’ and S– ‘NoGo’) or 
incorrect (S– ‘Go’ and S+ ‘NoGo’) and resulted in rewards (S+ ‘Go’) 




 A trial on which an intermediate line probe was shown. Responses to 
experimental trials were non-reinforced, and there were neither 
correct nor incorrect responses.  
 
Treatment  Testing was conducted during two treatment conditions for each 




 A correct response was defined as + ‘Go’ (positive stimulus/ Go 





 An incorrect response was defined as + ‘NoGo’ (positive stimulus/ 







The procedure for S+ control trials is shown in Figure 6.2a. The correct response to S+ 
was ‘Go’ (Figure 6.2a: top three slides) and the incorrect response to S+ was NoGo 
(Figure 6.2a: bottom three slides). Each control trial began with a black screen 
presented for a variable duration of 5000-6000ms. The black slide was replaced with the 
S+, which was presented for 2000ms, or until the monkey touched it. If the monkey 
touched S+ (correct +’Go’ response), the response was immediately rewarded with a 
reinforcing tone, feedback screen showing the rewarded stimulus for 1000ms, and 
immediate delivery of one or two pellets on 100%-40% of trials. At the offset of the 
feedback screen, a plain black screen was shown for a variable duration between 
5000ms and 6000ms until the onset of the next trial. Incorrect responses on ‘Go’ trials 
(i.e. no Go response was made) were not rewarded, nor were they punished. If no 
response was made to the S+ within 2000ms, then the S+ was replaced by a black 
screen for 5000ms-6000ms until the onset of the next trial. 
 
The procedure for S- control trials is shown in Figure 6.2b. The correct response to S- 
was ‘NoGo’ (Figure 6.2b: bottom three slides) and the incorrect response to S- was ‘Go’ 
(Figure 6.2b: top three slides). Correct ‘NoGo’ responses were not rewarded. The 
stimulus was presented for 2000ms and then replaced with a black screen for 5000-
6000ms until the onset of the next stimulus slide. Incorrect responses on ‘NoGo’ trials (- 
‘Go’) were punished. On touching S-, it was removed from the screen and replaced by a 
blue feedback screen and a three second burst of white noise. The blue screen was 
shown for 16000ms. At the offset of the feedback screen a plain black screen was 
shown for 5000m-6000ms until the onset of the next stimulus slide.  
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Table 6-3 Reinforcement contingencies for the Go-NoGo task 
Trial  Response 












Correct, rewarded: 1 pellet 
delivered at a 100%FRR 
during training, 
incrementally reduced to 2 
pellets rewarded at 
40%VRR* at the end of 
training and during testing. 
Secondary reinforcing tone 












 Incorrect, punished: White 
noise, blue screen, 16000ms 
delay to next trial 
 Correct, non-rewarded/non-
punished: Moves onto next 








    
P+   
Pi   
P-  
 
No reinforcement or other 
feedback  
 
No reinforcement or other 
feedback 
 
S+ signifies the rewarded stimulus; S- signifies the punished stimulus. 
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Figure 6.2 a) The experimental procedure for ‘Go’ control trials; b) The experimental procedure for ‘NoGo’ control trials; c) The 




Trial (control ‘Go’ trial) 
2000ms or until response 
Black screen for 
5000-6000ms 
If no response is made 
Black screen is shown 
for 5000-6000ms until 
onset of next trial 
 
Time 
Feedback screen for 
correct response 
1 second 
Trial (control trial 
shown) 
2 seconds or until 
response 
If a ‘Go’ response is 
made secondary 
reinforcing tone is 
sounded and two pellets 
are delivered on 40% of 
trials 




Figure 6.2 (Continued) 
 
b) 
Black screen for 
5000-6000ms 
Trial (control ‘NoGo’ trial) 
2000ms or until response 
Black screen for 
5000-6000ms 
If no response is made Black 
screen is shown for 5000-
6000ms 
Time 
Blue feedback screen 
for incorrect response 
16000ms 
Trial (control ‘NoGo’ trial) 
2000ms or until response 
If a ‘Go’ response is made 
white noise is sounded 
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Figure 6.2 (Continued) 
 
c) Black screen for 
5000-6000ms 
Trial (probe trial) 
2000ms or until response 
Black screen for 
5000-6000ms 
If no response is made trial 
ends and black screen is 
shown for 5000-6000ms 
 
Time 
If a ‘Go’ response is made 
trial ends and black screen is 
shown 
Trial (probe trial) 




If the monkey touched the black screen during the inter-trial interval the Eprime 
program automatically reset the inbuilt interval counter to 0s and the black screen 
remained until the monkey removed his hand from the screen. Training sessions 
consisted of 60 control trials, with an additional two slides to ensure the first and last 
trials were always + ‘Go’ trials. Criteria for learning the Go-NoGo task were ≥80% 
correct responses over the 60 trial training block, with ≥70% accuracy for each of the 
‘Go’ and the ‘No-Go’ trials respectively.  
 
6.2.3.2. Testing 
During testing sessions control trials were interspersed with experimental probe trials 
(P+, Pi, P-: Figure 6.1b). Trials were presented in a randomised order. Control trials 
were those on which S+ and S- (long and short lines) were presented. Experimental 
trials were those on which P+, Pi and P- (ambiguous probes) were presented. Control 
trials were included to gain baseline data on performance on the learned Go-NoGo task. 
Experimental trials were included to test the experimental hypotheses about the effects 
of the treatment conditions on responses to ambiguous stimuli.  
 
The procedure for training and testing sessions was as follows. The EPrime program 
was opened and the participant monkey details entered into the initial information 
screen (i.e. Monkey ID and session number). The monkey was then transported to the 
laboratory in the testing cage, positioned in front of the apparatus at a viewing distance 
of approximately 60 cm, and allowed to settle. The experimenter immediately moved to 
the adjacent room, and set the video to record events. The experimenter triggered the 




reinforcement contingencies for control trials were identical to those described for 
training sessions. On experimental trials a probe was presented for 2000ms or until the 
monkey touched the probe (Figure 6.2c). The inter-trial interval remained variable at 
5000-6000ms. There was no reinforcement for ‘Go’ and ‘NoGo’ responses to probes. 
 
Testing sessions consisted of three blocks. Within each block the first and last trials 
were always + ‘Go’ trials, as during training, with a series of intervening trials. The 
following numbers refer to the intervening trials. Block 1 contained 12 control trials 
only: six S+ ‘Go’ trials and six S- ‘NoGo’ trials, presented in random order. Block 1 
was included to ensure monkeys were working to criterion prior to the start of the 
experimental block. A feedback score in the left hand corner of the screen allowed the 
experimenter to monitor performance. Monkeys were required to score ≥9 correct 
responses during block 1, with ≥4 correct responses for each of the ‘Go’ and ‘NoGo’ 
trials in order to move onto block 2. Where a monkey failed to reach criterion, Block 1 
was repeated
2
 until the monkey started working or the session was cancelled. 
 
Block 2 contained 48 control trials (24 x S+ ‘Go’ trials, and 24 x S– ‘NoGo’ trials). 
These were randomly interspersed with 18 experimental trials (6 x P+; 6 x Pi and 6 x P-: 
Table 6-4: note this table shows number of trial from three daily testing sessions). This 
block was included to collect data on frequency and latency of responses on control and 
experimental trials in order to test the experimental hypotheses.  
                                                 
 
2
 Monkey 94K regularly required two runs of block 1 in order to start working. All other monkeys 





Block 3 contained 20 control trials (10 x S+ ‘Go’ trials: 10 x S– ‘NoGo’ trials). This 
block was included to reduce ambiguity in the reinforcement contingencies for control 
trials following the presentation of the ambiguous probes in block 2. Monkeys were 
required to perform ≥14 correct responses, with ≥7 correct responses for each of S+ and 
S- trials during block 3. If a monkey failed to reach criterion, block 3 was run a second 
time only. At the end of the session each monkey received the daily food ration. 
 
All monkeys were tested on three days Post-enrichment and three days Post-health-
check. The order of testing was counterbalanced across individuals so that monkeys in 
Group 1 were first tested Post-enrichment, and monkeys in Group 2 were first tested 
Post-health-check (Figure 6.3). The order of events was as follows. All monkeys began 
training on the Go-NoGo task in mid November 2006, and those who learnt the task did 
so by mid January 2007. Following training, Group 1 monkeys (Post-enrichment first) 
undertook three consecutive days of maintenance sessions concurrent with enhanced 
enrichment in the home enclosure. This was followed by three daily testing sessions 
(Post-enrichment), then seven daily maintenance sessions, the health-check, and finally 
three daily testing sessions (Post-health-check), Group 2 monkeys followed a similar 
procedure which ran in the following order: training and maintenance sessions – health 












Table 6-4 The number of presentations of control trials (n=288) and experimental 




Trial  Trials per treatment condition (n)  Total 
(n) 
 Post-enrichment 
(3 x daily testing 
sessions) 
 Post-health-check 





























      





























      




The full series of events was as follows, and as summarized in Figure 6.3. On 
days -7 to -1 all monkeys housed in the enclosure received enrichment in the 
home cages, as described in Chapter 3 and both Groups 1 and 2 underwent daily 
training on the ‘Go-NoGo’ task. On days -3, -2 and -1 Group 1 underwent 
maintenance training sessions during which they were required to work to 
criterion to qualify to take part in testing sessions on days 0, 1 and 2. On days -3, -
2 and -1 the monkeys in Group 2 also worked on the ‘Go-NoGo’ task in the 
laboratory, as usual. On each of days -7 to -1 each monkey was transported to the 
laboratory where he was presented with a single-trial practice block followed by a 
60-trial training block and a single (rewarded) end trial (total 62 trials). To assess 
feeding motivation, the number of pellets left in the pellet tray and the number of 
monkey chow left in the lunch box at the end of each session, were recorded. 
 
On days 0, 1 and 2 Group 1 took part in three consecutive daily Post-enrichment 
testing sessions (Figure 6.3). Group 2 monkeys continued ‘Go-NoGo’ training on 
these days. On days 3-9 Groups 1 and 2 engaged in daily maintenance sessions on 
each of which the control stimuli were shown for 62 trials, as during days -3 to -1. 
On days 7, 8 and 9 monkeys in both groups were required to perform to criterion 
in order to qualify to take part in testing sessions on days 11, 12 and 13. On day 
10 all monkeys in the enclosure received their three-monthly health-check. On 
days 11, 12 and 13 Groups 1 and 2 took part in Post-health-check testing. On day 
14 all monkeys in the enclosure began a second week of enrichment during which 
Group 2 engaged in daily maintenance sessions on the ‘Go-NoGo’ task. On days 




Figure 6.3 The counterbalanced order of testing sessions conducted post-enrichment (p-e) and post-health (p-hc) check. All monkeys 
were provided with enrichment during the enrichment phases, and all monkeys were subjected to a health check on day 10. 
 
Group  Day 
  -7…-4 -3…-1  0, 1 & 2 3…6 7…9  10  11, 12 & 13  14…20  21,22 & 23 
                
                




Maintenance    Test (Post-
health-check) 
     
                 
2 (n=4)       Training* and 
maintenance 
   Test (Post-
health-check) 
 Maintenance  Test (Post-
enrichment) 







Days on which enrichment was 





Day on which health check was conducted 
(12 noon on day 8) during the health-check 
phase 
  
* Monkeys began training up to two months 
before the start of the study, signified by 




Throughout the study, care was taken to maintain a regular daily working routine. Staff 
access to the area in and around the animal housing was restricted and all nonessential 
husbandry procedures postponed until the end of the study. During the training and 
enrichment phases monkeys were provided with regular enrichments (ice lollies, toys, 
twigs and preferred foods), which were usually frozen inside ice blocks, with daily food 
rations adjusted accordingly for calorie intake. 
 
6.2.4. Data selection and treatment  
Criteria for inclusion of each monkey in the analyses were a) responses on at least 80% 
of control trials (and at least 70% of trials for each of the S- and S+ control stimuli 
separately) within a 28 trial window in block 2 on at least one daily testing session in 
each treatment; and b) the monkey ate a comparable proportion of pellets and daily food 
ration to that consumed during training sessions. The latter was assessed according to 
the number of pellets left in the pellet tray, and the number of chow pellets and fruit 
slices left in the lunch box, at the end of each session.  
 
Performance data for experimental sessions are presented in Table 6-5. All seven 
monkeys who took part in testing met criteria for inclusion in the analyses. Five 
monkeys met criteria on all six of their testing sessions. For these monkeys data from all 
six testing sessions were included in the analyses. One monkey reached criteria during 
four testing sessions (monkey 94K) and one monkey reached criteria during five testing 
sessions (AI73). For these two monkeys only daily testing sessions for which data were 




Table 6-5 Performance data for the seven monkeys who took part in testing sessions. All seven monkeys who took part in testing 
reached criteria for inclusion in the final analysis. (Values in brackets signify number of sessions where criterion was met within a 
28-trial window only.) For all other sessions criterion was met over all trials. 
 
   
 N testing sessions 













































79S 3.7  3 3  1.00 1.00 1.00       Grp 1 
 79T 3.65  3 
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(two and four sessions, respectively). A total of 2376 trials, from 36 testing 
sessions spread across seven monkeys therefore met the criteria for entry into the 
analysis. 
 
For analysis of proportion of responses made, frequency data are presented as  
 
Proportion   =   n (‘Go’ responses) 
             n trials 
 
for each of the control trials (S+ and S-), and each of the experimental probe trials 
(P+, Pi and P-).  
 
For analysis of latency to respond, latency data were treated following Harding et 
al. (2004), in order to maintain comparability of findings between the two studies. 
Mean latency to respond was calculated for each stimulus, in either condition, per 
monkey. Mean latency to respond was calculated from all trials, including non-
responses which were included as 2000msec.  
 
Due to small sample size it was not possible to include order of testing (Post-
enrichment first versus Post-health-check first) or stimulus group (long line 
rewarded versus short line rewarded) in the analyses. The influence of these 
factors is addressed separately in Post-hoc tests. 
 
Collapsed data were checked for a normal distribution using a one-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. All K-S tests revealed data did not differ 




throughout. For t-tests, a Levene’s test of equality of variance was also conducted. 
All descriptive data are reported as mean ± 1SE.  
 
A 1 x 3 RMANOVA was performed to examine whether feeding motivation (a 
proxy measure of motivation to perform the task), measured as proportion of 
pellets eaten, varied with affective state. Data were proportion of pellets 
consumed with within-subjects factor of treatment condition (training, Post-
enrichment testing and Post-health-check testing) for the seven monkeys who took 
part in testing sessions (Table 6.5). The proportion of pellets eaten did not differ 
significantly between training and the two treatments (F2,12 = 1.399, P=0.28). 
Planned t-tests revealed there was no significant difference in pellet consumption 
between the treatments (Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check: t(6)=1.491, 
P=0.187) nor between either of the treatments and training (Post-enrichment 
versus training: t(6)=0.065, P=0.950; Post-health-check versus training: 
t(6)=1.538, P=0.175). All monkeys consumed the full daily food ration while in 
the laboratory after each training and testing session. 
 
These results suggest there was no significant reduction in appetite or motivation 
to work, as measured by consumption of pellets and daily food ration, between the 
training and Post-enrichment and Post-health-check testing sessions. The seven 
monkeys consumed pellets at comparably high rates during the training and 
testing phases. It is therefore likely that motivation to work on the task was 
maintained throughout the study. Increase in appetite would be masked by a 





6.2.5. Data analyses for experimental trials (intermediate probes) 
Experimental trials (P+, Pi and P-) were included to investigate the influence of 
treatment condition on responses to ambiguous stimuli. The measures were 
frequency of responses and latency to respond. Frequency data were included to 
measure the influence of affective state on tendency to respond. Latency data were 
included to measure the influence of affective state on speed to respond.  
 
To test the hypothesis that treatment condition influences responses to ambiguous 
stimuli, frequency data were entered into a 2x5 RMANOVA. Data were frequency 
of responses with within-subject factors treatment (Post-enrichment versus Post-
health-check) and trial type (S+, S-, P+, Pi and P-). Latency to respond to each of 
the S+, S- and the three probes Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check was also 
analysed using a RMANOVA. All main effects and interactions arising from the 
higher-order RMANOVAs were then examined using Bonferroni adjusted t-tests, or 
their non-parametric equivalents. 
 
6.2.6. Data analyses for control trials (long line and short line) 
Control trials (S+ and S-) were included to investigate the effects of treatment 
condition on performance on the learned Go-NoGo task, and to distinguish valid 
from invalid testing sessions, as defined in section 6.2.4.  
 
To test the effects of treatment on tendency to respond, two paired samples t-tests 
were conducted. Data were mean frequency of responses Post-enrichment versus 




whether treatment affects latency to respond, two further paired samples t-tests 
were conducted. Data were mean latency to respond Post-enrichment versus mean 
latency to respond Post-health-check for each of the S+ and S-. 
 
6.3. Results 
The experimental hypothesis was tested by running two higher-order 2x5 
RMANOVAs, separately for each of the frequency and latency data. The within 
subjects factors were treatment condition (Post-health-check versus Post-
enrichment) and trial type (S+, P+, Pi, P- and S-). Specific predictions are tested 
with subsequent planned comparisons.  
 
6.3.1. Frequency of responses 
For frequency data, there was a significant interaction of treatment x stimulus 
(F4,24 = 2.74, P=0.05) and a main effect of both treatment (F1,6 = 7.93, P=0.03) and 
stimulus (F4,24 =59.16, P<0.01: Figure 6.4). Monkeys tended to make more 
frequent responses Post-enrichment than they did Post-health-check, and tended to 
respond more frequently to S+, P+ and Pi compared with S- and P-. These data 
suggest that treatment condition and trial type mediate monkeys’ frequency of 
responses on the Go-NoGo task. These effects are examined in more detail below.  
 
Regression equations were calculated per treatment per monkey. Data were 
entered into a paired samples t-test, separately for slope and intercept. There was a 




(t(6)=2.41, P=0.05), indicating that monkeys made a greater number of responses 
Post-enrichment than they did Post-health-check. There was no difference in 
intercepts (t(6)=1.58, P=0.16), suggesting that the difference in slopes was driven 
by a difference in proportion of responses to any of S+, P+ and Pi, but not to S- 
and P-.  
 
Planned pairwise comparisons were conducted to examine the two-way 
interaction, and difference in slopes between the two treatments, in more detail. 
Data were frequency of responses Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check, 
separately for each of P+, Pi and P-. Paired samples t-tests wre used with the 
Bonferroni adjusted P value P=0.017. These analyses were conducted to test the 
prediction that monkeys will make fewer responses on trials when an ambiguous 
probe is shown Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment. There was a trend 
towards fewer responses Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment for each of P+ 
(t(6) = 2.52, P=0.05) and Pi (t(6) = 2.54, P=0.04)
3
. There was no difference in 
frequency of responses to P- Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment (t(6) = 
1.48, P=0.18).  
 
 
                                                 
 
3
 Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance between Post-enrichment and Post-health-check data 
sets approached, but did not reach, significance for P+ (P=0.08) and Pi (P=0.06). Wilcoxon signed 




Figure 6.4 The proportion of responses on control trials (S- and S+) and 
experimental probe trials (P-, Pi and P+) Post-enrichment (open circles) and 
Post-health-check (closed circles). 
































In summary, monkeys showed a trend towards the expected difference in 
frequency of responses to ambiguous probes Post-health-check versus Post-
enrichment. This occurred for the intermediate probe Pi, and P+, but not for P-. 
 
Two further planned comparisons were performed to determine whether treatment 
condition altered frequency of learned responses to stimuli of known reward value 
(S+ and S-). Data were proportion of responses Post-enrichment versus Post-
health-check for each of S+ and S- respectively (Figure 6.4). Levene’s test 
showed significant heterogeneity of variance for S+ (P=0.02). Bonferroni P=0.025 






versus Post-enrichment (Z=1.78, P=0.07), and no difference in the proportion of 
responses to S- Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment (t(6) = 0.63, P=0.55). 
 
In summary, there was no significant difference in monkeys’ performance on 
control trials for the Go-NoGo task Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check. 
Monkeys were equally accurate in their responses in both conditions. These data 
suggest that treatment condition had no significant effect on monkey’s baseline 
performance on the task. Therefore, factors such as learning, memory and 
motivation (which would be revealed by impaired task performance on control 
trials) are unlikely to account for the difference in frequency of responses to 
experimental trials. 
 
6.3.2. Latency data 
A 2 x 5 RMANOVA for mean latencies to respond revealed a main effect of 
stimulus (F4,24 = 24.16, P<0.01), and no effect of treatment nor interaction 
between the two (both Ps >0.16). The main effect of stimulus reflected the fact 
that monkeys were faster to respond to the S+ and probe closest to it, and were 
slower to respond to the S- and probe closest to it. There were also no other main 
effects or interactions when only data from the three probes were included in the 
same analysis. 
 
Regression equations were calculated per treatment per monkey and data were 




no significant difference between the slopes Post-enrichment versus Post-health-
check for either slopes or intercepts (both Ps>0.3). 
 
In summary, treatment condition had no effect on latency to respond on either 
control or experimental trials. 
6.4. Discussion 
Seven monkeys learned to perform a Go/NoGo task during which they touched 
one CS (a long or short line) presented on a touch sensitive monitor to gain a 
pellet reward, and to refrain from touching another CS (a line of the opposite 
length: short or long) in order to avoid an aversive US (a burst of white noise and 
delay until the onset of the next trial). Monkeys were then presented with the 
Go/NoGo task during two treatments: Post-enrichment and Post-health-check. 
During testing, presentations of the CS were interspersed with ambiguous probe 
trials. Frequency and latency of responses to the ambiguous probes were recorded. 
 
The proportion data from experimental trials provide strong supportive evidence 
for affect-mediated judgement bias in rhesus macaques, in line with patterns of 
results obtained with rats, starlings and dogs (Table 6-1) and humans (Eysenck et 
al., 1991; Richards et al., 2002 and 2007). Monkeys responded to the central 
probe (Pi) and the probe nearest the S+ (P+) on significantly fewer trials Post-
health-check than they did Post-enrichment. This is consistent with data from both 
animals and humans, which suggest that inferred negative affective state is 
associated with a reduction in frequency of responding to ambiguous cues 




Alternatively, the change in responses to P+ and Pi may reflect a positive bias 
Post-enrichment (Matheson et al., 2008). There was no evidence for an influence 
of treatment on latency to respond to the CS and ambiguous probes. This in 
contrast to studies which found differences in latency measures to ambiguous 
probes as a function of affective state (e.g. Burman et al., 2008a; Harding et al., 
2004). This may be due to a ceiling effect in the data, or arise from a speed-
accuracy trade-off. For example, ‘Go’ responses to S- were incorrect responses, 
therefore reaction times to S- trials reflect errors only. 
 
The data from control trials revealed treatment condition had no effect on either 
frequency or latency to respond to the CS. Monkeys responded as often and as 
quickly to the S+ Post-enrichment as Post-health-check, and this was also the case 
for the S-. There was therefore no significant change in task performance on 
control trials between the two treatment conditions. These data indicate there was 
no significant change in, or effect of, motivational or arousal factors on responses 
to the S+ and S- Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check, since monkeys were 
as likely to correctly perform both the ‘Go’ and ‘NoGo’ responses in either 
condition. Monkeys also consumed an equal amount of daily food ration, and 
rewarded pellets, Post-enrichment as they did Post-health-check. These findings 
are consistent with data from previous judgement bias studies that found no 
between-groups differences in responses to either of the CS during testing (e.g. 
Burman et al., 2008a). The present data build on this previous work by indicating 
that performance on a Go/NoGo task may also be maintained using a within-
subjects design when testing the same individual under different treatment 





The maintenance of task performance on control trials is important for the 
interpretation of data from experimental trials. It suggests that arousal, motivation 
and cognitive function (e.g. learning and memory) effects alone are unlikely to 
account for the change in frequency of responses to the ambiguous probes (Mendl 
et al., 2009). This is pertinent given the evidence for an influence of affect on such 
processes (e.g. attention and memory formation: Mendl, 1999; state-dependent-
learning and reward sensitivity: Pompilio et al., 2006; van der Harst et al., 2003; 
Woike et al., 2009). Therefore, in the present study, changes in responses to 
ambiguous probes are likely to reflect factors associated with the processing of 
ambiguous stimuli rather than processes related to stress-related impairment in 
task performance. The current data add weight to the interpretation of studies that 
have found a reduction in performance on ‘Go’ trials among animals following a 
negative affect manipulation relative to those who have not undergone a negative 
affective manipulation (e.g. Harding et al., 2004). 
 
There are many implications of these findings. Firstly, this is the first 
development of a method to measure judgement bias in a species of primate, 
indicating that the judgement bias task developed initially by Harding et al.  
(2004) is suitable for use with primates.  
 
Secondly, the data presented here suggest that rhesus macaques may demonstrate 
affect-mediated judgement biases, and these may share features in common with 
judgement biases in humans and other animals (Garner et al., 2006a; Mendl et al., 




such as stress and anxiety result in more negative (and/or less positive) 
judgements about ambiguous stimuli (Eysenck et al., 1991; MacLeod & Byrne, 
1996; Rusting, 1999; Richards et al., 2002; Harding et al., 2004; Garner et al., 
2006a; Burman et al., 2008a; Casey et al., 2008; Matheson et al., 2008). Monkeys 
responded significantly less often to the central probe (Pi) and the probe nearest 
the rewarded stimulus (P+) Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment. This 
suggests that the pattern of results may reflect mechanisms sensitive to reward 
rather than punishment. This is in line with findings from the majority of 
published studies of judgement bias in animals, which found a change in 
responses to P+ (where three ambiguous probes were used: Harding et al., 2004; 
Bateson & Matheson, 2007), while one study has found a change in responses to 
P- (Burman et al., 2008a). The findings may also relate to studies with humans 
that have found people who suffer from both anxiety and depression have a 
reduced expectation of future positive events (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; Garner et 
al. 2006a), and that reward sensitivity may vary as a function of implicit 
motivational states (Woike et al., 2009). 
 
Thirdly, this study provides valuable data towards furthering our understanding of 
the range of animal groups that demonstrate influences of inferred affect on 
judgement biases for ambiguous information (Mendl et al., 2009). Currently, this 
group includes rats, starlings and dogs (Mendl et al., 2009). The data presented in 
this thesis suggests rhesus macaques may also be added to this list.  
 
Fourthly, the use of a within-subjects design indicates that changes in 




veterinary inspection of enrichment devices) can lead to changes in the way a 
given individual responds to the same information when that information is 
ambiguous in meaning. This concurs with data from starlings which show biases 
in responses to ambiguous stimuli that vary with environmental enrichment 
(Bateson & Matheson, 2007; and Matheson et al., 2008). No studies with humans 
have used a within-subjects design where the same participants are tested on the 
same task while in different moods (Richards, pers comm, 13th July 2009). 
Studies developing therapeutic methods in which people train to induce positive 
biases have been conducted (Mogg et al., 1995; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). 
However, these address the effects of training individuals to attend to and 
interpret information differently, and therefore do not provide a comparable 
method to that used here. Between-group mood manipulations with human 
participants provide the closest comparison (Richards et al., 2002; Rusting, 1999). 
Richards et al. (2002) used a single mood manipulation to increase state anxiety. 
Rusting (1999) used a positive mood manipulation for one group and a negative 
mood manipulation for another group and found mood manipulation interacts with 
trait factors to influence information processing. Again, none of these studies with 
humans have tested the same participants on the same task under different 
conditions.  
 
Finally, cognitive biases are considered to reflect vulnerability to clinical anxiety 
in humans (Mogg et al., 1995), and there is empirical evidence that cognitive 
biases provide a reliable predictor of experienced (self-reported) distress in 
humans that is more accurate than autonomic measures (van den Hout et al., 1994; 




(2002) measured interpretive bias for homophones in students during a period of 
low academic stress and found negative interpretive bias to be a reliable predictor 
of experienced negative affect during a later period of high academic stress. This 
provides an interesting avenue for the consideration of the possible judgement 
biases that might feed into subjectively experienced distress in animals, if such 
subjective states exist. 
 
There are several areas where the method presented here may be improved. The 
use of two similar operant responses would provide a more robust response 
measure than the Go/NoGo format used here. For example, the active choice 
paradigm used by Matheson et al. (2008) required starlings to peck at one of two 
coloured lights following a CS. Following the S+, pecking the associated coloured 
light resulted in instant reward. Following the equivalent of an S-, pecking the 
associated (other) coloured light resulted in a reward, but only after a delay. 
Following the presentation of probe cues, pecks to either coloured light were 
recorded. In a similar manner, a design in which monkeys are required to touch 
the screen in different places (or, for example, move a lever in different 
directions) on each response would provide data that could be more easily 
compared between conditions. This would also negate the problem in analyzing 
the latency data in the current study whereby latencies reflected correct responses 
to the S+, but incorrect responses to the S-.  
 
An important future development will be to incorporate facial expressions into the 
judgement bias task. Humans suffering from anxiety show heightened sensitivity 




morphed faces, compared to non-anxious controls (Richards et al., 2002). Current 
research (Anne Richards, Mandy Holmes and Emily Bethell) is investigating the 
use of adaptation and oddball
4
 paradigms for measuring the effects of state and 
trait anxiety on interpretation of emotion in morphed faces, as well as neural 
correlates of these processes (ERP). The development of methods currently used 
with humans for use with primates would enable us to test hypotheses about the 
significance of cognitive biases for social stress among social animals housed in 
captivity. The inclusion of baseline trials for the ambiguous probes would allow 
direct tests of the relative influence of each treatment condition on responses to 
the probes. The current method only allows differentiation in responses between 
the two treatment conditions. It does not allow us to identify whether the 
difference in frequency of responses arises from an optimistic bias Post-
enrichment or a negative bias Post-health-check. 
 
In summary, the data presented here demonstrate that the judgement bias task 
originally developed by Harding et al. (2004) may be adapted for use with 
primates. Following a stress-inducing veterinary procedure, monkeys showed a 
reduction in the proportion of positive responses to ambiguous probes relative to 
proportion of responses made Post-enrichment. This effect was apparent for the 
intermediate probe and the probe closest to the rewarded stimulus. This suggests 
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 The adaptation and oddball paradigms mentioned involve the repeated presentation of a 
prototype face (e.g. angry or fearful), followed by, or interspersed with, unexpected and infrequent 
presentations of ambiguous faces. Behavioural and ERP responses to the ambiguous faces are 




that following a stressor, monkeys have a reduced expectation of positive 
outcomes following ambiguous cues, compared to expectations for the same 
ambiguous cues after a week of enrichment. This pattern of results is similar to 
that seen for other animal species (starlings: Bateson & Matheson, 2007; rats: 
Harding, Paul, & Mendl, 2004), and is suggestive of state effects in humans 
(Rusting, 1999; Richards et al. 2002). Given the evidence for the role of 
interpretive processes in the experience of negative affect in humans (Pury, 2002) 
Judgement bias tasks may, therefore, provide a reliable measure of psychological 








The main argument of the thesis is that cognitive biases, which provide an 
indicator of psychological wellbeing in humans, may also provide a valuable 
measure of psychological wellbeing in animals. The general aim of this thesis was 
to develop and test methods that measure the cognitive component of emotion in 
rhesus macaques. The end goal is to contribute data that will inform discussion 
about the capacity of animals to suffer distress or experience positive 
psychological wellbeing. The general aim was met: methods were developed to 
measure several aspects of the cognitive component of emotion in rhesus 
macaques. Two measures (emotion-mediated attentional bias and emotion 
evaluation) have not been tested in animals previously. The third measure 
(emotion-mediated judgement bias) represents an adaptation of recently 
developed methods for use with animals.   
  
In this general discussion I first summarise the main arguments for the study of 
cognition-emotion interactions as a measure of animal psychological wellbeing. 
These include ethical arguments, data from recent methodological developments 
in animal cognitive bias research, and evidence from neuropharmacological and 
neuropsychological studies. Secondly, I present an overview of the experimental 
chapters, summarising the methods developed and the implications of the data for 
theories of cognition-emotion interaction in animals. Thirdly, I conclude with 
discussion of the implication of these novel methods and findings in light of the 




7.1. Arguments for the development of novel methods to study 
psychological wellbeing in animals 
 
In Chapter 1, I presented the argument for measuring cognition-emotion 
interactions in animals as a novel measure of psychological wellbeing. The 
measurement of psychological wellbeing is a central goal of animal welfare 
research, yet we have few methods to assess psychological processes associated 
with positive and negative affect in animals (Paul et al., 2005). In humans, 
affective disorders such as anxiety and depression are characterized in part by 
specific cognitive profiles (MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Mathews, 1990). These cognitive profiles are known as cognitive biases. People 
in negative affective states broadly attend to, appraise, expect and recall negative 
information more than positive information (Williams et al., 1996; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). People in 
positive affective states show biases for positive information (Schweizer & 
Schneider, 1997). Negative cognitive biases feed into and maintain negative 
psychological states and are reliable predictors of experienced distress (Mogg et 
al., 1995; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Pury, 2002; Jansson & Naström, 2009). The 
measurement of cognitive biases is consequently a valuable tool in the assessment 
of negative psychological wellbeing in humans. By contrast, positive biases are 
considered to be associated with positive psychological wellbeing, although this is 
less well studied (Cummins & Nistico, 2002).  
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If animals have the capacity to suffer psychological distress (a possibility that 
drives animal welfare research) then it is parsimonious to consider that this 
capacity may rest, in some part, on underlying mechanisms evolved from a 
common ancestor shared with other animal groups including humans (Byrne, 
1999; Mendl & Paul, 2004). In other words, cognition-emotion interactions 
contribute largely to psychological wellbeing in humans, and therefore, by 
definition, psychological wellbeing in some animal taxa may also depend on 
cognition-emotion interactions to some degree (Paul et al., 2005). The study of 
emotion-mediated cognitive biases in animals therefore provides an important 
avenue of research for developing our understanding of animal psychological 
wellbeing. 
 
The assertion that cognitive biases may provide a valuable measure of 
psychological wellbeing in primates is supported by the data presented in this 
thesis. Monkeys demonstrated differential patterns of response to threatening, 
non-threatening and ambiguous information, and these varied as a function of 
inferred affective state (Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment). Importantly, 
these biases in responding are comparable to the patterns of responding seen in 
affective-disordered humans versus normal controls. These data, together with 
data from recent studies with rats, dogs and starlings (Mendl et al., 2009) are 
highly suggestive that methods traditionally preserved for humans provide a 
valuable tool for the assessment of cognition-emotion interactions in animals as a 
novel measure of psychological wellbeing. 
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Cognition was defined as the mechanisms by which animals take in, process, 
retain and act on information from the environment (Shettleworth, 2001). 
Cognition involves processes such as sensory perception, attention, learning, 
decision making, memory and (where present) conscious thought (Gross, 1993). 
Emotions were defined as states elicited by rewards and punishers that drive 
organisms to seek fitness-enhancing stimuli and avoid aversive or harmful stimuli 
(Panksepp, 1998; Rolls, 2000). Emotions are therefore adaptations selected for 
their impact on survival and reproductive fitness (LeDoux, 1996; Damasio, 2000; 
Rolls, 2000). They involve behavioural, physiological, cognitive and subjective 
components (Paul et al., 2005). The extent to which different cognitions and 
emotions are expressed will necessarily vary between species due to different 
evolutionary histories and environmental pressures (e.g. Mason & Mendl, 1997; 
Clubb & Mason, 2004). However, there are core similarities, for example, the role 
of the amygdala in processing fear-relevant information in the brains of mammals, 
reptiles and birds (LeDoux, 1996). It is the similarities which are of greatest 
importance to this thesis since, by definition, our understanding of animal 
psychological wellbeing will necessarily be based on an understanding of human 
psychological wellbeing.  
 
In each of chapters 4-6, I reviewed the background literature to cognition-emotion 
interactions in humans. In each of the reviews, it is clear that much of what is 
understood about the mechanisms underlying human cognition-emotion 
interactions comes from studies with animals. For example, theories of 
information processing in humans are based on data from rats regarding the role 
of the amygdala and thalamic pathways in rapid orienting and appraisal of 
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potentially threatening stimuli (LeDoux, 1996). LeDoux (1996) highlighted the 
role of direct magnocellular inputs from the retina to the amygdala  (via the 
pulvinar and colliculus) in addition to less direct inputs from cortical sensory 
areas to the amygdala. Stimuli are tagged for valence in the amygdala and then 
passed forward to sensory and cortical areas for more detailed processing and 
matching with ongoing cognitive processes and motivations. The work of LeDoux 
(1996) is widely used and applied to models of attention in humans, including 
attentional bias (e.g. LeDoux is referenced strongly in vigilance theories of 
orienting to threat in anxiety: Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998) and the development of attentional control models (e.g. the circuit-breaker 
system which acts as a ventral alerting system to redirect attention to threat: 
Taylor & Fragopanagos, 2005). Work with rats also informed the development of 
reinforcement sensitivity models of the role of emotion-cognition interactions in 
directing behavioural responses to threat (Gray, 1971). Later amendments to these 
models have also relied heavily on data from animals (McNaughton & Gray, 
2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Our understanding of the emotions we identify 
as ‘fear-related’ (underlying the Freeze-Flight-Flight System: FFFS), ‘positive’ 
(underlying the Behavioural Approach System: BAS) and ‘anxiety-related’ 
(conflict between FFFS and BAS leads to activation of the Behavioural Inhibition 
System: BIS), is based on our understanding of these emotional-motivational 
systems in animals. Given the importance of animal studies in informing the 
development of theories and models of human cognition-emotion interactions, it 
is not surprising that the methods developed with humans may be suitable for 
adaptation for use with the animals who first informed those methods. 
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7.2. Overview of the experimental chapters 
 
The experimental chapters met the general aim of the thesis: to develop and test 
methods that measure the cognitive component of emotion in rhesus macaques. 
The data arising from these methods supported the main argument of the thesis, 
that as cognitive biases provide a measure of psychological wellbeing in humans, 
so may this therefore provide a valuable measure of psychological wellbeing in 
animals. Data were gained on three aspects of cognition-emotion interaction in 
rhesus macaques. These were emotion-mediated biases in spatial attention 
(attentional bias: Chapter 4), emotion-mediated biases in appraisal and response 
processes (emotion evaluation and response-slowing: Chapter 5) and emotion-
mediated biases in interpretive and expectancy processes (judgement bias: 
Chapter 6). I will discuss each of these in turn and relate these findings to the 
behavioural and physiological data presented in Chapter 3, as well as the technical 
aspects of establishing a laboratory and training animals presented in Chapter 2. 
 
7.2.1. Developing a method to assess attentional bias in rhesus 
macaques 
In Chapter 4, I presented data on emotion-mediated attentional bias in rhesus 
macaques. Monkeys demonstrated a vigilant-avoidant pattern of overt orienting to 
threatening versus non-threatening faces Post-health-check. Overall, monkeys 
tended to look faster towards the aggressive face in an aggressive-neutral face 
pair, regardless of treatment condition, and a tendency to spend less time looking 
at the aggressive face overall Post-health-check. These findings are consistent 
with data from humans which suggest anxious (stressed) individuals show an 
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initial vigilance for threatening versus non-threatening information, followed by a 
subsequent avoidance of threatening versus non-threatening information (Garner 
et al., 2006). This vigilant-avoidant pattern of attentional bias has been 
demonstrated in studies which measured eye-gaze in humans. This is also the 
method used in this thesis.  
 
The data presented in chapter 4 are important for both the human and animal 
literatures. Firstly, these are the first data on emotion-mediated attentional bias for 
threatening versus non-threatening information in an animal species. They suggest 
that inferred affective state alters the way in which monkeys attend to conspecific 
faces. Further tests are required to unravel the underlying mechanisms and social 
implications of these biases for rhesus macaques and other species. 
  
Secondly, the data presented here add novel and valuable information for the 
refinement of theories of attentional bias in humans. There is much debate in the 
human literature about the direction of attentional biases. Traditional theories of 
attention focused on vigilance for threat in anxiety (vigilance theories: Eysenck, 
1992; Williams et al., 1996; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998), while some authors argued for avoidance of threatening information in 
anxiety (avoidance theories: Mansell et al., 1999). More recent work has 
identified initial vigilance, followed by avoidance, of threatening faces by anxious 
people (vigilance-avoidance theories: Rohner, 2002; Calvo et al., 2006; Garner et 
al., 2006). The data presented in this thesis concur with the vigilance-avoidance 
account. This is the first evidence for affect-mediated attentional bias in a species 
of primate. Further, the data suggest that attentional biases in anxiety may 
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function in a similar manner in humans and primates. If it is found that the similar 
patterns between rhesus macaques and humans arise from common underlying 
mechanisms, this would have important implications for our understanding of the 
evolution of early attentional biases for threat in humans. 
 
Thirdly, this study highlights the utility of gaze measures for assessing the time-
course of the attentional response to threatening information in rhesus macaques, 
as has been shown for humans. Eye-gaze measures capture early and late 
processes, which are required for vigilance-avoidance accounts of spatial 
orienting of attention to threat in anxiety. Vigilance theories and avoidance 
theories have arisen from dot-probe and visual search studies. These are limited in 
the time-window of the attentional response recorded. In the case of dot probe 
studies this is determined by stimulus presentation time, which is usually ≤500ms 
(e.g. Mansell et al., 1999; Bradley et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2002; Mogg et al., 
2008; Holmes et al., 2009). Visual search tasks are also commonly used (e.g. 
Öhman et al., 2001; Eastwood et al., 2003) but these are only sensitive to initial 
latencies to detect a stimulus within an array and hence do not measure 
subsequent processes. Therefore, the use of eye-gaze to assess spatial orienting of 
attention to stimuli is a powerful method for use with both rhesus macaques and 
humans. 
 
Fourthly, the data are important for highlighting the possible role of early and 
later attentional processes in the onset and maintenance of affective disorders in 
primates. In humans, vigilance for threatening faces is a predictor for vulnerability 
to anxiety (Mathews, 1990). Following stressful husbandry procedures, such as 
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the health-check used in the method presented here, monkeys may have a negative 
attentional bias, and therefore display patterns of attention that enhance ongoing 
detection of environmental threat and produce sustained negative affectivity. 
From a psychological welfare perspective this may leave animals vulnerable to 
deterioration in psychological wellbeing. There are also implications for the social 
interactions of both singly- and socially-housed captive primates alike, since 
overall avoidance of faces in anxiety impairs social interactions and may 
exacerbate social submissiveness (Chen et al., 2002). 
 
In summary, the method developed to measure attentional bias in rhesus 
macaques was successful and produced data of importance for both the human 
and animal literatures. A few improvements to the method are however needed. 
Due to a slight delay between triggering the onset of each trial and the stimuli 
appearing on the screens, on some trials monkeys were no longer looking 
centrally between the screens at stimulus onset and these trials were lost from 
some of the analyses. Training monkeys to look towards a central cue prior to 
stimulus onset, as is done in human studies, should improve accuracy in 
measurement of direction and latency of first gaze. This would provide a greater 
number of valid trials in the final analysis, but would also require training and 
therefore take longer to execute. Promising future directions of this research 
would be to include non-aggressive emotional faces to test the emotion-specificity 
of the attentional response. Development of a dot-probe paradigm suitable for use 
with monkeys would provide a means of identifying the timings of vigilance and 
avoidance effects (e.g. Mogg et al., 2008) 
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7.2.2. Developing a method to measure emotion evaluation and 
response-slowing in rhesus macaques 
In Chapter 5, I presented data on the effects of two treatments on threat evaluation 
and response-slowing in rhesus macaques. Monkeys showed differential patterns 
of impairment on a simple operant task in the presence of threatening versus non-
threatening distractor faces Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment. Once 
differences in arousal between treatments were accounted for, the data were 
consistent with data from humans which suggest that the presence of a threatening 
distractor interrupts ongoing task-relevant cognitive processes and impairs (slows) 
task performance in anxious individuals but not in non-anxious controls (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). In this thesis monkeys were slower to touch stimuli containing 
direct gaze face distractors, relative to control trials, Post-health-check versus 
Post-enrichment. These data are consistent with models of attentional control in 
humans, whereby the onset of highly salient information acts as a circuit breaker 
which inhibits ongoing goal-directed processes (Taylor & Fragopanagos, 2005). 
This allows redirection of attentional resources towards the salient stimulus for 
further evaluation, resulting in a slowing in task performance (Algom et al., 2004; 
Mogg et al., 2008). The data are also consistent with reinforcement sensitivity 
models which propose that competition between three motivational systems in the 
brain results in different degrees of impairment on an ongoing cognitive task 
(Gray, 1971; McNaughton & Gray, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Conflict 
between the system sensitive to positive reinforcers (BAS) that drives approach 
behaviours towards reward, and the system sensitive to negative reinforcers 
(FFFS) that drives avoidance behaviours away from threat, may result in a 
conflict of response (BIS) and subsequent impairment on an ongoing cognitive 
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task (McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Activation of any or all of the systems may 
underlie the pattern of results revealed in the current study (Algom et al., 2004; 
Mogg et al., 2008). 
 
The method developed here was informed by recent advances in human eStroop 
paradigms (particularly the use of faces: Bar-Haim et al., 2007), advances in 
theories regarding underlying mechanisms of the task impairment effects of 
threatening distractors (sensitivity reinforcement models: McNaughton & Gray, 
2000; attentional control models: Taylor & Fragopanagos, 2005), and recent 
consideration of arousal related response-slowing (Mogg et al., 2008). These 
different approaches were combined with methods that directly test approach and 
avoidance of threatening stimuli in primates and humans (Wisconsin General 
Task Apparatus used with primates: Cook et al., 1985; social approach-avoidance 
task used with humans: Roelofs et al., 2009). This produced a method that directly 
tests approach-avoidance tendencies in primates in different affective states (As 
inferred by treatment condition) with respect to differently-valenced stimuli. It 
also allowed tests of the effects of inferred affective state on task impairment in 
the presence of distracting emotional information. 
 
The data presented in Chapter 5 are important for several reasons. Firstly, these 
are the first data on emotion evaluation and response-slowing in the presence of 
emotionally (or motivationally) relevant stimuli in an animal species. The data 
indicate that speed to perform a task changes when a threatening face is presented. 
Post-health-check, monkeys show a slowing of response to direct-gaze faces, but 
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no slowing of response to averted gaze faces. Post-enrichment, monkeys show a 
speeding of responses to direct-gaze faces but not averted gaze faces. Emotion 
evaluation, approach-avoidance, arousal and affective systems were discussed as 
possible contributory factors to the slowing of responses to threatening stimuli by 
monkeys Post-health-check. This paradigm requires further investigation in order 
to identify the underlying mechanisms and social implications of these findings in 
rhesus macaques and other species. 
 
Secondly, the method has implications for arguments about the emotional saliency 
of face stimuli used in cognitive tests with humans. It has been argued that face 
images presented on a computer monitor are likely to convey less meaning to a 
perceiver than the facial expressions encountered during real-life interactions. The 
requirement for monkeys to touch the distractor stimuli directly, rather than press 
a remote button as in human studies, provides a novel means of assessing 
approach-avoidance behaviours, since it requires participants to touch the stimuli. 
This is likely to increase the tendency for both approach and avoidance 
behaviours. No study conducted with humans has required participants to touch 
stimuli directly. However, this may provide a valuable means of enhancing the 
emotional saliency of stimuli shown on a screen. 
 
Thirdly, the trend for slowing of responses, relative to baseline, on direct-gaze 
trials Post-health-check, versus a trend for speeding of responses, relative to 
baseline, Post-enrichment, has implications for captive primate welfare. In 
anxious humans, threatening stimuli capture attention and limit attentional 
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resources available to perform other tasks (Taylor & Fragopanagos, 2005). This 
can lead to impairment in other areas of cognitive function from social 
communication to learning and memory in both humans and animals (Mendl, 
1999). As with the bias for spatial orienting towards threatening information in 
anxiety revealed in Chapter 4, attentional capture by distracting threatening 
information presented during an ongoing task may also have implications for the 
onset and maintenance of negative affective states in primates. 
  
Fourthly, the finding for arousal-related speeding of responses on control trials 
indicates that arousal affects speed to respond to non-emotional stimuli. This 
finding highlights the fact that control trials are therefore essential for studies 
where animals are likely to be in different states of arousal.  
 
In summary, the method developed here was successful in measuring changes in 
speed to perform an operant task in the presence of threatening and non-
threatening face distractors. The initial task requires some alterations in order to 
tease apart the likely underlying mechanisms of this change in latency to respond. 
As with the attentional bias task, a pre-training phase in which monkeys learn to 
gaze towards a central fixation cross would ensure monkeys were attending to the 
location of the stimulus at stimulus onset. This would reduce noise in the data. 
Further directions of this method are to increase operant task difficulty (for 
example, introduce a discrimination task in which correct and incorrect responses 
may be distinguished), and to investigate saliency versus valence effects of 
distractors (e.g. positive versus negative faces: Bradley et al., 1998). 
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7.2.3. Developing a method to measure judgement bias in rhesus 
macaques 
In Chapter 6, I presented data on judgement bias in rhesus macaques. Following 
the original method developed by Harding et al. (2004), monkeys were trained on 
a Go-NoGo task in which they learned to touch one stimulus (a short or long line) 
to gain a reward and to avoid touching another stimulus (a long or short line) in 
order to avoid a punisher. Go-Nogo responses to previously unseen ambiguous 
probes (lines of intermediate length) were then measured Post-health-check and 
Post-enrichment for each monkey. Monkeys responded less often to the central 
probe and probe closest to the rewarded stimulus Post-health-check than they did 
Post-enrichment. The findings are consistent with data from rats, starlings, dogs 
and humans which suggest a more negative (or less positive) judgement and 
corresponding response to ambiguous stimuli by anxious (stressed) individuals 
compared with non-anxious (non-stressed) individuals (Mendl et al., 2009). The 
studies reviewed in Mendl et al. (2009) used variations of the Go-NoGo design on 
which the study presented in this thesis was also based. 
 
There are several implications of the data presented in Chapter 6. Firstly, these are 
the first data on judgement bias in a species of primate. The method developed 
was suitable for recording monkeys’ responses to stimuli of known and unknown 
reward or punishment value, when in different affective states. The method 
presented is therefore suitable for further development to assess in more depth the 
underlying mechanisms and conditions under which ambiguous information may 
be processed as more or less negative.   
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Secondly, the data add supportive evidence for existing animal data on judgement 
bias. The pattern of results is consistent with recently published findings with a 
range of animals (Mendl et al., 2009). This suggests that affective state may 
influence patterns of responding to ambiguous indicators of reward or punishment 
in a similar manner across species, including humans. Whether the similarities in 
the data arise from mechanistic or functional similarities of judgment biases 
remains to be assessed. This is especially important for interpretation of the data 
since similarly-valenced affective states are characterized by different cognitive 
profiles. For example, depression is characterized by a reduced expectation of 
positive events, while anxiety is characterized by an increased expectation of 
negative events.  
  
Thirdly, these data add a new taxonomic group to the list of non-human animals 
for whom judgement biases have already been demonstrated. Previously, 
judgement bias using a Go-NoGo paradigm has been demonstrated in a rodent 
(rat), a carnivore (dog) and a bird (starling). Other paradigms have revealed 
comparable or suggestive findings for chickens and mice (Rodd et al., 1997; 
Tsetsenis et al., 2007). In this thesis I present data that indicate judgement biases 
exist in primates as well. 
 
In summary, the development of the Go-NoGo task to measure judgement bias in 
rhesus macaques was successful and provided data that will contribute to ongoing 
work in animal cognition-emotion interaction research. In the context of the other 
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studies presented in the thesis, it was clear that there are many possible underlying 
mechanisms (e.g. spatial orienting of attention, priority of processing, emotion 
evaluation and activation of approach-avoidance systems) that may contribute to 
the differences seen in responding to ambiguous probes following different 
treatments (enrichment versus health-check). There are many avenues for 
refinement of the method, such as inclusion of approach-avoidance lever 
responses used with humans and training to fixate a cross prior to the onset of 
each trial. Consideration of trait factors, in addition to treatment-induced state 
factors, would allow investigation of the interplay of trait and state characteristics 
on responses to stimuli. Following recent advances in the human literature (e.g. 
Richards et al., 2002), the inclusion of ambiguous social stimuli, such as morphed 
facial expressions, would allow investigation of the effects of emotion state on 
interpretation of ambiguous social cues. Further, presentation of ambiguous 
stimuli in the presence of valenced contextual cues (Richards et al., 2007), would 
allow examination of the interplay between affect and contextual cues on 
perception of social signals in primates (e.g. Flack & de Waal, 2007). 
 
 
7.3. Triangulation of measures of affect in rhesus macaques – 
what cognitive measures tell us that traditional measures 
cannot 
 
All of the above experimental studies rely on the inference that the enrichment 
and health-check treatments altered monkeys’ underlying affective states. The 
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experimental data from chapters 4-6 showed a significant change in the cognitive 
component of the affective response between the two treatments (Post-health-
check versus Post-enrichment). Behavioural and physiological responses to the 
treatments were also measured to allow assessment of the treatments in terms of 
traditional methods for studying inferred affect in rhesus macaques. 
 
Previous studies have shown that enrichment interventions influence the 
behaviour and physiology of captive primates in a way that is typically assumed 
to reflect an improved or positive affective state (Kalin et al., 1998; Dawkins et 
al., 2004; Honess & Marin, 2006). Invasive husbandry procedures typically lead 
to behavioural and physiological responses that are considered to reflect stress or 
negative affective states (Ruys et al., 2004). In the present study, changes in 
behaviour and levels of excreted faecal cortisol metabolites following to two 
treatments (a week of enrichment and a health-check) were recorded. These data 
were used to assess the effects of the two treatments on the behaviour and 
physiology of the monkeys, and to allow comparability with previously published 
studies that have used these traditional measures to assess the welfare of captive 
primates. However, the results were unclear. There was some evidence for 
differential behavioural and physiological responses following the two treatments, 
but interpretation of the data in terms of underlying affective states was difficult. 
It is only in light of the cognitive data that more substantial conclusions about 
valence differences in inferred affective states may be drawn.  
 
The behavioural data revealed monkeys spent more time engaged in self-directed 
and stereotypical and self-harm behaviours Post-health-check than they did Post-
 380 
enrichment. This result is suggestive that monkeys were either in a more negative 
affective state, and/or that they were more physiologically aroused Post-health-
check compared with Post-enrichment. However, the data lack the power to 
distinguish between these two possibilities (affect versus arousal). There are 
several reasons for this. Firstly, behavioural responses may become dissociated 
from physiological responses and are therefore not reliable indicators of affect 
(e.g. dissociation of behaviour and cortisol responses in dogs: Beerda et al., 2000; 
and primates: Capitanio, 1999; Ruys et al., 2004; Higham et al., 2009; and 
dissociation of behaviour and autonomic responses in humans with a repressive 
coping style: Derakshan et al., 2007). Secondly, the same behaviour may result 
from different underlying mechanisms. For example, self-directed behaviours 
such as scratching and autogrooming may be induced in primates with anxiogenic 
drugs and attenuated with anxiolytic drugs, and are therefore assumed to reflect 
anxiety-like states (Schino et al., 1996). This has led to the formulation of such 
behaviours as displacement activities that reflect anxiety in situations of 
uncertainty (chimpanzees: Baker & Aureli, 1997; rhesus macaques: Karere et al., 
2009), but they are also self-maintenance behaviours which serve, for example, to 
remove ectoparasites under non-stressful conditions (Dunbar, 1988).  
 
Stereotypical and self-harm behaviours may function as a coping mechanism to 
reduce arousal in animals who have limited response options to threat, providing a 
measure of coping style rather than a direct measure of underlying affect 
(Reinhardt, 2008; Higham et al., 2009). There are no accepted behavioural 
indicators of positive affect in singly-housed monkeys, so this dimension could 
not be examined. The behavioural data therefore indicated a difference in 
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monkeys’ behaviour Post-health-check versus Post-enrichment but were 
inconclusive with respect to the positive or negative nature of the behaviours, 
whether they reflected underlying affective states such as anxiety, or active coping 
mechanisms. 
 
The physiological data revealed that monkeys had higher levels of faecal cortisol 
metabolites Post-health-check than they did Post-enrichment. This finding 
suggests that monkeys had higher levels of arousal Post-health-check than Post-
enrichment. The physiological data do not provide power to identify whether the 
difference in arousal was related to differently-valenced affective states or not. 
Therefore, it is possible that monkeys were in a negative affective state following 
both treatments, but this was simply enhanced Post-health-check. 
 
The cognitive data provide potential explanatory power about the valence of 
affective states that the behavioural and physiological data in themselves do not. 
To begin, there was some agreement between the traditional and cognitive 
measures with respect to arousal. The physiological data suggested monkeys were 
more physiologically aroused Post-health-check than they were Post-enrichment. 
During the emotion-evaluation task presented in chapter 5 monkeys were faster to 
respond on control trials (to touch a grey square) Post-health-check than they were 
Post-enrichment. Control trials comprised non-emotional stimuli, and were 
included to measure baseline speed to respond (i.e. underlying physiological 
arousal) specifically.  
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With regard to the valence of the underlying affective states, each of the cognitive 
studies presented in this thesis provided data that could be interpreted in several 
ways. The data may be interpreted as indicating that monkeys were in a positive 
emotional state Post-enrichment and a negative emotional state Post-health-check. 
Data from humans demonstrate that optimistic people have an enhanced 
expectation of positive future outcomes (Schweizer & Schneider, 1997), 
depressed and anxious people have an enhanced expectation of negative future 
events, and depressed people have a reduced expectation of positive future events 
(Williams et al., 1996). In the judgement bias tasks presented in chapter 6, 
monkeys responded to the intermediate probe and the probe closest to the 
rewarded stimulus as often as they responded to the rewarded stimulus Post-
enrichment. This may be interpreted as an enhanced expectation of reward – an 
optimistic bias. Post-health-check, monkeys responded to the previously 
mentioned two probes significantly less often than they did Post-enrichment. This 
may be interpreted as a reduced expectation of reward – a pessimistic bias 
associated with depression. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as reflecting 
‘depressive realism’ (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) since monkeys still responded on 
at least half of the trials for either probe.  
 
A second interpretation is that monkeys were in a negative emotional state Post-
health-check and a less negative, or near-neutral, emotional state Post-enrichment. 
The physiological data indicated that monkeys were more physiologically aroused 
Post-health-check than they were Post-enrichment, but provide no indication of 
valence. In the attentional bias task presented in Chapter 4, monkeys 
demonstrated a vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention allocation to aggressive faces 
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when an aggressive-neutral face-pair was shown Post health-check. This is 
comparable to the vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention allocation to threatening 
versus non-threatening faces seen in anxious people (Rohner, 2002; Garner et al., 
2006). Post-enrichment, monkeys were equally fast to orient towards threatening 
faces, but were slower to disengage their gaze from these faces. This is compatible 
with vigilance theories of attention for threat whereby threatening stimuli both 
draw and hold attention in anxious people (Eastwood et al., 2003). Therefore early 
orienting to threatening versus non-threatening stimuli may be revealed in 
negative affect, but increased physiological arousal and/or negative affect may 
lead to faster disengagement of attention away from threatening stimuli once 
engaged. This influence of arousal on the time course of attentional bias in 
negative affect has not been tested in humans. However, it is interesting to note 
that phobics, who are characterized as having extreme anxiety with regards to 
certain classes of stimuli, are vigilant for phobia-related information (e.g. faster 
detection of snakes and spiders in an array of competing non-threatening stimuli: 
Öhman et al., 2001) and also demonstrate subsequent avoidance of phobia-related 
stimuli (Amir et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2002).  
 
A third interpretation is that the tests reveal nothing about valence of the affective 
states of the monkeys Post-enrichment versus Post-health and the data simply 
reveal differences in physiological arousal. However, this interpretation does not 
fit the data from any of the studies easily. In studies with humans, increased 
arousal speeds latency to respond on non-emotional cognitive tests (e.g. playing 
an auditory accessory stimulus prior to probe onset speeds latency to respond to 
probes: Jepma et al., 2009), but there is no evidence increased physiological 
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arousal alone can account for differential responses to stimuli of different valence. 
For example, startle probe studies have revealed that looking at highly arousing 
positive pictures attenuates the startle response in humans, while looking at highly 
arousing negative pictures potentiates this response. However, looking at low 
arousal positive and negative stimuli both lead to an attenuated startle response 
(Cuthbert et al., 1996). Further, it is not clear whether attentional bias in humans 
reflects automatic capture of attention by threatening stimuli as proposed in the 
threat-specificity hypothesis (e.g. Bradley et al., 2000) or automatic capture of 
attention by arousing salient (emotional) stimuli in general, as proposed by 
theories of general emotionality effects (e.g. Mogg et al., 2000).  
 
In Chapter 4, there was no overall difference in speed to orient gaze towards, or 
disengage gaze from, faces Post-enrichment versus Post-health-check when 
aggressive-neutral face pairs were shown. If arousal was the primary factor 
underlying the results it would be expected that overall speed to gaze towards and 
away from stimuli would vary between the two treatment conditions. Monkeys 
gazed towards aggressive faces for more time Post-enrichment and towards 
neutral faces for more time Post-health-check, but there was no difference in total 
time spent looking towards faces overall between the two treatment conditions. 
Given that arousal typically influences speed to respond, while affective state 
influences type of response (e.g. engagement versus disengagement), these data 
are difficult to reconcile with an arousal-only interpretation.  
 
In the emotion evaluation task presented in Chapter 5, arousal effects had a 
significant impact on speed to respond on control trials. Monkeys were faster to 
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respond to a grey square when it was presented on the screen in order to gain a 
pellet Post-health-check than they were Post-enrichment. This is compatible with 
an arousal-related speeding of responses to non-emotional stimuli seen in humans 
(Jepma et al., 2009). This study demonstrated the importance of considering both 
arousal and valence together in tests of cognition-emotion interaction.  
 
Finally, in the judgement bias task presented in Chapter 6 monkeys made more 
responses Post-enrichment than they did Post-health-check, but there was no 
difference in speed to respond between the tow treatments. If responses on the 
judgement bias task reflected physiological arousal alone, then the speeding of 
responses to non-emotional stimuli (as revealed on control trials in the emotion 
evaluation task discussed previously) would have resulted in the opposite pattern: 
faster, and possibly more, responses Post-health-check than Post-enrichment. 
 
In summary, the data from the three cognitive studies, together with the 
behavioural and physiological data, suggest that monkeys were in a more negative 
affective state Post-health-check than they were Post-enrichment. The data raise 
interesting questions regarding the cognitive profiles expressed by monkeys 
following two different treatments (a health-check and a week of enrichment). 
There were parallels with the patterns of attentional, emotion evaluation and 
judgement biases seen in humans, and judgement biases in animals. The studies 
also raised important issues regarding controlling for physiological arousal when 
measuring latencies to respond following different treatments. It was not possible 
to distinguish negative affect from positive affect, although there was strong 
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evidence that Post-enrichment monkeys were in a less negative (more positive) 
affective state than they were Post-health-check. 
 
 
7.4. Conclusion on the utility of cognitive measures of emotion 
in rhesus macaques  
The cognitive laboratory used in this research was established for the purposes of 
the studies presented in this thesis. The monkeys used in the study had never 
taken part in any form of cognitive experiment previously. From the beginning of 
establishing the laboratory to the end of the cognitive testing took approximately 
two years. The first year was spent raising money, researching and acquiring 
equipment and piloting the use of stimuli and touchscreens. The second year was 
spent setting up the laboratory at the Caribbean Primate Research Centre, training 
the monkeys and running the cognitive experiments. The laboratory and 
procedures were successful in many aspects of measuring cognition in rhesus 
macaques which I have discussed above. Therefore, within a two-year time frame 
it is possible to establish a cognitive laboratory with rhesus macaques trained to 
respond to stimuli on a touch-screen using a range of experimental paradigms. 
 
The methods developed in this thesis provide valuable data which should inform 
both the design and direction of future studies of cognition-emotion interactions in 
animals, and also discussion of the implications of these measures for animal 
psychological wellbeing. Each of the three cognitive studies presented represents 
the first development of a method to measure the aspect of cognition-emotion 
interaction of interest in a species of primate. Therefore, each method requires 
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replication and refinement, as discussed. The studies demonstrate that assessment 
of primate emotions, and understanding of primate and other animal 
psychological wellbeing, may be reliably achieved through the development of 
measures of cognitive bias, such as those presented here. Importantly, while 
cognitive bias measures have been discussed here as a measure of emotion state, 
an interesting future direction is to consider the use of cognitive bias as a measure 
of vulnerability to psychological distress. Given the reliability of cognitive bias as 
a predictive factor for experienced psychological distress in humans, methods that 
address cognitive bias in animals may provide new insights to the potential for 
non-human species to experience distress. This, undoubtedly, must be the greatest 
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Detailed methodological sections and data not presented in 
Chapter 3 
 
3.1. Full protocol for collection of faecal samples from captive Macaca 
mulatta. 
3.2. Full protocol for the extraction of hormone metabolites from frozen 
faecal samples collected from M. mulatta. 
3.3. Full protocol for the recovery of radiolabel from M. mulatta faeces  
3.4. Materials and reagents for the 5β-Androstan-3α,11β-diol-17-one 
enzymeimmunoassay 
3.5. Full protocol for the 5β-Androstan-3α,11β-diol-17-one 
enzymeimmunoassay 
3.6. Protocol for running dilution plates 
3.7. Protocol for calculating intra-assay variability 
3.8. Additional behavioural data not shown in Chapter 3, Part B.  
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3.1. Protocol for faecal sample collection  
On each day of collection a clean sheet of corrugated cardboard was placed under 
each animal’s single cage at 6am, immediately following cage cleaning. I 
inspected the cage floor and the cardboard for faecal matter throughout each day 
at 10-30 minute intervals. Where faecal matter was present I removed the whole 
bolus, using a clean glass rod, onto a clean sheet of paper. If the sample was solid 
it was kept for analysis. Loose stools or diarrhoeic samples were disposed of as 
biohazard waste. Loose stools may indicate a reduced gut-passage time, affecting 
the time for absorption of fGCMs and therefore provide unreliable data.  
 
Samples were examined for contamination (urine, water, food or any other non-
faecal substrate which might affect [fGCM], or dried bolus weight). Contaminated 
samples were disposed of as biohazard waste. For accepted samples, a thumb-nail 
sized piece (~2g wet weight) of the bolus was separated and homogenised using 
the glass rod. All larger undigested matter (hair and other material that may affect 
dried sample weight) was removed and the homogenised sample placed in a 30ml 
screw top centrifuge tube (Sarstedt
TM
). Two Toughtag® labels were attached to 
each tube: one marked in pencil and a second in marker pen. A third label was 
attached to the tube lid. Tubes were labeled with animal ID, date, time, and 
sample number. Tubes were sealed with parafilm to prevent leakage during 
storage and transport, and placed in a freezer at -20
0
C within 10 minutes of 
collection. 
 
Following sample collection, all remaining faecal matter was removed from the 
cage floor. Any cardboard which had come into contact with faeces or urine was 
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replaced with a new sheet. The glass rod was cleaned with water and wiped dry 
with a clean paper towel. All disposable items that had come into contact with 
urine or faeces were disposed of as biohazard waste. 
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3.2. Full protocol for the extraction of hormone metabolites from 
frozen Macaca mulatta faecal samples  
 
Collection tubes containing frozen faecal samples were removed from the freezer 
and allowed to defrost for 5-10 minutes, or until the faecal matter had thawed 
enough to allow thorough homogenisation.  
A 10ml syringe was used to dispense 7.5ml of 70% ethanol into each collection 
tube and a glass rod was used to mash the faeces to produce a faecal suspension. 
Collection tubes containing the faecal suspension were then covered with parafilm 
and stored in a fridge for 48 hours before further handling to reduce pathogen load 
to a minimal level.  
On each day of extraction, 50-100 conical-based graduated centrifuge tubes 
(30ml) were labelled with numbered stickers on the tube and lid. For each sample 
collected, two sets of centrifuge tubes were labelled: Set A and Set B. 
Each labelled Set A tube was weighed (without lid) on a calibrated Sartorius 
BL60S scale and the tube weight recorded (g to 3 decimal places, i.e. 0.001g). 
Samples were processed in batches of eight (the capacity of the centrifuge). 
Eight collection tubes containing faeces in ethanol were removed from the fridge. 
For each tube, the faecal suspension was poured carefully into each sample’s 
corresponding pre-weighed and labelled centrifuge tube A. Any remaining 
compacted faecal matter in the collection tube was re-mashed in a small amount 
of methanol dispensed using a pasteur pipette. The remaining matter was poured 
into the centrifuge tube so that all faecal matter was transferred. A small amount 
of methanol was then used to rinse any remaining faeces off the rod into the 
centrifuge tube, ensuring that all faecal matter was transferred. 
 402
Set A centrifuge tubes were then shaken on a VWR VX2500 multi-tube vortexer 
for 15 minutes. Samples were checked after 30 seconds to ensure all faecal matter 
was suspended in the ethanol, and that maximal extraction could therefore occur. 
The Set A centrifuge tubes were removed from the shaker. Any faecal matter 
remaining on the sides of the tube above the meniscus were dislodged using a 
small amount of 80% methanol dispensed from a pasteur pipette. 
Set A tubes were then centrifuged on a Heraeus Labofuge 400R at 4500rpm for 
12 minutes. 
After centrifuging, the Set A tubes were inspected. Any faecal matter remaining 
on the sides of the tube, above the meniscus, was dislodged with a further small 
amount of methanol and the suspensions again centrifuged at the same setting for 
a further 12 minutes.  
On removal from the centrifuge, the supernatant from each sample was poured 
into the corresponding Set B centrifuge tube. Care was taken to transfer as much 
of the liquid as possible (containing the suspended hormone) while not 
transferring any faecal matter into tube B.  
7.5ml of methanol were then dispensed into the Set A centrifuge tube. The pellet 
was again homogenised using the glass rod and steps 8-12 repeated. 
Supernatant from the second extraction phase was poured into centrifuge tube B 
containing the supernatant from the first extraction step. This resulted in two 
centrifuge tubes for each sample: tube A containing the faecal pellet, and tube B 
containing hormone suspended in 50:50 ethanol-methanol mix (>15ml).  
Set B centrifuge tubes containing supernatant were capped, sealed with parafilm 






Protocol for measuring faecal weight: 
 
The pre-weighed tubes (Set A: see Appendix GM1) containing the faeces were 
placed in a Griffin 1/200 drying oven at 40
0
C for 24 hours.  
After 24 hours tubes were removed individually and weighed without lids. 
Samples were weighed after a further 24 hours drying time, and reweighed until 
the dry weight stabilised over three consecutive weighing sessions.  
The final weight (g to 3dp) of the dried faeces in tube A was recorded.  
The original weight of the empty tube A was subtracted from this value to provide 
the calculated dry faecal weight. 
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3.3. Full protocol for the recovery of radiolabel from M. mulatta 
faeces  
All procedures were conducted at the Roehampton radio-lab under the technical 
guidance and supervision of Professor Ann MacLarnon, Professor Jolanta Opacka 
Juffry and Mr Balbir Josen. 
 
A Working dilution of [6, 7, -
3
H] Oestradiol was prepared (by Mr BJ) and 
dispensed at 50µl into each of eight faecal collection tubes containing faeces in 
10ml ethanol. 
The extraction procedure was performed as given in Appendix 3.2. 
The final volume of dosed supernatant in each of the centrifuge tubes after 
extraction was noted. 
A 50µl volume from the dosed supernatant was dispensed into a scintillation vial, 
and 5ml of scintillation cocktail added.  
Step 4 was repeated. Duplicates were labelled #a and #b.   
For the Total Count control a 50µl volume of working dilution radiation was 
dispensed into a scintillation vial, and 5ml of scintillation cocktail was added.  
For the Background control, 5ml of scintillation cocktail was dispensed into a 
scintillation vial. 
The Scintillation counter was used to count the samples, providing an initial count 
for each of samples #a and #b, a mean count of #a and #b, a total count, and a 
background count. 
The percentage recovery was calculated. 
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3.4. Materials and reagents for the 5β-Androstan-3α,11β-diol-17-
one enzymeimmunoassay 
 
EIA Assay Antibody Used For Coating 
5β-Androstan-
3α,11β-diol-17-one 
Anti- Sheep IgG (whole molecule), developed in Rabbit 
Sigma Product No: S1265 
Preciptin analysis: 
1ml of antiserum contains 1.8 – 2.5mg of specific antibody. 
 
1) The Sigma Product No: S1265 ‘Anti- Sheep IgG (whole molecule), developed 
in Rabbit’ antibody solution may be stored frozen in working aliquots. 
2) Repeated freezing and thawing is not recommended. 




Carbonate Coating Buffer, pH 9.6 (Store at 4°C for up to 6 months) 
For 0.5 Litre: 
0.75g Na2CO3 (Sodium Carbonate anhydrous – BDH 102404H) 
1.46g NaHCO3 (Sodium Hydrogen Carbonate – BDH 102474V) 
Dissolve in 0.5 Litre of distilled water, and adjust to pH 9.6 with HCL or NaOH. 
 
Stock Assay Buffer   (Store at 4° C for up to 1 month) 
For 0.5 Litre: 
2.98g Na2HPO4 (di-Sodium Hydrogen Orthophosphate, anhydrous –BDH 
102494C) 
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4.25g NaCl (Sodium Chloride – BDH 102415K) 
Dissolve in 0.5 Litre distilled water.  This buffer has an approximate pH of 9. 
 
Assay Buffer / 0.3% BSA, pH 7.2 (can keep for 1 week stored at room 
temperature) 
For 100ml: 
100ml stock assay buffer 
0.3g BSA (Albumin, Bovine, Fraction V Sigma A4503) 
Adjust the pH from approximately 8.7 to 7.2, using HCl. 
  
Assay Buffer / 0.1% BSA, pH 7.2 (can keep for 1 week stored at room 
temperature) 
For 100ml: 
100ml stock assay buffer 
0.1g BSA (Albumin, Bovine, Fraction V Sigma A4503) 
Adjust the pH from approximately 8.7 to 7.2, using HCl. 
 
Stock Phosphate Buffered Saline (x25), pH 7.2 (Store at 4°C for up to six weeks) 
For 400ml: 
79.49g NaCl (Sodium Chloride – BDH 102415K) 
11.49g Na2HPO4 (di -Sodium Hydrogen Orthophosphate, anhy. –BDH 102494C) 
2.0g KCl (Potassium Chloride – BDH 101984L) 
2.0g KH2PO4 (Potassium Dihydrogen Orthophosphate – BDH 102034B) 
 Dissolve in 400ml of distilled water, and adjust to pH 7.2 with HCl or NaOH 
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Washing Solution – PBST (Store at 4°C for up to 1 week) 
For 1 Litre: 
40ml Stock PBS (x25) 
500µl Tween 20 (0.05%w/v) [Polyoxyethylene (20) sorbitan monolaurate] –
Sigma Aldrich 437082Q  
Add both solutions to a volumetric, and make up to1 Litre with distilled water. 
 
TMB Stock Solution (Store at room temp. in the dark for up to 1 week) 
For 10ml: 
Dissolve 125 mg of TMB (3, 3’, 5, 5’-Tetramethylbenzidine –Sigma Aldrich T 
2885) in 10ml of DMSO (Dimethyl Sulfoxide –Sigma Aldrich 154938).  Store in 
a 30ml polyethylene amber bottle (VWR cat. no. 215-7544). 
 
Stock Substrate Buffer (X5), pH 3.8 (Store at 4°C for up to six months) 
For 250ml: 
11.875g C6H8O7•H2O  Citric Acid (BDH-100813M) 




Hydrogen Peroxide Urea (Sigma U1753) 
 
Dissolve in 250ml of dissolved water, and adjust to pH 3.8 with HCl or NaOH. 
 
Working Substrate Buffer solution, pH 3.8 (make fresh, store for 1 week at room 
temp.) 
For 100ml: 
20ml Stock Substrate Buffer 
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80ml Distilled water 
Adjust pH to 3.8 if required. 
 
TMB / Working Substrate Buffer Solution (make fresh, store for 1 week at room 
temp) 
For 1 plate add the following into a glass beaker: 
17 ml of working substrate buffer 
250µl stock TMB solution 
Once made, the beaker must be kept in the dark. 
 
2M H2SO4 - This is used to stop the assay reaction. 
 
Streptavidin-Peroxidase (Store for up to 1 year at -18°C) 
From Streptomyces avidini lyophilized powder, 80 – 150 units/mg protein.  Unit 
definition: one streptavidin unit will bind 1µg biotin. 
For 2000ng/20µl (0.1mg/1000µl): 
Dissolve 1mg of streptavidin-peroxidase (Sigma S5512) in 10ml of distilled water 
and vortex.   
Dispense 1ml aliquots into nine 1.7ml eppendorf tubes.   
Dispense the remainder as 20µl (2000ng/20µl) aliquots into 1.5ml eppendorfs.  
Date, label and store these aliquots in the freezer at -18°C.  When stocks are low, 
the1ml aliquots can be thawed and dispensed into fifty 20µl volumes.  One 
eppendorph containing 20µl is sufficient for one plate.  This will need a further 




Preparation of Stock Standard from the Vendor 
 
PdG  
A 5mg vial of 5β-Pregnane-3α, 20-α-diol-glucuronide is bought from Sigma (Cat. 
no. P3635).  An initial concentration of 1000µg/ml (1000, 000, 000pg /1000µl) is 
prepared in ethanol.  The stock standard is to be prepared from this at 
16,000pg/50µl:  
16000pg/50µl = 320,000pg/1000µl = 0.320µg/1000µl 
 




PdG Added Diluent Added Final 
Dilution 
a) 100µg/ml 100µl of initial concentration 
(1000µg/ml)  
 
900µl ethanol 1/10 
b) 10µg/ml 100µl of  (a) 
 
900µl ethanol 1/10 
c) 1µg/ml 400µl of  (b) 
 
3600µl ethanol 1/10 
d) 0.320µg/ml 
 





PdG at a concentration of 0.320µg/ml was dispensed at 150µl volumes into 
yellow eppendorf tubes and stored in freezer at temperature of -20°C.  A volume 
of 1ml was dispensed into white eppendorf tubes and stored in freezer at -20°C.   
 
The QCH and QCL samples are prepared from the 1µg/ml dilution shown in the 
table above at 0.004µg/ml (200pg/50µl) and 0.001µg/ml (50pg/50µl).  This would 
be a dilution of 1/250 and 1/1000 respectively in assay buffer.  QCH was 
dispensed at a volume of 250µl into pink eppendorf tubes, whilst QCL was 
dispensed likewise into blue eppendorf tubes.  They were then stored in the 
freezer at -20°C.    
 
Coating- This Takes 3 Days 
Day 1 
Thaw out working aliquot of IgG (assuming concentration to be 2.5mg/ml) from 
freezer. 
Dose coating buffer with the antibody at 1µg/150µl. 
Table A3.1. illustrates how much antibody should be added to the coating buffer, 
for Corning (Costar 3590) 96 well EIA/RIA Clear Flat Bottom Polystyrene High 
Bind Microplate(s) (Fisher Cat. No. DPS-110-080G) at 150µl volumes/well. 
The mixture is dispensed using eppendorf Research Pro 1200 (8 channel, 50-
1200µl). 
The coated plate(s) are covered with clingfilm, and left overnight at 4°C. 




Table A.3.1. Table for calculation of coating buffer: antibody ratios. 
 
No. of 96 Well Microtitre Plates to Be Prepared at 150µl/well 
Coating Buffer 
Required 
1 2 3 4 5 10 
15ml 30ml 45ml 60ml 75ml 150ml 
[Required] 1µg/150µl 1µg/150µl 1µg/150µl 1µg/150µl 1µg/150µl 1µg/150µl 
[mg/ml] 0.1mg/15ml 0.2mg/30ml 0.3mg/45ml 0.4mg/60ml 0.5mg/75ml 1mg/150ml 

















Remove coated microtitre plate(s) from fridge, and pour off the IgG solution. 
Bang the plate(s) dry with some paper towel on the bench.  
Dispense 300µl of Assay Buffer / 0.3% BSA into each well. 
Cover the plate(s) with clingfilm and store in the fridge, overnight at 4°C. 
 
Day 3 
Remove the plate(s) from the fridge. 
Pour off the Assay Buffer / 0.3% BSA. 
Bang the plate(s) dry with some paper towel on the bench. 
Cover the plate(s) with clingfilm, and store at -20°C. 
 
 
Addition of Reagents / Samples - This takes 2 days 
Day 1 
The following are removed from the fridge or -20°C freezer and then defrosted or 
brought to room temperature: 
-Stock P.B.S (x25), if needed 
-Assay buffer / 0.1%B.S.A 
-Plate(s) coated with unspecific antibody (Sigma R9754) 
-Aliquoted steroid-specific antibody (glass vial) 
-Aliquoted biotin labelled steroid (glass vial) 
-Standard (yellow eppendorf tube, PdG @ 16000pg/50µl)) 
-Quality Control High (pink eppendorf tube, PdG @ 200pg/50µl) 
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-Quality Control Low (blue eppendorf tube, PdG @ 50pg/50µl) 
-Test sample(s) 
 
The following reagents are prepared: 
a) Dilution of Standard (yellow eppendorf tube) 
The PdG standard curve is made up using assay buffer / 0.1% B.S.A as the 
diluent.  It is prepared at the following concentrations: 1600, 800, 400, 200, 100, 
50, 25, 12.5 and 6.25 pg / 50µl.  Each dilution will be dispensed in duplicate. 
 
b) Test Sample 
The test sample is prepared at dilutions such as 1/5, 1/10, 1/20, 1/40 and 1/80 
using assay buffer / 0.1% B.S.A as the diluent.  Each dilution will be dispensed in 
duplicate. 
 
c) Biotin Labelled Steroid (glass vial) 
The glass vial containing aliquoted biotin labeled steroid is opened, and the 
appropriate amount of assay buffer / 0.1% B.S.A added.  The vial is gently 
agitated to ensure proper mixing.  Using the EDOS 5222, and a 5ml Combitip 
plus, the biotin labeled steroid will be dispensed into all the wells of the microtitre 
plate. 
 
d) Steroid Specific Antibody (glass vial) 
The glass vial containing aliquoted steroid specific antibody is opened, and the 
appropriate amount of assay buffer / 0.1% B.S.A added.   
The vial is gently agitated to ensure proper mixing.   
 414
Using the EDOS 5222, and a 5ml Combitip plus, the steroid specific antibody will 
be dispensed into most of the wells of the microtitre plate. 
The plate(s) are washed 4 times in plate washer with PBST and then dried by 
banging on a paper towel.   
The reagents prepared above are pipetted into the microtitre plate(s) as shown in 
Table A3.2. below: 
 
Table A.3.2. The order in which reagents are added, and the quantities 



















Blank 100µl ------ ------ 50µl ------ 
Zero 50µl ----- ------ 50µl 50µl 
Standard ------ 50µl ------ 50µl 50µl 
Test Sample ------ ------ 50µl 50µl 50µl 
Quality 
Control 




The microtitre plate is sealed with cling film, and the reagents mixed through 
circular movements on the bench top.  It is then incubated overnight (12<20 
hours) in the fridge at 4°C. 
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Quick Reference Guide to Use of the EDOS 5222: 
Turn on the EDOS by pressing the ON / OFF key located on the main body. 
A menu showing <Single Dispense> as the default is shown on the display. 
Insert the appropriate dispenser attachment into the arm of the EDOS (see Table 
A.3.3.). 
The sensor in the arm of the EDOS will automatically know which attachment has 
been inserted into it. 
 
Table A.3.3. Reagants, dispenser attachments and volumes dispensed using 
the EDOS.  
Liquid Dispensed 
 
Dispenser Attachment Used Volume 
Dispensed 
Biotin Labelled Steroid 5ml Combitip Plus 50µl 
Steroid Specific Rabbit 
Antibody 
5ml Combitip Plus 50µl 
Streptavidin-Peroxidase 10ml Combitip Plus 150µl 
TMB / Working Substrate 
Buffer 
Eppendorf Research Pro 
1200 
150µl 





Press ENTER key on the main body. 
To adjust the volume dispensed, press the solid black, , , or  key on the 
main body. 
Place the attachment into the vial containing the liquid to be dispensed. 
 416
Press the R key on the arm of the EDOS once to Re-set. 
Press the hollow black key once to take the liquid into the attachment.  It will 
automatically stop filling when full. 
Press the hollow black key once to get rid of any bubbles.  To dispense the 
liquid, press the down arrow on each occasion. 
When finished, press the R key again to re-set. 
To eject the attachment out of the EDOS arm, press the solid black  key with a 
horizontal bar above it. 
Day 2 
Make sure the following reagents (see page 3) are made up: 
-TMB Stock Solution 
-Stock Substrate Buffer (X5), pH 3.8  
-Working Substrate Buffer Solution, pH 3.8 
 
Remove the following from fridge/freezer until they reach room temperature: 
-Assay plate left overnight 
-Eppendorf tube containing 2000ng / 20µl Streptavidin – Peroxidase  
-Assay buffer / 0.1% B.S.A, pH 7.2 
 
Wash the plate 4 times in plate washer with PBST and bang dry. 
 
Aliquot 20µl of Streptavidin-Peroxidase from 1.5ml ependorf tube into a beaker 
containing 16ml of assay buffer / 0.1%B.S.A.  Rinse the tube with assay buffer 
several times.  Using the EDOS 5222, dispense 150µl into each well.  Seal the 
plate with clingfilm and shake for 30 minutes at room temperature. 
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Prepare TMB / Working Substrate Buffer solution.  
  
Wash plate 4 times in plate washer with PBST and bang dry.  Using the eppendorf 
Research Pro 1200, dispense 150µl of TMB / Working Substrate Buffer solution.  
Seal plate with clingfilm and shake at room temperature in the dark for about 45 
minutes.  Make sure to check colour formation after 10 minutes (zero should be 
the darkest blue). 
 
To stop the reaction, use the eppendorf Research Pro 1200 to dispense 150µl of 
2M H2SO4 and read the extinction on the plate reader at 450nm (reference filter 
630nm). 
 
The calculation of concentrations based on the optical density is done by the 
Ascent Software. 
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3.5. Full protocol for the 5β-Androstan-3α,11β-diol-17-one 
enzymeimmunoassay 
 
Preparing the EIA (Day 1): 
1. An assay plate, antibody solution and antigen solution were removed from 
the freezer and allowed to thaw away from any light source for 15 
minutes. 
2. The serially double-diluted standard curve solution was prepared from the 
stock solution (12500pg/50µl).  
3. Faecal sample extracts were prepared at a 1/80 dilution.  
4. The microtiter plate was washed 4 times with PBS washing buffer using 
the Wellwash 4MK2 (Thermo Labsystems) plate-washer. The plate was 
dried by shaking and banging on blotting on paper. 
5. Assay buffer was dispensed into the duplicate Blank (100µl buffer in each 
of wells A1 and A2) and Zero-standard (50µl buffer in each of wells B1 
and B2) wells (Figure A3.1).   
 
Figure A3.1: The layout of the 96-well microtitre plate as used for measuring 
the concentration of [fGCM] in the samples used in the analyses presented in 
the thesis. All wells were designated in duplicate as described in the text. 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
A Blank Blank S1 S1 S6 S6 S14 S14 S20 S20 S26 S26 
B Zero Zero S2 S2 S7 S7 S15 S15 S21 S21 S27 S27 
C 0.6 0.6 39 39 S8 S8 QCH1 QCH1 S22 S22 S28 S28 
D 1.21 1.21 78 78 S9 S9 QCL1 QCL1 S23 S23 S29 S29 
E 2.43 2.43 156 156 S10 S10 S16 S16 S24 S24 S30 S30 
F 4.87 4.87 S3 S3 S11 S11 S17 S17 QCH2 QCH2 S31 S31 
G 9.75 9.75 S4 S4 S12 S12 S18 S18 QCL2 QCL2 S32 S32 
H 19.5 19.5 S5 S5 S13 S13 S19 S19 S25 S25 S33 S33 
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6. Standard curve solutions (0.6-156pg/50µl), sample dilutions (33 diluted 
sample hormone-metabolite extracts, 50µl) and quality controls (one of 
[high]: QCH; and one of [low]: QCL, 50µl) were pipetted into the 
designated wells of the microtiter plate.  
7. Assay buffer (6ml) was added to 25µl biotin-labelled antigen in a glass 
vial with screw-tight lid and inverted gently to mix. 
8. 50µl of biotin-labelled antigen solution was dispensed into every well.  
9. Assay buffer (6ml) was added to 21µl antibody in a glass vial with screw-
tight lid and inverted gently to mix. 
10. 50µl of antibody solution was dispensed into all wells EXCEPT the Blank. 
11. The plate was covered with clingfilm and placed on a plate shaker for five 
minutes to mix reagents.  




Continuation of EIA (Day 2): 
1. The plate was removed from the fridge and allowed to warm to room 
temperature for five minutes.  
2. The assay plate was washed four times with PBS washing buffer and 
blotted dry as before. 
3. An aliquot of 20µl streptavidin-horseradish peroxidise was diluted in 20ml 
assay buffer in a glass beaker. The beaker was covered with parafilm and 
inverted several times to mix the solution. 150µl of the streptavidin-
horseradish peroxidase solution was dispensed into all wells. 
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4. The plate was sealed with clingfilm and incubated for 30 minutes on the 
shaker at room temperature and in the dark. 
5. After 30 minutes, the plate was washed 4 times with PBS washing buffer 
and blotted dry. 
6. 295µl TMB stock solution was added to 20ml working substrate buffer in 
a glass beaker. This was covered with parafilm and inverted several times 
to mix the contents. The solute was kept out of the light since TMB is light 
reactive. 
7. 150µl substrate solution was dispensed into every well. 
8. The plate was immediately sealed with clingfilm and incubated on the 
shaker, at room temperature and in the dark, for 30-60 minutes.  
9. The plate was checked after five minutes for appearance of blue colour in 
the wells. This indicates a reaction is occurring and the plate is developing. 
10. The plate was checked again after 30 minutes and at regular intervals to 
monitor development. 
11. Adequate plate development was assessed by eye. Zero-standards develop 
a darker blue colour (OD = 1). Low concentration standards show weaker 
colour development (OD <<1). A gradient of colour change will be visible 
throughout the standard curve (wells containing low concentrations of the 
stock standard solution will appear dark blue and wells containing high 
concentrations of the stock standard solution will appear pale blue). 
12. Once colour development was complete the enzyme reaction was stopped 
by adding 50µl 2M H2SO4 to every well. 
13. The optical densities of each well in the plate were measured using a 
Multiskan Ascent (Thermo Labsystems) plate photometer at a wavelength 
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of 450nm. This system provided data on the OD of every well on the plate, 
and was used to construct a standard curve for the serial standard dilutions, 
based on a four-parameter logistic (sigmoidal) function. 
14. The linear range of the standard curve was used to determine appropriate 
sample dilutions (only ODs within the linear range of the standard curve 
were accepted), and sample hormone metabolite concentrations. 
 
The criteria for acceptance of an assay plate as reliable were: 
 
The Blank must measure <0.1nm OD. The Blank provides a measure of 
background reactivity, and should be close to zero. A high blank value 
indicates an unacceptable level of background noise, possibly due to 
contamination. 
The Zero must fall within an OD range 0.5 < 1.5nm. An optimal value for the 
Zero is 1.00nm. A value below 0.5nm indicates the plate has not developed 
sufficiently (e.g. due to incomplete binding during the final substrate stage). A 
value above 1.5nm indicates the plate has over-developed (e.g. the plate was 
left to incubate for too long during the final substrate phase, or the reaction 
was not stopped fully.)  
The standard curve requires a correlation coefficient (r) close to 1, indicating it 
is close to the appropriate four parameter function. This provides a measure of 
the linear function of the serial dilutions of the standard. If the serial dilutions 
of the standard are poor then the values against which the samples are 
calibrated will be inaccurate, leading to unreliable data on hormone 
concentration of the samples.  
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A plate should contain no more than five poor duplicates. A poor duplicate is 
defined as one where the difference of the two OD values for a duplicate is 
greater than 10%. Poor duplicates reflect overall plate quality, and may be due 
to a number of factors. Multiple poor duplicates indicate poor reliability across 
the plate. Poor duplicates for the standard will provide an unreliable standard 
curve against which to compare sample values. A plate may be rejected if 
there is ≥1 poor duplicate in the standard curve.   
The Coefficient of variation (Cv) between the two sets of QCH and two sets of 
QCL readings on a plate should be less than 10%. A Cv above 10% for either 
of the QCH or QCL indicates readings across a plate are not comparable. Post 
hoc to completion of all plates, QCH and QCL values are assessed for inter-
assay variation. QCH and QCL values should each fall with 2SD of the mean 
inter-assay variation. QC values outside of 2SD of the mean inter-assay 
variation indicate that all readings from that plate are unlikely to be 
comparable with values measured on other plates. Once all plates have been 
run, plates for which the QCH or QCL fall outside of 2SD of the mean for all 
plates should be rerun, until all plates fall with 2SD of the mean.  
 
Where a plate failed to reach these criteria it was discarded and a repeat plate 
prepared. Where a plate met all of the above criteria but there were some (≤5) 
poor duplicates, only the samples for which duplicates were poor were 
repeated on the next plate.  In addition, samples for which the OD fell outside 
the linear range were tested again, at the same dilution factor for samples that 
fell outside, yet close to, the limits of the linear range, or at an adjusted 
dilution factor for samples that fell far outside the linear range. 
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3.6. Protocol for running dilution plates 
 
Two microtitre plates, each containing serial dilutions of five samples, were used 
to determine an appropriate dilution factor for samples of both high and low 
[fGCM], and to assess degree of parallelism. The layout of the microtitre plates is 
shown in figure A3.2.  
 
Samples were selected to provide [fGCM]s that were likely to be at the higher and 
lower ends of the likely range of all samples to be analysed to ensure that a 
dilution factor most appropriate for the maximal number of samples was selected. 
The six samples were each serially diluted at five concentrations of 1/10, 1/20, 
1/40, 1/80 and 1/160 and dispensed onto a plate (Plate 1) following the scheme 
shown in Figure A5.1. The procedure was repeated using the same sample 
extracts on a second plate (Plate 2) with serial dilutions at 1/40, 1/80, 1/160, 1/320 
and 1/640.  For each plate the EIA was conducted as described in Appendix GM3.  
 
 
Figure A3.2. The layout of the 96-well microtitre plate used to determine the 
appropriate dilution factor for samples. 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
A Blank Blank S1 1/10 S2 1/10 S3 1/80 S4 1/160 S6 1/10 
B Zero Zero S1 1/20 S2 1/20 S3 1/160 S5 1/10 S6 1/20 
C 0.6 0.6 39 39 S2 1/40 QCH1 QCH1 S5 1/20 S6 1/40 
D 1.21 1.21 78 78 S2 1/80 QCL1 QCL1 S5 1/40 S6 1/80 
E 2.43 2.43 156 156 S2 1/160 S4 1/10 S5 1/80 S6 1/60 
F 4.87 4.87 S1 1/40 S3 1/10 S4 1/20 QCH2 QCH2   
G 9.75 9.75 S1 1/80 S3 1/20 S4 1/40 QCL2 QCL2   
H 19.5 19.5 S1 1/160 S3 1/40 S4 1/80 S5 1/160   
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Results from the inspection of optical density readings for the samples revealed 
that all samples fell within the linear range of the standard curve at a dilution of 
1/80, and most fell within the linear range at 1/40. Serial dilutions for five samples 
on the second of the two dilution plates performed (Plate 2), which contained 
sample dilutions between 1/10 and 1/160, provided three or more optical density 
readings that fell within the linear range of the standard curve. Regression lines 
for the serial dilutions of the five samples and the standard curve are shown in 
Figure A3.3.  
 
 
Figure A3.3: The optical density readings for the linear range of the standard 
(known concentrations between 39 – 2.43 pg/µl) and five extracts containing 
fGCM at dilutions between 1/10 and 1/160. Regression lines for each sample 
are shown. The regression line for the standard curve is shown in bold.  
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Concentration of standard (pg/ul)











The standard curve represents the standard against which sample readings are 
calibrated in calculation of their respective OD readings. Therefore, samples 
which fail to dilute in parallel to the standard will provide inaccurate data on 
fGCM levels. Degree of parallelism was more accurate between sample dilutions 
than between the samples and the standard. Since it was the comparison of values 
between testing conditions for each monkey, and not absolute [fGCM] that was of 
interest, care was taken to include all samples from a given individual on as few 
plates as possible and, where possible, to assay all samples at the same dilution for 
that individual. 
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3.7. Protocol for calculating intra-assay variability 
 
A series of six test plates were run to assess the level of intra-assay variability 
prior to conducting the EIA using the samples containing [fGCM]. Each test plate 
contained pairs of duplicate wells for each of the blank, zero, standard dilutions, 
QCHs and QCLs. Two samples of known high and low concentration (H and L) 
were pipetted, in duplicate, into the remaining wells as shown in Figure 3.4. The 
average concentration readings for the 17 pairs of H wells and the 16 pairs of L 
wells were used to calculate the coefficients of variation for each. A 
predetermined level of 15% was set as the maximum cut-off for intra-assay 
reliability to be accepted. 
 
 
Figure A3.4. The layout of the 96-well microtitre plate as used for assessing 
the intra-assay reliability for samples of high and low concentration.  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
A Blank Blank H H L L H H L L H H 
B Zero Zero L L L L H H L L H H 
C 0.6 0.6 39 39 L L QCH1 QCH1 L L H H 
D 1.21 1.21 78 78 L L QCL1 QCL1 L L H H 
E 2.43 2.43 156 156 L L H H L L H H 
F 4.87 4.87 H H L L H H QCH2 QCH2 H H 
G 9.75 9.75 L L L L H H QCL2 QCL2 H H 
H 19.5 19.5 H H L L H H L L H H 
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Appendix 4 
Face stimuli used to study Attentional Bias (Chapter 4) 
Set 1 
Neutral and aggressive faces





Neutral and aggressive faces






Additional information for emotion evaluation and response 
slowing (Chapter 5) 
 
5.1. Face probes 
 
5.2. Distribution of invalid trials 
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5.2. Distribution of invalid trials 
Table A.5.1. The distribution of invalid trials that were removed for each monkey  




































29C  -  -  1  -  6  - 
 
-  -  - 
 
-  -  - 
 
7 
C55  -  1  1  -  3  1  -  1  1  -  -  -  8 
16P  1  1  3  1  3  6  -  -  -  -  -  -  15 
AI73  2  2  -  1  -  1  3  11  9  1  7  3  40 
                           
                           
92R  8  14  15  9  20  19  -  -  -  -  -  -  85 
27S  2  3  1  4  7  3  1  -  -  1  1  -  23 
66S  3  6  3  -  11  11  3  1  -  -  -  1  39 
















6. 1 Table showing the dimensions of the stimuli and probes. 
 
6.2 Table showing individual data sets for proportion of responses made to 
stimuli of learned reward value (S+ and S-) and three ambiguous probes (P+, 
Pi and P-). 
 
6.3 Table showing the distribution of invalid trials. 
 
6. 4 Seven monkeys reached the training criterion for inclusion in the study. 
Three monkeys in Group 1 and four monkey in Group 2 learned to perform 
a ‘Go-NoGo’ task. Criteria were: correct responses on ≥80% of trials overall, 
with ≥70% accuracy for each of the ‘Go’ and ‘NoGo’ trials respectively, on 
three successive days of training. Six monkeys failed to meet these training 




6.1 Dimensions of the stimuli and probes 
 
Table A. 6. 1 The dimensions of the two control stimuli (short line and long 
line) and three experimental probes 
Stimulus/ 
Probe 
 Length   
(mm) 














 16  11  176 
 
 06.79  0.99  
            
Experimental 
Probe 1 
 22.5  11.5  259 
 
 09.21  0.99  
            
Experimental 
Probe 2 
 33  12  396 
 
 14.86  0.99  
            
Experimental 
Probe 3 
 49.5  12.5  594 
 
 25.45  0.99  
            
Control (long 
line) 
 70  13  910 
 
 37.83  0.99  
1 Luminosity value obtained from Adobe Histogram function 




6.2 Individual proportion data 




ID  Post-enrichment  Post-health-check 
 
  

































79S  0.90  0.94  0.72  0.33  0.13  0.94  0.78  0.83  0.33  0.17 
79T  0.97  0.94  0.83  0.72  0.22  0.86  0.94  0.83  0.33  0.07 
86O  0.86  1.00  0.89  0.50  0.18  0.85  0.94  0.72  0.44  0.21 
16P  0.85  0.89  1.00  0.50  0.28  0.79  0.72  0.67  0.44  0.35 
66S  0.86  0.83  0.89  0.17  0.31  0.86  0.67  0.67  0.28  0.26 
AI73  0.75  0.83  0.50  0.28  0.07  0.67  0.58  0.17  0.25  0.06 
X   0.85  0.88  0.79  0.37  0.18  0.73  0.65  0.55  0.29  0.16 
SE  ±0.03  ±0.04  ±0.06  ±0.08  ±0.04  ±0.09  ±0.12  ±0.13  ±0.06  ±0.05 
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6.3 Distribution of invalid trials 
Table A.6.3 The distribution of invalid trials removed from the analyses 












 S+ P1 P2 P3 S-  S+ P1 P2 P3 S- 
 
S+ P1 P2 P3 S-  S+ P1 P2 P3 S- 
 
 
94K  15 2 3 5 4  2 0 0 0 0 
 
2 1 3 5 57  16 6 5 6 24 
 
156 
79S  11 3 1 0 1  6 2 1 0 2 
 
7 1 5 12 63  4 4 3 12 60 
 
198 
79T  15 2 3 5 4  7 2 2 3 2 
 
2 1 3 5 57  10 1 3 12 67 
 
206 
             
 
           
 
 
86O  4 3 1 1 5  7 2 1 4 6 
 
10 0 2 9 59  11 1 5 10 57 
 
198 
16P  23 2 1 2 3  18 4 4 1 7 
 
22 4 3 11 56  21 7 8 12 49 
 
258 
66S  27 6 6 1 21  19 5 7 4 12 
 
10 3 2 15 50  9 5 6 13 53 
 
274 
AI73  2 0 1 0 1  0 0 0 0 0 
 


























 N daily training sessions 
to reach criterion [or 
cessation of training] 
 N daily training sessions 
performed at criterion 











C55 24.7  [5]  [0]  [42/54]*   
06H 9.9  [8]  [0]  [13/96]*   
94K 7.4  28  11  87/100   
92R 4.8  [27]  [0]  [50/42]*   
27S 4.6  [40]  [2]  [80/25]*   
79S 3.7  20  6  93/93   







       n=3 
Group 2 
 
29C 12.0  [4]  [0]  [0/100%]*   
94E 10.2  [1]  [0]  [0/100%]*   
86O 5.3  27  9  93/87   
16P 5.2  43  5  87/87   
66S 3.8  31  10  100/80   





       n = 4 
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